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I. Isocrates as writer of discourse 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the terminological 
studies in chapters II-IV and the commentary on Isocrates' Helen in 
chapter V. First, a general introduction to the central question of this 
dissertation will be offered, together with a summary of the scholarly 
work on Isocrates. Both general issues and the particular issue of his 
theorizing on rhetorical method will be addressed. The question of the 
character and intention of Isocrates' published discourses will also 
receive attention. Secondly, the corpus isocrateum as such will be placed 
in its broader context of Greek literary history. The consequences of the 
use of writing in the production and publication of literary works is part 
of this history. Finally, specific problems will be formulated to which 
the following chapters seek to provide answers. 
1. the status quaestionis 
Isocrates of Athens (435-338 ВС) belongs to the Canon of Attic 
Orators. In antiquity and in later periods, when rhetoric was a broadly 
respected and practiced discipline, his works were influential, both for 
their stylistic exemplariness and their moral content.' He became 
famous as a teacher and educator: his school with its educational 
programme based on rhetoric was highly successful, and his doctrines 
inspired later authors.2 For the most part his oeuvre consists of discourses 
of varied character, which have a common feature of content: in 
different ways they are all concerned with issues of "political life", i.e. 
the life of members of the πόλις-community. 
Scholarly research on Isocrates began in the latter half of the 19th 
century. Philologists were first and foremost interested in his 
importance as a rhetorical writer, and this interest resulted in studies of 
his style and mastery of formal rhetorical rules. Isocrates' place in the 
1
 See Hubbell (1913), Marrou (I960), 121-2 Isocrates was "l'éducateur de la Grèce du 
Г е siècle et, après elle, du monde hellénistique et romain", see also Finley (1975), 
esp 195-202 
2
 On Isocrates' school see Usher (1990), 7-10 with bibliography, a concept 
fundamental to his thinking was that of λόγος (the word as instrument of both 
internal and external human communication) as a civilizing force Ntc 5-9 (= 
Anita 253-258), followed by Cicero Inv 1,2,2-5, De trraL 1,8,32-3, QuinL IO 11,16,9 
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rhetorical tradition was addressed, and his relations with predecessors 
and other teachers of rhetoric became subjects of inquiry.3 Also in the 
19th century there was growing attention to the political tendency of 
Isocrates' published works and attempts were made to assess his 
influence from that perspective.4 
The interpretations by mostly German scholars were challenged 
by more critical approaches published in the last fifty years. Isocrates' 
political works were now seen as attempts to influence contemporary 
politics and as reflections of the views and ideals of a specific and 
identifiable group: the conservative bourgeois opposition in IVth century 
Athens. Thus his works came to be regarded as propagandiste and 
partisan, and his school was viewed as a training institution for 
conservative politicians.5 Furthermore, the content of his writings 
received more and more negative evaluation. He was presented as an 
author of little originality and lacking incentive for serious thought.6 
The publication in 1958 of Buchner's analysis of the Panegyricus 
marks a new approach in the scholarship on Isocrates. Büchner 
attempted to address the important issue of Isocrates' supposed 
inconsistency in his political inclinations. Jaeger had argued earlier that 
Isocrates proved himself to advocate Athenian imperialism in his 
discourses Panegyricus and Areopagiticus , but that he changed his mind 
as a result of the Social War and urged peace and the abandonment of 
the naval empire in his On the Peace. This interpretation was challenged 
by Büchner. He presents a new analysis of the Panegyricus and uses a 
method of interpretation that consists of a preliminary study of the 
particular features of the discourse's structure and composition as a 
necessary condition for establishing a balanced and informed analysis 
of the discourse itself. In doing so, he acknowledges the significance of 
formal elements for understanding a discourse's content. The necessity 
to do so was already emphasized by Isocrates himself. More than others 
before him, Büchner is aware that Isocrates produces in the Panegyricus a 
3
 See Blass (1892), 101-213; Norden (1958), 113-123; on Isocrates and his relations 
with contemporary philosophers see Eucken (1983) with extensive discussion and 
bibliography. 
4
 See Bringmann (1965), 13-19; Harding (1973), 137-138. 
5
 Bringmann (1965) is an example of such an approach; see also Jacoby (1949), 74, 
130; FGH 3b Suppl. 1, 87, 90; Jaeger (1940), 409-450. 
6
 See e.g. O. Murray in Boardman et al (1991), 272-273; an extremely critical view is 
expressed by Bavnes (1955). 
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work that consists of a mixture of rhetorical genera (epideictic and 
deliberative) and that its separate parts should be interpreted by taking 
into consideration the different generic rules and conventions. 
Furthermore, he was able to show by studying the relevant terminology 
of the Panegyricus that Isocrates' opinion on the Athenian naval empire 
is consistent, and that there was no political change of heart on his part. 
As he convincingly shows, Isocrates is careful to distinguish between 
αρχή and ηγεμονία, or between "empire" and "leadership". He dismisses 
the first as unsalutary for Athens, but advocates the latter as Athens' 
prerogative. The acknowledgment of this distinction solves the question 
of Isocrates' supposed inconsistent stand: it is now dear that he has not 
changed his views between the time of his Panegyricus and On the Peace . 
The importance of this change of approach was that Büchner 
fully concentrated on the intrinsic qualities and characteristics of 
Isocrates' discourse as a work of literary rhetoric. Similar to Buchner's 
approach are the contributions by Heilbrunn (1977) and Race (1978). 
Heilbrunn, in a reaction to Kennedy's interpretation of the Helen (1958), 
offers a detailed analysis of the proemium and convincingly shows that 
the discourse in its entirety cannot be described as a panhellenistic 
document. Rather, it is a piece of rhetorical writing in the encomiastic 
tradition. Although he does not pursue the potentialities of the 
encomium as serious writing, and therefore falls short in his 
interpretation, it is to Heilbrunn's credit that he takes full account of the 
discourse's complexities. Race points out the rhetorical sublety in 
hocrates' use of digression in the Panathenaicus . The excursus on 
Agamemnon is shown to have a dual function: it is both an epideictic 
encomium and constitutes a defensive forensic argument at the same 
time. By amplification of Spartan atrocities, Isocrates succeeds in 
diverting the attention from Athenian ones. 
For a long time Eucken (1983) offered the only modern 
monograph on Isocrates. It is surprising that this thorough study of the 
connections between Isocrates and his contemporary colleagues and 
rivals in the field of education, among whom was Plato, has received so 
little attention. Eucken dealt extensively with the struggle between 
Isocrates, Plato, and other contemporaries in the field of education over 
the principles to be preferred. In order to describe each of the opponents' 
positions, Eucken analyzed with precision the relevant works by these 
I. Written Discourse 4 
authors and endeavoured to reconstruct the altercations between them. 
Without detracting from the merits of this publication on other points (of 
which the establishment of Isocrates as participant in the philosophical 
debate of his time stands out as most important), one can refer to a 
specific shortcoming: in dealing with the Isocratean source material, 
Eucken never showed himself concerned with the problems they can 
provide, being rhetorically composed works of literature. In the words of 
reviewer Hudson-Williams (1985), it would have been better "if 
(Eucken) hade made a more general study of Isocrates' method of 
composition". 
Hudson-Williams was not the first to point to that particular 
deficiency in the scholarship on Isocrates. Earlier there had been 
publications concerned with his rhetorical technique, but these tended to 
restrict themselves to matters of style. The most important contribution 
was provided by Wersdorfer (1940), who studied Isocratean technical 
rhetorical terminology in the context of his general philosophy of 
education. His work consists of two parts. The first contains an attempt to 
define the meaning of the most important technical terms (πρέπον, 
καινόν, ιδέα, καιρός) and their synonyms. This part concludes with an 
interpretation of Against the sophists with the help of results obtained so far. 
The second part contains what could be called the reconstruction of an 
Isocratean περί λέξεως: a synthesis of his theory of style and diction. 
Although this study is conducted thoroughly by an examination of 
context and similar instances, it is unsatisfactory. First, it is mainly 
concerned with matters of style and diction, and does not treat Isocratean 
views on the earlier stages of finding arguments and of arranging them 
as separate categories. Furthermore, Wersdorfer is inclined to treat terms 
that seem very similar in meaning and whose semantic range may 
indeed partly coincide, as synonyms. In doing so he deprives himself of 
the possibility to reach a higher level of exactitude in the definition of 
terms.7 This is to be regretted, because it is evident that Isocrates does not 
yet have a fully developed technical terminology. A certain amount of 
vagueness is present and can be explained by the fact that Isocrates 
occupies a place in the early stages in the history of rhetorical theory. 
For that very reason considerable exactitude in the definition of terms 
and their semantic demarcation is called for: only that way can the 
7
 See Sicking (1963), 232 n. 3; Zucker (1942), 16-17; see also p. 78. 
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different stages of terminological development be identified. This being 
the case, the work by Wersdörfer might be improved upon, first by 
including invention and arrangement in the scope of a new 
investigation, and secondly to attempt greater precision in the semantic 
demarcation between closely related terms. 
A valuable attempt at evaluating Isocrates' position in the history of 
rhetoric and his theoretical notions was provided by Steidle (1952), who 
investigated his ideas on rhetoric and education in an unbiased way. 
Steidle studied the technical terminology used by Isocrates in its 
immediate context and in the wider perspective of literary history. In 
doing so he is able to show the elements of orginality in Isocrates' 
educational programme and its philosophical basis by distinguishing it 
from contributions by the sophists and Plato. The main conclusion 
reached by Steidle, that Isocrates occupies an important independent 
place in the history of rhetoric, is taken as one of the starting points of 
this dissertation. 
An investigation into Isocrates' theory and practice of 
composition, that is to say the stages εΰρεσις and τάξις as they were 
defined in later rhetorical theory, would be welcome for two reasons. 
First, seen against the background of literary history in general, a 
description of his methods and their applications may elucidate the 
differences and common features between Isocrates himself and his 
predecessors, both poets and writers of prose. Secondly, such an 
investigation could contribute to attempts made to identify the exact place 
Isocrates holds in the history of rhetoric. Since a clear definition of his 
achievements in this respect is missing, the issue of his position can not 
be addressed satisfactorily. At the same time there is strong evidence 
that he played a major role: Cicero and Quintilian mention Isocrates and 
those in his tradition as a separate group of rhetoricians next to the 
Aristotelians.8 The gap in scholarship was pointed out explicitly by 
Solmsen (1941), who made it clear that filling that gap is difficult 
because "for the history of the Isocratean tradition we lack a starting 
point of the same solidity and authenticity as Aristotle's three books on 
rhetoric" (p. 36). No τέχνη or manual by Isocrates is extant (and problably 
there never was one written by him, see below § 3), so therefore 
Solmsen called for "a thorough and at the same time cautious analysis of 
8
 Cic. Inv. 11,2,8; Quint. JO 111,1,14 f.; see Hubbell (1913), 40. 
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Isocrates' "speeches" from the technical point of view" (ibid.). The issue 
of the Isocratean tradition involves in the first instance the relations 
between Isocrates and his predecessors, the sophists, and between him 
and his near contemporaries like Plato and Akidamas. Then there is 
the relationship between Isocrates and Aristotle, who was seen by 
antiquity as representing a rival tradition in rhetoric. The answer to the 
question what the "Isocratea ratio" in later rhetoric consisted of can, 
however, only be given when a full account of the theory and practice as 
it emerges from his writings is offered. 
A recent attempt to define Isocrates' place as a rhetorical theorist 
has been made by Gaines (1990). Although his reconstruction of 
Isocrates' technical precepts for the parts of the speech cannot be accepted 
as such (see p. 34 f., below), Gaines deserves credit for identifying the 
preliminary stage of "intellection" in the process of invention and, most 
of all, for providing evidence that Isocrates' reputation in antiquity as a 
rhetorical theorist can be sustained. This indicates that the investigation 
as proposed by Solmsen (1941) should indeed be undertaken. 
Prior to answering the questions involved in that investigation by 
providing a new analysis of theoretical passages in Isocrates' published 
works, a number of preliminary issues must be dealt with. First, in § 2 
the nature and general character of his works will be discussed in more 
detail. Then § 3 is concerned with the presumed absence of a handbook 
(τέχνη) by Isocrates. And finally § 4 discusses how the transition from 
orality to literacy has a bearing on understanding Isocrates. 
Recently Too (1995) has provided a new monograph on Isocrates. 
Here a fresh reading of the author and his works is offered from the 
perspective of contemporary strategies of reading as proposed by literary 
criticism and theory. The drawback of Too's method is that theory 
regularly appears to override the analysis of primary source material. 
The study contains an attempt at an overall assessment of the author 
Isocrates and his oeuvre and the way his works are to be read. It does not 
address the issues studied here, and therefore will receive only 
incidental attention.9 
For my review of Too (1995) see Mnemosyne (forthcoming). 
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2. The nature of Isocrates' publications 
Here the more general issue of how to understand Isocrates' works 
as such must be adressed, i.e. finding an answer to the question why he 
wrote at all. Scholars who provided an answer to this question can be 
divided in three groups. First, there are those who interpret Isocrates' 
publications as contributions to the political debate of his time, either in 
the narrow sense of political pamphleteering or as distanced 
commentary (see above, p. 1-2). Secondly, a group of scholars regard 
Isocrates first and foremost as a writer with philosophical inclination. 
Although he rejects speculative inquiries like Plato's, he is interested in 
the practical philosophy, which concerns itself with the principles of 
speaking and acting well, and he tries to provide what could be called an 
ethics based on common sense and experience. The most important 
representatives of this group are Jaeger (1943), Mikkola (1954) and 
Eucken (1983). 
Thirdly, a renewed interest in the history of rhetoric, prompted 
primarily by the scholarly work of G A. Kennedy, provided possibilities 
for a fresh assessment of Isocrates. The new tendency was to concentrate 
less on matters of historical and philosophical interest, and more to the 
consequences of the acknowledgement that Isocrates is a rhetorical 
writer. This shift of focus resulted in publications such as those of 
Büchner (1958), Heilbrunn (1977) and Race (1978). It also resulted in an 
interpretation as offered by Harding (1973), who argues that Isocrates 
might be primarily a sophistic writer engaged in subtle rhetorical play 
and using historical contexts for reasons of dramatic verisimilitude. 
Thus he maintains that the Archidamus and On the Peace are, in fact, 
antilogica] discourses in the sophistic tradition, intended to argue both 
sides of a question, and unconnected with any specific historical 
circumstances. 
This raises the fundamental question of why Isocrates wrote. Was 
his intention purely sophistical in the restricted, negative sense? Did he 
produce with his discourses pieces of epideictic rhetoric of no serious 
consequence? The answer must be in the negative, as can be concluded 
from the following points. 
First of all, to qualify a piece of writing as epideictic should not be 
taken to mean that it is without serious intent. As Aristode comments on 
the γένος έπιδεικτικόν, it takes the form of praise or blame, is concerned 
I Written Discourse 8 
with the present and has as its subject the honourable and disgraceful.10 
These subjects are more general than those of judicial and deliberative 
rhetoric: they deal with the more particular and pragmatic subjects of 
what is just and unjust or of what is expedient and harmful, each in a 
certain case. Epideictic is therefore essentially concerned with moral 
issues, even though it is ceremonial and has solemn occasions as its 
natural context. One must keep in mind that in this genre there are texts 
such as the επιτάφιος λόγος, i.e. a speech presented at a public meeting 
and intended to express commonly shared communal values. As such, 
an epideictic speech can be instrumental in the inculcation of 
communal values and even in influencing behaviour. This potential 
made epideictic relevant also to Plato: he recognized its moralistic 
function and acknowledges it as a potentially valid branch of 
philosophical rhetoric n 
Furthermore, in its didactic function epideictic rhetoric could 
claim to be the successor to paraenetic poetry. This claim seems justified 
on the basis of two observations: first, epideictic prose is indebted to poetry 
for its embellished diction and style. The liaison between poetry and 
epideictic was established by Gorgias, whose prose-style is characterized 
in terms otherwise applied to the elevated style of Aeschylean tragedy.12 
Secondly, epideictic often draws on themes traditionally used by poets 
for its subject-matter. Again, Gorgias, who wrote discourses on Helen 
and Palamedes, provides evidence. 1 3 Thirdly, what could be called 
"protreptic mythical eulogy" is a common feature of both paraenetic 
poetry and epideictic prose, and therefore provides a dear indication that 
both shared teaching as a purpose.14 This particular point is borne out by 
both the content and formal features of Isocrates' paraenetic discourses 
To NicocUs and Nicocles : they contain lessons to the young prince and 
1 0
 Ar ДА 1,3, 1358 a 36 f; 1358 b 12 f, see Grimaldi (1980), 81-82 ai 1358 Ь 8-29. 
1 1
 See Duffy (1983), 87 f, Carter (1991), 209-232 
1 2
 See O'Sullivan (1992), 74 f 
1 3
 Cf Protagoras' use of the myth of Prometheus in PI Prot 320 с f, Prodicus' story 
about Heracles on the crossroads in Xen Mem 11,1,21-34 
1 4
 See Ch Г , 140-141, see Greene (1951), 33-34, North (1952), 1-7, Burgess (1902), 
166 f , on poetry as education see Nagy (1989), 1-77, esp 69-77, on the general issue 
of the sophistic tradition and its interest in ancient poetry see Verdemus (1981), 127 
& nn 64-66 
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his subjects and in their sequential listing of specific pieces of advice 
resemble the gnomic poetry of the corpus Theogntdeum , 1 5 
In principle, therefore, seriousness is a feature of epideictic 
rhetoric. That it was used for reasons of showing virtuosity and display 
of rhetorical abilities is not inconsistent with this view. Gorgias' Helen 
may be referred to as a case in point: the fact that the author qualifies his 
discourse as "play" (§ 21: έμον δε παίγνιον) should not result in believing 
that it has no serious intent. The defense of Helen as such is, of course, 
playful in the sense that it serves no immediate practical purpose. But 
because of the general applicability of the categories of arguments used, 
the discourse becomes a study of valid and invalid argumentation, and 
thereby gaines philosophical qualities. In its conception as a speech for 
the defense in a fictitious case, Gorgias' Helen is amusing, but not 
trivial.16 In its ambivalent character, moreover, it is also a specimen of 
discourse exemplifying Gorgias' statements on the power of λόγος1 7. 
Generally speaking, in epideictic rhetoric the boundaries between 
play and seriousness cannot always be clearly drawn. In fact, 
playfulness seems to have been a quality explicitly claimed by the 
sophists: it was part of their preferred methods in propagating their 
tenets. Intellectual virtuosity and scharpness can be stimulated or proven 
by being successful in verbal games and puzzles. Thus playing and 
learning go together and can even be seen as complementary activities. 
Thus it is quite understandable that Theaetetus admits to the Stranger 
from Elea that the Sophist is "one of those whose province is play" (PI. 
Soph. 235 a 6: των της παιδιάς μετεχόντων εστί τ\ς...εΐς).1 8 The 
functionality of play in the process of acquiring knowledge is further 
recognized by the philosopher Plato himself. In the Parmentdes 137 b 2 
Parmenides, when forced to take a stand on the question of existence, 
calls this assignment "a difficult game to play": πραγματειώδη παιδιάν 
1 5
 Note that Nu. 43 explicitly refers to the gnomic poets Hesiod, Theognis and 
Phocylides as the "best counselors of human conduct" 
1 6
 See Rutherford (1995), 203-204, Huizinga (1956), 142-148, for further examples of 
the sophistic παίγνιον see the Lysiamc Eroucus in Plato's Phdr, the Isocratean Bustns 
(see esp its с 9), Agathon's contribution in Plato's Symposium , which Agathon 
concludes by qualifying it as τα μεν παιδιάς, та δέ σπουδής μετρίας μετέχων 
1 7
 See Robinson (1973), 53 "(the Helen is) a vehicle for certain general ideas that 
are deserving of attention To this extent at least it should be taken seriously " 
1 8
 Cf Socrates' cnuque of the unsenous intentions of the playful methods used by 
Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus in PI Euthyd 283 b 3, 287 b 1 f these disputatiomsts 
only propose tnck quesuons that do not contribute to learning about the essence of 
things 
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παίζειν. He then proceeds to discuss this issue with profundity and 
seriousness, although the discussion has the form of an exchange of 
questions and answers, during which the issue is looked upon from 
different angles.1 9 
Against this general background Isocrates' statements on the 
intention of his works gain greater prominence. He is explicit on his 
relative position in the field of rhetoric: the part of his oeuvre he 
considers relevant are the "scholastic" discourses. These are the 
discourses he published after the establishment of his school at about 392 
ВС. He considers his career as a publicist and teacher to begin at that 
point, and he dismisses his activities prior to that event (XV, 36, 161-162). 
These scholastic discourses are not deliberative nor forensic, even if they 
sometimes adopt their outward form. But they differ from them: his 
discourses are stylistically more elaborate and have as their subject not 
the incidental but rather issues of a general and more elevated kind.20 
He claims φιλοσοφία as the occupation by which he can distinguish 
himself from rivals. His field is the "philosophy of discourse" (Г , 10: ή 
περί τους λόγους φιλοσοφία), which is different, on the one hand, from 
abstract philosophizing (X, 1-5; see Ch. V, ad loc.), and, on the other, from 
the formalized art of rhetoric (XIII, 9-13). It is, positively defined, the 
reflection on the common opinions and practices of the polis 
community (XIII, 21; XV, 46, 260), hence the qualification of his 
discourses as πολιτικοί λόγοι. 
These considerations make it clear that Isocrates' discourses are 
meant to be taken seriously.21 They serve as the only source for the 
study of his ideas. This general conclusion paves the way for a careful 
analysis of his works, in search of answers to the questions formulated 
above. First, however, the specific character of these discourses must be 
established as precisely as possible. 
1 9
 Cf. Parai. 142 b f., 155 e f„ 165 e f.; on the "play" element in Plato's philosophy see 
Rutherford (1995), 268-270. 
2 0
 See Wilcox (1946) on these features of distinction; see also Hudson-Williams 
(1949), 65-66. 
2 1
 Harding's position is convincingly attacked from the historian's point of view by 
Moysey (1982); the issue of using the works of the orators as historical source 
material is considered in general terms by Todd (1990) and Davidson (1990), esp. 
20-21. 
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3. Discourses as means of instruction. 
By founding his school Isocrates sought a way to disseminate his 
views on what constituted a senous and respectable form of rhetoric and 
he m e d to educate pupils according to that concept There is, however, n o 
extant handbook or τέχνη by him, in which his ideas on the theory and 
practice of his rhetorical education are systematically presented There 
exists a number of fragments belonging to such a τέχνη supposedly 
written by him, b u t they can n o t be ascribed to h im with any 
certainty 2 2 The absence of a handbook may be due to the possibility that 
there never existed such a handbook For that possibility some evidence 
exists 2 3 
a) Isocrates himself declares in his programmatic discourse Against the 
sophists, published about 390 ВС when he began his career as head of his 
s c h o o l 2 4 , that he opposes the formulation of hard and fast rules for 
rhetorical composition The teaching of rhetonc, he writes, is a ποιητικον 
πράγμα or creative activity rather than a τεταγμένη τέχνη as offered by his 
rivals, the sophists (c 12) Thus he would have acted inconsistently with 
his own teaching had he produced a τέχνη of his own 
At this point, further remarks on this particular discourse may be 
relevant T h e text seems to be fragmentary the closing chapter (22) 
contains an a n n o u n c e m e n t that it will be possible to show that the 
critique of rivals is justified, and that the programme, which so far has 
been only described in general terms, is feasable This might lead one to 
think that the extant text is, in fact, a proemium to a main text now l o s t 2 5 
From the perspective of content, however, the text can stand on its own 
Two explanations have been offered to account for the present state of the 
text as mtended by Isocrates Eucken interprets the open ended text as an 
invitation to inquire for more information by becoming a pupi l in 
Isocrates' school His suggestion is followed by Cahn, who adds another 
2 2
 For the fragments see Radermacher (1951), 153-163 (Isocrates В ХХГ 1-36) 
2 3
 On the following see Brown (1914), 22 24, Barwick (1963), Eucken (1983), 27 f, 
Cahn (1989) 
2 4
 This date for XIII depends on two considerations 1) Isocrates says at XV, 194 
before ciung from this text that it belongs to the early stage of his activity as teacher, 
2) in XIII, 13 and 19 he distances himself from forensic rhetonc and thereby 
implicitly from his own logography the last forensic speeches of his (XVIII and 
XIX) date from about 390 ВС Therefore the start of his scholastic career can be dated 
from ca, 390 ВС onwards See Blass (1892), 230, 235 f, Drenip (1906), cxxv, cxxvi f, 
RE IX, 2165, 2167 [Mùnscher], Mathieu - Bremond (1956), 91 f, Eucken (1983), 5 
2 5
 The closing chapter is indeed constructed as a transitional passage cf X, 15, XI, 
9, IV, 51, see Blass (1892), 240 t , Eucken (1983), 6 
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argument in its abrupt end at the very point where a specific 
formulation of Isocratean rules is expected, the text underscores in its 
form the point made by the author. According to Isocrates, one should 
not endeavour to determine what is essentially variable.26 That tenet is 
his particular contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of rhetoric 
as a discipline. In this view the discourse can be characterized as iconic: 
its form reflects its content.2 7 
b) The passages XIII, 14-18, XV, 180-192 and XII, 200-265 allow a 
reconstruction of Isocrates' methods of teaching and the school 
curriculum It becomes clear that there must have been a few pupils at a 
time, who received individual tuition. 2 8 They were involved in 
composing discourses and discussing these among themselves and with 
their teacher. These discussions apparently involved matters of style and 
structure, argumentation and selection of subject-matter. From this it can 
be deduced that Isocrates saw education as a process of correction, which 
not only consisted in the master correcting his pupil but also in group-
criticism. Evidently discussion lies at the basis of this method, in which 
there was little room for the mechanical application of handbook rules.29 
c) The practice of using (parts of) discourses as study material in 
rhetorical education conformed with the use of model speeches by the 
sophists. Corgias' rhetorical instruction seems to have consisted in the 
presentation of exemplary speeches to be learnt by heart by his pupils. 
These speeches could be described as stores of arguments concerning a 
general issue, and from these the speaker was to make a selection in a 
given particular case 3 0 Similarly Isocrates seems to have used his own 
discourses as texts to be studied in his school. The discussion between 
Isocrates and a pupil in the Panathenaicus can be adduced as evidence for 
26Cahn (1989), 127-137 
2 7
 See Ch V, ρ 185 f 
2 8
 Cf Cic De oral 111,9,35-36 etenim videmus ex eodem quasi ludo ( ) exisse 
discípulos dissimilis inter se ас tarnen laudandos, cum ad cuiusque naturam 
insututio doctons adcommodaretur Cuius est vel maxime insigne ìllud exemplum 
( ) quod dicebat Isocrates doctor singularis se calcanbus in Ephoro, contra autem in 
Theopompo frems uu solere 
2 9
 On Isocrates' school and educational practice see Burk (1923), Johnson (1957) and 
(1959), the practice of oral instruction constitutes a parallel with Plato's Academy 
see Greene (1951), 46-50 
3 0
 Cf Ar Soph el. 33,183 b 36 -184 a 8, ЯЛ III, 17, 1418 a 32-37, Pol I, 13,1260 a 21-28, 
Isoc XI, 48 the rhetor Polycrates is said to have composed his discourse on Busins 
as παράδειγμα ώς χρη περί των αισχρών αιτιών και δυσχερών πραγμάτων ποιείσθαι τας 
απολογίας, cf PI Mena 236 a 8 - b 4, cf Oc Brul 46-48, Quint. IO 11,17,4, see Wilcox 
(1943), 13, Cole (1991), 82-88, see also Ch Г , 121 n 50 
/ Written Discourse 13 
this belief This didactic procedure practised by Isocrates can also 
account for the occurrence of passages containing reflections on matters 
of rhetor ical technique in many o t h e r discourses t h a n only the 
explicitly programmatic ones Thus his discourses can be referred to as 
λόγοι διδασκαλικοί και τεχνικοί artful and instructive discourses (XII, 
271) 
This evidence leads to the conclusion that Isocrates probably did 
not write a manual, but used his own discourses as study material or 
παραδείγματα in his school The tradition that he wrote such a manual 
might originate m the confusion between the terms τέχνη and τέχναι 
The plural τέχναι can refer to rhetorical exercises, and could therefore be 
used of Isocrates' discourses as well s l The case of the Helen is perhaps 
the clearest example of such an instructive discourse as this study will 
show, it contains theoretical reflections on rhetorical rules and method, 
and serves as an exemplary specimen or paradeigm of Isocratean 
rhetoric 
4. Isocrates as author of written discourses. 
Another important point to be considered with respect to the 
nature of Isocrates' discourses is the general context of Greek literary 
history During the 4th century ВС the use of writing became a 
significant element in the producuon of literature, both in its conceptual 
stages and in its means of publication and reception Evidence for this 
process can be found among writers of philosophy and rhetoric Plato's 
highly critical attitude towards writing, for example, can be seen in this 
context, and in rhetoric, the old orally based and extemporary way of 
speech making was defended by Alcidamas 3 2 
Isocrates himself is explicit m distinguishing his position His 
statements concerning methods of product ion and publication show 
clearly that his authorship was profoundly influenced by these new 
developments He claims, in short, to be a writer, writing for a reading 
31 Barwick (1963), 50, In this sense τέχναι seems to be used in Speus Ep Soar XXX 
(Ep adPkiL), 4, 10 see E Bickermann -Joh Sykutns, Speusipps Brief απ König Philipp 
Text, Übersetzung, Untersuchungen, Leipzig 1928 (Ber Verh d Sach Akad d Wiss, 
phil-tust Klasse, Bd 80, Η 3), 59 ad he, see also Radermacher (1951), 156 ad no 
16, Steidle (1954), 279 n 2 
3 2
 In general see Thomas - Webb (1994), Bons (1993), 160-161 Äc n 1, 7, Thomas 
(1992), 3-4, 124 f, 161-2, for Plato see Havelock (1963), Connors (1986), 49-57, 
Andersen (1987), for Alcidamas see Eucken (1983), 121-140, Vallozza (1985), 
O'Sullivan (1992), passim. 
I. Written Discourse 14 
public 3 3 . As a consequence of this claim, the following points on his 
authorship deserve attention: 
a) in V, 25-30 Isocrates stresses that there is a difference between 
discourses intended for oral delivery (λόγοι λεγόμενοι) and discourses to 
be read (λόγοι άναγιγωσκόμενον). The difference consists in the means by 
which the discourse to be read can make up for the oral elements it 
lacks, such as the role the speaker with his authority and performance 
plays in the relation to the listening audience. A discourse to be read 
focuses less on performative characteristics such as rhythm and variety, 
and concentrates more on content. Its argumentation is more difficult to 
appreciate, and requires the exercise of reason and reflection (λογισμός 
και φιλοσοφία) and is thus on a higher intellectual level. This involves 
the use of more advanced literary techniques both with regard to style 
and composition, and the text will therefore be more difficult to 
appreciate. At the same time, however, these features are a stimulus to 
attentive reading.34 
b) The use of what can be called the written style involves a number of 
specific tendencies in the composition of a text, among which are logical 
structuring, linear development and explicitness of argumentation. More 
so than in orally based texts, one will find rationality reflected in style 
and composition. To this feature Isocrates himself refers in XV, 47 and 
especially in XII, 246, where the discussion between himself and the 
pupil criticizing the discourse at hand, draws attention to the hidden 
agenda that was consciously and intentionally applied. At the same 
time, however, ornamental stylistic devices are not absent in his works: 
they are a means conducive to persuasion by charm, but they are 
supplementary. Dionysius of Halicarnassus remarks that Isocrates' style 
is elevated, but not intended to create πάθος. The intended effects of the 
pathetical style like ψυχαγωγία and εκπληξις, which are appropriate to the 
oral, poetic style, are explicitly dismissed by Isocrates himself (see e.g. II, 
49 and IX, 10). This, also, conforms with the requirements of written 
prose.3 5 The absence of πάθος even develops into a generic requirement 
for the encomium, as is observed by Longinus Subi. 8,3. 
3 3
 See Jahne (1991); on the author-audience relationship in the case of Isocrates see 
now Usener (1994), 47 f. 
34
 See p. 80-84; Bons (1993), 162-171. 
'5 Dion.Hal. De Isoc. 2; on the features of the written, "scientific" prose style see 
Thesleff (1966), 89-113; see also O'Sullivan (1992), 71 f., 74 f., 82 f., esp. 100-102, 114 f.; 
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c) Isocrates' intended audience were educated readers (πεπαιδευμένοι), 
who appreciated the quality and intellectual level of his works and 
consequently studied them in detail and part by part, if necessary.36 
d) The use of writing enables an author to execute the careful preparation 
and revision needed to produce a text of the required intellectual level. In 
XII, 231 f. Isocrates gives some impression of that process, which involves 
rereading and reworking previously written segments, and 
reconsidering content and style. Such a process is laborious and calls for 
precision, and accounts for the great amount of time needed to finish a 
discourse (see, e.g., Г .14). Moreover, this process makes the written text 
essentially different from the text to be performed: that genre requires 
spontaneity and living up to the moment. It is not surprising that 
Alcidamas criticized those who produced discourses in the way Isocrates 
does. Because of the careful finish and precision this group of authors 
exercized in producing their works, Alcidamas considers them 
"producers of discourse" rather than "effective speakers" (c.2: πολΰ 
δικαιότερον αν ποιητάς ή σοφιστάς προσαγορεύεσθαι; cf. с. 34: ρήτωρ δεινός 
vs. ποιητής λόγων). Ποιητής "maker" seems a deliberate allusion to the 
activity of craftsmanship3 7. As will be seen later (Ch. Ill, p. 99 f.), 
Isocrates' use of the technical term καιρός is closely akin to the 
terminology of statuary. This would support the view that Alcidamas has 
Isocrates or, at least, the Isocratean methods of rhetoric in mind.3 8 
These features of Isocrates' activity as a writer of discourse suggest 
that he was influenced by Prodicus, maybe even more so than by 
Gorgias. The typically Gorgianic features of the oral style, such as 
emotionalism and linguistic imprecision, are absent as goals in 
themselves: the Gorgianic style in its well-known form of antitheses 
combined with assonance is subordinated to the requirements of 
writing.39 On the other hand, the command over the tool of language as 
Steidle (1952), 293-295, an instructive example of the rationality involved in using 
discourse is the advice Isocrates gives to Timotheus in XV, 132 f 
3 6
 See V, 29, XII, 30-32, 136, 240, 246, XV, 12 
3 7
 Cf Alcid Soph. 12. written speeches are μάλλον ποιήμασιν ή λόγοις έοικότες, cf XV, 
192, ХШ, 15, Plato Phdr 234 e 6; 236 d 5 αγαθόν ποιητήν, Euthyd. 305 b 4; Legg IX, 858 
сб. 
3 8
 On Alcidamas see O'Sulhvan (1992), passim, Ritoók (1991), Fnemann (1990); 
Hudson-Williams (1951), for the introduction of ποιητής in literary context see 
Sperdati (1950) 220 n 44, besides to statuary, the allusion might also be to Isocrates' 
close connection with the poetic tradition (see above, ρ 6-7) 
3 9
 See O'Sullivan (1996), 123 n 26 
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required for the writer, as it emerges in the requirement of μετρίως λέγειν 
a n d in semantic precision ( ό ρ θ ό τ η ς ) , can be directly related to 
Prodicus. 4 0 
5. The issue: Isocrates' theory and practice of composition. 
§§ 2-4 have provided the general framework for the issues 
formulated above. In his discourses Isocrates has produced a corpus of 
texts with serious intent, of instructive use, and written to be read. T h e 
establishment of this framework can lead to the delineation of texts 
within the corpus Isocrateum , which will be the source-material for 
analysis . 
Two groups will be excluded: first, the forensic speeches XVI - XXI 
are not taken into consideration. O n the basis of what Isocrates himself 
declares about these discourses, they must be regarded as untypical of 
what he considered to be his oeuvre They belong to the period before the 
opening of the school, when he tried to make a career as logographer. 
From this period in his life he distances himself explicitly: he was not 
successful in public life and devoted his career to intellectual pursuits 
and to reflection on general issues of permanent value, foresaking petty 
matters such as private contracts and other subjects of the rhetors (XII, 11. 
επειδή τοΰ πολιτεύεσθαι διήμαρτον, έπί το φιλοσοφείν και πονείν και γράφειν 
α διανοηθείην κατέφυγον, ού περί μικρών την προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος ούδε 
περί των ιδίων συμβολαίων ουδέ περί ων άλλοι τίνες ληροΰσιν, άλλα περί 
των 'Ελληνικών και βασιλικών και πολιτικών πραγμάτων).4 1 
The second group of excluded texts are the letters. Since their 
authenticity remains debated, it does not seem justified to use them as 
primary source material. In some cases, however, it is possible to adduce 
4 0
 For μετρίως λέγειν see Ch Π, 51 ad Plato Phdr 267 b f, cf also Resp VII, 518 b 5, 
Theaet 191 d 1, cf XII, 171, an example of Isocratean όρθότης is the distinction 
between άπολογεΐσθαι and έχαινείν in X, 14 (see Ch V, below ad loc), the connection 
Prodicus-Isocrates is made in antiquity cf D Η Isocr 1, Photius Cod 260, Ps-Plut 
Vu X Oral 836, see Welcker, Kbme Schuften Π, 393-541 
4 1
 His failure in public life Isocrates ascribes to natural disabilities: the lack of a 
strong voice and self-assurance (XII, 10, V, 81) It is difficult to decide on the 
historical truth of this explanation it occurs late in his career, the image of the self-
assured man with strong voice might be intended as a depiction of what he 
distances himself from the democratic populist politician, and one might be 
dealing with an excuse ex evcntu If historically correct, the explanation reinforces 
the image Isocrates depicts of himself the intellectual keeping a distance from 
public life and providing sound advice on fundamental issues See Campbell (1984), 
Lateiner (1982-1983), on the disuncuon of prose genera see below, ρ 41, 43 
1 Written Discourse 17 
them as supplementary evidence If authentic, a (passage from a) letter 
can serve as evidence, because the content of that passage conforms with 
material from the discourses This very state of affairs, however, can be 
taken as an argument against authenticity since many letters consist of 
rephrasings of material from the discourses, the possibility cannot be 
ruled out that the letters are products of progymnasmatical rhetorical 
exercises, in which Isocratean subject-matter was reproduced in letter 
form In that case, however, they can still be useful as auxiliary 
material 4 2 
In sum, the published discourses are the source material for the 
present study As was noted above, these could be labelled "scholastic" in 
the sense that they are instructive, both as exemplary specimma of 
Isocratean discourse and as containing passages on rhetoncal theory 
Isocrates himself seems to have regarded the collection of discourses 
published after the establishment of his school as his relevant oeuvre 
This can be deduced from the fact that he uses quotations from a number 
of them, starting from Against the sophists, in the late apologia pro vita sua, 
the Antidosis 
The object of this study is Isocrates' concepts of rhetoncal 
composition This term refers to the stages of both εϋρεσις and τάξις their 
conceptual separation was not yet complete at the time The distinction 
that did already exist was that between composition and styhstics, 
including diction and embellishment 4 3 Thus Isocrates seems to be 
using the basic distinction between composition and style, which 
coincides with the classification used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
who distinguishes between πραγματικός τόπος and λεκτικός τόπος 4 4 
In order to study these concepts §§ 14-18 of the programmatic 
discourse Against the sophists will be taken as a starting point at the 
beginning of each terminological chapter In that passage Isocrates 
proposes in general terms the outlines of his rhetorical παιδεία In this 
passage are three pivotal terms, by which his ideas can be arranged 
ιδέα, καιρός and καινός The following study argues that they, in that 
4
^ The same argument applies, mutaus mutandis, to Ad Demonuum. See Too (1995), 
196-199, Eucken (1983), 6 Sc η 9 
4 3
 See Hamberger (1914), 1 f, O'Sullivan (1992), 2 f 
4 4
 On Dionysius distinction see Fntchetl (1975), xxxvi, see also Martin (1974), 55, 
217, in general see Kremer (1907) 
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order, constitute a sequence in the activities of the writer of discourse and 
represent the principles of Isocrates' concepts on composition. 
- ιδέα is used in the preliminary and conceptual stage of composition: 
this involves the selection of all the elements or parts from which to 
compose the discourse, both with regard to form and to content; this stage 
is concerned with the surface structure of the discourse; 
- καιρός plays a crucial part in the arrangement of the parts of discourse, 
both with respect to their place and their relative length: a sense of 
proportion provides guidance; this phase concentrates on the articulation 
of the discourse and the purpose of its parts; 
- καινός concernes the presentation of the subject-matter in a novel and 
fresh way, which implies selection of unused subject-matter, innovatory 
use of traditional material and improvement upon predecessors; 
The Chapters II - Г will provide an analysis of Isocrates' concepts on 
composition following this sequential arrangement. In Chapter V the 
results of this analysis will be used to provide a rhetorical commentary 
on the Helen , which is intended to elucidate both its technical features 
and its exemplariness of Isocratean rhetoric in the broad sense. 
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П. ЮЕА / EIDOS 
The first technical term to be studied is ιδέα, to which είδος is very 
closely linked. Prior to determining the technical usage in Isocratean 
rhetorical theory, both words will be examined in general. In order to 
provide a context for the technical usage a short historical survey of the 
usage of both nouns will be provided. 
1. ιδέα / είδος in general. 
'Ιδέα and είδος are derived from the root ριδ and are therefore related to 
the verb-form ίδείν, which is an aorist to όραν "to see". Ίδείν has as its 
root meaning "to see with the eyes", and can thus refer to visual 
perception as such.1 As nominal derivations from ίδείν, both ιδέα and 
είδος refer to "what is being seen", so that "appearance" may be taken as 
their common denotation.2 Taking this as a starting point, one can 
distinguish between a number of derived usages. 
The history of both words shows that είδος has the earliest 
attestations.3 It occurs with some frequency in the Iliad and is used for 
"what is seen", esp. the shape of a human being. See, e.g., II, 57-58: 
...μάλιστα δε Νέστορι δίφ 
είδος τε μέγεθος τε φυήν τ' αγχιστα έωκεν.4 
Here είδος refers to the human form as it presents itself to the perceiving 
eye. From later instances like Hdt. Ill, 107,2, one can conclude that in its 
usage είδος developed into a means of distinction by outer shape: in his 
description of the winged snakes, a species living in Arabia, Herodotus 
says that they are σμικροί τα μεγέθεα, ποικίλοι τα εΐδεα. This suggests that 
these snakes can be classified or distinguished by the way they look. 
This development continues, when είδος is found to refer to a thing 
perceived with special interest in one of its distinguishing features. An 
1
 Lexdfruhgr.Epos, Bd Π, Gdmngen 1991, Sp. 1116-1129, s ν ίδείν [Vlachodimitns], Snell 
(1975). 15 & nn. 7,8 
2
 See Η Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Heidelberg 1960, Bd. I, 708 i.v ιδέα, 
Ρ Chantraine, Dictionaire étymologique de la languw grecque Histoire des mots. Pans 1968, 
455, HC Baldry (1937), 141 
3
 The following brief historical sketch is based on К von Fntz, Philosophie und sprachlicher 
Ausdruck bei Demokra, Plato und Aristoteles, Dannstadt 1966, 38-64, esp 40-50 
4
 It (sc δνειρος) very closely resembled noble Nestor, m shape, heigth, and stature, more than 
any other 
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example of this is at Th 111,82 there the political changes affecting the 
state are τοις εϊδεσι διηλλαγμένο or "different in kind". 
Thus είδος seems to have developed from referring to "shape" in 
the objective sense as "total form as it is perceived by the eyes" to 
"appearance" in the sense of "distinguishing feature" From this the 
development into "kind" in the abstract sense is a next step (see below) 
In what seems to be the oldest occurrance, ιδέα is found in the 
corpus Theogmdeum There the word refers to "appearance" or 
"semblance", and is to be understood as "what appears to be the case". 
The subject of these verses (119-128) is the unreliability of one's fellow-
man's disposition, his untrue heart The section concludes thus: 
ουδέ γαρ είδείης άνδρας νόον ούδε γυναικός, 
πριν πειρηθείης όβσπερ υποζυγίου, 
ουδέ κεν είκάσσαις ώσπερ ποτ' ές ωριον έλθών 
πολλάκι γαρ γνώμην έξαπατωσ' ϊδέαι 5 
Clearly ιδέα as the subject of έξαπατώσι is here meant to convey the 
deceptiveness of appearance things are not what they seem, and people 
hide their true feelings 
'Ιδέα, then, occurs in the sense of "shape" or "outward form" as it 
presents itself to the beholder Pindar's Tenth Olympian provides an 
example 
παΐδ' έρατον (δ') Άρχεστράτου 
α'ΐνησα, τον εΐδον κρατέοντα χερος άλκα 
βωμον παρ' 'Ολύμπιον 
κείνον κατά χρόνον 
ιδέα τε καλόν 
ώρα τε κεκραμένον 6 
The poet looks (εΐδον) at the young Hagesidamos, and describes what he 
sees the beauty of his physical outward appearance 
5
 Theogn 125-129 You cannot know a man's or woman's character until you've tried ¡fit mil 
bear a load, nor can you judge as if inspecting merchandise so often the appearances deceive [tr 
ML West, 1994], see Τ Hudson-Williams The Elegies of Theogms London 1910 (= New York 
1979), 183, В A van Groningen, Theognis Le premier livre Amsterdam 1966,53 
6
 Pind О X, 99-104 I have praised the loved son of Archestratos whom I saw winning with 
valour of hand by the Olympian altar m those days, beautiful to the eye and endowed with 
youthfulness [tr С M Bowra, adapted] 
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Comparable is an instance in Herodotus, where he mentions that 
a horse cannot stand the sight and smell of a camel, and is frightened 
by it: 
κάμηλον 'ίππος φοβέεται, και ούκ ανέχεται οΰτε την ΐδέην αϋτης όρων οΰτε 
την όδμήν όσφραινόμενος.7 
That ιδέα predominantly refers to form may be concluded from another 
instance in Herodotus, where he compares the Boudinians and 
Gelonians, two tribes who live near Scythia. After mentioning their 
different ways of life, he says: 
ουδέν την ίδέην όμοιοι ουδέ το χρώμα.8 
When discussing Egyptian birds, Herodotus introduces the ibis, and 
proceeds to give a description of this bird's outward appearance: 
είδος δε της μεν Ί'βιος τόδε.9 
In his description he mentions the bird's black colour, the shape of its 
legs and beak, and its size. He concludes his description of the black ibis 
as follows: 
των μεν δη μελαινέων...ηδε ίδέη10 
and then goes on to describe another kind of ibis, the ones that live near 
humans. From this it would seem that in referring to "appearance" 
Herodotus used both ιδέα and είδος, without any specific difference. Both 
nouns can be seen to cover common ground in their reference to form. 
This means that they can be interchanged in referring to "appearance", 
but that is not to say that one is allowed to treat them as synonyms.11 The 
general distinction between the two nouns seems to be that ιδέα is used 
where the denotation "outward appearance" dominates, and είδος where 
"total form" is meant. 
But one can point also to a more specific use of ιδέα, where it refers 
to a certain characteristic perceived by the senses. These characteristics 
are qualities an object can have, like colour, heat, coldness, liquidity, 
dryness, etc., and they can be determined by sight, touch, or taste. 
' Hdt-1,80,4 a horse is frightened by a camel, and it cannot stand its looks when it sees one nor 
its odour when it smells one, cf 11,71.1 (description of the φυαις ίδέης of hippopotamusses), 
Π.92,4 (similarity in appearance of the fruit of the Egyptian bean to the whasp's honeycomb); see 
J E Powell, A Lexicon to Herodotus, Cambridge 1938, s ν ιδέα 1 
8
 Hdt Г , 109,1 and they are completely unalike, both inform and colour (sc. of skin). 
9
 HdL 11,76.1 The Ibis looks as follows 
1 0
 ibid.. well then, the black ones look like this 
' ' This leads to my disagreement with Wilamowitz- see n 25, below. 
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Although this usage is often found elsewhere too 1 2, its occurrances in 
the corpus Hippocraticum are of particular interest. There different 
properties of a certain substance or thing can be referred to with both ιδέα 
and είδος. In this way one can speak of, e.g., αϊ τρεις ΐδέαι των 
νουσημάτων τοΰ ΰδρωπος13, using ιδέα as "form" in order to classify the 
ways in which a certain disease can present itself.14 It might be added 
that the physician Philistion used ιδέα to describe the four elements 
from which a human being is "constructed": 
Φιλιστίων δ' οΐεται έκ δ' ιδεών συνεστάΙναι ημάς, τοΰτ' εστίν έκ στοιχείων· 
πυρός, Ι αέρος, ύδατος, γης.
15 
This use of ιδέα / είδος as "form" or "property" can be termed 
classificatory, and it extends to the process of division, resulting in the 
distinction of a number of kinds or types, belonging to a certain 
category. Thus Thucydides can say: 
oi δε έν TJì Αίγύπτω 'Αθηναίοι καί οι ξύμμαχοι έπέμενον και αύτοίς πολλαί 
ΐδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν.16 
War may consist of victory or defeat: these are its intellectually 
perceivable "forms", and, as can be seen from Thucydides' description 
of what happened, these vicissitudes did indeed take place.17 With this 
one may compare the question Pentheus asks the god Dionysus in the 
Bacchae: 
τα δ' οργι' εστί τίν' ίδέαν έχοντα σοι ; 1 8 
1 2
 E.g. Hdt. Г ,185,3 on the different colours of salt (είδος in ace. respectas); cf. VI,119,2 on a 
well that provides three different kinds of products (τοΰ φρέατος το παρέχεται τριφασίας ιδέας: 
asphalt, salt, and oil). 
1 3
 Hipp. Morb. Г ,57: the three forms of dropsy-diseases: cf. Г .32 
1 4
 See Gillespie (1912), 191 ff.\ cf. Baldry (1937), 143. 
1 5
 Anon Lond. 20, 25-27. 
" Th. 1,109,1: 77ie Athenians who were in Egypt and their allies stayed there, and they 
encountered many vicissitudes of war ; for ιδέα as "intellectually perceivable kind" sec already 
Hdt. VI,100,1 on the Eretnans: των δέ Έρετριέων ήν άρα ουδέν υγιές βούλευμα...έφρόνεον δε 
διφασίας ιδέας (their way of thinking went two ways); cf. also PI. Tht. 184 d 2: ιδέα as "kind 
of existence". 
1 7
 Cf. the scholion ad loc: διάφοροι πόλεμοι, οίον.,.νίκαι καί τ|τται; on this use of ιδέα in 
Thucydides see K.W. Kruger, Thoukydidou Sungraphe, Bd. 1, Berlin 1860, 121; S. Homblower, 
A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. I: Books І-Ш, Oxford 1991,173-175 points to the connection 
with the Hippocratic writings. 
18 Eur Bacch 471: These rites of yours, of what kind are they9; if, however, the όργια are 
physical objects, the translation of iota should be "appearance": see ER. Dodds, Euripides. 
Bacchae, Oxford I960, 137; cf. Ar. Ra 382' αγε νΰν, έτέραν ΰμνων ίδέαν την καρποφόρον 
βασίλειαν Ι Δήμητρα θεαν έπικοσμοΰντες ζαθέαις μολπαΐς κελαδείτε. 
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A summary of the general usage of ιδέα / εΐδος is as follows: given 
the root-meaning "that which is seen" or "form", it seems possible to 
distinguish four classes: (1) "appearance" in contrast with real nature; 
(2) "shape"; (3) "property" and (4) "kind" or "type". The summary is 
predominantly based on texts prior to the fourth century ВС, which is to 
say before Isocrates and Plato. 
The use of ιδέα / είδος found in Plato, insofar as he uses these 
words to refer to his Ideas or Forms, seems to present a further 
development. 1 9 His innovation was that he used both words to refer to an 
abstraction, something exclusively intelligible: the t ranscendent a n d 
eternal Ideas fundamental to his philosophy of knowledge. Because the 
sensible world is in constant flux, there cannot be a universal definition 
of a sensible thing: for that reason, Aristotle 2 0 says, Plato postulated 
"things of another sort, and these he called Ideas, and sensible things, 
h e said, were apart from these, and were all called after these". Thus 
Plato was able to use the existing words ιδέα and είδος for his specific 
purposes, when constructing the language of his philosophy. T h e 
historical development of both nouns reached a stage which made this 
adaptation possible.2 1 As an innovator of language, however, he was not 
unique: as will be shown below, his contemporary Isocrates also made 
use of the possibilities both nouns allowed to refer to abstractions. 
2. ιδέα / είδος in Isocrates: modern scholarship 
It has long been recognized that both nouns ι δ έ α and ε ί δ ο ς 
represent an important element in Isocrates' rhetorical theory, and a 
n u m b e r of attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of these 
terms. 
At first, they were taken as termini technici in the narrow sense. 
This means that their use was supposed to be restricted to the formal 
1 9
 In general see E. Des Places SJ, Lexique de la ¡angue philosophique et religieuse de Platon, 
(Platon. Oeuvres complètes T. XIV), Paris 1964. 159-61 (είδος); 260-1 (ιδέα); see also W.D. 
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951, ch. 2; P. Brommer, EIDOS et IDEA. Étude 
sémantique et chronologique des oeuvres de Platon, diss. Utrecht (Assen 1940). 
2° Ar. Metaph. 987 b 5: τα μέν τοιαύτα τών όντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσε, τα δε αισθητά παρά 
ταύτα καΐ κατά ταΰτα λεγεσθαι πάντα (things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and 
sensible things, he said, were apart from these, and were all called after these, u. W.D. Ross) ; 
see Baldry (1937), 144. 
1 1
 Von Fritz (1966), 47 (which also offers a succinct description of the development of both 
nouns into their specific use for the Ideas or Forms within the Platonic corpus: 40-41,48-49). 
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process of expression and composition, i.e. the stages of invention and 
composition as they came to be understood in later, traditional rhetorical 
theory. An early representative of this view is Taylor, who attributes 
"various technical senses" to both terms and proposes to interpret them as 
"gorgianic figure, style, manner".22 Later H.M. Hubbell founded his 
interpretation on XIII, 16 in combination with Ep. VI,8 (on which see p. 
33 f.), and reached the conclusion that by ΐδέαι Isocrates meant "thought 
elements; ideas...which the orator has ready as part of his stock in trade; 
commonplace arguments."2 3 Contrary to Taylor, he defined the terms 
as more related to content or substance than to form. 
In his study of Isocratean rhetorical terminology Wersdörfer2* 
came to define ιδέα in terms of both form and content. His definition, 
consequently, is rather broad and ranges from "die allgemeine Art und 
Weise rednerischer Stoffbehandlung nach Inhalt und Form zum Zweck 
der Überredung" to "allgemeine Gesichtspunkte, von denen die 
Stoffwahl geleitet wird", and he finally narrows down to "sogenannte 
Topoi, konkrete Gedankenkomplexe", as far as content is concerned. 
With regard to form as such, he defines ιδέα as "die einzelne Stilmittel, 
sogenannte Stilfiguren." To this he adds the use of ιδέα in an ethical 
sense, meaning "Tugend, Eigenschaft", as a separate category. In his 
approach Wersdörfer takes what he calls the "Grundbedeutung" of the 
term, being "Aussehen, äussere Gestalt, Erscheinung, Form", as his 
point of departure. Moreover, in his survey of ιδέα he also looks at the 
instances of είδος, which he regards as synonym to ίδέα. 2 5 He finally 
distinguishes seven different meanings, of which three are general in 
character and four are more specific (p. 53-54): (1) the general way and 
method of handling content in rhetoric; (2) kind, genre; (3) the general 
character of genre which determines its process of invention; (4) 
commonplace, topos; (5) figure of style; (6) quality, virtue; (7) situation, 
moment (only at 111,44). He concludes that there is "ein weites ίδέα-
2 2
 A.E. Taylor, The Words Είδος Ίδέα in pre-Socratic Literature. Varia Socratica, London 1911, 
178-211. 
2
' H.M. Hubbell. The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius, and Aristeides, New Haven 
1913,6-9. 
2 4
 Wersdörfer (1940), 43-54. 
25
 For this he quotes (p. 44, nn. 36 and 37) Wilamowitz (Platon. И, Berlin 1919, 249) to support 
his view: "Die Entwicklung des Wortgebrauchs (von είδος) is...wert verfolgt zu werden. 
Hinzugenommen muss gleich ίδέα werden, das jüngere Synonymon..." 
II. IDEA/EIDOS 25 
Begriff", and that in each instance the context should provide a specific 
meaning on the basis of the root-meaning. 
Even though Wersdörfer's analysis allows room for ιδέα as 
applied to content and not just form, it was Schlatter26 who stressed that 
by this term Isocrates referred to the part of oratory outside the limited 
sphere of rhetorical technique. Schlatter defines this part as "the 
leamable material ... from which rhetoric builds its structures." In order 
to clarify his point, he uses the division between λεκτικός τόπος and 
πραγματικός τόπος, as developed in later rhetorical theory, and argues that 
ιδέα belongs predominantly to the latter category. 
Schlatter's interpretation is further developed by Lidov27, who 
rightly points out that any interpretation that isolates form from content 
is unsatisfactory, because the limitation to form does injustice to 
Isocrates' concern for education and philosophy. To this it may be added 
that any attempt to draw a clear line between matters of form (λέξις) and 
content (εΰρεσις) is unsatisfacory, because such a disconnection is 
artificial. Λέξις refers to expression, the activity of "how-to-say-it-in-
words", and necessarily combines matter and means, the 
"complementary features of speech". 
Lidov does not reach a unified interpretation: according to him 
ιδέα represents "a somewhat vague concept...subject to variation in use". 
In addition, not all instances of the word can be subsumed under the 
meaning he proposes. This suggests that his interpretations are solely 
dependent on the context in each separate instance. Consequently, this 
invalidates the conclusions he reaches, the more so because he prefers to 
present each context "in a condensed translation" (p. 276). 
Eucken2 8, in his study of the interrelationships between Isocrates 
and his contemporaries, also pays attention to the meaning of ιδέα. He 
concentrates on its occurrence in the eulogy of beauty in the Helen (X,54-
60), and this suggests to him some kind of relationship with Plato: 
"Isokrates kommt in wörtlichen und gedanklichen Anklängen der 
platonischen Ideenlehre so nahe, daß der Hinweis auf sie evident ist. 
Zugleich wird aber auch die Distanz zu ihr offenkundig." (p. 105) On the 
basis of idiomatic similarity in comparison to Plato Eucken proposes an 
2 6
 Schlauer (1972), 594 f. 
27
 Lidov (1983), 275 f. 
28
 Eucken (1983), 105-106. 
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Isocratean "Ideenlehre", prior to the Platonic one but different from it, 
and refers to ХІІІДб: there knowledge of the ίδέαι λόγων (interpreted as 
"alle Formen sprachlicher Darstellung'') is mentioned as a necessary 
precondition to success in rhetoric. Eucken concludes: "So war bereits 
unabhängig von Platon 'Idee' als allgemeine Form, unterschieden von 
ihrer konkreten Realisierung, verstanden worden. Ebenso war klar 
geworden, daß sie ihre Bedeutung erst in der durch 'Meinung' 
geleiteten Anwendung in der empirischen Realität hat. Hier liegt ein 
eigener Begriff von Idee als allgemeiner, jedoch weltimmanenter Form 
vor." (p. 106) Eucken does not elaborate, but refers to Wersdörfer for the 
specific usages. Thus he seems to allow for the possibility that ιδέα refers 
to an abstraction (the "allgemeine Form" as opposed to its concrete 
realisation in discourse), and in doing so he puts Isocrates on a par with 
Plato, who is likewise credited with the innovation of philosophical 
idiom (see above). Still, Eucken's treatment of the word remains 
wanting: in his discussion of XIII, 16 f. (p. 30-31) he does not distinguish 
between ιδέα and είδος, and his explanation of the passage must 
therefore be imprecise. In both cases his translation reads 
"(Rede)formen", but what exactly is meant by this remains unclear. 
From this survey it is clear that of the programmatic key-words 
ιδέα / είδος in Isocrates no unified interpretation has yet been given.29 
The usage of both words should be further clarified: to achieve this it is 
necessary to provide satisfactory interpretations of all occurrences of 
these words in Isocrates, on the basis of a clear root-meaning. The root-
meaning can be taken as the general concept to which Ιδέα refers, while 
in the different instances one can see this concept applied in its specific 
denotations. All the instances, therefore, of ιδέα / είδος in Isocrates will 
again be considered in this chapter, and, in order to provide a precise 
analysis, be studied in their wider context. 
3. 'Ιδέα as a technical term in rhetoric 
The instances of both terms will be considered in the following 
order. First, the occurrences of Ιδέα in a technical context will be looked 
** Kennedy (1994), 44-45 mentions Isocrates' "ideas" as constituent of Ms definition of rhetorical 
ability as "knowledge of ideas (ίδέαι)", but he offers no further interpretation than "elements of 
rhetoric" 
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at, i.e. a programmatic context in which Isocrates explicitly deals with 
technical matters concerning the composition of discourse. Second, the 
instances of ιδέα in a general context will be considered (§ 4). And 
finally, the instances of εΪδος will be presented (§ 5). 
The first example to be studied is XIII, 16: this passage is taken from 
a discourse which belongs to the early period of Isocrates' activity as a 
teacher of rhetoric and publicist. It was, in fact, written at the very 
beginning of his career, as can be gathered from what Isocrates says at 
XV.193 before quoting from Against the sophists, the discourse in question: 
ot' ήρχόμην περί ταύτην είναι την πραγματείαν (= accepting pupils), λόγον 
διέδωκα γράψας εν φ φανήσομαι τοις τε μείζους ποιουμένοις τας υποσχέσεις 
επίτιμων καί την έμαυτοΰ γνώμην αποφαινόμενος.30 
The double intention of criticizing competitors who make false promises 
and of presenting one's own ideas, as made explicit here, is clearly 
reflected in the structure of the discourse itself It has an aia-scheme: 
criticisms of fellow-rhetoricians and rival philosophers make up the chs. 
1-13 and 19-22, while the presentation of his own views occupy chs. 14-
18. The discourse can therefore be indentified as an επάγγελμα or 
programmatic discourse, in which Isocrates introduces his views on 
rhetoric.3 1 In ch. 16 Isocrates proceeds to elucidate his ideas on how to 
compose a discourse: 
[1] МП, 16 φημι γαρ έγώ τών μεν ιδεών, έξ ων τους λόγους απαντάς και 
λέγομεν καί συντίθεμεν, λαβείν την έπιστήμην οϋκ είναι τών πάνυ 
χαλεπών...
32 
In this passage Isocrates is making two points: first (μεν), obtaining 
knowledge of the rhetorical ίδέαι as such is not that difficult; second (see 
p. 30 f.), what the proper use one has to make of them consists of. The 
second point will be discussed later, but now we concentrate on the first 
3 0
 When I entered upon this activity, I wrote and published a discourse m which you will see that 
I attack those who make pretensions that are unwarranted and set forth my own ideas 
3 1
 On the επάγγελμα in general see Cole (1991), 86, Steidle (1952), 259, see also p. 78, 130 
with n 86 
3 2
 / say that to obtain knowledge from the forms from which we put into words and construct 
discourses, is not very difficult 
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point Isocrates makes. It is said that discourses (λόγοι) are "put into 
words" (λέγειν) and "constructed" (συντιθέναι) with the help of ίδέαι. 
One should not confine the the scope of the verb λέγειν to the 
category of style in the narrow sense of embellishment. As Aristotle 
observes, an alteration in expression of the same statement reflects the 
change of intention one has when uttering the statement. This he 
exemplifies with the case of praise and deliberation: δ γαρ έν τφ 
συμβουλέυειν ύπόθειο ίχν, ταΰτα μετατεθέντα τρ λέξει εγκώμια γίγνεται.33 
What he means by this can be gathered from the example he provides: 
the statement "ού δει μέγα φρονείν έπι τοις δια τύχην άλλα τοις δι' αυτόν* 
("one ought not to think highly of things gained by chance but of things 
gained through one's efforts") when thus phrased (οϋτω λεχθέν) is a 
proposition. But as an utterance of praise it runs "μέγα φρονών οΰ τοις δια 
τύχην ύπάρχουσιν άλλα τοις δι' αυτόν" ("he did not think highly of what 
came by chance but of what he gained by his own efforts") .** It is clear 
that λέξις involves more than just finding the right phrase: it also 
involves a conscious decision on the structure and grammar of the 
statement as a whole. 
The next verb to which λόγοι is object, is συντιθέναι "to put 
together constructively". Isocrates uses this verb with some frequency to 
refer to the process of composing a discourse, e.g. in 11,7, where he 
speaks of literary works as yet unfinished and still being έν ταΐς 
διανοίαις...τών συντιθέντων (in the minds of their composers). In the 
Panathenaicus there is a prolonged discussion between Isocrates and a 
pupil, who is invited to criticize the discourse as it has been presented to 
him. He refers to his master as (XII, 246) προελόμενον δέ σε συνθεΐναι 
λόγον (you who chose to compose a discourse) and discusses (XII, 249) 
την διάνοιαν f| χρώμενος αυτόν (= τον λόγον) συνέθηκας (the thought3 5 
which you used when writing the discourse, i.e. the intention you had 
in writing the discourse). The phrase (λόγον) συντιθέναι in the technical 
sense of "composing a discourse" occurs elsewhere as well and seems to 
" Ar Rh 1367 b 36-37 what one might propose in deliberation, becomes encomia when the 
form of expression is changed [tr Kennedy 1991] 
3 4
 The statement seems to be taken from Isocrates IX,45 (praise) and ХП.Э2 (proposition), and 
quoted from memory see Cope/Sandys (1877), 181-2, Grimaldi (1980), 216. 
3 5
 On διάνοια in the sense of "intent", as it is used in this hermeneubcal passage on the 
ambivalence and "hidden intent" of the discourse as a whole, see Bons (1993), 160-171. 
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refer to the production of literary works in writing.36 This clearly 
emerges from Th. 1,97,2, where Thucydides justifies the insertion of a 
digression by saying: έγραψα δε αυτά...δια τόδε, οτι τοις προ έμοΰ απασιν 
έκλιπές τοΰτο ήν το χωρίον και ή τα προ τών Μηδικών 'Ελληνικά 
ξυνετίθεσαν ή αυτά τα Μηδικά.
37
 Here Thucydides is referring to 
historiographers and their works he consulted, which means written 
sources.
38 
Συντιθέναι also suggests the metaphor of building.39 The verb is 
used in the sense of "to put together constructively, in order to make a 
whole", as in Herodotus' description of the construction of the bridge 
over the Hellespont by means of joining ships: πεντηκοντέρους και 
τριήρας συνθέντες.
40
 In Thucydides the improvement of defense walls by 
soldiers is described thus: σιδήρια μεν λιθουργά ουκ έχοντες, λογάδην δε 
φέροντες λίθους, και ξυνετίθεσαν ώς εκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι.41 The image of 
building can then be applied to making a story, e.g. in Euripides' Bacchae 
297: συνθέντες λόγον.42 Finally the activity of producing a written 
scholarly work can be described in terms of building, as is clear from a 
fragment of the sophist Hippias: έγώ δε έκ πάντων τούτων τα μέγιστα καί 
ομόφυλα συνθείς τοϋτον...τον λόγον ποιήσομαι43 
According to Schlatter44 the verbs λέγειν and συντιθέναι are 
complementary: they refer to the closely linked "double methodology" 
of expression and composition. From this it does not follow, however, 
that the ίδέαι should not be confined to the purely technical sphere and 
that they refer to the material from which the discourses are made: the 
"general education" or the 'doctrina on which rhetoric must draw in the 
exercise of its art" (p. 597). Schlatter's interpretation rests on the 
supposition that Isocrates did not look upon rhetoric as a τέχνη but as an 
3
^ E g Th 1,21,1 λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν, Plato Phdr 260 b 6 σοντιθείς λόγον εκαινον, Ar. 
Rh. 1354 a 12 οι τας τέχνας τών λόγων συντιθέντες 
3 7
 I wrote this for this reason, that all my predecessors left this field open and either wrote on 
Greek history before the Persian War or on the Persian War itself 
3 8
 See Homblower (1987), 83, 120, 128 
3 9
 See Muller (1974), 34, cf Plato Soph 219 а в т о σόνθετον "the art of constructing" and το 
κλαστόν "the art of moulding vessels", both subsumed under the τέχνη ποιητική 
4 0
 Hdt П,Зб,1 joining together fifty-oars-ships and triremes, see How/Wells (1928), 142 for 
the details of the construction 
4 1
 Th Г ,4,1 they had no iron tools to cut stone but selected stones and put them together as 
each one happened to fit. cf IG 4-2 (1), 103,59, Xen Mem. Ш,1,7 
4 2
 Cf Ar Ra. 1052 λόγον ξυνέθηκα 
4 3
 By putting together the most important and related of ail this. I will write this discourse, see 
ρ 127 & n 74 
4 4
 Schlatter (1972), 591 f 
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ασκησις (p. 593-4). Consequently one should distinguish between 
rhetorical technique and the elements from which the technique draws 
in producing a discourse, as, likewise, Cicero distinguished between ars 
and materia artis.45 
It seems that Schlatter reads too much in this passage. Isocrates' 
remark that knowledge of the ίδέαι can be attained easily (the first point 
he makes in this passage), suggests that they do not belong to the 
general, more advanced concepts on rhetoric he has (see Ch. Ill, 80 f.). 
As became clear in XIII, 12-13, Isocrates distances himself from the 
purely technical approach of rhetoric and criticizes those who guarantee 
success in speaking by offering technical knowledge. He warns against 
this and claims that rhetoric is a creative rather than an automatic art. 
From this it is clear that for him general knowledge is superior to 
technical knowledge, but in XIII, 16, at least, it is not implied that the 
ίδέαι refer to this general, advanced knowledge alone. In this passage, 
however, the ίδέαι must also refer to elements of the propaedeutic 
rhetorical training, i.e. knowledge of technical precepts on composition 
and style. 
The second point (δέ) Isocrates makes in XIII, 16 concerns another 
phase of rhetorical practice: the use of the ίδέαι: 
[2] x m , 16 το δε τούτων (= των ιδεών) έφ' έκάστω των πραγμάτων ας 
δει προέλεσθαι και μΐξαι προς άλλήλαις και τάξαι κατά τρόπον...ταΰτα δε 
πολλής επιμελείας καί ψυχής ανδρικής και δοξαστικής έργον είναι.46 
What is difficult in rhetorical composition is not learning about its 
principal technicalities (see above), but the way these should be put to 
use. Making use (later referred to by χρήσις, see below) of the ίδέαι 
involves three different tasks, that seem to be presented in a logical 
4
' Cic Inv 1,5,7, Schlatter connects this passage with De Orot 1,5,6 and 11-16, where it is stated 
that rhetoric presupposes a fund of knowledge which rhetoric itself does not supply. He reads an 
Isocratta ratio oratoria in these words and refers to Fam 1,9,23 where Cicero characterizes his 
recently written work De oratore abhorrent emm a communibus praeeeptis (rules such as are 
found in the technical treatises) atque отпет antiquorum et Anstoteluvn et Isocratiam rationem 
oratonam complecluntur, see W W How - А С Clark, Cicero Select Letters, П, Oxford 1978, 
233 
•** but to chose from these the ones which should be employed for each subject, to combate them 
to each other, and arrange them properly, that <I say> requires much study and is the task of a 
mature and imaginative mmd. 
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sequence (1) to chose for each subject the required ίδέαι, (2) to make a 
combination of these, and (3) to arrange them in good order 
On the basis of this programmatic passage one might tentatively 
conclude that with ίδέαι Isocrates refers to the elements of discourse 
either as the components of an exisUng text (material sense) or as the 
potential components of a text still to be produced (conceptual sense) 
These components will consist of all those elements from which a 
discourse can be constructed This will include the choice of words and 
style ("compositie"), and the speech parts ("disposino") Thus one can, 
m accordance with the root meaning of the word, propose to translate 
ιδέα as "format" and taking it to refer to all constituents that together 
make up the discourse as it presents itself to the reader 
Further specification can be gained from the Antidosis, where 
Isocrates has included a number of citations from prior discourses In the 
introduction he points out that his discourse has a special character 
some parts would more properly fit the court-room, others are 
philosophical or educational discussions, and then there is material 
taken from discourses written by him in the past All this made for a 
long and complex discourse, on which he says 
[3] XV, 11 τοσούτον ουν μήκος λόγου συνιδείν, και τοσούτος ιδέας καί 
τοσούτον αλλήλων άφεστώσας συναρμόσαι καί συναγαγείν, καί τάς 
έπιφερομένας οίκειωσαι ταΐς προειρημέναις, καί πάσας ποιήσαι σφίσιν 
αύταίς όμολογουμένας, ού πάνυ μικρόν ήν έργον 4 7 
From this passage somewhat more specified information emerges on 
the use of the ίδέαι in a discourse 
(1) the author should keep a comprehensive view (συνιδείν) of the 
discourse as a whole, 
(2) the author should harmonize and bring together the ίδέαι which 
consutute the discourse, this is further specified 
4 7
 Now to have a complete view of so long a discourse, and to harmonize and bring together its 
forms so many m number and so different the one from the other and to connect smoothly the 
following ones to the ones before and to make them all consonant with one another that was no 
small task. 
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(2a) the discourse contains a number of them (τοσαύτας) : this probably 
refers to the plurality of the identifiable sections of different character 
already announced in general terms in chs. 9-10. 
(2b) the sections are very different in character (τοσοΰτον.,.άφεστώσας); 
(3) the author must establish smooth connections (οίκειώσαι) between 
the sections in their sequential order; 
(4) the author must establish consistency (όμολογουμένας) between the 
sections. 
These passages result in the identification of five specific 
categories of ways in which the ίδέαι can be applied in discourse: 
(1) selection 




Each of these technical aspects can be further elucidated with the help of 
other passages. 
(1) selection 
T h e task of προέλεσθαι can be clarified by citing Х Д42-3. There 
Isocrates praises Philip of Macedón, and in a praeteritio considers but then 
rejects the possibility of introducing a comparison between Philip and 
those who lived before his time, by which it would have been possible to 
show Philip's superiority: 
[4] XV, 142-3 πώς ουκ αν προς εκαστον αυτών άντιπαραβάλλων 
ραδίως αν επέδειξα μείζω σε κάκείνων διαπεπραγμενον; άλλα γαρ είλόμην 
άποσχέσθαι της τοιαύτης ιδέας.
4 8 
What Isocrates considers is int roducing the literary form of the 
comparison (σύγκρισις) , a well known means of amplification. T h e 
comparison is a potential part of the discourse Isocrates presents, but he 
consciously decides not to include it here, although, of course, by 
considering this possibility the amplificatory effect is already present. 
What matters here is that the comparison is referred to by the term ιδέα, 
*8 would it not have been easy for me to show, by comparing you to each of them, that you 
accomplished greater things than they ? l'es, but I chose to abstain from a format such as this. 
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and that inclusion or exclusion of this form in the larger whole of the 
discourse is subject to a deliberate choice (είλόμην) on the part of the 
author. 
Selection is explicitly treated in Ep. VI,8, where Isocrates49 gives 
some impression of the procedures of his teaching: 
[5] Ep. VI, 8 εϊθισμαι γαρ λέγειν προς τους περί την φιλοσοφίαν την 
ήμετέραν διατρίβοντας δτι τοΰτο πρώτον δεί σκέψασθαι, τί τω λόγω και τοις 
του λόγου μέρεσι διαπρακτέον εστίν- έπειδάν δε τοΰθ' εΰρωμεν και 
διακριβωσώμεθα, ζητητέον ειναί φημι τάς ιδέας δι' ων ταΰτ' έξεργασθήσεται 
και λήψεται τέλος δπερ ύπεθέμεθα и 
In his instruction Isocrates distinguishes between two stages or 
procedures: 
(a) a preparatory stage, during which one establishes what one wants to 
achieve with the discourse to be produced: its τέλος. This entails not only 
the discourse as a whole, but also its component parts; 
(b) an inventive stage, during which a selection is made of those ίδέαι 
by which the purpose of the discourse can be achieved.51 
The phrase τέλος δπερ ύπεθέμεθα suggests that the discourse's purpose is 
equivalent to its ΰπόθεσις or "subject". An example of this is the Busins, in 
which Isocrates wishes to present a eulogy for the tyrant Busiris. He 
wants to present a correct specimen of the genre "eulogy" and thus to 
instruct his rival Polycrates, who had produced an incorrect eulogy of 
the same tyrant. Isocrates announces in his prooemium that he will 
present a discourse περί την αύτην ύπόθεσιν (9).52 
The use, then, of έξεργασθήσεται "to bring to completion" is 
significant. The ίδέαι of the discourse are presented as instrumental 
4 9
 On the authenticity of this letter see Blass Π (1892), 110, 297-99, Steidle (1952), 265, Too 
(1995), 196-199, Mikkola (1954), 291 f argues against its authenticity, further study of the 
problem of authenticity of the Isocratean letters is desired to date no detailed study is available 
that incorporates linguistic entena like particle-usage, further, the fact that most letters are similar 
with regard to their content to some of the discourses, might raise doubts could it be that they in 
fact are progymnasmatic wntings ("present Isocrates' concept X in letter-form")'' See ρ 13 
5 0
 It is my custom to soy to those who study my philosophy, that they should first investigate 
what ts to be accomplished by the discourse and by the parts of the discourse, when we have found 
that and have accurately determined it, then, I say, the forms must be sought by which this can be 
developed and the goal that we have set ourselves can be achieved. 
5 1
 Gaines (1990), 165 calls these the stages of "intellection" (a) and "invention" (b), see ρ 44 on 
[13] and ρ 59 below 
5 2
 Cf X,l and commentary, ρ 167 ad locum 
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(διά) to the achievement of the discourse's purpose. The metaphor 
implies that these ίδέαι are used as if they were building material: the 
verb έξεργάζεσθαι is used to refer to the activity of completing something 
by building, e.g. in Th. νΐ,101,1-2:...έτείχιζον οι Άθεναίοιτον κρημνόν τον 
ύπερ τοΰ ελους...έπειδη το προς τον κρημνόν έξείργαστο.53 
The verb ζητείν implies an activity of looking for materia], and the 
material to be found is explicitly qualified in teleological terms. This 
implies that one should choose what is conducive to the achievement of 
the goal set. This, in its turn, implies a deliberate choice and hence 
selection of the material. 
This leaves the question about what the passage reveals about the 
ίδέαι. According to Gaines54, the passage can be connected with "what 
we know about Isocrates' theory of the parts of the speech", a theory to be 
distilled from Dionysius' Lystas 16. There an analysis is offered of the 
Lysias' capabilities with regard to what we know as the traditional parts 
of the speech (partes orationis): prooemium, diegesis etc. This analysis is 
based on the methods of division "as favoured by Isocrates and his 
school": 
περί τε προοιμίων καί διηγήσεων και των άλλων μερών τοΰ λόγου και 
διαλέξομαι και δηλώσω, ποΐός τίς έστιν έν έκαστη των ιδεών ό άνήρ. 
διαιρήσομαι δε αύτας, ώς Ίσοκράτει τε και τοις κατ' εκείνον τον άνδρα 
κοσμουμενοις ήρεσεν, άρξάμενος άπο τών προοιμίων.55 
This passage in Dionysius, however, has little value as evidence for the 
Isocratean theory of speech parts. First, the phrase ως Ίσοκράτει τε και 
τοις κατ' εκείνον τον άνδρα κοσμουμένοις ήρεσεν suggests that there is a 
particular way in which he and those following him equip speeches: the 
utterance at least implies the existence of a τέχνη by Isocrates. That there 
has ever been such a τέχνη is, however, highly improbable.56 At most, it 
5
' The Athenians stoned fortifying the edge over the swamp .after they had finished <the 
fontfication> up to the edge, cf Г .4,3, for εξεργασία as 11 for treatment (as part of the 
πραγματικός τόπος) in later rhetorical theory see D HJsaeus 3, Isocrates 12 and esp 4, where 
Isocrates is praised for his superior arrangement and division of subject-matter (τάξις και μερισμοί 
των πραγμάτων), and its treatment by way of argumentation (εξεργασία κατ' επιχείρημα), see 
Martin (1974), 217, 228 
5 4
 Games (1990), 167 & nn 8-12 
' O H Lysias 16 / shall go on to talk about the introduction, narrative and other parts of the 
speech, and to demonstrate the orator's (sc Lysias') characteristics m each part I shall dcvide them 
up according to the arrangement favoured by Isocrates and his school, beginning with the 
introduction [tr Usher 19741 
5 6
 See for a recent discussion of the question and a convincing argument against the existence of 
such a techne by Cahn (1989), 121-144, see also Ch I, § 3 
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could be argued on the basis of this that there were rhetoricians who 
ascribed their methods of speech division to Isocrates. Second, since the 
speech Dionysius analyzes is by Lysias and furthermore belongs to the 
dicanic genre, it is only to be expected that the ίδέαι refer to the 
traditional parts of the dicanic speech. Isocrates, however, frequently 
insists on the epideictic character of his discourses, even if they adopt the 
outward form the deliberative genre (see Ch. I, § 2). One should not 
conclude, therefore, that Isocrates' "parts" were identical with 
prooemium, diegesis, etc. 
The process of selection is also implied in XV,180 f., where 
Isocrates compares his education in philosophy with the physical 
education in gymnastics (παιδοτριβικη). This analogy originates from 
the acknowledgement that human nature consists of two parts, the 
physical and the mental. The mental part is the more important, because 
of its hegemonical function. For these two components two educational 
arts were devised: physical training of gymnastics for the body and 
mental training or philosophy for the mind. Both these arts are, 
according to Isocrates, each other's corresponding counterparts. Since 
they belong to each other, they are consistent with one another (διττάς 
επιμελείας., αντίστροφους57 και σύζυγος και σφίσιν αύταΐς όμολογουμένας). 
He then proceeds to describe both methods of training, closely observing 
the analogy between the two: 
[6] XV, 183-4 έπειδάν γαρ λάβωσι μαθητάς, οι μεν παιδοτρίβαι τα σχήματα 
τα προς άγωνίαν εΰρημένα τους φοιτώντας διδάσκουσιν, οι δε περί την 
φιλοσοφίαν οντες τας ιδέας άπάσας, αίς ό λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, 
διεξέρχονται τοις μαθηταΐς. έμπειρους δε τούτων ποιήσαντες και 
διακριβώσαντες έν τούτοις πάλιν γυμνάζουσιν αυτούς, και πονείν έθίζουσι, 
και συνείρειν καθ' εν εκαστον ών εμαθον άναγκάζουσιν, 'ίνα ταΰτα 
βεβαιότερον κατάσχωσι και των καιρών έγγυτέρω ταΐς δόξαις γένωνται.
58 
5 7
 On αντίστροφος as characterizing an analogy cf Plato Gorg 462 Ь - 466 a (Ine analogies oí 
real arts and flattery), Anst Rh 1,1 (rhetoric / dialectic), see Grimaldi (1980), ad loc, L D Green, 
"Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of αντίστροφος", Rhetonca 8 (1990), 5-28 
5
° When they accept pupils, the physical trainers instruct their followers m the postures devised 
for the contest, while the teachers of philosophy go through all the forms which discourse uses 
with their pupils And when they have made them familiar with these and have gone into them in 
detail, then they put hem to exercises, and make them used to hard work, and force them to string 
together, one after the other, the lessons they learnt, m order that they get a firmer grasp of them 
and with the theories approach the occasions <ofapplicanon> 
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The significant analogy is between the ίδέοι of philosophy (rhetoric) 
and the σχήματα of physical training, as part of a comprehensive didactic 
procedure. As the following remarks by Isocrates (184-185) make clear, 
this procedure of training entails not only what one might call 
theoretical knowledge (διδάσκουσι and διεξέρχονται imply instruction 
by the transfer of knowledge), but also elements of practice or exercise 
and, as a prerequisite to successful teaching, the presence of natural 
ability in the student. Thus one finds in these chapters a comprehensive 
view on didactics, organized on the principle of the so-called trias 
paedagogica: φύσις, επιστήμη, μελέτη.59 It should be noted that Isocrates 
explicitly limits the scope of επιστήμη to the elementary level. In 184 he 
writes: 
τω μεν γαρ είδέναι περιλαβεΐν αυτούς (sc. τους καιρούς) ούχ οίοντ' εστίν · έπί 
γαρ απάντων των πραγμάτων διαφεύγουσι τάς έπιστήμας, οι δέ μάλιστα 
προσέχοντες τον νουν και δυνάμενοι θεωρείν το συμβαίνον ως έπί το πολύ 
πλειστάκις αυτών τυγχάνουσι.
60 
The preference of δόξα "opinion" over επιστήμη "knowledge" is 
fundamental to Isocrates' view on didactics and, therefore, on rhetoric in 
general. According to him, attainment of exact knowledge is impossible 
for humankind, and the highest level achievable is that of opinion. With 
this, however, Isocrates does not mean subjective opinion: in his view it 
is opinion based on experience and observation, which enables the 
intelligent man to judge and gain insight in situations as they arise. On 
the basis of what regularly happens in similar circumstances the 
intelligent and educated man can take the right decisions by drawing 
on his experience. Thus, in the process of acquiring expertise, opinion is 
the necessary complement to knowledge.61 
5 9
 Cf II, 35 (on learning the requirements for good kingship) 8 τι αν άκριβωσαι βούλησης δν 
έπίστασβαι προσήκει τους βασιλείς, εμπειρία μέτιθι και φιλοσοφία- το μεν γαρ φιλοσοφείν τας 
οδούς σοι δείξει, το 6' ел' αυτών των έργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαί σε χρησθαι τοις πράγμασι 
ποιήσει {whenever you wish to determine precisely the things which it is fitting for kings to 
know, pursue these both by practice and theory to theorize will show you the ways, and training 
in the actual doing of things will make you capable of dealing with affairs; see Steidle (1952), 257 
f, Burk (1923), 94 f. Shorey (1909), 185-201 
°0 for with knowledge they cannot be grasped, because in all cases they elude exact science; but 
those who most apply their intelligence and are capable of observing the consequence as it 
happens for the most part, can most often hit on them 
61
 Cf ΧΙΙΙ,Ι-3, XV.271, see Wersdorfer (1940), 45-46, Mikkola (1954), 22 f; 97-103; see also 
Gillis (1969), 321-348, esp. 327-332 (to be used with care), Rummel (1979), 26-28 (where 
"situational" is to be preferred to "relativisuc" as a characterization of Isocratean ethics: see below, 
ρ 49, 178-179), cf also Gorgias Hel 11, Pal. 24. 
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In the first stage of the didactic procedures, the aim of physical 
training is to teach "postures": positions or stances, which a participant in 
a bodily contest needs to know and master in order to perform well and 
be successful. These can be interpreted as the techniques belonging to a 
particular kind of contest, such as wrestling. They are analogous to the 
techniques used in discourse. Learning these elementary techniques 
does not mean that all of them will always be used when occasion 
arises: this is made clear by a passage in Quinuhan, who seems to draw 
on this Isocratean analogy when he compares rhetorical instruction to 
the teaching by trainers of wrestling. The trainers do not teach their 
pupils the various throws in order that they use all of them in a wrestling 
match, the outcome of which depends on other factors as well. They 
equip them, however, with a store from which to choose in a particular 
situation. 6 2 Similarly, it is up to the speaker, as to his analogon the 
wrestler, to select from his store of potentialities, when he finds himself 
in a situation where he must draw on the technique he has learned. 
The word σχήμα itself is used by Isocrates in a rhetorical-technical 
sense in the opening of the Antidosis, where he gives his reasons for 
having chosen the form of an apology for his discourse. An encomium 
would not have served his purposes, because he would not be able to 
address all the points he selected for treatment, and he would have 
incurred the envy of his audience (8): 
ει μεν ούν έπαινεΐν έμαυτον έπιχειροίην, έώρων οϋτε περιλαβείν άπαντα περί 
&ν διέλθει ν προηρύμην οίος τε γενησόμενος, οΰτ' έπιχαρίτως ούδ' 
άνεπιφθόνως ειπείν περί αυτών δυνησόμενος.63 
The arguments against the use of an encomium are concerned with 
generic convention: the genre of the encomium has its own rules and 
therefore excludes some of the subject-matter selected by Isocrates; 
6 2
 Quint 10 XII,2,12 et ut palaestnci doctores lllos, quos numéros vocani, non ldcirco 
discentibus tradunt, ut us omnibus и. qui didicennt, in ipso luclandi certanune utantur (plus cium 
pondere et fìrmitate et spintu agitur), sed ut subsit copia illa, ex qua unum aut alteram, cuius se 
occasio dedent, efficiant, see R G Austin, Quintilioni Instilutiones Oratonae Liber XII, Oxford 
1948 (= 1954), 80 ad loc on the "athletic" simile in general he does not, however, refer to 
Isocrates, cf Quint IO XII, 10,41, X, 1,4 verum nos non quo modo sit instituendus orator hoc 
loco dicimus sed athleta, qui omnes lam perdidicent a praeceptore numéros, quo genere 
exercitauonis ad certamina praeparandus sit Igitur eum qui res ìnvenire et disponete seiet, verba 
quoque et eligendi et collocandi rauonem percepcnt, instruamus qua ratione quod didicent faceré 
quam optane, quam facilitine possit, see W Peterson, Quintilioni Institutions Oratonae Über X, 
Oxford 1958 (= 1903), ad loc 
*3 I saw that if I were to try to praise myself, I would not be able to include all the points I chose 
for treatment, nor would it be possible for me to speak on them with favourable reception or 
without incurring envy 
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secondly, a discourse of praise on oneself is likely to provoke negative 
reactions on the part of the audience 6 4 The form of the apology also 
enables him to answer all the calumnies brought against him and is 
therefore most suited: 
ei δε ύποθείμην αγώνα ... έμαυτον δ' έν απολογίας σχήματι τους λόγους 
ποιούμενον, οΰτως αν έκγενέσθαι μοι μάλιστα διαλεχθήναι περί απάντων ων 
τυγχάνω βουλόμενος.65 
The apology and its conventions enable the speaker to present himself 
and his case in a certain way. By adopting this literary format, Isocrates 
will be able to address all the topics he has selected: he adopts the 
s tance 6 6 of the defendant before a court of law and refutes all the 
incriminations brought forward by the imaginary adversary (a fictional 
character manipulated, of course, by himself). 
(2) part and whole 
Again in the Antidosu Isocrates discusses briefly poetry and prose, 
and says that there are no fewer "ways of prose" (τρόποι τών λόγων) than 
there are of poetry. He enumerates some of these kinds of prose-writing: 
genealogy (oi τα γενή τα των ημιθέων αναζητούντες), interpretation of 
poetry (οι περί τους ποιητάς έφιλοσόφησαν), military history (oi τάς 
πράξεις τάς έν πολέμοις συναγαγεΐν έβουλήθησαν), and dialogue (οι περί 
τας ερωτήσεις καί τάς αποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν).67 Then he writes: 
[7] XV, 46 εΐη δ' αν ού μικρόν έργον, ει πάσας τάς ιδέας τάς τών λόγων 
έξαριθμείν έπιχειρήσειεν.68 
Неге ιδέα is used parallel to τρόπος and refers to the different forms or 
kinds of prose-writing. As the reference here is to discourses as 
6 4
 On the conventions of encomiastic writing see the Busins, a lesson-by-example containing 
theory as well, see Bons (1996), the envy is a topos cf Gorgias Pal 28 περί έμοΰ βούλομαι 
ειπείν έπίφθονον μεν αληθές δε 
6 5
 but if I would use the fiction of a mal having myself speak m the manner of an apology, 
thus if would best be possible for me to discuss all the points I want 
6 6
 For σχήμα as "stance" cf Plut QC 747 В it is one of the means of expression, next to 
φοραί "steps" and δείξεις "gestures", in acting (comparable to dancing), cf Plato Leg VII, 795 
E, 816 A, Xen Symp Π,Ι5, 19, Anst Poet 1447 a 26-28, Lucianus De saltu 19, cf LSJ s v. 
σχηματίζεινί,ΐ 
6 7
 See ρ 42 with n 78 
6 8
 It would be no small task for one to enumerate all forms of prose 
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specimens of a certain distinct literary category, it is the specific aspect 
of the whole of a work which is relevant here. The way it presents itself 
in form and content is the criterion for classification. The matter of 
distinguishing genera in prose is taken up again by Isocrates in XII, I: see 
p. 13,35. 
With this one may compare a passage from the Bustrts. This 
encomium was composed by Isocrates as reaction to a similar discourse 
published by the rhetorician Polycrates of Samos, who had also written 
an "Accusation of Socrates" He, however, allegedly made some 
fundamental mistakes against the rules of encomiastic writing in his 
Defense of Busms, and Isocrates wishes to correct him by producing an 
exemplary encomium of his own (4: πειράσομαί σοι ποιήσαι καταφανές 
δτι πολύ του δέοντος έν άμφοτέροις τοις λόγοις διήμαρτες69). After showing 
how Polycrates has gone astray (5-8), Isocrates explicitly states his 
intention. He wishes to make dear what the prescriptions70 are for the 
writing of eulogy and apology (πειράσομαί .δηλώσαι.. έξ ών έδει και τον 
επαινον και την άπολογίαν ποιήσασθαι) by treating the same subject again 
(την αυτήν ΰπόθεσιν). One of the genene conventions discussed by 
Isocrates is the question about allowing fictionahty In ch. 33 he 
introduces the problem of truth and falsehood, and stipulates that false 
arguments can be allowed, provided that they are credible, which in 
tum depends on their being possible or probable He says: 
[8] XI, 33 επειτ' ει και τυγχάνομεν αμφότεροι ψευδή λέγοντες, αλλ' 
ουν έγώ μεν κέχρημαι τούτοις τοις λόγοις οίσπερ χρή τους έπαινοΰντας, σύ δ' 
οίς προσήκει λοιδοροΰντας ώστ' ού μόνον της αληθείας αυτών άλλα και της 
ιδέας όλης δι' ής εΰλογεΐν δει φαίνει διημαρτηκώς 7 1 
The mistake Polycrates made against the conventions of the encomium 
is twofold, first, he used untrue arguments lacking credibility; second, 
he used the kind of arguments that belong to another genre and 
therefore failed to observe the rules that govern the format of eulogy 
691 will try to make if clear to you that you in both discourses have fallen far short of what is 
required 
7 0
 See ρ 49 with n 100 
'l Further, even if both of us have spoken untruth, I at least have used those arguments one 
should use when writing praise but you used those as fit those who revile, consequently, you not 
only made a mistake regarding their truthfulness, but also regarding the whole form which one 
must employ in eulogy 
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'Ιδέα της ευλογίας can be interpreted as the complete set of rules out of 
which eulogy is composed. The result of the appropriate use of 
conventional arguments is, in this case, a discourse that presents itself as, 
or has the form of, a eulogy.72 
In the opening of the Panegyricus Isocrates discusses the principle 
of υπερβολή, the necessity for a literary author to improve on the work of 
predecessors.73 A precondition for the realisation of this aim is, besides 
the presence of the suitable situation in general and the treatment of the 
subject at hand being imcomplete, the possibility of literary variation: 
[9] IV, 7 ει μεν μηδαμώς άλλως οΐόντ' ήν δηλοΰν τας αύτάς πράξεις 
αλλ' ή δια μιας ιδέας, εΪχεν αν τις ύπολαβείν ώς περίεργον έστι τον αυτόν 
τρόπον έκείνοις λέγοντα πάλιν ένοχλεΐν τοις άκούουσιν · επειδή δε οι λόγοι 
τοιαΰτην εχουσι την φύσιν, ώστ' οΪόντ' είναι περί των αυτών πολλαχώς 
έξηγήσασθαι..
74 
Discourses are capable of variation in presentation and expression, and 
therefore it is possible to treat (δηλοΰν)7 5 the same subject in different 
ways. 'Ιδέα refers to the form which is the final result of that treatment: 
the discourse as it presents itself to its recipient. 
The point of generic appropriateness к also made in the Helen. In 
the introduction of this discourse Isocrates criticizes his forerunner 
(maybe Gorgias of Leontini, but see the commentary ad loc), who 
mistakenly produced an apology of Helen while maintaining to have 
written an encomium. At this point Isocrates writes: 
[10] X, 15 εστί δ' ούκ έκ των αυτών ιδεών ούδε περί των αυτών έργων ό 
λόγος, άλλα πάν τουναντίον άπολογείσθαι μεν γαρ προσήκει περί τών 
άδικεΐν αίτίαν εχόντων, έπαινεϊν δε τους έπ' άγαθω τινί διαφέροντας.
76 
7 2
 Cf. Ar. Αν 993 τί δ' ου σύ δράσων; τ ίς δ' ιδέα βουλεύματος; (what will you do now7 What 
do you plan71 what does your plan look like7 7, on the implication of completeness m όλης see 
ρ 54 with n 117 and ρ 62 
7 3 SeeChIV, 128-133 
7 4
 if it were m noother way possible to present the same subject-matter except in one form, one 
might suppose it to be superfluous to trouble the audience once more by speaking m the same 
way as those <before hun>, but since discourses are of such nature that they can go on at length 
in many different ways on the same subject 
7 5
 See ρ 45-46 
7 6
 This discourse does not consist of the same forms nor is it about the same actions, but quite 
the contrary a plea in defense is appropriate for those who are charged with doing wrong, and 
praise for those who excel иг some good quality 
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It seems, then, that a discourse belonging to a certain genre consists of 
(έστι έκ) certain ίδέαι that are appropriate to each separate genre and not 
to the other. This means that a discourse is envisaged as being built from 
(a number of) parts. Secondly, this passage indicates implicitly that the 
author must be conscious of the rule of generic convention and must act 
accordingly when, as in this case, composing an apology or eulogy. 
This again means that the aspect of selection of ίδέαι is present here as 
well. At the same time the generic distinction implies a difference of 
content these ίδέαι have: in the case of apology the material and 
argument the author uses must be different from eulogy, and vice versa. 
Thus ιδέα refers to both form, in the sense that a certain part or section is 
meant, and content, insofar as it refers to what is said in these parts or 
sections. In short, ιδέα can refer to both formal and material qualities of 
the discourse. 
With this one might compare Isocrates' characterisation of his 
own works as opposed to other kinds of prose, as he presents this contrast 
in the opening sections of the Panathenaicus. There he dissociates 
himself from a number of other works (λόγοι) : 
(a) works with mythical subjects (μυθώδεις) 
(b) works full of marvels and fictions (τους τερατείας και ψευδολογίας 
μεστούς) 
-two categories77 appreciated by the majority of the audience-
(c) works on history and wars of the Hellenes (τους τάς παλαιάς πράξεις 
και τους πολέμους τους 'Ελληνικούς έξηγουμένους) 
(d) works which give the impression of being expressed in a simple way 
and lacking any subtlety (ιούς απλώς δοκοΰντας είρήσθαι και μηδεμιας 
κομψότητος μετέχοντας). 
The first three categories can be generally identified as mythical (see 
below), fictional, and historiographical works. The last can be identified 
by what Isocrates adds: that kind of works is advocated by "those who are 
clever at trials" (οι δεινοί περί τους αγώνας), which means the 
7 7
 Ψευδολογία or writing which lacks αλήθεια (the property of "truth" belongs to his 
φιλοσοφία ΧΠ.260) is a category to which can belong many different kinds of writing cf X,l, 
where Platonic views are connected with the works of the εριστικοί and philosophers who 
speculate on nature their works are characterized in с 4 as ψευδή . λόγο ν; see Steidle (1952), 261-
262, commentary, ρ 167 ad loc ; Fuchs (1993), 1-12. 
// IDEA /EIDOS 42 
practitioners of forensic rhetoric.78 He then says of his own writing that 
they are on different subjects and that they furthermore 
[11] ΧΠ, 2 και πολλών μεν ενθυμημάτων γέμοντας, ούκ ολίγων δ' 
αντιθέσεων και παρισώσεων και των άλλων ιδεών τών έν ταΐς ρητορείαις 
διαλαμπουσών και τους άκούοντας έπισημαίνεσθαι και θορυβεΐν 
άναγκαζουσών
 7 9 
It seems that the ίδέαι are to be understood as other examples of that 
category of means of expression to which antitheses and parisoses 
belong, i.e. the verbal figures. With that interpretation the ίδέαι can be 
identified with what came to be called the "gorgianic figures". But 
another way of interpretation seems to be possible as well. After first 
mentioning content as a distinctive mark of his works, Isocrates adduces 
another criterium: the means of expression used in his discourses. Of 
these he explicitly mentions ενθυμήματα or "arguments", stylistic 
features "and the other forms that will give brilliance in practical 
discourse and will meet with approval and applause". Seen in this way 
Isocrates uses a classification of means of expression which can be 
labelled with the help of technical terminology from later rhetorical 
theory: the first class is concerned with thoughts and might be 
identified with the figurât sentential, the second class with expression in 
the narrow sense and is thus to be identified with the figurât verborum.60 
Both classes are ways of expression and, when applied, cause the 
discourse to have its final form Both classes are subsumed81 under the 
term ιδέα. 
That ιδέα also has to do with content and subject-matter (its 
material aspect) emerges from a passage in the protreptic discourse To 
Nicoclts, where Isocrates discusses the preferences the public has with 
regard to the content of literary works (48). A writer seeking to please his 
audience (γράφειν τι κεχαρισμένον τοις πολλοίς) should, Isocrates 
7 8
 By using the characteristics άπλας είρήσθοι and μηδεμιδς κομψότητος μετέχειν Isocrates 
clearly hints at the divide between oral and written discourse, see O'Sullivan (1992), 42-62, on 
these characteristics see also Bons (1992), 17-22, for Isocratean divisions of prose in general see 
Pfisler (1933), 457 460, Wilcox (1943), 427-431 
7 9
 they are fitti of thoughts, and of not a few balanced phrases and sounds, and of the other forms 
that will give brillance to public speaking and will make the audience applaude and cheer 
8 0
 For όχημα as "figure of speech" see Rh. ad Alex. 1438 b 6, 1444 b 34, 1449 b 14, Dem De 
cloc 263-271, see Schenkeveld (1964), 132-134 
8 1 1 take άλλος to cover both classes, see LSI s ν II-8, see also Lidov (1983), 280. 
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ironically says, abstain from writing works that are profitable 
(ώφελιμωτάτους των λόγων). He will, rather, acknowledge that the 
multitude appreciates works containing mythical fiction 
(μυθωδεστάτους)82. The multitude like listening to this, just as they like 
looking at competitions and contests: άκούοντες μεν γαρ των τοιούτων (= 
works of fiction) χαίρουσι, θεωρούντες δε τους αγώνας και τάς άμιλλας. 
Therefore Homer and the inventors of tragedy deserve admiration, 
because they understood this aspect of human nature and 
[12] II, 48 άμφοτέραις ταΐς ίδέαις ταύταις κατεχρήσαντο προς την 
ποίησιν.
83 
By ίδέαι Isocrates refers to the two sources of pleasure for the multitude, 
fiction and agonistics (combative situations), which Homer and the 
early tragedians used in their works. The verb κατεχρήσαντο is used in 
the technical sense of "using raw material for a work of literature". 
Homer did this by putting the contests and wars of the demigods into 
mythical fiction (ό μέν γαρ τους αγώνας και τους πολέμους τους των 
ημιθέων έμυθολόγησεν), the tragic poets by making myths into contests 
and actions (oi δε τους μύθους εις αγώνας και πράξεις κατέστησαν).84 If, 
then, the aim of an author is to have an attentive audience, which is 
expressed by the verb ψ υ χ α γ ω γ ε ί ν , he should abstain from 
admonishment and advice (νουθετείν και συμβουλεύειν) - the aim of 
Isocrates' own writing -, and say the kind of things he sees his audience 
appreciate: τα δε τοιαύτα λεκτέον οίς όρώσι τους όχλους χαίροντας. Both 
these elements, mythical fiction and agonistic activities, are potential 
subject-matter for a writer: thus ιδέα is here used in a material sense, as it 
refers to these forms of material to be used in a literary work. 
8 2
 For μυθώδης in Isocrates cf ΓΧ.10; XII, 1,237; esp. Г .28 where Ihe myth of Demeter bringing 
civilisation to Attica (an early example of "Kulturentstehungslehre") is introduced as a μυθώδης ό 
λόγος; this might indicate that by μυθώδης Isocrates means "mythical", m the sense that the 
material of the story is drawn from myth. 
8 3
 They used both these forms for the production (of their works). 
8 4
 See on χρήσις; one might compare Anst Poet. 14, I4S3 b 22 on the use the poet can make of 
traditional story material in tragedy Ιούς μεν ουν παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν οΰκ εστίν (he 
mentions two examples), αυτόν δε εϋρίσκειν δει καΐ τοις παραδεδομενοις χρήσθαι καλώς "(the 
poet) cannot interfere with the traditional stones , but should invent for himself and make good 
use of the traditional material", I take καί as explanatory, the "good use" consists of ingenious 
variation, not shaping whole new plots, see Lucas (1968), 152 ad loc. 
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(3) plurality 
In the prooemium of the Helen Isocrates stresses that he will 
present a work of praise that has serious intention, which should not be 
compared to the gratuitous works of other writers of encomia. Of his own 
work he says: 
[13] X, 11 οι δε κοινοί και πιστοί και τούτοις όμοιοι των λόγων δια 
πολλών ιδεών και καιρών δυσκαταμαθήτων ευρίσκονται τε και λέγονται85 
Serious discourse deserves that qualification not just on the basis of its 
subject-matter, but also because of certain formal characteristics. Here 
Isocrates stipulates that serious discourse comes into existence by a 
procedure of invention and expression, which entails the presence of a 
multitude of ίδέαι. Serious discourse is, therefore, not simple, in the 
sense that the plurality of forms implies complexity. On the καιροί as 
"measures" of discourse, see further below, Ch. III. 
When defending his activity as a teacher of rhetoric in the 
Antidosis, Isocrates points out that one should differentiate between 
himself and the writers of speeches concerning private contracts 
(λόγους...περί των ιδίων συμβολαίων). He, on the other hand, is 
concerned with writing discourses that he characterizes as "Hellenic, 
political and panegyric" ('Ελληνικούς και πολιτικούς και πανηγυρικούς), 
meaning that they deal with matters relevant to all Hellenes, are of 
interest to the body politic, and are appropriate to be heard at communal 
festivals. This kind of discourse can be classified more easily together 
with works that are set to music and are rhythmical than with forensic 
speeches (οΰς άπαντες αν φήσαιεν ομοιότερους είναι τοις μετά μουσικής και 
ρυθμών πεποιημένοις ή τοις έν δικαστηρίω λεγομένοις86). The difference 
pointed at here is that between works that are "made" (πεποιημένοις) and 
works that are "spoken" (λεγομένοις), in other words: between written 
and oral discourses. This difference he explains further: 
8 5
 But the discourses of common interest, the ones that are trustworthy and similar to these, are 
devised and put to words through a multitude of forms and measures that are hard to learn 
°° (discourses) that all would agree are more like the works made with music and rhythm than the 
ones spoken in a court of law 
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[14] XV, 47 και γαρ τρ λέξει ποιητικωτέρα και ποικιλωτέρα τας 
πράξεις δηλοΰσι, και τοις ένθυμήμασιν όγκωδεστέροις και καινοτεροις 
χρήσθαι ζητοΰσιν, ετι δε ταΐς άλλαις ίδέαις έπιφανεστέραις και πλείοσιν 
όλον τον λόγον διοικοΰσιν
 8 7 
On the basis of this passage a number of observations can be made The 
statement is clearly divided in three parts (και γαρ δηλοΰσι / 
και ζητοΰσιν / ετι δε διοικοΰσιν), which indicates that Isocrates has 
three differences between written and oral discourse in mind These 
seem to be (a) the manner of expression, (b) the way of using 
arguments, (c) the way of using ίδέαι In all these respects Isocrates' 
works are more like poetry than delivered discourse Each of these will 
be discussed separately 
With respect to (a) one may compare IX,9-10, where Isocrates 
explains why it is more difficult for writers of prose to compose an 
encomium than it is for poets This is due to the fact that poets have more 
means of verbal equipment at their disposal (τοις ποιηταΐς πολλοί 
δέδονται κόσμοι), of which he specifies the following 
και γαρ πλησιάζοντας τους θεούς τοις άνθρώποις οίον τ' αύτοίς ποιήσαι και 
διαλεγομένους και συναγωνιζόμενους οίς αν βουληθωσι, και περί τούτων 
δηλωσαι μη μόνον τοις τεταγμένοις όνόμασιν, άλλα τα μεν ξένοις, τα δε 
καινοΐς, τά δε μεταφοραϊς, και μηδέν παραλιπείν, άλλα πάσι τοις εΐδεσι 
διαποικΐλαι την ποίησιν 
- they can represent the gods as associating with men, and have them 
speak to or help in battle whomsoever they please, 
- they can treat these subjects not only in ordinary, conventional 
language, but also in exotic words, neologisms, metaphor, 
- they don't have to leave anything out, but can variegate the work they 
make with all kinds (of ornament) 
Isocrates distinguishes here between representation and phrasing, the 
first bemg an aspect of content, the second of form Finally, he says that 
poets have license in both these aspects both are κόσμοι to be used for 
variation (διαποικΐλαι) ю 
8 7
 For they treat the subject matter with an expression more poetical and variegated, and seek to 
use thoughts more impressive and fresh, and further they also give order to the speech as a whole 
with forms that more conspicuous and greater m number 
8 8
 See Zucker (1927) 247-8 
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The feature of phrasing can serve as a specification of (a) in [10]: in the 
way they set forth (δηλοΰσι) their subject-matter, Isocrates' works are 
akin to the works of the poets, who enjoy license in their choice of 
words. Freedom in this respect is one of the means of ornament which 
serve to variegate. In this sense he can characterize his works as 
ποιητικός and ποικίλος. 
For (b) again the comparison in ΙΧ,ΙΟ between prose and poetry is 
relevant. Whereas poets have a great freedom of choice, the writer of 
prose does not: 
τοις δε περί τους λόγους ουδέν εξεστι των τοιούτων, αλλ' άποτόμως και των 
ονομάτων τοις πολιτικοίς μόνον και των ενθυμημάτων τοις περί αύτας τάς 
πράξεις άναγκαΐόν έστι χρησθαι.
8
' 
The same two aspects, albeit in chiastic order, are identified for the 
writer of prose: with regard to expression (form) he must restrict himself 
to current usage, and with regard to "thoughts" (content) to relevance to 
the subject. An ενθύμημα is connected to subject-matter and can be used 
(χρησθαι) in the treatment of subject-matter. The same distinction is 
made somewhat further on in the same passage: there Isocrates says that 
the influence of rhythm and metre in poetical works is so strong that 
poets can retain their hearer's attention with these very features, even if 
they are deficient in style (λέξις) and thought (ενθυμήματα): (such is the 
charm of metre and rhythm) ώστ' αν καΐ τ¥[ λέξει και τοις ένθυμήμασιν 
εχη κακώς, ομως αύταΐς ταΐς εύρυθμίαις και ταΐς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοΰσι 
τους άκσύοντας. 
In ΧΙΙΙ.16 Isocrates says that one task of the composer of discourses 
is to variegate the whole speech with thoughts: τοις ένθυμήμασι πρεπόντως 
όλον τον λόγον καταποικίλαι. The verb καταποικΐλαι makes it clear that 
he is thinking of the means of equipment (κόσμοι) in poetical discourse, 
in which both form and content are included. The use of πρεπόντως 
suggests that the presence of the ενθυμήματα should be clearly 
perceptible, which means that they should not only occupy a fitting 
position but also that they should be conspicuous in their presence.90 
Taken by itself, ενθύμημα as "thought" is prior to the activity of 
expression: it is already present and is potential raw material to be used 
8 9
 For prose-wnlers none of such things is possible, but they absolutely must only use current 
words in expression, and things relevant to the subject itself in argumentation. 
9 0
 Cf AnsL Rh Ш,7, on πρέπον (and its difference from προσήκον) see ch Ш, 95 & n 102. 
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(χρήσις) in the composition of the discourse. This involves selection, in 
order to use the thoughts relevant to the subject-matter at hand, as 
emerges from TV,9, where that subject-matter is past events or history: 
at μεν γαρ πράξεις αϊ προγεγενημέναι.,.το δε έν καιρώ ταυταΐς 
καταχρήσασθαι και τα προσήκοντα περί έκαστης ένθυμηθηναι και τοις 
όνόμασιν ευ διαθέσθαι των ευ φρονσύντων ΐδιόν εστίν.91 
Here the use of the past as subject-matter is presented in three aspects: 
first, it should be used with a sense of measure (on which see Ch. Ill); 
then, on each separate event one should develop relevant thoughts; and 
finally, one should give attention to good expression. The second aspect 
is one of invention: when it is decided that a certain historical event 
should be included in the discourse, then one must develop thoughts on 
that subject that are fitting and that belong to it (προσήκοντα). 
In 11,11 there is a more specified use of ένθυμέομαι in this technical 
sense. In his advice to the young king Nicodes Isocrates stresses the 
need for the monarch of developing his intellectual capacities, and he 
uses an a fortiori argument: as the athlete trains his body, so the king will 
even more train his mind, because the prize for the king is superior. 
Isocrates goes on to remark: ων ένθυμοΰμενον χρή προσεχειν τον νουν92. 
The "thought" here referred to is the argument just mentioned. This 
passage, for which there are many parallels9 3, confirms the 
interpretation of ενθύμημα in a technical sense as "argument". 
In XII,2 Isocrates says that one thing that makes his discourses 
different is that they "are filled with many thoughts" (πολλών 
ενθυμημάτων γέμοντας). With this phrase may be compared what he says 
in V.109 on the potential topics for praising Heracles: many have 
singled out his valour and labours in their hymns, but nobody has dealt 
with his excellences of spirit (των τη ψυχή προσόντων αγαθών 
οΰδείς...φανήσεται μνείαν πεποιημένος). He continues: 
εγώ δ' όρώ μεν τόπον ίδιον και παντάπασιν άδιεξέργαστον, οΰ μικρόν ουδέ 
κενόν, άλλα πολλών μέν επαίνων και καλών πράξεων γέμοντα, ποθοΰντα δε 
τον άξίως αν δυνηθέντα διαλεχθηναι περί αυτών.
94 
9 1
 the events of the past to use them with due measure, and to concene relevant thoughts on 
each of them, and to set them forth effectively m words, is the peculiar gift of the intelligenL 
9 2
 Bearing thai thought m mind, you should be attentive 
9 3
 Cf. IV.122, V.78,118, VI.52, П,3, Ш,б,121, ХГ ,51; Х .Ш.ПЗ, Ер П,9 
9 4 1 , however, see afield of its own and entirely lacking treatment, not small or empty, but full 
of many subjects for praise and honourable actions, that yearns for one who is able to produce a 
treatment worthy of the subject 
II. IDEA /EIDOS 48 
On the general subject of Heracles' spiritual qualities Isocrates sees 
many possibilities for original95 treatment and development (see above 
on έργάζεσθαι): that particular field is "filled" with many subjects for 
praise and beautiful actions, all of which can be used in discourse. Thus 
these subjects can be considered specific examples of what Isocrates calls 
ενθυμήματα or thoughts: they are arguments to be used in the treatment 
of a subject 
The attributes ογκώδης and καινός used in [10] (b) to qualify 
ενθύμημα are compatible with this interpretation. When used with 
"thought" the verb όγκόω is used in a technical sense as "to confer 
dignity", e.g. in Longinus, where the question is raised to what extent 
Plato was able to confer dignity in the opening of his Epitaphios (= 
Menexenvs 236 d): άρα δη τούτοις μετρίως ώγκωσε την νόησιν.96 The need 
for the composer of discourse to present "new" arguments will be dealt 
with seperately further below, Ch. Г . 
For the use of ίδέαι, aspect (c) under [10], the verb διοικείν "to 
manage a household" suggests the idea of management or ordering. 
The verb is used in connection with the content of a discourse and its 
arrangement in other instances as well. In the prooemium of his 
Panathenaicus Isocrates announces what will be the content of his speech: 
he will speak on his own life and ways, and will try to give insight into 
the work to which he is devoted. By doing so Isocrates expects to live free 
from annoyance, but this will happen only if he succeeds in putting 
forth a well-ordered discourse (XII, 6): 
ην γαρ ταύτα τφ λόγω δυνηθώ διοικησαι κατά τρόπον.
97 
Ταύτα is the object to διοικησαι and refers to the just announced subject-
matter of the discourse. The focus here is more than just on 
management, but rather on good management. The phrase κατά τρόπον 
suggests correctness, a state of being in accordance with the rule.98 In 
this sense the same expression is used by Isocrates on correct behaviour. 
9 5
 On ίδιον as the term for "originality" see commentary, p. 172 on X,13. 
" Long. Suhl. 28,1 : is if in a slight degree only that he has magnified the concept by the use of 
these words'; cf Arist. Rh. Ш.6; See O'Sullivan (1992), 12 & n. S3 on όγκος in literary 
criticism. 
9 7
 If lam able to manage this in my discourse in due order. 
9
" Cf. the older expressions κατά κόσμον and κατά μοίραν, in a context of literary theory to be 
interpreted as "properly", referring to the fact that (he speaker/singer knows his job: see Veidenius 
(1983), S3 & n. 183 
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A king's life consists of courses of action, and about these it is the task of 
those near him to give advice (11,6): 
καθ' έκάστην μεν ουν την πράξιν, έξ ων αν τις μάλιστα δΰναιτο κατά τρόπον 
διοικείν και τα μεν αγαθά διαφυλάττειν τάς δε συμφοράς διαφεύγειν, των αεί 
παρόντων έργον εστί συμβουλεύειν.99 
The king will manage by his policies, and good management should 
result in what is required: a situation characterised by the presence of 
good and the absence of evil. One can thus interpret κατά τρόπον in the 
sense of "according to the rule" or "correctly". 
The interpretation of κατά τρόπον as "according to the rule" 
implies that the phrase can be related to the prescriptive technical 
terminology of το δέον and its cognates.100 Furthermore, the phrase also 
suggests that the work which is in accordance with this requirement 
can be characterized as being consistent (on which see below). 
Finally, there are the attributes πλείοσιν and έπιφανέστεραις. With 
the former plurality is again suggested. A discourse as envisaged by 
Isocrates should have more than one ιδέα, and each of these should 
stand out and be clearly distinguishable. 'Επιφανής suggests that these 
ίδέαι are not only clearly visible because they are marked, but also 
because they are remarkable.101 In that sense one can draw a parallel 
between επιφανής and πρεπόντως, both attributed to ιδέα in a similar 
context (see above, p. 95). 
The clear perceptibility of ίδέαι also emerges from XII.2, where 
Isocrates contrasts his own works to other kinds of rhetoric. He stresses 
that his works are meant as advice to Athens and the whole of Hellas 
(περί εκείνους έπραγματευόμην, τους περί των συμφερόντων τη τε πόλει και 
τοις άλλοις "Ελλησι συμβουλεύοντας), and adds that they 
και πολλών μεν ενθυμημάτων γέμοντας, οΰκ ολίγων δ' αντιθέσεων καί 
παρισώσεων και των άλλων ιδεών τών έν ταΐς ρητορείαις διαλαμπουσών καί 
τους άκούοντας έπισημαίνεσθαι και θορυβείν άναγκαζουσών.102 
" Well, with regard to each course of action, it is the task of those always around him to give 
advice on the means of how to manage them properly, and how to preserve what is good and avoid 
misfortune 
1 0 0
 Cf e g ХШ.16 ας δει, cf Gorgias HeL 2 λέξαι το δέον ορθώς, see Wersdorfer (1940), 20, 
60, Steidle (1952), 264 & n 6, see also Ch IV, 124 & n 63 
'01 Cf Г .68 επιφανέστατος μεν ουν τών πολέμων ό Περσικός γέγονεν (the most famous of our 
wars was the one against the Persians), VII.62 των άλλων πόλεων ταΐς έκιφανεστάταις καί 
μεγίσταις (the most renowned and greatest of our cities) 
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 they are full of thoughts, and of not a few balanced phrases and sounds, and of the other forms 
that will give brillance to public speaking and will make the audience applaude and cheer 
Il IDEA /EIDOS 50 
The verb διαλάμπειν suggests that the ίδέαι "shine", and thus are 
conspicuously present in the composition. Interestingly it is stated what 
effect their presence will have on the audience: they will make them 
applaud10* and c h e e r 1 0 4 Here one is given insight in the rhetorical 
practice.105 A speech will be read aloud to an audience, which will react 
to what it hears, and indicate its approval. Such a situation can be 
envisaged from XII, 233, where Isocrates describes how he invited a 
number of pupils to come and listen to a speech of his: 
ευθύς παρεκέκληντο μεν ους εϊπον, προειρηκώς δ' ήν ούτοίς έφ' ö 
συνεληλυθότες ήσαν, άνέγνωστο δ' ό λόγος, έπηνημένος δ' ήν και 
τεθορυβημένος καί τετυχηκώς ωνπερ οι κατορθοϋντες έν ταΐς έπχδείξεσιν.106 
The situation is described in a clear sequence: a successful discourse is 
read aloud to an audience, that will indicate its appreciation by 
expressing praise and by applause. 
(4) connection 
(5) consistency 
The connection of ίδέαι (οίκειώσαι) and their consistency 
(όμολογουμένας ποίησαν) can be most conveniently taken together and 
subsumed under the head of Isocrates' synthetic view of the discourse. 
He stresses the fundamental unity of discourse, and argues for the 
necessary integration of all parts to a synthetic whole. In this respect one 
can point to a clear difference in approach to the sophists and their 
treatment of discourse by a division into parts. In Plato's Phaedrus 266 d 6 
f. Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the achievements of the sophists in 
rhetoric, and they point out the highlights of rhetorical theory as it 
emerges from the technical handbooks (τα έν τοις βιβλίοις τοις περί 
^ Cf Aesch 11,49 άνίσταται Δημοσθένης όρων έπισημαινόμενον τον δήμον και 
άποδεδεγμένον τους παρ' έμοϋ λόγους (Demosthenes got on his feet seeing that the people 
applauded and accepted what was said by me), Menander Phasma fr 2 (Roerte) όησημαίνεσθ' έάν 
1 ή σκευασία καθάριος ή καί ποικίλη 
1 0 4
 Cf AnsL Rh 1356 Ь 23 πιθανοί μεν ουν ούχ ήττον ο'ι λόγοι δια τών παραδειγμάτων, 
θορυβούνται δε μάλλον οι ένθυμηματικοί {speeches using paradigms are not less persuasive, but 
those with enthymemes excite more favourable audience reaction, tr Kennedy 1991) 
1 0 5
 On ρητορεία as "rhetorical practice" see Grimaldi (1980), 51 
1 0
* immediately they whom I have mentioned were summoned, I had announced beforehand to 
them for what reason they were assembled, the discourse was read aloud, I received praise and 
applause and was accorded wish the appréciation successful discourses get in displays 
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λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις)1 0 7. Socrates distinguishes between the 
following groups: 
(a) 266 d 7 - 267 b 5/ 267 d 2-6: the precepts on (the parts of) discourse 
(prooemium, narration, evidence by witnesses, indirect evidence, 
probabilities, proof, refutation for prosecution and defense), which can be 
attributed to Theodorus of Byzantium; covert allusion and indirect 
compliment, attributed to Evenus of Paros; argument from probability, 
amplification and dimunition, variation of content and length, attributed 
to Tisias and Gorgias; relative proportion of parts, attributed to Prodicus 
and Hippias; recapitulation; 
(b) 267 b 10 - d 2: the precepts on language and style by Polus, Protagoras 
and Thrasymachus of Chalcedon. 
The sophists named under category (a) are concerned with matters of 
composition, both on the level of overall structure and of argumentation: 
their concepts are relevant to the parts of the judicial speech 
(introduction, narrative, argumentation, conclusion). 1 0 8 Thus these 
sophists display an analytical approach rather than a synthetic one. 
The synthetic approach by Isocrates can be illustrated by what he 
says in the Antidosis on the generic differences within his own oeuvre. 
He states (XV, 67) that one should distinguish between his paraenetic 
works and other discourses. Before quoting from the speech To Nicocles, 
a work described by him as an advice on his part to the young king on 
how to manage his rule (συμβουλεύων ως δει των πολιτών αρχειν), 
Isocrates comments on the nature of the discourse's structure. This 
advisory discourse, he says, is written in a way different from the 
discourses he has presented extracts from so far: 
[15] XV, 67 ούχ ομοίως δε γέγραπται τοις άνεγνωσμένοις. ούτοι μεν γαρ 
το λεγόμενον όμολογούμενον αεί τω προειρημένω και συνκεκλειμένον 
εχουσιν, έν δε τούτω τουναντίον · άπολύσας γαρ από τοΰ προτέρου και χωρίς, 
ώσπερ τα καλούμενα κεφάλαια, ποιήσας, πειρωμαι δια βραχέων εκαστον ¿ ν 
συμβουλεύω φράζειν.1 0 9 
1 0 7
 On the doctnnes of the sophists on discourse in general see Rutherford (1995), 102-111 ; on 
the complications caused by Plato's misrepresentations of their views see Wilcox (1943), 113-
115,131-133; Classen (1975), 348, id (1976), 11 
1 0 8
 See Kennedy (1963), 56 f, Cole (1991), 18-19, 82-85,130-133; see also Ch. Г , 112 f.; see 
also Hamberger (1914), 6-80, Laplace (1995), 1-15. 
" " It is not written in the same way as the ones already read. In them what is said is always in 
accord with what is said before, and in necessary connection; but in this one it is the opposite: 
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The paraenesis has a very loose structure, and resembles a string of 
pieces of advice, each of which can be, as it were, taken out of the 
discourse and still be a piece of valid advice, even if isolated from the 
others and standing independently. As such the paraenetic discourses 
are comparable to wisdom-literature and gnomic advice in general, of 
which the corpus Theognideum is a good example. 1 1 0 They follow no 
linear course (άπολύσας - χωρίς) and derive their disjuncted structure 
from the enumeration of main points (κεφάλαια) of advice. 
By reversing what is said about paraenesis, one gets a clearer view 
about what is meant by the requirement of connection and consistency 
in serious discourse, which is different from paraenesis. Such discourse 
(a) should have agreeing (όμολογούμενον) parts, in the sense that latter 
parts fit to the former; 
(b) should be linear (συγκεκλειμένον), in the sense that each part is 
necessarily linked or connected with the one before. 
Thus connection and consistency are integral parts of a synthetic 
concept of discourse. 
The demand of linearity or linear development is demonstrated 
in the prooemium of the Panathenaicus, where Isocrates decides not to 
begin with the praise of Athens before concluding his polemics with his 
rivals: 
[16] XII, 24 et γαρ τοΰτ' ηδη ποιοίην μήτε τέλος έπιθεις τοις 
γεγραμμένοις μήτε συγκλείσας την αρχήν των ρηθήσεσθαι μελλόντων τη 
τελευτη των ηδη προειρημένων, όμοιος αν είναι δόξαιμι τοις εική και 
φορτικως και χύδην δ τι αν έπέλθη λέγουσιν α φυλακτέον ήμίν έστιν.1 1 1 
Thus one part must be rounded off and completed before the speaker 
proceeds to his next topic, and thus there is a connection between 
beginning and end. 
disconnecting one part from the before-going and isolating it. as it were m what is called headings. 
I try to formulate m a few words each of the items of my advice 
1 1 0
 Cf Π.43, where Hesiod, Theogras and Phocylides are mentioned as sources; see Too (1993), 
59-60 
1 1
^ If I were to do this now, without putting an end to what I have written and without 
connecting the beginning of what is going to be said to the end of what has been said just now, 1 
would resemble those who speak randomly, coarsely, and by mdtscnmenately saying what occurs 
to them this is what should be avoided by us 
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Similarly, a preference for synthetic structure of discourse is 
pronounced by Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus, during his critical discussion 
of the pseudo-Lysianic ερωτικός λόγος presented at the opening of the 
dialogue. After Phaedrus has read the speech said to be composed by 
Lysias aloud, Socrates subjects it to formal criticism, and says that Lysias 
himself would have considered it inadequate (τω γαρ ρητορικω αύτοϋ 
μόνω τον νουν προσείχον, τούτο δε ούδ' (αν) αυτόν φμην Λυσίαν οΐεσθαι 
ίκανον είναι). At 234 e 5 - 235 b 5 Socrates provides his reasons for this 
judgment: the speech is repetitive, its author seems incapable of going on 
at some length on the same subject, and leaves the impression not to care 
about the subject; he gives an impression of youthful extravangance by 
showing off his ability to say the same thing twice differendy.112 Later 
on, at 264 b 4 - e 3, Socrates adds to these criticisms the specific objection 
concerning the speech's structure. He says: 
ού χύδην δοκεΐ βεβλήσθαι τα τοΰ λόγου; ή φαίνεται το δεύτερον είρημένον εκ 
τίνος ανάγκης δεύτερον δεΐν τεθήναι, ή τι αλλο τών ρηθέντων; έμοί μεν γαρ 
εδοξεν, ώς μηδέν εϊδότι, οΰκ άγεννώς το έπιον είρήσθαι τφ γράφοντι- συ δ' 
έχεις τινά ανάγκην λογαγραφικην ί| ταύτα εκείνος ούτως εφεξής παρ* άλληλα 
εθηκεν;113 
The criticism about lack of cogency in composition resembles in its 
phraseology what Isocrates says in XII,24 (see above, [16]) about the need 
of connection and consistency, especially in the way in which the 
absence of such cogency is described: compositions like that are 
characterized as being written χύδην "haphazardly" and by a procedure 
in which the writer just puts down what comes into his head (το έπιον 
είρήσθαι Plato / ö τι αν έπέλθη λέγουσιν Isocrates). A discourse should, 
instead, according to Socrates, answer to a cogent principle of 
composition (ανάγκη λογογραφικη), which he describes by using the 
image of the living body (264 с 2-5) : 
1 1 2
 See Ch. IV, 122 f 
ИЗ aoen't his matter strike you as thrown out at haphazard7 Do you find any cogent reason for 
hts next remark, or indeed any of his remarks, occupying the place it does9 I myself, in my 
ignorance, thought that the writer, with afine abandon, put down just what came into his head. 
Can you find any cogent principle of composition which he observed m setting down his 
observations m this particular order7 [tr Hackfoith] 
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...δείν πάντα λόγον ώσπερ ζώον συνεστάναι σώμα τι έχοντα αυτόν αύτοΰ, 
ώστε μήτε άκέφαλον είναι μήτε απουν, άλλα μέσα τε εχειν και άκρα, 
πρέποντα άλλήλοις και τω δλω γεγραμμένα.114 
Socrates here introduces the concept of organic composition, which he 
illustrates with an epigram on Midas115: it has four lines, but the order of 
these lines can be changed indiscriminately and the epigram still 
makes sense. The Lysianic speech is just like this epigram and, by 
implication, appears not to conform to the requirement of organic 
composition Just as the body is made up out of functional parts, so all 
parts of a composition must have their proper function and place in order 
for the discourse to be a whole.116 
Socrates further elaborates his concept by discussing the technical 
precepts of rhetoric as taught by the sophists (266 b 2 f.), of which he says 
that they are, in fact, the preliminaries to a real art (τα προ της τέχνης, 269 
b 7-8), but that the art itself consists of τα δε έκαστα τούτων πιθανώς λέγειν 
τε και το όλον συνίστασθαι "employing them (sc. the technical rules) 
persuasively in speaking and organizing the work into a whole". 
Because the image of the body is missing, one cannot state that 
Isocrates advocates a requirement of organic unity as present in Plato, but 
the concept of connection and consistency, or coherency, at least allows 
for the conclusion that his ideas on composition in discourse compare to 
those of Plato. The synthetic approach as it emerges from (4) and (5) 
accounts for the emphasis laid by Isocrates on the procedures of χρήσις: to 
know the ίδέαι belongs to a preliminary stage, but real mastership of 
rhetoric only reveals itself in the way the "forms" are used in order to 
produce a discourse that can be regarded as a coherent whole.117 
1
 !4 any discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it were; it 
must not lack either head or feet, it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit 




 See De Vnes (1969), 212 for a discussion of the epigram as such 
1 1 6
 On organic composition see Sicking (1963), 225-242, Hellwig (1973), 322 f, Ferrari (1987), 
52-53, 74-81, Heath (1989), 12 f 
1 1 7
 Cf Anst Poet 1450 b 21-34 on unity or wholeness, the first characteristic of which is order 
(το όλον), which is defined as τα έχον αρχήν και μέσον και τελευτήν After providing definitions 
of these parts any plot should have, A concludes δει αρα τους συνεστωτας ευ μύθους μήθ' 
οπόθεν ετυχεν αρχεσθαι μήθ' οπού έτυχε τελευτάν, αλλά κεχρησθαι τοις είρημέναις ίδέαις 
"Well-ordered plots, then, must not begin or end just anywhere, but use the afore mentioned 
parts" This prescription seems to be influenced also by Isocratean synthetic theory of ίδέαι and 
their χρήσις, and not only by the Platonic concept of organic composition as proposed in the 
Phaedrus (see Lucas (1968), 111 ad loc ) 
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The usage of διοικείν in [13] also provides some further 
clarification on οϊκειώσαι, which appears in XV.ll (= [3]) and which can 
be translated with "to make fit". In [3] the idea of making a fitting 
connection between what came before and what follows is predominant. 
The image of connection is used in this sense in Х Д07, where it is 
reported that the area surrounding some cities, captured by the general 
Timotheus, was forced to come to terms with Athens: άπας ό τόπος ò 
περιέχων οικείος ήναγκάσθη τη πόλει γενέσθαι.
118
 Furthermore, the image 
of a well ordered whole as a result of connection emerges from Г ,41, in 
a description of the general characteristics of Athen's constitution: 
την τοίνυν αλλην διοίκησιν οΰτω φιλοξένως κατεσκεύασατο και προς 
απαντάς οίκείως, ώστε καί τοις χρημάτων δεομένοις καί τοις άπολαΰσαι των 
υπαρχόντων έπιθυμοΰσιν άμφοτέροις άρμόττειν.119 
The management (διοίκησις) of the state is such that it results in 
harmony and a well-ordered whole (άρμόττειν), made up of both the 
poor and the rich. Management on the level of the state is parallel to the 
management on the level of discourse: also a discourse will become a 
harmonious whole1 2 0, provided its author manages its parts well. 
4. ιδέα in non-technical contexts 
Beside the sphere of rhetorical theory and prescription, ιδέα also 
occurs in more general contexts. First, in the Panathenaicus Isocrates 
discusses the different possible kinds of polity. He writes: 
[17] ΧΠ, 132 έγώ δε φημί τάς μεν ιδέας των πολιτειών τρείς είναι 
μόνας, όλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατίαν, μοναρχίαν.121 
Here ιδέα concurs with general usage: it refers to the different forms a 
polity can have, and is thus the word with which to refer to the species in 
a certain genus. 
" 8 Cf Г , 135 προς ημάς τ' οίκείως εχουσι {people who are on friendly terms with us); V,80. 
ην. παύσρ ταΐς μεν των πόλεων οίκείως έχων, προς δε τας άλλοτρίως διακείμενος (if you stop 
being treating some cities as friends and others as strangers) 
^9 And apart from this she established her polity to such a degree open to strangers and friendly 
to all, that it adapts to both those who are in need of money and those who wish to enjoy their 
possessions 
1 2 0
 See further Ch Ш, ρ 91-98 on αρμονία in relation to καιρός 
'
2
' I hold that there only three forms of government oligarchy, democracy, monarchy 
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In the Ntcocles Isocrates has the young ruler of Salamis, Nicocles, 
pronounce the correct way of testing virtue: 
[18] Ш, 44 χρή δε δοκιμάζειν τάς άρετάς ούκ έν ταΐς αύταϊς ίδέαις 
άπάσας, άλλα την μεν δικαιοσύνην έν ταΐς άπορίαις, την δε σωφροσύνην έν 
τοις δυναστείαις, την δ' έγκράτειαν έν ταϊςτών νεωτέρων ήλικίαις.
122 
According to Isocrates, there is no comprehensive or absolute concept of 
virtue, as he also maintains in the opening paragraph of the Helen. There 
he criticizes those who expound that courage, wisdom and justice are 
one and the same thing, are not natural qualities, and can be integrated 
by a single knowledge (οι δε διεξιόντες ώς άνδρία και σοφία καί 
δικαιοσύνη ταύτον έστι, καί φύσει μεν ουδέν αυτών εχομεν, μία δ' επιστήμη 
καθ' απάντων εστίν). With regard to virtue one should differentiate 
between circumstances and judge according to the appropriate criteria. 
These consist of relevant situations, in which the particular quality 
under scrutiny can best be evaluated: justice when one remains just in 
time of poverty, temperance when one remains temperate when in 
power, self-control when one is able to control oneself as a young man. 
Thus one should look at situations in which the person to be judged 
could be tempted to act contrary to what is expected from him in terms of 
virtue. When poor, a man might feel himself forced to break the law in 
order to escape from poverty; when powerful, a man might be tempted to 
use that power to excess; when young, a man is likely to be impulsive.123 
What matters, therefore, is to evaluate behaviour as a result of "using 
affairs and situations" (VI, 50: ώς αν χρήσηταί τις και τοις πράγμασι καί 
τοις καιροίς), because behaviour is the necessary consequence of this 
process 1 2 4 
1 2 2
 One should not test all the virtues m the same circumstances, but justice in poverty, 
temperance m power, self-control in youth 
123 Categories in ethics are therefore situational, which does not mean that ethics is based on 
relativism the situations and their respective virtues seem to be organized on the basis of practical 
life, where different circumstances call for different choices See e g the description of Euagoras' 
virtues in the biographic discourse Euagoras each of them is presented in different stages and 
episodes of Euagoras' life (youth, early manhood, exile, ascendancy to power, rule), cf Ans! Pol 
1,13, 1260 a 21-28, for ιδέα as "circumstance", being a "kind of existence", see above ρ 11&.η 
16 
1 2 4 Thus m VI.50 ουδέν γαρ των τοιούτων εστίν άποτόμως οϋτε κακόν οΰτ' αγαθόν, αλλ' ώς αν 
χρήσηταί τις και τοις πράγμασι καί τοις κατροίς, ούτως ανάγκη καί το τέλος έκβαίνειν έξ αυτών 
"nothing of this kind is in itself entirely bad or good, but in the way in which one will make use 
of affairs and situations, thus will the outcome necessarily result from this", see Mikkola (1954), 
154-5 
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Nicodes himself is an example of this (III, 45): when left without 
means, he was just (δίκαιος) in his dealings with citizens, and did not 
injure one of them; when in possession of absolute power, he proved 
himself temperate (σωφρονέστερος); and, although being still young, he 
showed his self-control (έγκράτησα) in both these instances. By taking 
these situations (έν πάσι τοις καιροΐς) as examples Isocrates spécules the 
phrase èv ταΐς αύταΐς ίδέαις: the "forms" by which to judge virtues are 
the particular circumstances in which a specific virtue is put to the test. 
They can be seen as configurations adapted for the purpose of judgment. 
These "forms" are instrumental in the process of judgment and 
therefore approximate "method" or "way": for this usage one refer to the 
similar use of ιδέα as "way of presentation" in [8] (see above).1 2 5 
The discourse Nicocles itself reflects this concept in part of its 
structure: chs. 31-35 illustrate Nicocles' δικαιοσύνη in dealing with the 
difficulties he met when ascending the throne, and the chs. 36-42 
provide evidence for his σωφροσύνη in the execution of his kingship. As 
Nicocles is portrayed as a rather young man while addressing his 
subjects, his evident mastery of these principal virtues is also exemplary 
proof of his self-control. 
In To Nicocles one encounters ιδέα in an ethical context. In ch. 33 
Nicocles is advised to watch always over his words and actions 
(επισκοπεί τους λόγους άεί και τάς πράξεις). He should be courteous and 
majestic (αστείος είναι πειρώ και σεμνός), and thus display qualities 
proper to a ruler. Although it will prove to be difficult, he 
[19] Π, 33 δει δε χρήσθαι μεν άμφοτέραις ταΐς ίδέαις ταύταις, την δε 
συμφοραν την έκατέρα προσοΰσαν διαφεύγειν.126 
Being courteous and majestic are manifestations of a royal ethos, indeed 
they are proper to it. To behave like a king should is to use these 
properties and avoid the inherent dangers to them both: coldness as a 
result of affected dignity, self-degradation as a result of trying to be 
courteous. Similarly to what was said above, for Isocrates the virtues are 
dependent for their value on the use one makes of them.1 2 7 
1 и
 For έν wiih the force of an instrumental dative see KG 1,542 (A. 1 ), 465. 
I2* you should use both the properties, and avoid the danger attached to both. 
127 On the possible polemics with Plato and his Ideas see Eucken (1983), 235 f. 
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A similar notion is also found in Nicocles 30, where Nicocles is 
speaking on the great importance of the ethical qualities of temperance 
(σωφροσύνη) and justice (δικαιοσύνη) with regard to the nature, power 
and use of human actions. If both these qualities are absent, human 
actions tend to be the cause of great evil, whereas the ones who possess 
these qualities are beneficial: 
[20] Ш, 30 ει 'θέλοιμεν σκοπεΐν και τάς φύσεις και τάς δυνάμεις και τάς 
χρήσεις των πραγμάτων, εύρήσομεν τας μεν μη μετέχουσας τούτων των Ιδεών 
μεγάλων κακών αιτίας οΰσας, τάς δε μετά δικαιοσύνης και σωφροσύνης 
γιγνομένας πολλά τον βίον τον των ανθρώπων ώφελούσας.128 
Both temperance and virtue are said to be acknowledged by all men as 
the most valued (29: πλείστου τών αρετών αξίας εΐναι). Again, these 
virtues are seen as properties belonging to a way of life, in this case that 
of the ideal king. As far as Nicocles is concerned, he proves his claim to 
these virtues by reminding his subjects of his record: the decisions and 
actions he took bear witness to his justice (chs. 31-35) and temperance 
(3642). 
In the Helen there are two occurrences of ιδέα referring to beauty. 
Beauty is a motif of central importance to the speech as a whole, 
especially in its function as the most important stimulant to ethical and 
moral improvement. It is for this reason that Helen is praiseworthy: her 
beauty stimulated the undertaking of great deeds.129 Part of the discourse 
is a separate eulogy on beauty itself (chs. 54-60), where it is maintained 
that κάλλος is the most august, most precious, and most divine of all 
existing things. Its power (δύναμις) can be understood from the 
following: 
[21] X, 54 τών μέν γαρ άνδρίας ή σοφίας ή δικαιοσύνης μη μετεχόντων πολλά 
φανήσεται τιμώμενα μάλλον η τούτων εκαστον, τών δέ κάλλους 
άπεστερημένων ουδέν εύρήσομεν άγαπώμενον άλλα πάντα καταφρονούμενα. 
128 if we wish to investigate the natures, capabilities and uses of <human> affairs, we will find 
thai if they do not partake m these properties (sc temperance and justice), they are the cause of 
great evtl, and that the ones with temperance and justice are beneficial to human life 
l 2
' See the commentary, passim 
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πλην όσα ταύτης της ιδέας κεκοινώνηκε, και την άρετην δια τοΰτο μάλιστ' 
ευδοκιμούσαν, δτι κάλλιστον των επιτηδευμάτων εστίν.130 
Further on (Χ, 58), beauty is described as a quality that elicits feelings of 
reverence and consideration: 
[22] X, 58 ευσέβεια και πρόνοια χρώμεθα περί την ίδέαν την τοιαύτην131 
Beauty is here described as a quality perceptible by the eyes, a property, 
not only of persons or things, but also of concepts such as ethical 
categories. In this case we have a quality or property visible only to the 
mind's eye, which is to say that beauty is here seen as an abstraction.132 
Isocrates133 seems to draw an analogy between the technical and 
ethical usages of ιδέα in Ep. VI,8-10: the analogy between the 
composition of discourse and the organisation of one's life. After having 
stated his customary way of teaching intellection and invention (see 
above p. 27, [5]), he says that this procedure does not only belong to the 
sphere of rhetoric, but constitutes a universal principle and is thus also 
applicable to both everybody else's and one's own affairs (8): 
και ταΰτα φράζω μεν έπί τών λόγων, εστί δέ τοΰτο στοιχείον και κατά τών 
άλλων απάντων και κατά τών υμετέρων πραγμάτων. 
The only way to act intelligently is to follow a procedure, consisting of 
forethought, reason and deliberation: 
ουδέν γαρ οίον τ' εστί πραχθήναι νουν έχόντως, αν μη τοΰτο πρώτον μετά 
πολλής προνοίας λογίσησθε και βουλεΰσησθε, πώς χρη τον έπίλοιπον χρόνον 
υμών αυτών προστήναι και τίνα βίον προελέσθαι και ποίας δόξης 
όριγνηθηναι και ποτέρας τών τιμών άγαπησαι, τάς παρ' έκόντων γιγνομένας ή 
τας παρ' ακόντων τών πολιτών.
134 
1 3 0
 of the things that have no part m courage or wisdom or justice many will seem to be more 
highly valued than any of these <qualtties> separately, but of the things lacking beauty we will 
find none that is admired no, they are all despised except in so far as they share in this property 
And virtue is held in highest esteem for this reason, that it is the most beautiful of inclinations 
1 3
 * we show piety and consideration to this property 
1 3 2
 See ρ 23 
1 3 3
 Seep 35 f, 85-86 
^^ for it is not possible to achieve anything intelligently, if you will not first of all consider and 
deliberate, with full forethought, how you must establish your own future, which way of life you 
must choose, what reputation you must wish for, and which honours you must be content with, 
those bestowed voluntarily or involuntarily by the citizens 
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Only after defining these aims (the stage of intellection) can one 
effectively determine what action is to be taken: 
ταΰτα δε διορισαμένους τότ' ήδη τας πράξεις τας καθ' έκάστην την ήμέραν 
σκεπτέον, όπως συντενοΰσι προς τας υποθέσεις τάς έξ αρχής γενόμενος.1'5 
There is thus a clear analogy between the composition of discourse and 
the "composition" or organisation of one's life. This analogy has two 
aspects: one with regard to the procedure which underlies both, another 
to the procedure's character. 
First the procedure as such: both activities of composition are 
concerned with making choices and selections, and both have two 
sequential stages of intellection and invention: one, a determination of 
aims/principles; two, the selection of appropriate means/actions. This 
emerges from the parallels in diction: (a) the stage of intellection: πρώτον 
δεί σκέψασθαι τί τω λόγω . διαπρακτέον έστιν ή πρώτον μετά πολλής 
προνοίας λογίσησθε και βουλεύσησθε πώς χρή.,.άγαπήσαι; this stage entails 
the determination of the aim to set oneself (τέλος όπερ ΰπεθέμεθα); (b) the 
stage of invention: ζητητέον...τάς ιδέας δι' ών...λήψεται τέλος δπερ 
ύπεθέμεθα ή τας πράξεις...σκεπτέον δπως συντενοΰσι προς τάς υποθέσεις τάς 
έξ αρχής γενομένας; this stage is concerned with the selection of means to 
achieve the end. Thus the discourse's ίδέαι are parallel to life's πράξεις, 
in the sense that both are subject to the procedure of intelligent choice. 
Secondly, there is the procedure's character. This can described as 
intellectually rigorous: it is founded on rule and discipline, and these 
arc the only way to ensure a certain measure of success in achieving 
one's aim (10): 
και τοΰτον μεν τον τρόπον ζητοΰντες καί φιλοσοφοΰντες ωσπερ σκοπού 
κειμένου στοχάσεσθε τη ψυχή καί μάλλον έπιτεύξεσθε τοΰ συμφέροντος· αν 
δε μηδεμίαν ποιήσεσθε τοιαύτην ΰπόθεσιν, άλλα το προσπίπτον έπιχειρήτε 
πράττειν, άναγκαϊόν έστιν υμάς ταΐς διανοίαις πλανδσθαι καί πολλών 
διαμαρτάνειν πραγμάτων.136 
It is with a mentality, which can be described as "scientific", that one 
should execute the procedures leading to decisions. The procedure is 
rigorous in the sense that there should be a necessary connection 
^ After these have been defined, only then you should investigate the actions to take day by day, 
to ensure that they are in strict accord with the principies established m the beginning 
^ б If you search and study m this way, you wilt take aim with your mind as tfat a mark and you 
will hit more upon what is expedient, but if you will not set yourself such a principle, but will 
try to act incidently, it is inevitable that you will err m your intentions and fail υι many affairs. 
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between principle and means (συντενοΰσι), and, by contrast from those 
who do not act according to the procedure, that one must proceed 
systematically, i.e. not doing το προσπίπτον. The required consistency 
may be compared to the consistency to be observed in the composition of 
discourse, as discussed above p. 50 f.137 
5. είδος 
The word είδος occurs four times in Isocrates' works. In the 
Antidosis 278 f. Isocrates stresses the importance of virtue in the character 
of a man wishing to persuade an audience. He will try to establish an 
honourable name or reputation (δόξα) amongst his fellow-citizens, 
because it is a well-known fact that words resemble the truth more when 
spoken by a person of good repute, and that arguments (πίστεις) are of 
more weight when furnished by a man's life than by reason alone. This 
point is also acknowledged by the philosophers, who furthermore know 
that 
[23] XV, 280 τα μεν εικότα και τα τεκμήρια και πάν το των πίστεων 
είδος τοΰτο μόνον ωφελεί το μέρος εφ' φ αν αυτών εκαστον τύχη ρηθέν1 3 8 
Argumentation as such is only useful at the particular point where it is 
needed: this holds good for the ways of argumentation mentioned 
(argument from probability, argument on the basis of direct evidence), 
and for all other forms of argument. Είδος refers to all the other 
manifestations of argumentation except for the ones already mentioned: 
they are the "kinds" of arguments belonging to the overall category of 
argumentation. 
Similarly είδος is used in IX,9: Isocrates enumerates the means of 
poetical equipment not open to use for a writer of prose. These are 
concerned with content (representation of the gods as associating with 
men) and with form (license in the use of words), and both categories 
serve the poets in variegating their work: 
[24] K, 9 πάσι τοις εϊδεσι διαποικίλαι την ποίησιν1 3 9 
1 3 7
 See also Ch V, ρ 192 f ad с 45-47 on Isocrates' "scientific" approach to myth and history. 
138 probabilities, direct proofs and every form of argumentation support only the part to which 
each of them happens to be applied 
1 3 9
 <theycanuse> all forms of<poetical equipmeno to variegate theirwork 
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Again, είδος refers to the different ways or kinds in which these means 
can manifest themselves: their "forms" or "manifestations". These ways 
entail both form and content. 
More specific is the use of είδος in Antidosis 74, where Isocrates 
announces that the excerpt from an earlier work of his just read aloud by 
the clerk will be the last of such citations. Prior to this, he has inserted 
three more of such citations, all substantial parts of other discourses. Of 
these he says: 
[25] XV, 74 ού μόνον μικροίς μέρεσιν άλλ' δλοις εϊδεσι προειλόμην 
χρησθαι προς υμάς. 1 4 0 
If one looks at the citations themselves, one can see what is meant by 
όλον είδος: they are Г , 51-99 (an epideictic description of the Athenian 
blessings to Hellas); VIII, 25-56 (a deliberation on how to preserve peace); 
VIII, 132-145 (summary and epilogue of the discourse from which the 
citation is taken); II, 15-39 (a list of gnomic exhortations to the young 
king Nicocles, is the core of that discourse). All these citations are 
clearly separate sections, marked as such both formally 1 4 1 and 
thematically.1 4 2 At the same time, the citations from VIII and II are 
introduced and called μέρη. Thus it is clear that they are indeed to be 
seen as part of a greater whole. This usage, therefore, approximates Ιδέα 
in the technical sense, under aspect (2). 
Comparable to this is XIII,17, where the student of rhetoric is 
required 
[25] XIII, 17 τά μεν είδη τα των λόγων μαθεΐν, περί δε τας χρήσεις 
αυτών γυμνασθηναι.143 
1 4
^ / have chosen not only to use smalt parts but whole sections for you 
1 4 1
 IV.51 Ivo δε μη δοκδ (transitional formula) 100 μέχρι μεν oîv τούτων; ІП.25 pepi μέν 
oîv ταδθ' 'ικανά, ήγοΰμαι δέ δείν ημάς βουλευσαμένους 57 τάχ' οΰν αν τις. έρωτησειε 
(transition by introduction of an imaginary objector), VIII, 132 διείλεγμαι μεν τα πλείστα περί 
αυτών τούτων, Π, 15 αρχεσθαι μεν οΰν εντεύθεν χρή 40 και μή θαυμάσης (transitional phrase) 
1 4 2
 See Zucker (1942), 16 "einheitliches, in sich abgeschlossenes Textstück", Lidov (1983), 
285 "thematic development" 
143
 to ¡earn the forms of discourse, and to practise their use 
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That the είδη των λόγων are subject to the procedure of χρήσις 
strongly suggests that είδος is here equivalent to ιδέα, or at least to a 
specific group of the manifestations of discourse to which ιδέα can refer: 
probably the "kinds" of discourse like eulogy or apology.1** 
Thus it would seem that Isocrates uses the word είδος as an 
equivalent to ιδέα, where that word refers to "kinds". It should, therefore, 
not be seen as a synonym for ιδέα. 
1 4 4
 See Lidov (1983). 285; see also above p. 32 f. 
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6. conclusion 
From the survey provided above it is clear that Isocrates' use of ιδέα 
and είδος is in accordance with general usage in the 4th century. All 
instances can be explained by taking the root-meaning "that which is 
perceptible by the eyes" as a starting-point, and next by determining its 
denotation in the specific context. It's specific use as a technical term in 
the theory of rhetoric, however, constitutes an innovation. Like Plato, 
Isocrates utilizes the semantic potential of these nouns to introduce them 
as words referring to theoretical abstractions. 
The technical context is of particular interest: those passages 
which provide information on Isocrates' views about the composition of 
discourse. Under the heading of ίδέαι, which refers to the forms or types 
of discourse, he presents the following notions: 
(a) in a conceptual sense, these forms are present and available prior to 
the discourse as such: they are potentialities, of which the writer can 
make use by intelligent selection; 
(b) when used, the writer will, as it were, actualize the forms: taken 
together they materialize and make up the discourse, both in its outward 
or superficial aspect (form) and in its inward aspect (content); 
(c) the forms of discourse cover all its features, both on the macro- and 
micro-level: i.e. by "forms" Isocrates can refer to all elements from 
which a discourse is constituted, starting from the discourse as a whole 
to the particular ways of expression; 
(d) all the forms in combination should make up a discourse which is 
complete and in its complexity it should be a synthetic whole. 
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Ш. KAIROS 
The next technical term to be studied is καιρός In ch II there was 
a focus on ίδέα/ειδος, and special attention was given to discourse as a 
synthetic whole, consisting of parts or sections (the discourse's surface 
structure or shape) Attention will now be drawn to the significance of 
καιρός In this context also πρέπον will be considered In this chapter the 
relations of the discourse's parts to each other are studied Before 
describing Isocrates' prescriptions on these relations, a general analysis 
of the word καιρός will be offered Then the role of καιρός m early 
rhetoric will be discussed Finally it will be seen that Isocrates' use of 
καιρός is accordance with a general theory of art, that encompassed not 
only literary rhetonc but also the visual arts and sculpture 
1. καιρός in general. 
Determination of the meaning of καιρός is difficult because of the 
complexity of apparently different usages in different contexts 1 This 
accounts for the variety of ways in which the word is translated from 
"due measure" to "the right moment" (including a number of other 
translations related to "time") and "advantage" 2 These translations may 
be appropriate to their individual contexts, but the wideness of range 
suggests that καιρός refers to a number of concepts rather than one, as 
one would expect Is it, nevertheless, possible to identify that one concept 
underlying such versatility in usage' 
An extensive study of καιρός has lately been offered by Trédé 
(1992) In her book she provides an analysis of the semantic range of the 
word and, on the basis of that, an oudine of the notion as such In the first 
part (pp 25-80) she discusses passages from Homer onwards, and 
concludes that the word καιρός essentially refers to the "right place", 
which makes its root meaning spatial In her view the usage of the word 
can then be divided in two main groups, one where the denotation of 
1
 Trédé (1992) is ihe most recent comprehensive study of καιρός up to the 4th century ВС, a 
congress on the subject ' Kairos et Logos dans l'Antiquité", organised by Alonso Tordesillas, was 
held in Aix en Provence, October 1994, the Proceedings of which will appear in 1996 
(Blbliopolis, Napoli) 
2
 See LSJ j ν , see also Wilson (1980) Race (1981), Smith (1989/90) 
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decisiveness is dominant, the other where the denotation of 
appropriateness is dominant. This division is based on semantically 
relevant words associated with καιρός. For the first group these are words 
referring to judgment (κρίνειν etc.), understood as the act of deciding by 
splitting a question, and to the sharp edge (ακμή). The second group 
consists in words referring to measure and adaptation (μέτρον etc.), 
appropriateness (πρέπον) and harmony (συμμετρία). Trédé shows that the 
spatial meaning of καιρός is primary, and that the temporal meaning, 
although dominant later, is secondary. 
The second part of Trede's book concentrates on the usage of 
καιρός as a reflection of the notion to which the word originally referred. 
The notion is primarily connected to archery (hitting the right mark: 
Homer). In archaic poetry a moral element is added when καιρός is 
used to denote an absence of excess or want, and the presence of 
harmony. To reach this state of affairs is seen as a benevolent gift from 
the gods in return for human deference. During the 5th century 
intellectual efforts are made to secure the obtaining of καιρός by 
providing a rational set of rules, adapted for different spheres of activity 
(medicine, statuary, rhetoric). The technical approach developed into 
the acknowledgment, during the 4th century, that to capture καιρός can 
not be guaranteed by method only, but that room should be left to the 
elements of luck, divine intervention, and feeling. Thus the outline of 
the usage of καιρός constitutes a reflection of the general intellectual 
development in Greece from Homer to Plato. 
The general semantic and diachronic division as proposed by 
Trédé will be a starting-point in the following discussion of a number of 
passages illustrative of the usage of καιρός. This discussion will provide a 
context for the analysis of καιρός as it occurs in Isocrates. The discussion 
by Trédé on καιρός in the orators focuses, as can be expected, less on the 
specifically technical aspect, which is the focus in § 3 below, and, 
furthermore, in the case of Isocrates she offers no extensive discussion. 
The essentially spatial definition of καιρός seems to concur with 
the root-meaning of "penetrable opening" as provided by Onians. He 
suggests that the term καιρός originally refers to the triangular opening 
through which the shuttle must pass when weaving at a loom.3 The fact 
3
 Onians (1951), 343 f.; see also Kerkhoff (1973), 258-9. 
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that this opening is the result of an action taken by the weaver, who has 
to separate the rows of thread in order to create the triangular opening, 
which necessarily takes a certain, albeit a short, amount of time, makes 
it clear that both the spatial (quantitative) and, by natural consequence, 
the temporal denotations are possible for καιρός 
From this perspective it is possible to understand the use of the 
adjective καίριος in Homer, Г 184-6 
ουκ έν καιρίφ όξΰ πάγη βέλος, άλλα πάροιθεν 
είρύσατο ζωστήρ τε παναίολος ήδ' ΰπένερθε 
ζώμά τε και μίτρη 4 
The arrow did not reach the fatal spot if it had, it would have killed 
Menelaos In that case the archer would have succeeded in his 
intention To this one can compare VIII 81-84 
'ίππος έτείρετο, τον βάλεν ίφ 
δίος 'Αλέξανδρος, 'Ελένης πόσις ήυκόμοιο, 
ακρην как κορυφήν, δθι τε πρώται τρίχες 'ίππων 
κρανίφ έμπεφύασι, μάλιστα δε καίριόν έστιν 5 
In this case the arrow does hit its intended mark the brain of the horse, 
and as a result the animal is mortally wounded Thus καίριος suggests 
the spot as the right one with regard to the intention of the action of 
attack with an arrow if hit, that spot will prove lethal The lethal spot is 
the "penetrable opening" through which the arrow is supposed to reach 
its goa l 6 
The first characteristic aspect of καιρός identified by Trédé is that 
of "decisiveness" This particular aspect is further specified by her as "le 
καιρός qui tranche" the notion would imply a division, e g of right from 
wrong in the case of judgment At this point a modificauon of her view 
seems necessary the texts cited (p 45-52) never compel to the conclusion 
* Not m a lethal spot the sharp arrowhead got stuck but before it was stopped by the beautiful 
bell and, beneath that, by the loin cloth and girdle 
3 the horse was weakened the one that the noble Alexander husband of fair haired Helen hit 
with his arrow m its head, where horses manes first start to grow the most lethal spot 
*Cf A Ag 1292 (Cassandra) επευχομαι δε καίριας πληγής τνχεΐν 1343-4 (Agamemnon) 
μοι πεπληγμαι καιριαν πληγην εσω Ι (Chor ) σίγα τις κληγην αυτεΐ καιριως ουτασμενος, Hdt. 
Ш,64 3 οι καιριη εδοξε ιετυφθαι 
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that it is καιρός itself, that is the agens in the activity of judging by 
division Rather, the act of judgment takes place by using καιρός as a 
criterion The spatial denotation of καιρός implies a certain quantitative 
extension, with a clear beginning and end This distinction is indeed 
sharp, which can explain the associations of καιρός with words referring 
to the cutting edge and its sharpness (ακμή, οξύς) In itself, however, the 
word καιρός does not necessarily imply division 7 
The following texts can be cited to show that καιρός involves 
decisiveness One of the subordinate aspects of καιρός is that the 
opportunity for decisiveness is very short, which implies that the action 
involved should be executed quickly In other words one must seize the 
opportunity when it is there This aspect is present in Aeschylus Septem, 
65 
και τώνδε καιρόν όστις ώκιστος λαβε
8 
Instances like this make it clear that καιρός is closely related to the 
concept of time For this see [Plato] Def 414 a 6 καιρός χρόνου ακμή προς 
το συμφέρον 9 As is apparent from this definition, καιρός is a relative 
concept it refers to a point in time m which an opportune goal is 
attainable This implies that that particular point in time is unique, and 
that no other will provide the same opportunity for success , 0 Thus it 
seems that καιρός refers to a segment of χρόνος if one envisages time 
(χρόνος) as a continuous line, one can envisage καιρός as a clearly 
demarcated, ι e having a fixed beginning and end, segment of that line 
Closely connected is καιρός' association with sharpness this is 
stressed by the occurrence of ακμή or 'edge" in combinauon with the 
word καιρός itself or with the idea of the right moment as such (see 
above) This aspect is present from Homer (X 173) onwards11 
νΰν γαρ δη πάντεσσιν έπί ξυροΰ ϊσταται ακμής 
ή μάλα λυγρος δλεθρον Άχαιοίς ήέ βιώναι12 
7
 See Barrett (1964), 231 
' seize the opportune moment for doing this as quickly as possible 
' kairos the edge of time with regard to the opportune 
1 0
 Sicking (1963) 232 & n 3 
1
 ' Cf Ar Pi 256 ο καιρός εστ' εκ' αυτής της ακμής 
1 2
 [Nestor speaking] now as you can see for all the Achaeans it stands on razor s edge to meet 
mournful destruction or to stay alive, for the proverb see Leaf I ( 1971), 437 ad loc 
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Both aspects in combination are understood in Plato Resp. II, 370 b fr8: 
έάν τις τίνος παρη έργου καιρόν, διόλλυται
1
* 
Trede's second main aspect is appropriateness, which seems 
further specified by the notion of limitation or demarcation: καιρός refers 
to a spatial extension that has a clear beginning and end and that can be 
used with respect to quantity or extension and to action. This seems clear 
from Aeschylus Choephori 582: 
ύμίν δ' επαινώ γλώσσαν ευφημον φέρειν 
σιγαν θ' δπου δει και λέγειν τα καίρια.
14 
As is implied by σιγαν θ' οπού δει (be silent where you must <be silent>), 
λέγειν τα καίρια must mean "speak within boundaries". Orestes instructs 
the women and urges them to know when15 to start and when to stop. In 
this and similar cases limitation in time may very well acquire a 
normative connotation as well, so that one could translate "saying what 
is appropriate". It does not seem necessary to postulate the priority of 
"normative meaning" over "temporal meaning", which is supposed to 
be a later development.16 Arguing the other way around is more 
plausible: the aspect of limitation allows for the ambiguity of time and 
boundary line. For this line of reasoning one can refer to Sophocles 
Oedipus Coloneus 806-9: 
Οι. γλώσση σΰ δεινός· άνδρα δ' ουδέν' οίδ' έγώ 
δίκαιον όστις έξ άπαντος εύ λέγει. 
Κρ. χωρίς τό τ' ειπείν πολλά και τα καίρια. 
!3 if one lets slip the favourable moment in any task, the work is spoiled 
1 4
 And you women I charge to be discreet in speech, I to be silent when it is needed and to speak 
what is opportune [a Η Lloyd·Jones (1979), adapted] 
1 5
 Taking οπού of time or occasion, rather (han place see Game (1987), 200 ad ¡oc. 
'6 For a study of καιρός in that vein see Race (1981). who maintains that "καιρός was one of 
several important normative words, often with little or no temporal connotation, whose basic 
sense ispropnety" (198-8) 
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Οι. ώς δη συ βραχέα, ταΰτα δ' έν καιρώ λέγεις.
1 7 
Because of the phrase άνδρα δίκαιον in the immediate context, the 
connotation of "what is fitting, right, just" seems present. The aspect of 
limitation remains, however, the point of departure: the qualification of 
the given boundaries as "right" or "fitting" is a element added to the 
essential idea. 1 8 
Pindar applies the notion of καιρός in its normative sense to his 
task as a poef each occasion referred to and each thought expressed has 
its proper place in the song. Because the right moment is short, these 
elements are best expressed concisely and briefly. This principle of 
c o m p o s i t i o n 1 9 becomes clear from a number of transitional passages in 
the odes, where Pindar reflects on his poetical technique: 
- P. Г , 286-7: 
.. ό γαρ καιρός προς ανθρώπων βραχύ μέτρον έχει 2 0 
- Ρ. Ι, 81-2 (a "break-off"21 ending a laudatory section): 
καιρόν ei φθέγξαιο, πολλών πείρατα συντανύσαις 
έν βραχεί, μείων έπεται μώμος ανθρώ­
πων · άπο γαρ κόρος αμβλύνει 
αίανης ταχείας ελπίδας
2 2 
T h e technical prescription πολλών πείρατα συντανύσαις έν βραχεί 
presupposes an image of weaving (see above): the texture of the song is 
presented as analogous to woven cloth 2 3 Thus, the song should have 
density: its t h e m e s 2 4 are closely connected and concisely presented. Its 
1 7
 Οι you are a clever speaker, but I know of no just man who can speak well on both sides Кг 
if ts one thing to speak much, another to say what is opportune Οι it is clear your words are 
brief, but they hit the mark. 
1 8
 See Smith (1989/90), 341, who seems willing to go even further "καίρια and καιρφ strongly 
connote, if they do not denote, fitting, right, or just", Trédé (1992), 63-67 
^ Clearly emerging from the recurrent opposition of βραχύ - τα μακρά in similar passages see 
Bundy (1986), 72 73 
20 the right time has short measure among men 
2 1
 See Race (1990), 41 ff, esp 56-7 
2 2
 if you speak m due time (= not too long), stretching together tightly the strands of many 
things, less blame from men will follow for wearisome tedium dulls keen expectation 
2 3
 Cf О Ш,8, Ρ IX.77, N Г .44, ІП.15, frg 179, see Verdenius (1983), 17 & n 10 
M
 For πείρατα as "themes" see Wilson (1980), 182 n 13, who interprets the word as the "bond 
and boundary that gives everything its specific value" in the case of literary subject-matter one 
can translate on the basis of this "theme" 
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concentration must guarantee the approval of the audience. As such the 
principle has restrictive force, since it necessitates self-restraint on the 
part of the poet.2 5 The underlying image is that of the song as the product 
of a kind of fabricating or building, clearly expressed in P. 111,113-4: 
έπέων κελαδεννών, τέκτονες οία σοφοί / άρμοσαν 
"loud voiced verses, which skilfull craftsmen fitted together". The 
literary form is thought of as a structure, made by builders.26 
This general rule is applied to a particular case in P. IX.76-8, again 
in a transitional passage between the description of Telesikrates' victory 
at the Pythian games and in a shortened catalogue of his previous 
successes: 
άρετα'ι δ' αίει μεγάλαι πολύμυθοι-
βαιά δ' έν μακροίσι ποικίλλειν 
άκοά σοφοίς - ό δέ καιρός ομοίως 
παντός έχει κορυφάν
27 
Limitation in time and space with resulting conciseness and brevity 
makes selection necessary: the poet should not strive after completeness, 
but obey to the rules set by καιρός. 2 8 Limitation implies that the poet 
should know how long he can go on with his performance: he must 
know the measures his sections can have. Thus Pindar says in Ο. XIII.48 
(where he breaks off the catalogue of Xenophon's victories, because 
listing them all would be like counting pebbles on the beach): 
έπεται δ' έν έκάστω 
μέτρον · νοήσαι δε καιρός άριστος29 
The sense of measure requires the poet to stop cataloguing his client's 
successes and to introduce a new topic: in this case the praise of the 
athlete's native town. Not overstepping the boundary set to the catalogue 
2 5
 Verderuus (1983), 18 & nn 16-17 
2 6
 Verdenius (1983), 16-18, esp 17 & nn 7-9. 
2 7
 great deeds always give many tales, but presentation of a few m colourful language is 
something for the wise to listen to the right time <and no more> gives the gist of everything 
alike (ομοίως is interpreted as "in song as in all else" see Carey (1981), 90 ad loc ) 
2 8
 See Carey (1981), 89 ad loc , see also Bundy (1986), 17-18, who paraphrases καιρός here as 
"judicious selection and treatment", see also Wilson (1980), 181. Trédé (1992), 105 
2
° in everything there is measure the right moment is the best to know 
III. KAIROS 72 
of victories (in order to avoid satiety in the audience) is the sign that the 
poet knows καιρός: he knows when to stop. This Pindaric line seems to 
echo Hesiod Op. 694 μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρός δ' επί πάσιν άριστος, 
where a warning against overloading a waggon clearly conveys the the 
quantitative meaning of right amount.3 0 
From these passages in Pindar, that can be characterised as 
"poetical" in the sense that they contain the poet's reflections on his 
technique, it emerges that the accomplished poet needs a sense of καιρός. 
The notion of the right moment, applied to song, requires the poet to 
know what subject-matter, available to him, to use and what to leave out. 
The treatment of a subject, like a catalogue of victories, should take a 
specific time, limited by the audience's capacity for reception. During 
this time not all can be said, but a selection must be made by the poet. 
Thus καιρός influences both the length and content of the song and its 
parts. Ultimately the criterion applied is success: καιρός is the time 
necessary for the part of the song to reach its intended effect. Here one 
meets the aspect of purposiveness: the rules about the right dimensions of 
a section are applied in order that the intended purpose of that section 
may be achieved.31 
This "teleologica! aspect" of καιρός raises the questions about the 
method and criteria by which the poet discerned the right timing for his 
song. From the verbs used in connection with καιρός up to the 5th 
century the image appears that success in this discernment was to a 
certain degree coincidental. The verbs used are metaphors derived from 
ballistics (βάλλειν, or its negative άμαρτάνειν), which imply the idea of 
"hitting" or introduce coincidence explicidy (τύχεΐν). In all cases there 
is an element of uncertainty: nowhere a method of defining καιρός with 
assured success is offered or implied. In other words, καιρός is not 
presented as an object of rational science. One might say that man in 
general is seen not in a position to control it, but rather that it happens to 
him. With regard to καιρός a human being is not "agens", but "patiens". 
With the development of rational speculation onwards there 
began a new stage in the concept of καιρός. The new element consists of 
3 0
 Cf. Thgn. 401-2: μηδέν άγαν σπεΰδειν καιρός δ' έπ'ι κάσιν άριστος Ι εργμασιν ανθρώπων; 
Critias DK 88 В 7 (with ascription to Chilon): μηδέν αγαν- καιρώ κάντα πρόσεστι καλά; note 
the expressed or implied opposition to άγαν. 
3 1
 Gundert (1978), 63; see also Heath (1989), 25. 
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the introduction of empiricism and competence, as part of the attempt to 
gain control over καιρός and secure its attainment: based on a certain 
degree of specific knowledge one is better able to make the judgment 
necessary to grasp the right moment or measure. This is especially 
traceable in the texts of the corpus hippocrattcum, where the outlines of a 
medical t°xnh are given. To this category of theoretical treatises belong 
the closing chapters of On places of the human body, where it is stated: 
ίητρικήν ού δυνατόν έστι ταχΰ μαθείν δια τόδε, οτι αδύνατον έστι 
καθεστηκός τι έν αύτη σόφισμα γενέσθαι, οίον ό το γράφειν ενα τρόπον 
μαθών δν διδάσκουσι, πάντα έπίσταται· και οι επισταμένοι πάντες ομοίως 
δια τόδε, δτι το αυτό και ομοίως ποιεύμενον νΰν τε και ού νυν ούκ αν το 
ύπεναντίον γένοιτο, αλλ' άιεί ένδυκέως δμοιόν έστι και ού δει καιρού, ή δε 
ϊητρικη νΰν τε και αύτίκα ού το αυτό ποιέει, και προς τον αυτόν ύπεναντία 
ποιέει, και ταύτα ύπεναντία σφίσιν έωυτοίσιν.
32 
The art of writing is a fixed art: practising that art will invariably 
produce the same result. Medicine, however, does not have that fixity: 
one and the same action can produce opposite results. A fixed art does not 
require καιρός: it is implied that medicine does. In therapy the element 
of judgment in each seperate case is fundamental. As stated in the same 
treatise, there is one fixed rule of medicine: to be able to judge the right 
measure in prescribing a therapy. Thus a definition of καιρός is given: 
ό δε καιρός δδ' εστί· τα a m a προσφέρειν ¡ίσων μέλλει το σώμα 
προσφερομένων το πλήθος κρατείν33 
Thus καιρός in medicine implies a judgment of quantities (όσων). The 
importance of defining the right measure appears from the fact that 
when there is too much administration of foods, the opposite of the 
intended cure will happen (έπην δε τούτον τον καιρόν ύπερβάλλη, το 
ύπεναντίον γίγνεται). 
3* Ηρ Loc Нот 41 ¡t is impossible to learn the art of medicine quickly because of the 
following reason that it is impossible to have a fixed doctrine m thai art For instance, he who 
learns to write in the one way in which one teaches it, knows everything, and those who know all 
know m the same way, for the following reason that the same thing when done in the same way 
now and some other time does not change into its opposite, but remains always identical, and does 
not require timing The art of médecine, however, does not do the same now and the next moment, 
and does things opposite with regard to the same man, and things opposite to one another 
33 Hp Loc Hum 44. the right measure is the following to administer foods m that quantity as 
the body will be able to surmount 
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Finally, the treatise underlines the necessity of knowledge in the art of 
medicine 
ΐητρικη δη μοι δοκέει ήδη άνευρήσθαι ολη ήτις οϋτως έχει, ήτις διδάσκει 
έκαστο και τα εΐδεα καί τους καιρούς δς γαρ οίίτως ΐητρικήν έπίσταται, 
ελάχιστα την τόχην επιμένει ή δ' επιστήμη άρχεται τε καί ευτυχής έστιν, 
οπόταν βούληται ό επισταμένος χρήσθαι 3* 
Thus an element of competence is seen as a precondition to achieve 
success it is on the basis of knowledge that the right, ι e an informed, 
judgment can be made Only thus can the role of chance be limited, 
and can the art of healing be made less coincidental 3 5 
The following observations can be made about καιρός in general 
a] it essentially refers to spatial extension, which is short and clearly 
defined, as "right point" it has, on the one hand, the connotation of 
decisiveness and, on the other, of appropriateness, quantitatively it refers 
to the right amount or degree, temporally to the short span of time in 
which an action must be completed to achieve its intended goal, thus it 
can be seen as "extension" both in urne and space, 
b] in Pindar καιρός is part of his theory of composition, providing rules 
for the establishment of the right measure of (parts of) the song, which 
involves the poet's (1) selection in his subject-matter and (2) forestalling 
satiety in his audience by observing the requirement of brevity, 
c] in a technical context attainment of καιρός is enhanced by 
competence, based on knowledge, in order to be able to make the 
required informed judgment 
Thus the basic concept has two components the principle of right 
timing and the principle of right dimension These components operate 
simultaneously, but each aspect may be singled out in individual 
occurrences of the term 3 6 
2. καιρός in early rhetoric 
3 4
 Hp Loc Hum 46 ft is clear that the art of medicine ¡s now brought to view in its entinty 
which is thus and which teaches in each case the kinds and measures He who knows the art of 
medicine thus rests m the least degree on chance science is at his disposal and has good chance, 
whenever he who knows it is willing to use iL 
35Trídé(1992), 172 178 
3 6
 See Kinneavy (1986) 85 87 
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That καιρός had an important place in the early development of 
rhetorical theory, is likely. It is very hazardous, however, to formulate 
conclusions about the level of theorizing at this early stage, both because 
of the primary source material is scarce and because there are 
difficulties in distinguishing in the few sources available between 
utterances by early sophists meant as indicating practical choices 
(presentation of work in progress, see above) or as reflections on those 
choices.37 
Still, a number of observations can be made in this matter. First, 
later sources indicate that the notion of καιρός did indeed play a role in 
early rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicamassus discusses the importance of 
καιρός in rhetoric in general and points to Gorgias of Leontinoi as one of 
its earliest theorists (CV12,5-6): 
άλλ' έπί πάντων οΐομαι δεΐν τον καιρόν όραν · ούτος γαρ ηδονής και αηδίας 
κράτιστον μέτρον. καιρού δε οΰτε ¿ιήτωρ ουδείς οΰτε φιλόσοφος εις τόδε 
χρόνου τέχνην ώρισεν, οϋδ' οσπερ πρώτος επεχείρησε περί αΰτοΰ γραφείν 
Γοργίας ό Λεοντΐνος ούδεν δ τι λόγου άξιον έγραψεν. 
ούδ' έχει φυσιν το πράγμα εις καθολικην και εντεχνόν τίνα περίληψιν πεσείν, 
οΰδ' όλως επιστήμη θηρατός έστιν ό καιρός άλλα δόξη. ταύτην δ' οι μεν έπί 
πολλών και πολλάκις γυμνάσαντες αμεινον των άλλων εΰρίσκουσιν, οι δ' 
άνάσκητον αφέντες σπανιώτερον καί ώσπερ άπο τύχης.
38 
This text suggests the tentative conclusion, supported by other instances, 
that Gorgias was concerned with καιρός. It should be noted, however, 
that the word itself only occurs once in his work: in the Palamedes the 
section on his own person is concluded by Palamedes with an apology 
for the presence of such a self-laudatory passage, which could jeopardize 
the audience's tolerance. He says (32): ό δε παρών καιρός ήνάγκασε. This 
phraseology does not admit, however, of a purely technical 
3 7
 For the sources see Radermacher (1951), on the issue see Schiappa (1991), 73-74 
38 In every case one must, I think, keep in view due measure, for this is the best criterion of 
charm and us opposite But on due measure no rhetorician or philosopher has, so far, defined a 
method, nor did the man who first undertook to write on this subject, Gorgias of Leontinoi, write 
anything worth mentioning 
The nature of this subject is not such that it can fall under any general and systematic 
comprehension, nor can due measure m general be apprehended by science, but only by judgment. 
Those who have trained this <faculty> in many connections and many times will find it (se. due 
measure) more often than others, while those leave it untrained will do so rarely and as it were by 
chance 
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interpretation, and καιρός only seems to refer to the specific 
circumstances dictating the insertion of that section.*9 
Dionysius reflects the empirical element in the notion of καιρός that was 
already identified above in the medical tradition. Both rhetoric and 
medicine are arts in which the element of judgment is paramount4 0, 
and it is thus to be expected that both arts develop similar or even 
analogous methods. One can refer again to Gorgias, who in Helen 14 
describes the power of the spoken word on the soul in terms of the effect 
of drugs on the body.41 This empirical element is, as seen below, also 
prominendy present in Isocrates' notion of καιρός. This indicates that it 
did play a part in early rhetorical theory. 
That the concept had a place in rhetoric also emerges from Plato's 
Phaedrus 272 a f., where Socrates offers his short summary of rhetorical 
teachings by the sophists: they offer instruction on the parts of the speech 
(266 d 5 f.), on ways to proceed or methods (267 b 10 f.), and on 
linguistics (267 с 6 f.).4 2 According to Socrates, these precepts are, 
however, to be supplemented by other elements in order to create a 
philosophically valid rhetoric. To these elements belongs that the orator 
προσλαβόντι καιρούς του πότε λεκτέον και έπισχετέον, βραχυλογΐας τε αΰ 
και έλεινολογίας και δεινώσεως έκαστων τε δσα αν είδη μάθη λόγων, τούτων 
την εύκαιρίαν τε και άκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλώς τε καί τελέως εστίν ή τέχνη 
άπειργασμένη.43 
The phrase προσλαβόντι καιρούς4 4 του πότε λεκτέον καί έπισχετέον may 
specifically refer to an early formulation of the καιρός-notion and, if it 
does, it provides an indication that Gorgias indeed entertained thoughts 
on the subject. In his EpUaphios, ch. 2, he praises the deceased for their: 
3 9
 All the references lo a Gorgianic concept of καιρός are significantly late see Buchheim (1989), 
104, 140 (Philostratus V« Soph I,pr, Vita Ptolemaei (cf DK, Bd I. 123 Anm 4), for the view 
expressed by Sullivan (1992), 318-320, that Gorgias developed a tripartite concept of καιρός in 
his Helen there seems little justification the word itself does not occur ш that text, nor can any of 
the instances cited be plausibly connected to the notion 
*" Cf Ar Rh 11,18, 1391 b 8 ή ιών πιθανών λόγων χρήσις προς κρίσιν εστί, cf Grimaldi 
(1988), 228 ad he 
41 tòv αυτόν 6è λόγον έχει η те του λόγου δΰναμις προς τήν της ψυχής τάξιν ή τε των φαρμάκων 
τάξις προς την τών σωμάτων φύσιν, the medical comparison is used by later writers on rhetoric, 
see e g Isoc Ш.39, PI Grg. 464 Ь 1, 465 a 2-5 and Dodds (1976), 228-9 
4 2
 See Ch II, 53 f 
4 3
 when he grasps the right moment of when to speak and when to hold back, and when, after 
having learnt concise speech, pathetic speech, forcefulness, and each of the lands of discourse there 
are, he understands their right and wrong limitation, then he has well and definitely achieved ha 
art 
4 4
 On the use of the plural see ρ 86-87 below 
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τούτον νομίζοντες θειότατον καί κοινότατον νόμον, το δέον έν τό) δέοντι και 
λέγειν ναι σιγαν καί ποιείν
 4 5 
Although the word καιρός itself is not used, it seems that this phrase 
captures the essence of the notion * 6 In any case, given the prescriptive 
nature of this utterance and of Plato's just cited, it seems justified to 
conclude that το δέον was a consument element of the notion In itself, 
Gorgias' phrase in its observatory character constitutes a pre-reflective 
stage m the development of the notion, which receives its place in a 
theoretical context at the hand of Plato 
T o grasp the κ α ι ρ ο ί , which, says Plato, is a supplementary task 
(προσλαβόντι) for the orator, is explained by Socrates as "when to speak 
and when to hold back" This involves an extension in t ime and, 
because of the activity of delivering a discourse, also an extension in 
space In that particular segment of time a particular segment of the 
discourse can be delivered To be able to make the right decision in this 
matter represents an advanced stage in the orator's skill, which follows 
o n his master ing the e lementary technicali t ies 4 7 Based on the 
observation that Plato in his creation of a philosophically valid rhetoric 
does not so much design new theoreucal concepts but is more concerned 
with the unification of diverse already existing techniques into a 
synthetic whole and its methodical validation 4 8, one can conclude that a 
notion of καιρός did exist in early rhetoric It may very well be that this 
originally consisted of an empirically acquired sense of t iming and 
limitation, and that the practical capability became subject of reflection 
in the generation of Plato and Isocrates 4 9 
3. καιρός as a technical term in Isocrates. 
The word καιρός and its denvated cognates (ευκαιρία, εΰκαιριος, 
εϋκαιριως and their opposites) appear 87 times in the works of Isocrates 
In 28 instances the word is used as a technical term in the context of his 
4 5
 regarding this as the most godly and commonly held law to say. be silent about and do what 
is needed when и is needed 
4 6
 Pfister (1938), 140 cf A Cho 582 (p 69, above) 
4 7
 See Ferrari (1987), 80, see also below ρ 80 f 
4 8
 Trédé (1992) 285 288, on the concept of synthetic unity in literature in general see 
Notopoulos (1949) 1 7 Heath (1989) see also Ch II, 50 55 on Isocrales' synthetic view of 
discourse 
4 9
 Trédé (1992), 252 
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reflections on matters of composition. These instances will be discussed 
below. 
Wersdorfer's discussion of καιρός seems unacceptable in its 
method, because in his analysis he proceeds from four basic meanings 
("das rechte Mass; der rechte Zeitpunkt; Zeitumstände; Nutzen"), a 
systématisation of connotations which he derives from the lexicon.50 Of 
these the first three are acceptable; the fourth, however, is not a 
connotation of καιρός, but at most a consequence of the observation of 
καιρός.
5 1
 At this point Wersdorfer's incorrect tendency to identify 
synonyms emerges: he styles το συμφέρον, το χρήσιμον, το βέλτιστον and 
το δέον as "gleichwertige Ausdrücke" for καιροί.5 2 
In the following paragraph attempts will be made to analyse the 
occurrances of the word καιρός in a technical context and to account for 
its usage from the perspective of its denotation as defined in § 2. Finally a 
synthesis will provide a general outline of technical καιρός in Isocrates. 
In chs. 12-13 of his programmatic discourse Against the sophists 
Isocrates introduces a final topic in his critique of rivals in the field of 
education. 5 3 From ch. 9 onwards he attacks those who profess to teach 
the art of political discourse (πολιτικούς λόγους) and who claim to make 
their students such good speakers that they will miss none of the 
possibilities a subject offers (ύπισχνοϋνται τοιούτους ρήτορας τους συνόντας 
ποιήσειν ώστε μηδέν των ενόντων έν τοις πράγμασι παραλιπείν). They 
promise that these students will automatically be successful after 
mastering their art: excluding practical experience and talent, they 
ascribe this success to their "science of discourse" (ή των λόγων επιστήμη), 
which they compare to the "science of writing" (ή των γραμμάτων). To 
this point Isocrates specifically objects in 12-13, saying that these 
teachers ignore the fundamental difference between both arts: the 
science of discourse is a "creative activity" (ποιητικον πράγμα), the 
science of writing a fixed technique (τεταγμένη τέχνη). While the use of 
letters is fixed and remains unchanged (άκινήτως έχει και μένει κατά 
5 0
 Wersdörfer (1940), 55-56 
5' See on the correct interpretation of to χρήσιμον in X,5 Ch. V, p. 168 f. a//oc 
5 2
 See Ch I, ρ 3-4 
5 3
 On this discourse as a specimen of the genre επάγγελμα (manifesto) see Ch. Π, 27 & n 31 and 
Ch. Г , 130 A n 86. 
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ταύτόν), the use of discourse is of opposite character 5 4 There a 
mechanical repetition of techniques is not sufficient for success, because, 
first, each subject presents its own demands and, secondly, there is a 
requirement of originality Thus only he will be considered most 
skilled in discourse (τεχνικώτατος) who is able to live up to these two 
demands, which imply uniqueness and variability as essential qualities 
of discourse 5 5 This is specified by a statement of the entena for "good" 
discourse (13) 
[1] XIII, 13 τους μεν γαρ λόγους ούχ οίον τε καλώς εχειν, τ\ν μη των 
καιρών και του πρεπόντως και τοΰ καινώς εχειν μετάσχωσιν, τοις δε 
γράμμασιν οΰδενος τούτων προσεδέησεν 5 6 
There are three qualities which discourses must possess m order to be 
considered good these can be labelled by the key-terms καιρός, πρέπον 
and καινός The precise reference of these terms is not immediately 
clear, but any attempt at interpretation must take the immediate context 
into account The demands of uniqueness and originality, the 
fundamental elements of difference from the mechanic art of writing, 
imply that these terms operate in the scope of situationality This means 
that the writer of discourse is dependent upon the fact that each occasion 
for discourse has a different set of specific demands These demands 
must be met by producing a discourse that shows the qualities 
understood by these three key-terms 
In the section of the same speech where Isocrates presents his 
views on discourse (chs 14-18), he first states his belief in the general 
law of education that teaching (παίδευσις) can only be successful if it 
incorporates the three basic elements of talent, knowledge and 
training 5 7 This pnnciple is applied to the teaching of discourse, which 
he announces he will discuss more fully What follows is a statement of 
the characteristics of the teaching of discourse (16), which is divided in 
two stages 
5 4
 Cf Hp Loc Hum. 41 see Trédé (1992), 154 & n 17,172. Wersdorfer (1940), 80-84 
5 5
 See Ch I, § 3 and Calm (1989) 121 144 
5
' discourses can only be good if they partake in ¡he right dimensions and in being 
conspicuously fitting and new but m the case of letters there is no need whatsoever of these 
<requirements> 
5 7
 For the trias paedagogica see Ch II, 35 36 on XV.183 4, cf 209 210 
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(1) acquiring knowledge of the ίδέαι; 
(2) making good use of the ίδέαι, which contains the following 
elements: 
(2a) selection, combination, arrangement; 
(2b) "not missing the καιροί", which is formulated as follows: 
[2] XIII,16 ετι 8έ των καιρών μη διαμαρτείν, άλλα και τοις 
ένθυμήμασι πρεπόντως δλον τον λόγον διαποικίλαι και τοις όνόμασιν 
εύρυθμος και μσυσικώς ειπείν.58 
Using the ίδέαι has two components, the second of which (ετι δέ) is 
introduced by the negative prescription of not missing the καιροί. The 
negatively formulated rule is then clarified by its positive substitute: not 
to miss the καιροί means (a) that the discourse as a whole will have a 
variety of thoughts, presented in a conspicuously fitting way, and (b) 
that the choice of words will convey rhythm and melodiousness. Both 
the components (a) and (b) are presented as gouverned by καιρός. This 
means that in the composition of a discourse both on the level of 
ενθυμήματα and of ονόματα success depends upon understanding the 
requirements of καιρός. From this it can be concluded that the quality of 
πρέπον is concerned with content (ενθυμήματα) and depends on καιρός. 
At the same time, that the words διαποικίλαι and πρέπον are used also 
suggest that this quality can be observed from the outside. To be good, a 
discourse must have such characteristics which deserve approval from 
the perspective of καιρός. This implies that the "thoughts" must not only 
be present, but that they also be presented in a certain way, governed by 
καιρός. Analysis of further instances will specify what Isocrates means 
by this. 
The secondary tasks in the sequence of actions taken by the 
prospective writer of discourse (2a + b) represent an advanced stage 
compared to (1), the level of acquiring technical knowledge. Of the 
second level Isocrates says (17): 
ταΰτα δε πολλής επιμελείας δεισθαι και ψυχής ανδρικής καί δοξαστικής 
έργον είναι (sc. φημί)59. 
^further, not to miss the right dimensions, but to highlight the discourse in its entinty in a 
conspicuously fitting way with thoughts and phrase it rhythmically well ana musically with 
words 
39 these things, I say, require much study and are the task of a vigorous and conjectural mind. 
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These skills, which belong to the domain of Isocrates' technical 
επιστήμη, must be supplemented on the part of the student by practice (the 
element of μελέτη) and by his particular talent (φύσις), which makes 
him suited for this field. According to Isocrates this talent consists of a 
state of mind or mentality, which has two qualities: it is ανδρικός and 
δοξαστικός. 
Both adjectives are used by Isocrates in the context of educational theory 
elsewhere. In XV.261-269 he discusses astronomy, geometry and other 
such sciences as part of education: although training in these sciences is 
considered without use for practical life (μηδέν χρησίμην είναι την 
παιδείαν ταύτην προς τάς πράξεις), it does have a preparatory function, in 
that it helps those who are in the process of learning (τους μανθάνοντας 
όνίνησι). When studying these subjects pupils are forced to give their 
attention to difficult (δυσκαταμαθήτοις) matters and train their powers of 
concentration (μη πεπλανημένην εχειν την διάνοιαν), and in that way they 
prepare themselves intellectually for the study of useful subjects. This 
preparatory stage in education Isocrates calls "training of the 
personality" (γυμνάσια της ψυχής) and "preparation to philosophy" 
(παρασκευή φιλοσοφίας). In its preparatory function, this studious activity 
(διατριβή) is parallel to what boys (παίδες) in school do (who train 
themselves in grammar, music and other subjects), but also more 
advanced (άνδρικωτέραν). Their preparatory training will not increase 
their capacity to speak well or deliberate, but they will increase their 
capacity to master the more important and serious studies (αυτοί δ' αυτών 
εΰμαθέστεροι γίγνονται προς τα μείζω και σπουδαιότερα των μαθημάτων) , 6 0 
What is meant by the second quality can be clarified by the passage XV, 
184, where Isocrates also speaks of the principles of education, now 
drawing an analogy between his philosophy and gymnastics. Both 
have learnable elements, the knowledge of which can be imparted to 
pupils. The next stage, however, consists in training the pupils in the use 
of these elements by having them do exercises, by habituating them to 
°° Cf XV,200, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus CV 1,5-6 the tasks that are part of the 
πραγματικός τόκος are more difficult than those of the λεκτικός τόπος the former, therefore, 
needs a mature intelligence (άκμαζούσης συνέσεως) and the grey-haired age (πολίαις 
κατηρτυμένης ηλικίας), and requires study of examples and practical training At this point 
Dionysius seems to reflect Isocratean teaching Cf also Plato Meno 81 d 3 (on the capability of 
the soul to acquire knowledge by learning μάθησις) ταλλα πάντα αυτόν άνευρείν, εάν τις 
ανδρείος J και μη άποκάμνη ζητών learning requires manliness to ensure perseverance and effort, 
see also Too (1995), 155 
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hard work and effort (πονεΐν), and by forcing them to combine 
(συνείρειν) the separate elements they have learnt These exercises serve 
a double purpose: 
[3a] XV, 184 'ίνα ταΰτα βεβαιότερον κατάσχωσι και των καιρών 
έγγυτέρω ταΐς δόξαις γένωνται.
61 
Again, the καιροί belong to the secondary stage in education, which 
consists of the practical use to which the elementary knowledge should 
be put, and they govern this use. There is, however, a fundamental 
difficulty, as Isocrates immediately adds: 
[3b] Х Д84 τω μεν γαρ είδεναι περιλαβεΐν αυτούς οΰχ οΐόντ' εστίν-
επί γαρ απάντων τών πραγμάτων διαφεύγουσι τάς έπιστήμας. οι δε μάλιστα 
προσέχοντες τον νουν και δυνάμενοι θεωρείν το συμβαίνον ώς έπί το πολύ 
πλειστάκις αυτών τυγχάνουσι.
62 
Καιροί are outside the domain of scientific knowledge, which means 
that there is no fixed rule for attaining them. Only practical experience, 
consisting of the observation of what mostly happens in most cases, will 
enable one to recognize them. Thus Isocrates places the καιροί in the 
domain of the empirical: observation of what mostly happens can lead to 
the formation of δόξα, an informed opinion. On the basis of that practical 
experience, gained from previous situations, a potentially successful 
conjecture in a new situation can be made.63 In the Panathenaicus 30 this 
point returns as one of the criteria for judging who is effectively 
"educated" (oi πεπαιδευμένοι): <τοΰς) την δόξαν επιτυχή τών καιρών έχοντας 
και δυναμένην ώς έπί το πολύ στοχάζεσθαι τοϋ συμφέροντος.64 It is 
judgment that will lead to success in demarcating one's actions.65 One 
6
* in order that they grasp them (the elements they have learnt) more firmly and thai they come 
closer to the right extensions by their opinions/judgments/conjectures 
tefor it is impossible to grasp them (the καιροί) with knowing, because m all cases they escape 
science but those who most apply their mind and who are able to observe the consequent as it 
happens for the most part, will m most cases hit upon them 
'
3
 Cf XII.9 (φύσιν) δοξάσαι μεν περί έκαστου την άλήθεισν μάλλον δυναμένην των είδεναι 
φασκόντων, see Ch II, 36-37, and below, 106 
M
 <those> who possess a judgment which is succesfull in attaining the right moment and 
capable m most cases to aim at what is expedient 
65
 See Wersdòrfer (1940), 60-62,67-68, Trédé (1992), 271-275, on 'Treffkunst" in general see H 
Herter, "Die Treffkunst des Artztes m hippokratische und platonische Sicht", Sudhoffs Archiv Al 
(1963), 247-290 (= id, Kleine Schriften, München 1975, 175-211) 
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might say that as a consequence of experience the capacity of "feeling" 
for καιρός will be developed. 
That Isocratean discourse represents a more advanced level of 
literature is also stated in the prooemium to the Helen, chs. 10-13, where a 
contrast is made with works of praise on unworthy subjects. Works such 
as these are simple and easily learnable, because they know only one 
method 6 6 (εστί γαρ των μέν τοιούτων συγγραμμάτων μία τις οδός, ήν οΰθ' 
εΰρείν οΰτε μαθείν οΰτε μιμήσασθαι δύσκολόν έστιν). Of his own works 
Isocrates says that they: 
[4] X,13 δια πολλών ιδεών και καιρών δυσκαταμαθήτων ευρίσκονται 
τε και λέγονται
67 
His works distinguish themselves by employing a multitude of 
rhetorical forms and quantifications and by the fact that these are 
difficult to learn: they are qualified as duskatamâyhtow, and by that 
qualification they are put on the same advanced level as the propaedeutic 
studies discussed above. 
The aspect of quantitative extension returns in the Antidosis, when 
Isocrates formulates a number of general considerations on literary 
composition. On this he has many things to say, but is uncertain in 
what order to present them (πολλών δ' έφεστώτων μοι λόγων απορώ πώς 
αυτούς διαθώμαι). Each separate point would seem to him suitable for 
discussion, but all taken together would provide a strain on himself and 
his audience (πάντα δε νυνί λεγόμενα πολύν αν δχλον έμοί τε και τοις 
άκούουσι παρασχείν), especially since he has been going on at some 
length. Insatiability on the part of the speaker makes him run the risk, 
however, of going on too long (311): 
[5] XV,311 οΰτω γαρ άπλήστως άπαντες εχομεν περί τους λόγους, ώστ' 
έπαινοΰμεν μέν την εϋκαιρίαν καΐ φαμεν ουδέν είναι τοιούτον, έπειδάν δ' 
6 6
 For this metaphor cf 11,35 οδός as the method to gain understanding by study (φιλοσοφείν) if 
what it is a king must know, cf also 1,9 
6
' are devised and put to words through a multitude of forms and quantifications that are hard to 
learn. 
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οίηθώμεν ώς εχομεν τι λέγειν, άμελήσαντες τοΰ μετριάζειν, κατά μικρόν άεΐ 
προστιθέντες εις τάς έσχάτας άκαιρίας έμβάλλομεν ημάς αυτούς.68 
Keeping an eye on ευκαιρία means to pay attention to measuring 
(μετριάζειν). Thus the writer of discourse must be attentive to the length 
of his discourse, its quantitative aspect of extension.6 9 If he keeps adding 
to it, even if by little parts at a time, he will run the risk of overstepping 
the limit. Then his discourse would be a failure, because it would no 
longer be appreciated by the audience. From the phrase κατά μικρόν one 
can conclude that keeping the rule of right limitation is a matter of 
subtlety and fine tuning: even a slight transgression will cause άκαιρία, 
which means that the discourse fails in having the desired extension.7 0 
This general consideration on matters of quantitative extension is 
expressed in a transitional passage. He has concluded his discussion of 
the undesirability of sycophants in 309, but wishes to add another point, 
which he introduces in 312. Thus the passage 310-311 is both meant as a 
transition and as an attempt to maintain his audience's attention. With 
regard to its content, this passage offers a reflection on the art of the 
writer of discourse: as such it could be labelled "poetical" and is parallel 
in both these respects to transitional passages in Pindar. There, as here, 
the transitional passage is a rhetorical pause, in which the author 
expresses his hesitation and claims to be at a loss how to proceed 
(απορία 7 1 ) , but at the same time, makes a conscious choice on selection 
or treatment of his material. 
The programmatic passages discussed thus far allow initially a 
general characterisation of καιρός in composition: 
1] it is at home in the secondary, advanced stage in the process of 
composition of discourse, where it is the author's task to make good use 
of the technicalities learned in the primary stage; 
'"for we are all so insatiable in discourse that, while we prize due measure and affirm that there is 
nothing like it, yet when we think we have something to add, we forget about measuring and by 
always adding little by little we bring ourselves to utter limitedness. 
^WersdörferiWO)^. 
7 0
 See p. 103 f. 
71
 See Bundy (1936), 8 for this rhetorical device in Pindar; Crotty (1982), 30-31 interprets 
passages such as these as a means for the author to portray himself as "a poet at work" and the 
literary work itself as "a work in progress"; on απορία as technical term see HWR Bd. I (1992), 
826-828 [Matuschek]. 
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2] the ability to compose in accordance with καιρός is acquired through 
practical training and experience, ι e it rests on εμπειρία, as such it is a 
relative concept, 
3] it entails the conscious limitation of the discourse, which requires 
subtlety and fine tuning, its result is a discourse in which order and 
right extensions are perceptibly present 
A survey of other passages can further specify this concept of καιρός. 
In his paraenetic discourse To Nicocles Isocrates lists a number of 
valuable recommendations to a young prince To these also belongs 
advice on how to speak 
[6] 11,33 επισκοπεί τους λόγους αεί τους σαυτοΰ καί τας πράξεις, ϊν' ώς 
έλαχίστοις άμαρτήμασι περιπίπτης κράτιστον μεν της ακμής των καιρών 
τυγχάνειν, επειδή δε δυσκαταμαθήτως έ'χουσιν, έλλείπειν αϊροΰ καί μή 
πλεονάζειν αϊ γαρ μετριότητες μάλλον έν ταΐς ένδείαις ή ταΐς ύπερβολαΐς 
ενεισιν
 та 
Ideally the pnnce should hit upon the exact boundaries of καιροί, the 
limitations set on words and actions The analogy between making 
choices in discourse (technical level) and making choices in life 
(ethical level) is fundamental to Isocrates' thought on education the 
education of the mind through rhetoric will lead to attaining the 
capability of making good moral choice (ευβουλία).7 3 This analogy is 
explicitly expressed in XV, 253-257 (= III, 5-9) that passage contains 
Isocrates' concept of λόγος as cultivating force and mark of disUnction 
between human beings and animals In 255 Isocrates writes λόγος 
αληθής καί νόμιμος και δίκαιος ψυχής αγαθής καί πιστής εϊδωλόν έστι 
"discourse that is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good 
and faithful personality" (see ρ 35 f, 59) To discern the boundaries of 
καιροί, however, is very difficult, and therefore one is wise to choose 
'2 Keep watch always over your Mords and actions in order to fall m as few mistakes as possible 
Best is to hit upon the edge of the extensions and as they are difficult to team, choose to leave 
something out and not to be m excess the norm is to be found m want rather than in what is too 
much 
7 3
 See Usher (1990), 7 10, Burk (1923), 53 f, ihe analogy is well known cf Hom IX, 443, 
Plato Resp Ш, 390 e 4 f, Thuc 1,139,4 (on Péneles) λέγειν τε кал πράσσειν δυνατωτατος 
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brevity rather than exaggeration, because the right measure lies more in 
the former than the latter 7 4 
What, then, are the tasks of the writer of discourse on the basis of 
the general concept of καιρός' In the following passages it becomes clear 
what specifically is to be done composition consists of the "use" (χρήσις) 
or organisation of the elementary ίδέαι, an activity governed by the 
requirements of selection, arrangement, and proportion. 
organisation 
In the introduction of the Panegyncus Isocrates discusses, among 
other things, the use of history as subject-matter for discourse.75 Even 
though the deeds of the past are, he says, a common heritage, to make 
proper use of this potential material is not easy; 
[7] Г ,9 το δε έν καιρώ ταύταις (σψ. τηε δεεδσ οφ τηε παστ) 
καταχρήσασθαι και τα προσήκοντα περί έκαστης ένθυμηθηναι και τοις 
όνόμασιν εϋ διαθέσθαι τών εύ φρονούντων ϊδιόν έστιν.7 6 
There exists a direct connection between καιρός and the organisation of 
discourse, referred to by the word χρήσις.7 7 As the other two tasks of the 
writer of discourse mentioned refer to invention and phrasing, it seems 
probable that organisation entails matters of composition, i.e. the activity 
of deciding what place to give to the selected subject-matter in the 
discourse. This activity is governed by the concept of καιρός. 
The use of the singular έν καιρώ indicates that what is referred to 
by this phrase is the abstract notion of καιρός. In texts [1] - [4] and [6] 
(and others quoted below), however, the plural καιροί is employed, 
which can be explained as refelecting the plurality of cases and 
instances where the abstract notion is applied.7 8 This distinction is 
7 4
 The general preference of limitation over exaggeration in the quantitative sense can be found 
again in Cicero Orator 22,75, where this passage of Isocrates may even have been on Cicero's 
mind m ommbltsque rebus videndum est quaienus etsi emm suits cuique ret modus est, tarnen 
magts offendtt nimium quam parum Note the use of the image of the sharp edge, stressing the 
narrow and difficult to discern boundary line seep 68, Wersdorfer(1940),57. 
7 5
 For a general analysis of this passage see Ch IV, 127 f 
76 to use them in the right dimension and to conceive what is appropriate to each of them and to 
make a good composition in phrase is typical of those who possess practical wisdom. 
7 7
 On χρησις as "organisation" sec IV, 131 f 
7 8
 See KG I, § 348, e), Wersdorfer (1940), 57 
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justified by texts as [11], where the singular is used, but clearly qualified 
as to be applied to the case at hand: τοΰ καιρού τοΰ παρόντος.79 
selection 
One of the sections in the Helen (chs. 28-38) is devoted to a 
eulogistic description of the achievements of Theseus, the founding 
father of Athens. The catalogue of his heroic exploits is broken off in 
chs. 29-30 in a transitional passage, in which Isocrates says that he is at a 
loss (29: άπορω δε) how to treat the rest of the potential material on 
Theseus. Using an aposwpests he mentions the possible treatment of the 
stories on Skiron and Kerkyon, but decides to leave them out 
(παραλιπεΐν). He proceeds: 
[8] X,29 αισθάνομαι δ' έμαυτον εξω φερόμενον των καιρών και 
δεδοικα μη τισι δόξω περί τούτου μάλλον σπουδάζειν ή περί ής την άρχην 
ΰπεθέμην. έξ αμφοτέρων οΰν τούτων αίροΰμαι τα μεν πλείστα παραλιπεΐν δια 
τους δυσκόλως άκροωμένους, περί δε τών άλλων ώς αν δύνωμαι 
συντομώτατα διελθεΐν.80 
To continue cataloguing Theseus' exploits would involve transgressing 
the proper limitation for that catalogue in this discourse on Helen. 
Moreover, it would suggest that its author was more concerned about the 
topic of this section than about the main topic announced at the 
beginning: the praise of Helen. Thus both the considerations of 
limitation (καιροί) and of thematic orientation or homogeneity 
(ΰπόθεσις) make Isocrates decide to be selective (παραλιπεΐν) and to leave 
most of the material out, because his audience might disapprove 
otherwise. Secondly, he must present the remaining material as briefly 
(συντομώτατα) as possible. The quantitative consideration, that the 
catalogue will become too long and therefore burdensome to the 
audience, is again prominently present.81 The requirement of limitation 
causes the author to intervene in his text. This involves a dual 
7 9
 Cf. [13], [18], [19], below. 
' " But I feel that I am earned beyond the proper dimensions, and I fear that I might seem to some 
to be more concerned about him (sc Theseus) than about the topic I originally announced. For 
both these reasons I prefer to leave out most because of a discontented audience, and to treat the 
rest as concisely as I can. 
" Wersdorfer (1940), 63 neglects Ihe point of thematic homogeneity 
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consideration both with respect to the length of this particular section, a 
consideration regarding the internal organisation of the discourse, and 
with respect to the expectation of his audience, a consideration 
concerning the external situation in which the discourse is presented 
A similar case is found in the Euagoras, the laudatory biographical 
discourse on king Euagoras of Cyprus The greatness of Euagoras would 
emerge clearly from a comparison with the other kings and rulers of 
history, but (34)· 
[9] IX.34 ει μεν ουν προς έ'καστον αυτών τάς πράξεις τας Εύαγόρου 
παραβάλλοιμεν, οΰτ' αν ό λόγος 'ίσως τοις καιροΐς άρμόσειεν οΐπ' αν ό 
χρόνος τοις λεγομενοις άρκέσειεν ην δε προελόμενοι τους εύδοκιμωτάτους 
έπί τούτων σκοποΰμεν, ουδέν μεν χείρον έξετώμεν, πολϋ δε συντομώτερον 
διαλεχθησόμεθα περί αυτών 8 2 
A full comparison as envisaged by the author is dismissed on the basis 
of two considerations first, the discourse would no longer be in 
harmonious concord with the right limitations, which suggests the 
application of a relative criterium the section containing the comparison 
would become too long m relation to other sections (on this see below 
proportion), secondly, its extension m time would render it impossible 
to be performed These considerations, of course, serve as a means of 
amplification, but at the same time, they reveal once more what 
application of the requirements of καιρός specifically entails The 
conscious act of selection (προελόμενοι) forestalls these potentially 
detrimental consequences, and does not affect the comparison as such 
negatively The investigation of Euagoras' exploits in the light of those of 
the most illustrious rulers ensures that the intended examination 
(έξετώμεν)83 will be equally valid, and that the section's intended purpose 
will therefore be achieved Secondly, in its abbreviated form it will have 
the quality of conciseness Here, as above, it seems that the principle of 
8 2
 If, then, we were to compare Euagoras' exploits to each of theirs, the discourse would perhaps 
cease to fit to the right dimensions and time would not suffice for the telling, but if we select the 
most illustrious and examine them in the light of his exploits, our investigation will be equally 
good and our discussion of these matters will be much more concise 
°3 On the "scientific" vocabulary used here see Ch V, ρ 192 f on Isocrates' scientific attitude 
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καιρός is applied in both internal (work-orientated) and external 
(audience-onentated) respects 8 4 
The correct use of comparison is also discussed in To Phtltp, 143 
There Isocrates says that it would be easy to demonstrate Philip's 
superiority by comparing him to others on the basis of his great 
achievements Still, he decides against the insertion of such a 
comparison 
[10] V.143 άλλα γαρ είλόμην άποσχέσθαι της τοιαύτης Ιδέας δι' 
αμφότερα, διά τε τους ούκ εύκαιρως αύτη χρωμένους και δια το μη βούλεσθαι 
ταπεινότερους ποιείν των νΰν όντων τους ημιθέους είναι νομιζομένους 8 5 
The decision against insertion of the comparison rests on two 
considerations first, he wishes to do nothing that others do wrong in 
this particular case, to use (χρήσθαι) the literary format of the comparison 
contrary to the requirements of καιρός, and, because favourable outcome 
of the comparison of Philip to the heroes of the past, the implication of 
his superiority to demi-gods The second consideration is in itself 
intended as laudatory, so that the decision against the insertion of the 
amplificatory device of comparison becomes an effective amplification 
itself The first consideration implies that Isocrates himself does wish to 
abide by the rules of καιρός 
In the Anttdosis a number of quotations from his earlier works are 
inserted in the mam body of the discourse At ch 194 the excerpt from 
Agatnst the sophists is introduced by giving the audience a general 
characterisation of that particular work as such (λόγον διέδωκα γράψας έν 
φ φανήσομαι τοις τε μείζους ποιούμενοις τάς υποσχέσεις επίτιμων και την 
έμαυτοΰ γνώμην αποφαινόμενος86) He then continues as follows 
8 4
 See Vallozza (198S) 122-123, see also Vallozza (forthcoming), who graciously made the 
manuscnpt of her contribution to the conference on kairos (see ρ 65 & n 1 ) available to me 
" Evenso I have preferred to abstain from a form such as thts, because of two reasons first 
because of ¡hose who use it without caring for the proper dimensions and secondly because of 
unwillingness to make those who are considered to be demi gods seem of less worth than Uving 
men 
8
° ƒ wrote and published a discourse in which you will find that I attack those who make 
unwarranted promises and make clear my own view 
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[11] XV,194 α μεν ουν κατηγορώ των αλλων παραλείψω- και γάρ έστι 
πλείω του καιροΰ τοΰ παρόντος, α δ' αυτός αποφαίνομαι, πειράσομαι 
διελθεΐν ύμίν.87 
Too long an excerpt, which would include the criticisms of rivals, would 
go beyond the limitation set by the goal present in this discourse, i.e. an 
apology of his own activity as an educator. Again καιρός demands 
selection and the exclusion of a certain part of the material available. 
In the Panathenaicus exclusion of available and potential subject-
matter is preferred in ch. 34. In 33 Isocrates concludes his discussion of 
what he considers educated men (πεπαιδευμένοι), and expresses his wish 
to discuss the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and others, in an attempt to 
silence those who "perform their verses in the Lyceum and talk 
nonsense about them" (οιμαι γαρ αν παϋσαι τους έν τω Λυκείω 
ραψωδοΰντας τάκείνων καί ληροΰντας περί αυτών).88 This discussion he 
decides to omit: 
[12] ΧΠ,34 αισθάνομαι δ' έμαυτον εξω φερόμενον της συμμετρίας της 
συντεταγμένης τοις προοιμίοις. εστί δ' άνδρας νουν έχοντος μη την εϋπορίαν 
αγαπάν, ην εχη τις περί τών αυτών πλείω των αλλων ειπείν, άλλα την 
εύκαιρίαν διαφυλάττειν υπέρ ών αν άεί τυγχάνει διαλεγόμενος.89 
Isocrates' decision to exclude is based on a quantitative criterium: even 
though an abundance of potential subject-matter is available, the good 
author should restrain himself and preserve due measure. In this 
particular case, it means that Isocrates must not allow his introduction as 
such to become too long: otherwise it would transgress the limit set by 
the συμμετρία for introductions. This implies that ευκαιρία, the 
circumstance in which relative extensions are fitting, involves observing 
the rule of proportion (συμμετρία) in discourse (see below). 
Another clear case of conscious selection occurs in the Archidamus, 
when in ch. 24 Archidamus says: 
8 7
 / will leave out my criticisms of others that would transgress the present proper dimension. I 
will try, however, to go through my own ideas with you. 
8 8
 On interpreters of Homer see Richardson (1975) and id (1992). 
8 9
 ¡feel that I am earned beyond the proportion prescribed for introductions It is the mark of an 
intelligent man not to indulge in abundance, when he can say more on the same subject as others, 
but to preserve the proper dimension concerning the subjects he will treat on any moment 
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[13] VI.24 περί μεν οΰν των έξ αρχής ύπαρξάντων ήμίν ακριβώς μεν ού 
διήλθον ό γαρ παρών καιρός ούκ έα μυθολογείν, άλλ' άναγκαΐον ην 
συντομώτερον η σαφεστερον διαλεχθήναι περί αυτών w 
A decision not to insert a passage m which legendary history supports 
the Spartans' claim to the land of the Messenians has had as 
consequence that this topic is treated briefly rather than with clearness, 
which would be the result of a more complete and precise account 
Observation of καιρός demands selection and, again, leads to brevity 
arrangement 
When announcing the recapitulation of his discourse On the Peace, 
Isocrates says that he has up to that point treated most of the available 
solutions to the crisis he has addressed Of these solutions presented he 
says (132) 
[14] VIII,132 διειλεγμαι μεν τα πλείστα пгрх αυτών τούτων, ούκ 
εφεξής, άλλ' ώς εκαστον τω καιρώ συνέπιπτεν
91 
By contrasting καιρός to εφεξής Isocrates draws attention to the aspect of 
arrangement, thus implying that it is inherent to that concept The 
available subject-matter, in this case the various solutions to the crisis as 
discussed in the discourse, is not to be presented without definite 
planning The presentation qualified as εφεξής would mean that the 
topics would follow one another in succession, the sequentially being 
the principle of order 9 2 A clear illustration of this is provided m Anttdosu 
140, another transitional passage, where Isocrates says απορώ δ' S τι 
χρήσομαι τοις ΰπολοίποις, και τίνος πρώτου μνησθώ και ποίου δευτέρου το 
γαρ εφεξής με λέγειν διαπέφευγεν 9 S Arrangement entails more than just 
9 0 1 have not treated with precision the possessions we had of old the present situation does not 
allow the recourse to legendary history but it was necessary the discuss them rather more briefly 
than clearly 
9
 ' I have discussed most of these points not one after the other but as each fell in with its proper 
dimension. 
9 2
 Cf IV 26 καλλιστ εξετασαιμεν, ει τον τε χρονον απ' αρχής και τας πράξεις ΐας της πόλεως 
εφεξής διελθοιμεν cf IV, 91 δις εφεξής on XII84 see below ρ 97 f 
9
^ I am at a loss on how how to proceed with the rest which topic to raise first and which one 
next the ability to speak in sequential order has escaped me 
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sequential order: only when each topic is introduced at its right place 
can one say that the presentation accords with καιρός. The phrase τω 
καιρώ συνέπιπτεν suggests that καιρός is seen as a slot or narrow opening, 
into which the topic falls with perfect fit. On the basis of the intended 
contrast with sequential order, one would conclude that the aspect of 
arrangement is dominant here, although limitation is also implied. 
The phrase τοις καιροίς άρμόσειεν, as it was used in text [9], 
deserves attention here: the notion of καιρός is related to the sense of 
αρμονία or "framework", the functional fitting together of parts into a 
whole. In Antidosis 103 Isocrates explains why he has decided not to 
mention his pupil and friend Timotheus amongst the list of his 
followers (chs. 93-94). The reason for this is, that Timotheus presents a 
different case: 
[15] XV,103 ωστ' ούκ αν ήρμοσεν 'άμα περί τούτου και τοις άλλοις 
χρήσασθαι τοις λόγοις, άλλ' αναγκαίος είχεν οΰτω διελέσθαι και 
διατάξασθαι περί αυτών.
94 
The phrase διελέσθαι και διατάξασθαι indicates that organisation 
(χρήσις) is the point of reference here, of which arrangement is a 
subdivision.95 Thus the state of αρμονία is the end of proper arrangement. 
The criteria to apply are concerned with content: because Timotheus is 
too different from the others he cannot be treated in the same group. 
Functionality and purpose is what matters in deciding on what to 
include where. This also clearly emerges from ch. 270, where Isocrates 
wants to define the exact meaning of the words σοφία and φιλοσοφία, 
because that topic is in keeping with the subject of the discourse: 
[16] XV,270 περί δε σοφίας και φιλοσοφίας τοις μεν περί άλλων τινών 
άγωνιζομένοις ούκ αν άρμόσειε λέγειν περί τών ονομάτων τούτων εστί γαρ 
αλλότρια πάσαις ταΐς πραγματείαις. έμοί 6' επειδή καί κρίνομαι περί τών 
τοιούτων καί την καλουμένην υπό τίνων φιλοσοφίαν ούκ εΐναι φημί, 
προσήκει τήν δικαίως αν νομιζομένην όρίσαι καί δηλώσαι προς υμάς.96 
9 4
 therefore, it would nat have fitted together to discuss this man and the others in one group, but 
is was necessary to make the selection and arrangement on them <asl did>. 
9 5
 See p. 30 f., 43 f. 
*· As to "wisdom " and "philosophy ", for those who are pleading on any other issue it would not 
befitting to speak on these words, because they are foreign to all litigation; but for me, as I am 
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The point in this passage is, that a discussion of correct definitions for the 
words σοφία and φιλοσοφία would be out of place in a discourse that 
belongs to the dicanic genre. A section containing such definitions 
would not properly fit into the framework that discourses in that genre 
should have: inclusion would constitute a breach of convention. But, 
since Isocrates conceives his Antidosis as a fictitious dicanic discourse, in 
which he is called to defend himself on exactly the issue of his 
performance in the field of education, the inclusion of this section is 
justified. 
Thus it seems that άρμόττειν is related to the fitting together of the 
sections of a discourse, and that this activity is not merely technical, but 
also involves the application of criteria of content.9 7 
That arrangement in the context of καιρός is linked with 
considerations of content also emerges from the prooemium of the 
Antidosis, where Isocrates explains that this discourse is special, in that it 
is "mixed" (λόγος μικτός). To write a discourse like this takes a great deal 
of effort, because its various sections naturally belong to different 
surroundings. Some of the topics are at home in the court-room, others 
are out of place there; still others are purely educational. Finally there is 
the category of excerpts from earlier works, inserted by Isocrates into this 
discourse (10): 
[17] XV, 10 πολλά δε καί των ΰπ' έμοΰ πάλαι γεγραμμένων 
έγκαταμεμιγμένα τοις νΰν λεγομένοις ούκ άλόγως ούδ' άκαίρως, άλλα 
προσηκόντως τοις ΰποκειμένοις.98 
The insertion of sections from previously written works is done 
carefully, to ensure that the sections selected perform a logical function 
(ούκ άλόγως) and have their proper place (ούδ' άκαίρως) given the subject 
of the discourse.99 These negative considerations are substituted (αλλά) 
being tried on these matters and who maintains that what is called philosophy by some is no such 
thing, it is relevant to define what is correctly understood by it and to make that clear to you.i 
9 7
 Similarly XII,126: in an praeteritio on Theseus Isocrates says κερί ob προ πολλού αν 
έποιησάμην μη διαλεχθηναι πρότερον (sc. in Χ, 18-38)...πολύ γαρ αν μάλλον ήρμοσεν έν χω 
λόγω ш περί της πόλεως διελθείν περί αυτών; cf. XV, 10; ШД; V. 155; Κ,34; ΧΠ.225. 
9
° Much of what I have written before is mixed into what is said now: not without reason nor 
without proper dimension, but appropriately to the subject at hand. 
9 9
 Cf. ΧΠ, 88 (a transitional passage): άεί γαρ οίόμενος Seîv προσιιθέναι το των προειρημένων 
έχόμενον. 
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by προσηκόντως "appropriate", which must again mean that content is a 
criterion here. 
Also in the Philip the insertion of a specific section is discussed: 
there it concerns the treatment of Heracles. Isocrates points to the fact that 
Heracles' bravery and valorous exploits have been the subject of many a 
writer's praise, but that his moral qualities (τα τη ψυχή προσόντα αγαθά) 
were never praised by either poets or prosewriters (109).10° This topic, 
however, would provide much subject-matter: a treatment of this topic 
could include Heracles' practical wisdom, ambition and sense of justice 
(φρόνησις, φιλοτιμία, δικαιοσύνη) as the predominant cause of his 
excellence: his cardinal virtues would be presented as contributing more 
to his superiority than his bodily strength. There is thus a multitude of 
available topics to treat (το πλήθος των ενόντων ειπείν), but Isocrates finds 
himself unable to insert a full discussion of the subject, because of failing 
powers due to his age and (110): 
[18] V,110 τον λόγον ήσθόμην διπλάσιον αν γενόμενον του νΰν 
άναγιγνσκομένου. τών μεν ουν αλλων άπέστην δια τας αιτίας ταύτας, μίαν δε 
πράξιν έξ αυτών ελαβον, η περ ην προσήκουσα μεν καί πρέπουσα τοις 
προειρημένοις, τον δε καιρόν έχουσα μάλιστα σύμμετρον τοις νΰν 
λεγομένοις.101 
The abundance of available material and the consideration that if used 
in full, this would lead to a discourse which is too long, necessitates 
selection (έξ αυτών ελαβον) of one topic. The story that follows (111-112) 
deals with Heracles as unifying the Hellenes and showing them the 
need to fight the common enemy of the East. Isocrates uses the Heracles 
myth to validate his argument, as proposed in this discourse, that Hellas 
should unite under strong leadership (Philip of Macedón) in fighting 
the Persian enemy: Heracles is a symbol of Panhellenistic ideology. 
Thus the story on Heracles is clearly related to (προσήκουσα) the subject 
of the discourse. Also it is suited to it (πρέπουσα), because the mighty 
hero Heracles is shown as foreshadowing the role Philip has to play: the 
story thus has the function of argument by example, based on the 
1 0 0
 See Laistner (1967), 159 ad loc 
" " I sensed that the discourse would become twice as long as the one read <to you> now. I have 
kept away, therefore, from the rest and selected one exploit only, which is related and suited to 
what has been said so far and which ts of proportioned dimension to what is said now. 
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aknowledged authority of the character setting it. The nobility inherent 
in the example and forcefulness of Heracles as a role model is further 
stressed in 113. From the point of view of content, then, the section on 
Heracles can be qualified as internally relevant (προσήκον) and 
externally suited (πρέπον). These qualifications are given based on point 
of view: one judges the appropriateness of a given section either from the 
angle of relatedness to the subject or from its effectiveness. Thus, πρέπον 
and προσήκον have in common that they refer to appropriateness, but 
they can be distinguished as conferring that quality on the basis of 
either basically external (πρέπον) or interna] (προσήκον) criteria.102 
The decision of insertion is furthermore dependent upon consideration 
of the right opportunity in the discourse itself, i.e. the place where that 
insertion should take place. Therefore what is said at the moment (τοις 
νυν λεγομένοις) is the point of reference for establishing that opportune 
place. Here it is arrangement with regard to form that is at stake: the 
Heracles story has its proper place at this instance and can serve its 
purpose here (καιρός). Moreover, as it stands it is qualified as σύμμετρον, 
which refers to its proportion or quantitative extension in relation to its 
context. Being singled out from the abundance of material available, its 
inclusion in the discourse will not lead to the overstretching of length 
that would occur if all the material was included. 
Again, in the same discourse, the inclusion of a topic on Heracles 
is considered at ch. 33. The possibility of describing the role Athens 
played in the immortalisation of Heracles is mentioned, but decided 
against: 
[19] V,33 την δε πόλιν την ήμετέραν φασίν, οϊς περί των παλαιών 
πιστεύομεν, Ήρακλεΐ μεν συναιτίαν γενέσθαι τής αθανασίας - δν δε τρόπον, 
σοι μεν αύθις πυθέσθαι ράδιον, έμοί δε νυν ειπείν ού καιρός.103 
1 0 2
 For προσήκον in this sense cf. IV,28, XV,119; the distinction is not identified by Weisdorfer 
(1940), 17-18 and 23, who implies the synonymity of both words, see Schenkeveld (1970), 169-
170; on πρέπον in the context of aeslhetic theory see Pohlenz (1933), 101 f., 112 f.; see also 
above, ρ 49 f. 
1 0 3 and people whom I trust on these historic matters say thai our city had a share in causing 
Heracles to become immortal - in what way you can easily team later, there is no proper space for 
me to tell that now 
Ill KAIROS 96 
Philip is referred to a instance later on (αύθις1 0 4) to read about Heracles, 
and indeed Heracles returns at a later stage in the same discourse, 
where the story on him serves its proper function (111-112, see above, ρ 
94 f ) Now Isocrates wants to focus attention on the merits of his city 
only with regard to Philip's ancestors the introduction of Heracles 
would deflect that focus 
proportion 
The Panathenaicus contains a long laudatory section on 
Agamemnon (chs 74-90), which serves its own, particular persuasive 
function 1 0 5 In chs 84-88 Isocrates offers an apology for the fact that he 
has given so much space to the treatment of Agamemnon's virtue He 
claims to be well aware of the multitude of things he has said on that 
topic (84 ούκ αγνοώ δε το πλήθος των είρημένων περί της 'Αγαμέμνονος 
αρετής) Although each and every part of that praise has its individual 
merit, Isocrates fears that taken as a whole the section might be 
considered too long The point of reference is the supposed audience 
reaction and their expectations εφεξής δε άναγιγνωσκομένων άπαντες αν 
έπιτιμήσαιεν ως πολύ πλείοσιν είρημένοις του δέοντος 1 0 6 
This potential criticism is used by Isocrates to elaborate his reasons for 
inserting the section in its present form He would, indeed, have been 
ashamed if he had made it too long inadvertently (ει μεν ελαθον έμαυτον 
πλεονάζων, ήσχυνόμην αν), which would mean that he proved himself 
unperceptive (άναισθήτως διεκείμην), ι e he would not have sensed his 
transgression This, however, is not the case, and his decision for the 
inclusion is explained thus (85) 
[20] XH,85 άλλα γαρ ήγησάμην ούχ οΰτως εσεσθαι δεινόν, ην έπί τοΰ 
μέρους τούτου δόξω τισί των καιρών άμελείν, ώς ην περί άνδρας τοιούτου 
διαλεγόμενος παραλίπω τι τών έκείνφ τε προσόντων αγαθών κάμοί 
προσηκόντων ειπείν
 1 0 7 
1 0 4
 Cf ΧΙΙ.34 Ер VII, 10, see LSI i ν ПЗ 
1 0 5





 ¡hey (= the topics on Agamemnon) are read one after the other, all would censure the 
fact that much more has been said than should have been said 
107 £де j considered that it would be less objected to, if I would seem to some not to be canng 
about the right dimensions in this section than when in my discussion of this man I would leave 
out some of the merits that pertain to him and what is relevant for me to mention. 
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It was a conscious decision to speak at such length on Agamemnon and 
so run the risk of being criticized for speaking too long. Speaking too 
long is a sign of disregarding the καιροί, the proper limitations expected 
by the audience. This point is elaborated further (86): 
[21] XII,86 ωμην δε και παρά τοις χαριεστάτοις των ακροατών 
εύδοκιμήσειν, ην φαίνωμαι περί αρετής μεν τους λόγους ποιούμενος, δπως δε 
ταύτης άξίως έρώ μάλλον σπουδάζων ή περί την τοΰ λόγου συμμετρίαν, καΐ 
ταΰτα σαφώς είδώς την μεν περί τον λόγον άκαιρίαν άδοξότερον έμε 
ποιήσουσαν, την δε περί τας πράξεις εΰβουλίαν αυτούς τους έπαινουμένους 
ώφελήσουσαν.
108 
Isocrates appeals to the connaisseurs in his audience, who would 
appreciate him giving priority to content over form in this instance. If 
the subject is virtue, then one should do everything needed for doing 
justice to that lofty theme, even if this means that the rules for relative 
length of the parts of the discourse have to be disregarded. Thus the 
decision called for here, to include more of Agamemnon's exploits, is 
the right one. Here one can see the close relationship of καιρός and 
συμμετρία: the observance of the right limitations (i.e. beginning and 
ending a section at the right point) is the method for ensuring that the 
discourse has correct proportion.109 
Later on in the Panathenaicus Isocrates discusses three different 
kinds of government (democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, chs. 132-133) 
and typifies them according to their general character and capacities. 
He says at 134 that one could say more on this subject, but that he will 
single out one of the polities for further discussion: Athen's ancestral 
constitution, which he will show to be of greater worth and source of 
more benefits than the Spartan constitution. This section is introduced 
thus (135): 
'°° And I thought that I would receive approval from the most accomplished of my hearers, if in 
writing a discourse on virtue. 1 would show myself to be more concerned about doing justice to 
the subject than about the proportion of the discourse, and that </ did> m the clear knowledge that 
the lack of right dimensions m the discourse would prove to be detrimental to my reputation, but 
that making the right decision on the exploits would be helpfull to the ones that are praised. 
'0® That limitation was also relevant to Euripides can be concluded from his implicit criticism of 
Aeschylus'inappropriate use of catalogues Suppl 849-850, Phoen 751-752, see Verdemus 
(1983), 18 & n 18. 
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[22] XII.135 έσται δ' ό λόγος τοις μέν ήδέως αν άκούσασι πολιτείαν 
χρηστην έμοΰ διεξιοντος ούτ' όχληρος οΰτ' άκαιρος, άλλα σύμμετρος και 
προσήκων τοις πρότερον είρημένοις 1 1 0 
The expected reaction in the audience favourable to him and his subject 
will be one of approval, provided that the section is of the nght proportion 
(being in the nght place in the discourse and of the nght extension) and 
that its content is related to the subject of the discourse An audience of a 
different disposition, one that does not take pleasure in senous discourse 
but prefers the contentious orators of the great festivals railing at each 
other, or the laudatory discourses on tnvial subjects or lawless men, will 
believe that it is going on too long (τούτοις 6' αυτόν οΐμαι δόξειν πολύ 
μακρότερον είναι του δέοντος) 
Thus the disposition of the audience appears to play a decisive role those 
interested in serious discourse will not object to a prolonged section, 
provided it deals with a subject worthy of such treatment Their sense of 
το δέον differs from that of an audience that prefers spectacular debate or 
paradoxographic virtuoso speech They disapprove of such prolonged 
sections The element of relativism m relation to the different recipients 
of the discourse and their evaluation of it seems to be more prominent in 
the Panathenatcus than elsewhere in theoretical passages The notion that 
prolonged treatment of morally worthy subject-matter, even if this leads 
to disregard what καιρός demands, has pnonty over form can be seen as 
a development in Isocrates' thinking on matters of composition ш 
synthesis 
The previous survey of passages where Isocrates uses καιρός in a 
context of theory of composition points to the following conclusions 
1] the capacity to discern the καιροί or proper dimensions of discourse 
and its parts constitutes an advanced level of rhetoncal skill, this level is 
attained by training the pupil's technical abilities and developing his 
judgment (δόξα), 
1 1 0
 What I am going to say will lo those who like to hear me discussing a good polity be neither 
a burden nor without proper dimension but of right proportion and relevant to what has been said 
before 
1 1 1
 Trédé (1992) 275-282 
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2] the sense of proper dimensions is closely linked to what is conceived 
as the order of discourse; to achieve that state of order the writer of 
discourse must organise his text (χρήσις), a task consisting of the 
practical activities of selection, arrangement, and proportioning; 
3] the notion of καιρός itself has as its constituents limitedness, 
situationality, and purposiveness. 
Compared to his predecessors, Isocrates displays not only an awareness 
of the necessities implied by καιρός on a practical level, but also offers 
theoretical reflection on the notion as such. In claiming a place for 
καιρός in advanced education in rhetoric, Isocrates and Plato represent 
similar views. In the case of Isocrates, however, the notion is treated 
more elaborately in its technical consequences, as can be expected of the 
man who was primarily interested in presenting his ideas on an 
education based on rhetoric. Matters of technique and method are, at the 
same time, firmly grounded in the concept of δόξα, thereby providing 
rhetoric with a philosopical base. 
5. Isocrates' notion of καιρός in the context of craftmanship 
Some of the technical vocabulary used by Isocrates in the context 
of his notion of καιρός suggests, as was the case with Pindar's utterances 
on his poetical technique, that in formulating his ideas on the rules of 
composition, the image of building is a leading thought. The first group 
of words is that related to "measuring": μετριάζειν, μετριότης, συμμετρία, 
σύμμετρος. The second group involves "fitting together": άρμόττειν. 
Thirdly, the words used to qualify the finished discourse as a product 
which is seen to be well-made and which is as such perceptible (πρέπον, 
διαποικίλαι) should also be referred to here. Of course, the word καιρός 
itself occurs frequently in a "technical" context as well. Since the 
discourse is described in terms of a structure to be fitted together by the 
author, an activity in which measurement plays an important role, the 
technical vocabulary could be characterised as "tectonics". 
It should not be surprising that there was common ground 
between the spheres of craftmanship and intellectualism. There are 
reports of close contacts between intellectuals and skilled workers in 
Athens, such as between Pericles, Anaxagoras and the sculptor Pheidias. 
The clearest example of an intellectual bridge between thinkers and 
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manual workers is Socrates and his frequent discussions with craftsmen 
on the subject of their craft itself.1 1 2 This common ground existed 
especially between philosophers, mathematicians and scientists on the 
one hand, and craftsmen such as architects, engineers, painters and 
sculptors on the other. Both groups were much concerned with numbers 
and measurement as the basis of proportion and harmony. 
An instructive example of the cross-current between literature and 
crafts can be found at Aeschylus Choephori 205 f., the so-called "footprint-
scene" in which Orestes' recognition finds further support (Electra 
speaking): 
και μην στίβοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον, 
ποδών, όμοιοι, τοις τ' έμοΐσιν έμφερείς113 
The evidence of the footprints is substantiated further at 209-10: 
πτέρναι τενόντων θ' ύπογραφαί μετρούμενοι 
είς ταύτο συμβαίνουσι τοις έμοΐς στίβοις.114 
The vocabulary used in this passage strongly suggests that one is to 
think of proportion rather than size here: the phrase μετρούμενοι είς ταύτο 
συμβαίνουσι can be interpreted as "resulting in the same proportions". 
This interpretation finds support in 229, where Orestes is said to be 
σύμμετρος to his sister and with this term a key word of the notion 
"proportion" is used. 1 1 5 There are indications that proportion was a 
concern of artists in this early period (the Choephori is to be dated 458 
ВС) : it is said of the sculptor Pythagoras of Rhegium (Jl. 480/460 ВС) that 
he raised theoretical questions about the proportions of the human 
form.116 Thus it would seem plausible that Aeschylus reflects a theory in 
circulation at the time. 
Vocabulary involving craftmanship occurs frequently in Plato, 
where the arts are often used as a point of reference. In the Politicus the 
nature of measurement is discussed, in the context of an examination of 
1 1 2
 Burford (1972), 129-135, Xen Mem ΙΠ,10,9-15, 10,1 f, 10,6 f recorded conversations 
between Socrates and Pislias the armourer, Parrhasius the painter, and Cleitophon the sculptor, it 
should be noted that already in Homer there is a close link between σοφία and skilled 
craftmanship see Verdemus (19S3), 20 f 
^ And then, of course, his footprints, a second proof like mine, resembling mme 
1 1 4
 The heels and the contours of his tendons, when measured, tally with my own footprints 
1 1 5
 Burkert (1963), 177, see also Game (1987), 96-97, 100-102,1 read, with Αί, σύμμετροι) 
instead of σΰμμετρον 
1
 ^ Diog Laert ПІ.47 πρώτον δοκοΰντα ρυθμού και συμμετρίας έστοχάσθαι, see also Pliny 
Ν Η 34,58 on Myron numerosior m arte quam Polyclitus et m symmetna diligentior, see Isager 
(1991), 99-100 
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weaving (283 с 2 f.): the point of departure is an consideration of excess 
and deficiency in general (πρώτον τοίνυν ϊδωμεν πάσαν την τε ύπερβολήν 
και την ελλειψιν), which should lead to establishing a norm by which to 
judge what is said as too much or too little ('ίνα κατά λόγον έπαινώμεν και 
ψέγωμεν τα μακρότερα του δέοντος εκάστοτε λεγόμενα και τάναντία). Of the 
two kinds of the art of measurement (ή μετρητική) one is concerned with 
the relative greatness and smallness of objects, the other with size in 
accordance with a certain standard or norm (το μέτρων). This second 
kind of measurement is basic to all arts concerned with το πρέπον, ό 
καιρός, το δέον και πάνθ' όπόσα εις το μέσον άπφκίσθη τών έσχατων. The 
point here is that this art of measurement is primarily concerned with 
determining what is the right length according to the norm, which is 
dependent upon the purpose involved. Thus the length of a discussion of 
weaving should be judged by whether it proves to be conducive to the 
promotion of the dalectical abilities of the participants in the discussion 
(286 с 5 - 287 b 2). In normative measuring, therefore, purposiveness is 
the main element.1 1 7 
To this might be compared what is said on "the good man 
speaking for the best" (ό αγαθός άνήρ και έπί το βέλτιστον λέγων) in 
GoTgias 503 d 6 f., where the same notion of purposive measurement is 
applied to rhetoric. Here the analogy between rhetoric and craftmanship 
is explicitly made. The good man speaking for the best 
α αν λέγη άλλο τι ούκ εΐκρ έρεϊ, αλλ' αποβλέπων προς τι; ώσπερ και οι αλλοι 
πάντες δημιουργοί βλέποντες προς το αύτων έργον έκαστος ούκ εική 
εκλεγόμενος προσφέρει (α προσφέρει) [προς το έργον το αύτων], άλλ' δπως αν 
είδος τι αύτώ σχη τοΰτο ο εργάζεται.
118 
The speaker, as every craftsman or artist, has the purpose of giving form 
to his work: he is, therefore, conscious of the goal he wants to achieve 
(the element of purpose).119 This is clarified by an example: 
οίον ει βούλει ίδείν τους ζωγράφους, τους οικοδόμους, τους ναυπηγούς, τους 
άλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, οντινα βούλει αυτών, ώς εις τάξιν τινά έκαστος 
εκαστον τίθησιν δ αν τιθίί, και προσαναγκάζει το έτερον τώ έτέρω πρέπον τε 
1 1 7
 Heath (1989), 24-25 
1 1 8
 [Dodds' text] will certainly not say what he says at random, but keeping an eye on 
something Just as all other craftsmen, with an eye to their own function, each of them applies 
the measures he applies, not at random but selecting them in order to get the thing he is making 
to acquire a particular form [tr. Dodds] 
1
 " On the background of arusuc theory in general see Webster (1939), esp 169-171. 
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είναι καί άρμόττειν, εως αν tò άπαν σοστήσηται τεταγμένον τε και 
κεκοσμημένον πράγμα.120 
As πρέπον, άρμόττειν, προσαναγκάζει (~ το δέον) indicate, the ultimate 
goal of producing a thing with structure and order depends on applying 
the principle of measurement according to a norm, as described above. 
This general principle is applied specifically to rhetoric, especially in its 
philosophically valid form, in Phaedrus 272 ab.1 2 1 
The relevance of the vocabulary of craftmanship for Isocrates' 
theory of composition can be further substantiated by looking more 
precisely at the art of statuary. Comparison of poetry and rhetoric on the 
one hand, and sculpture on the other, can be attested from Pindar 
onwards (Ν.ν,Ιί.): 
ούκ άνδριαντοποιός είμ', ώστ' έλινύσοντα έργά-
ζεσθαι άγάλματ' έπ' αύτας βαθμίδος 
έσταότ· άλλ' επί πάσας 
όλκάδος εν τε άκάτψ, γλυκεΐ' άοιδά, 
στεΐχ' απ' Αίγινας διαγγέλλοισα
122 
The same comparison of the sedentary statue and the activity of song1 2 S 
occurs in Isocrates as well, albeit that the laudatory song has been 
replaced by the prose encomium. In the Euagoras Isocrates says: 
έγώ δ', ω Νικόκλεις, ηγούμαι καλά μεν είναι μνημεία καί τάς των σωμάτων 
εικόνας, πολύ μέντοι πλείονος αξίας τάς τών πράξεων καί της διανοίας, ας έν 
τοις λόγοις αν τις μόνον τοις τεχνικώς εχουσι θεωρήσειεν...(δισψουρσε ισ 
πρεφερρεδ) οτι τους μεν τύπους άναγκαΐον παρά τούτοις είναι μόνοις, παρ' 
οΐς αν σταθώσι, τους δε λόγους έξενεχθηναί θ' οίον τ' εστίν...
124 
1 2 0
 Consider, for example, the painters, architects, shipwrights and all the other craftsmen you 
would care to name· each of them arranges whatever it is he arranges into some sort of structure, 
and compels each thing to be appropriate to another and to fit them together, until he has 
composed the whole into a thing of structure and order [tr Heath, adapted]. 
1 2 1
 Heath (1989), 18-24. 
'
2 2
 / am no maker of statues, who fashions figures to stand unmoved on the self-same pedestal 
On every merchantman, in every skiff, go, sweet song, from Aegtna and spread the news [tr. 
Bowra] 
1 2 3
 Cf /. Π.46, see Race (1990), 63, 69-70 & n 30, cf. also Thgn 237-254; see Too (1995), 
187-8 
12* I think, Nicocles, that representations of the body are beautiful monuments, but those of 
exploits and spint are of much greater value, when, that is, they can be observed m discourse 
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Неге Isocrates shows himself a, probably conscious, follower of Pindar's 
comparison of the activity of the sculptor to that of the literary author. 
The comparison shows that both spheres were thought to be akin, but is 
intended to prove the superiority of literature.125 
Of special interest, however, are the fragments of a treatise by the 
sculptor Polycleitus, known by as the "Kanon", which contains some 
evidence of reflection on the art of statuary. Three utterances of 
Polycleitus can plausibly be attributed to this treatise, because they are 
either quotations, or paraphrases by another author (Plutarch). They can 
safely be taken to reflect the essence of Polycleitus' thought.1 2 6 Two of 
these are relevant here, because they contain specific technical 
vocabulary. 
The first quotation is found in Philo of Byzantium, known as "the 
Mechanic", who wrote a treatise Mechanica , to be dated in the second 
half of the third century ВС. The introduction to Book Г on the 
construction of catapults contains a discussion on the best method of 
developing "construction-plans" (συντάξεις ) . These can only be 
successfully devised in a long process, in which both theory and 
practical experience have an essential role. But even these plans do not 
guarantee that all catapults build according to them have identical 
mechanical qualities. The slightest deviation results in divergence in, 
e.g., reach of the device. As a consequence, Philo argues, the constructor 
should work with a maximum of accuracy. The necessity to work with 
accuracy is first underlined by a quotation from Polycleitus: 
ώστε την ΰπο Πολυκλείτου τοΰ όνδριαντοποιοΰ ρηθεΐσαν φωνήν οϊκείαν 
είναι τφ μέλλοντι λέγεσθαι· το γαρ εύ παρά μικρόν δια πολλών αριθμών εφη 
γίνεσθαι.
127 
composed according to the art. because images must necessarily remain among those, where they 
have been set up; but discourse can be spread by publication... 
1 2 5
 Cf. 11,36, the close relation between statuary and rhetoric is implied in Gorg. Hel. 18 (see 
below), in another sense the image of the statue is used by Alcid Soph. 27-28, on the concept "ut 
pictura poësis", possibly originating with Simonides, see Schmid-Stahlin 1,1, p. S16, Anm. 6; 
Philipp (1968). S8-S9. 
1 2 6
 References and quotations in context arc presented and discussed by Philipp (1990), 135-155; 
see also Moser von Filseck (1990), 1-31 on the archaeological material. 
127
 Consequently the word from the sculptor Polycleitus is relevant to what I am going to say. 
He said: "success occurs by a small margin through many numbers. " 
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The phrase παρά μικρόν refers to the small margin left to the technician: 
a small deviation will lead to big divergence, as in the case of plans for 
catapults. This seems to be a plausible interpretation of the quotation, in 
which the consequences of small alterations are discussed. To manage 
these difficulties will only be possible when the technician has 
theoretical knowledge combined with practical experience. The fact that 
Polycleitus is quoted as confirmation of this precept can be taken to 
indicate that he was also no pure theorist, but adhered to the practical 
wisdom of the craftsman. For these, experience and theory are 
complementary.128 Furthermore, the phrase δια πολλών αριθμών 
suggests that to achieve success in a technical activity the role of "many 
numbers" is essential.129 By this phrase he probably refers to proportion, 
as will become clear further on 
The second quotation occurs in a later source: Galen's De placttis 
Hippocratts el Platonts 5, which has a discussion of Chrysippus' notion that 
healthiness in the body consists of the right proportion (συμμετρία) of 
warm and cold, and dry and humid. These are the elements of bodies 
(στοιχεία των σωμάτων). He continues: 
το δε κάλλος ούκ èv τίί των στοιχείων, άλλα έν τη των μορίων συμμετρία 
συνίστασθαι νομίζει, δακτύλου προς δάκτυλον δηλονότι και συμπάντων 
αυτών προς τε μετακάρπιον και καρπον καί τούτων προς πηχυν και πήχεως 
προς βραχίονα και πάντων προς πάντα, καθάπερ έν τω Πολυκλείτου Κανόνι 
γέγραπται. πάσας γαρ έκδιδάξας ημάς έν έκείνω τω συγγράμματι τάς 
συμμετρίας του σώματος ό Πολύκλειτος εργφ τον λόγον έβεβαίωσε 
δημιουργήσας ανδριάντα κατά τα τοΰ λόγου προστάγματα καί καλέσας δη 
και αυτόν τον ανδριάντα καθάπερ καί το σύγγραμμα Κανόνα, το μεν δη 





 Philipp (1990), 137-138 
1 2 9
 On a possible relationship of Polycleitus thoughts with Pythagoreamsm see Raven (1951), 
Philipp (1990), 144 
'30 but he thinks that beauty does not consist in the right proportion of the elements, but m that 
of the parts that is to say <m the right proportion of> one finger to another finger and of all of 
them to the palm of the hand and the wnst and of these to the forearm, and of the forearm to the 
<whole> arm, and of all <further parts> to all <others>, as it is written down m the Canon of 
Polycleitus For Polycleitus instructs us in that book of his on all proportions of the body, and he 
confirmed this principle in practice by making a statue according to the prescriptions m his 
account, and he named the statue ¡ike his book " Canon " Beauty of the body, then, consists in the 
right proportion of the parts according to all physicians and philosophers 
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Beauty (κάλλος), according to Polycleitus in his treatise (σύγγραμμα) 
entitled "Canon", consists of συμμετρία των μορίων: the right proportion of 
all the parts of the body to each other. This principle is applied to all parts, 
beginning with the extremities (fingers) to the hand, the hand to the 
forearm, the forearm to the whole arm, and so on. This leads up to an 
elaborate whole of relative measures, which in its entireity results in 
συμμετρία, the right proportion as it is manifest in the complete system of 
measures. Obviously κάλλος is the aim the artist seeks to attain in his 
work of art: if he is succesful, his work will have the quality of beauty. In 
that case κάλλος coincides with το εϋ, as it is used above by Philo 
Mechanicus. If this is correct, then the phrase δια πολλών αριθμών refers 
to the elaborate whole of relative measures constituting συμμετρία. 
Clearly these measures are not absolute figures, but numbers which 
indicate a relation in size of one part to another. 
Confirmation for this interpretation is found in another passage of 
Galen's work, where he discusses the difficulties in finding the mean 
(το μέσον). He says (De temp. 1,9): 
το δε άσκήσαι γνωρίζειν έτοίμως έν έκάστω γένει ζώου καΐ κατά τα 
σύμπαντα το μέσον ού του τυχόντος ανδρός, άλλ' εσχάτως εστί φιλόπονου 
και δια μακράς εμπειρίας και πολλής γνώσεως απάντων των κατά μέρος 
έξευρίσκειν δυναμένου το μέσον. 
οΰτω γοΰν και πλάσται και γραφείς άνδριαντοποιοί τε και δλως 
άγαλματοποιοί τα κάλλιστα γράφουσι και πλάττουσι καθ' εκαστον εΐδος, 
οίον ανθρωπον εΰμορφότατον ή ϊππον ή βοΰν ή λέοντα το μέσον έν έκείνφ τφ 
γένει σκοποΰντες. και πού τις άνδρίας επαινείται Πολυκλείτου κανών 
ονομαζόμενος, έκ τοΰ πάντων των μορίων ακριβή την προς άλληλα 
συμμετρίαν έχειν ονόματος τοιούτου τυχών.131 
1 3 1
 training to easily determine in each seperate species of living creature and in general the mean 
is not something for just anybody rather a man who is exceedingly assiduous can, also with long 
experience and much knowledge, of all things in their pans find the mean, 
thus also the moulders, painters, sculptors and, m short, all the producers of images, depict and 
mould the most beautiful in each kind <ofart>: for instance, a well-formed man, horse, ox, or 
lion, by looking at the mean in each species. And there is somewhere a much appreciated statue 
by Polycleitus, called Canon it has that name because it possesses an exact proportion of all parts 
to each other. 
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Finding το μέσον is compared by Galen to the way artists work who 
produce images: in their search for the "most beautiful" they look at the 
species they want to depict in order to find the mean of that species. This 
must refer to a general mean in relations of size: the relative measures 
typical for each species. As before, the συμμετρία typical of each species 
is what is sought, as is evident from the specific example given by 
Galen: the Canon-statue of Polycleitus, described as having ακριβής 
συμμετρία "exact proportions", is presented as a specific instance of 
artistic μέσον. 
It is also interesting to note that finding the mean is said to be 
difficult: it requires a man who is willing to exert himself and who 
needs experience and theoretical knowledge. Here, as before, one meets 
the three fundamental requirements to master any technique: talent, 
knowledge and training.132 
The artistic procedure just described acknowledges that the perfect 
proportion, which is aimed at in art, cannot be found in reality. It is the 
task of the artist, therefore, to observe reality and select beautiful 
elements from it, and then to create a beautiful work of art from these 
selections. This common wisdom 1 3 3 is already reflected in the 5th 
century ВС, when Gorgias says in his Helen (18): 
άλλα μην oi γραφείς 'όταν εκ πολλών χρωμάτων και σωμάτων εν σώμα και 
σχήμα τελείως άπεργάσωνται, τέρπουσι την δψιν.1 3 4 
The same procedure is discussed in the so-called Zeuxis anecdote in 
Xenophon's Memorabilia (111,10,2): 
καΐ μην τά γε καλά εϊδη άρομοιοϋντες, επειδή οϋ ρφδιον ένί άνθρώπφ 
περιτυχεΐν άμεμπτα πάντα εχοντι, έκ πολλών συνάγοντες τα έξ έκαστου 
κάλλιστα οϋτως 8λα τα σώματα καλά ποιείτε φαίνεσθαι.135 
1 3 2
 See above, p. 35-36, 82 f. 
1 3 3
 See Buchheim (1985), 424-425 on a possible relation of this Gorgianic text with Empedocles 
(fr. 31 В 23 DK). 
134 But when painters complete out of many colours and objects a single object and form, they 
please the sight, [tr. MacDowell]. 
135
 an¿ imitating the beautiful forms - as it is not easy to find one man perfect in all respects · 
by bringing together the most beautiful pans from many you make the bodies as a whole seem 
beautiful 
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As such, the procedure followed by these artists is mimetic: they imitate 
what is beautiful in nature and the combination of these seperate 
elements is a new, beautiful work of art.1 3 6 
Finally, to these fragments of Polydeitean theory can be added 
another text, which does not contain a quotation, but seems to provide a 
synoptic paraphrase of his thoughts and avails itself of a technical 
vocabulary, that may well have been used by Polycleitus himself.137 
The text is to be found in Plutarch (Мог. 45 c-d): 
ώς έν έργω γε παντί το μεν καλόν έκ πολλών οίον αριθμών εις έ'νο καιρόν 
ήκόντων ΰπο συμμετρίας τινός και αρμονίας επιτελείται, το δ' αίσχρον εξ 
ένας τοΰ τυχόντος ελλείποντος ή προσόντος άτόπως ευθύς έτοίμην έχει την 
γένεσιν...
138 
Even though there is no direct reference to Polycleitus, it seems at least 
possible to include the text here. Plutarch is thinking of him as he 
comments on craftmanship and the mechanics of productive activity. If 
something beautiful is to result from that activity, then the achievement 
of that result is dependent upon (έκ) a regularity of numbers or measures 
with regard to a certain "right measure" or relation (καιρός). This again 
is governed by the qualities of being proportioned and having an 
harmonious arrangement or framework. The ugly, by contrast, is 
caused either by the absence of some element required or its presence 
where not required. Thus craftmanship involves many stages, in which 
the artist tries to add to his work where he should, in order to reach 
beauty, and in which he must beware of adding too much in order to 
avoid ugliness. 
If compared to the texts quoted above, this passage from Plutarch 
contains at least a clear parallel, both in content and diction, to what can 
plausibly be seen as Polycleitus' thoughts on the aim of the art of 
statuary. This suggests that the key-words of the passage (το καλόν, εκ 
πολλών αριθμών, καιρός, συμμετρία, αρμονία, ελλείποντος, προσόντος 
1 3 6
 Grassi (1962), 76-78. 
1 3 7
 Philipp (1990), 140 f 
'
3
* As in every work the beautiful is reached as a result of the fact that many numbers come 
together in one right measure by a certain kind of proportion and framework, and the ugly 
immediately originates as a result of one occasional element being absent or present where it is 
out of place. 
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άτόπως) belong to theorizing on craftmanship in general. It is, therefore, 
not necessary to argue that the passage in Plutarch reflects Polycleitean 
thought: rather, it seems that Polycleitus availed himself of the 
vocabulary of craftmanship, as it is found in the fifth century ВС. 
On the basis of these texts some conclusions on the notion of 
καιρός in craftmanship can be made: 
a) it is something to be aimed at; 
b) it is something strictly defined and confined, and therefore easily 
missed; achieving it depends on subtlety and fine tuning; 
c) the qualities of right proportion (measurable relations) and 
arrangement (fitting together) are conducive to its existence; 
d) it is something non-mechanical and must be aimed at anew in every 
separate work of art; 
e) its realisation depends on both theoretical insight and practical ability 
(experience) of the craftsman. 
From a comparison of the technical terminologies and phrasings 
on καιρός in Isocrates on the one hand and the arts on the other, it can be 
concluded that they are essentially similar. This conclusion is justified 
since Isocrates, in theorizing on his activity as a writer of discourse, had 
the image of a finished discourse as a product of craftmanship in mind. 
In this respect he seems to follow the traditional notion of the close 
relationship between poetry and the visual arts, one which can be traced 
back to Simonides and which was alsovery much present in Plato. 
Central to this notion is that both poetry and the visual arts are branches 
of σ ο φ ί α , and that they therefore share a common purpose and 
technique.1 3 9 
More specifically, Isocrates follows in Pindar's footsteps in using 
the technique of transitional passages, marking the boundaries between 
parts of the song/discourse, for reflections on the technique of a maker of 
discourse. While Pindar's aim in these passages was to present his song 
as a performance in progress, it seems that Isocrates used these same 
passages with a didactic purpose. His works were used as paradeigmatic 
specimins of discourse in his educational system 1 4 0, and they provide 
both examples and theoretical reflection at the same time. The didactic 
1 3 9
 On the notion in general see Bowra (1973), 166-187. 
1 4 0
 See Ch. I. § 3. 
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effectiveness of the vocabulary of craftmanship might have been 
enhanced by the fact that reflection on the arts seems to have been very 
common among the intellectuals of Isocrates time. 
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IV. KAINOS 
In this chapter the concept of "newness" or "novelty" (καινότης 
and κοινός) will receive explicit attention.1 Isocrates' thoughts about this 
concept were probably influenced by the sophists and their contributions 
to Greek literary practice and theory.2 However, he does not follow in 
their foot-steps but offers a view on literary novelty in keeping with his 
own general rhetorical doctrine. Isocrates' thoughts on "newness" will 
be discussed in the general context of Greek literary theory up to his 
time. 
I. Homer, Pindar, Aristophanes. 
When in the palace at Ithaca the bard Phemius performes a song 
on the sorrowful return of the Greeks from Troy, he causes Penelope to 
weep. She cannot stand listening to this song because she is painfully 
reminded of her situation and the absence of Odysseus. She therefore 
asks Phemius to discontinue his song, and to choose another subject: 
Φήμιε, πολλά γαρ άλλα βροχών θελκτήρια οίδας, 
εργ' ανδρών τε θεών τε, τά τε κλείουσιν αοιδοί, 
τών εν γέ σφιν αειδε πορήμενος,... 
..., ταύτης δ' άποπαΰε' άοιδης 
λυγρης, ...
3 
Telemachus then defends the singer and says that he is not to blame for 
the effect of his song but Zeus, the one responsible for the fate of men. 
Although the songs on the returns of the Greek heroes are full of sorrow, 
the public wants to hear them. Of songs like these Telemachus says: 
την γαρ άοιδήν μάλλον έπικλείουσ' άνθρωποι, 
ή τις άκουόντεσσι νεωτάτη άμφιπεληται.4 
Here we have an early example of literary criticism, albeit in the form 
of self-conscious reflection, concerned with novelty (νεωτάτη). 
Apparently it is the charm of the latest performance, which is evidence 
1
 On this concept see IV, 8, XIII, 13, Wersdorfer (1940), 36-42, Mikkola (1954), 29, Hudson-
Williams (1948), 77 
2
 See Verdemus (1983), 22-23 with relevant bibliography 
3 Hom 1, 337-41 Phemius, do you not know many other charmed songs for people's ears? 
Songs tn which poets have extolled the great deeds of gods or men ? Sing one of those, herefrom 
your place [..], but this lamentable tale give over (transi TE Lawrence) 
4
 Hom 1, 351-2 A crowd ever extols the song which sounds freshest m its ears (transi. T E 
Lawrence) 
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of the singer's art, that makes the song so popular. The subject is not 
original in the sense that it is unknown: the public is aware of the home­
coming stories (nostoi) of the Greeks. The novelty here seems to refer to 
content rather than (poetic) form: the singer's performing techniques, 
like his playing the kithara and using the epic format, are a matter of 
course. Obviously it is the way he presents the song's story which is the 
criterion5. The boundary line between content and form, however, 
cannot be drawn with certainty. If the audience knows the story, they 
know the song's content. They are mainly interested in the way that 
story is presented: therefore both content and form (presentation) are at 
issue.6 Two relevant points can be made here: 
(1) Penelope says of the home-coming song that it is just one of those 
which Phemius could sing: he knows many other songs, as he belongs 
to the profession of singers who extol (κλείουσιν) the deeds of gods and 
men in their song; the singer can perform a song on request, which 
means that the audience is acquainted with the content of the song; 
(2) it is the realisation of these songs that appeals to the audience: the 
singer's subjects are traditional and well-known, but the audience is 
anxious to see in what way the story will be told to them. 
The appreciation of the song's novelty is thus related to the familiarity 
and realisation of its content. 
A similar observation can be made about another singer in the 
Odyssey known by name: Demodocus, in the palace at Scheria. At the 
end of the meal he is inspired by the Muse and starts his song: 
αύτάρ έπει πόσιος καί έδητύος έξ έ'ρον έ'ντο, 
Μοΰσ' αρ' άοιδον άνήκεν άειδέμεναι 
οϊμης, της τότ' αρα κλέος ούρανον εύρύν ϊκανεν, 
νείκος 'Οδυσσηος και Πηλείδεω Άχιλήος,
7 
The singer commences his performance by singing about the feud of 
Odysseus and Achilles. This song or lay apparently belongs to a cycle of 
5
 See S Goldhill (1991), С Segal (1992), 3-29, esp. 14-17; A. Ford (1992). 8-9, 32-34, 68-70, 
129-130, Zs Ritook (1989), 331-348 
6
 See Ford (1992), 33. who wams against anachronism in the clear distinction between form and 
content They are best seen as complementary. 
7
 8,72-5· ..until they had satisfied their lust for drink and meat Then the Muse pricked the 
musician on to sing of the great deeds of heroes, as they were recounted m verses whose fame had 
already filled the shes telling of the feud between Odysseus and Achilles the son ofPeleus (vert 
Т.Е. Lawrence). 
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songs, referred to with οϊμη 8 on the "great deeds of heroes", the κλέα 
ανδρών (cf. IX, 185-191). As can be seen from line 74, these songs are 
well known. Later on, Demodocus is praised by Odysseus for his skill as 
a singer: "you have sung very well on the doom of the Greeks" (489: λίην 
γαρ κατά κόσμον 'Αχαιών οίτον άείδεις). Then Odysseus askes him to 
change the subject and sing another song from the same collection, the 
story of the construction of the Wooden Horse: 
αλλ' αγε δη μετάβηθι και ίππου κόσμον αεισον 
δουρατέου, τον Έπειος έποίησεν συν Άθήνη
9
. 
Here we see the aspect of familiarity of the audience with the themes of 
the songs performed by the singer confirmed. Like Phemius on Ithaca, 
Demodocus is requested to sing on a well-known theme He is to change 
from the song on the Feud of Odysseus and Achilles (75 f.) to the one on 
the Wooden Horse. This story Demodocus pickes up from the point 
where the Greeks embarked on their ships and leave the camp, and the 
Wooden Horse is standing on the beach (500: ένθεν ελών1 0): he can do so 
because the elements of the story were already familiar.11 
If the content of the song is already known and if its performance 
is of paramount importance, what does the quality of "newness" actually 
refer to? It should be remembered that the Homeric poems are to a very 
large extent the product of an oral culture. This means that one should 
realize that concepts like originality and novelty are to be evaluated in 
the specific terms of that culture and not anachronistically to be 
compared to modern technical distinctions like form and content1 2. In 
this case it is relevant to note that the activity of the singer was not 
defined in terms of his individual performance, but seen as the result of 
8
 On οϊμη as "cycle of songs" see J В Hainsworth, Odysseia Vol II (Libri V-VIII), 1982, ad 
loc ;cf 8,479-81 
πάσι γαρ άνθρώποισιν έπιχθονίοισιν αοιδοί 
τιμής εμμοροί είσι και αίδοϋς, οϋνεκ' άρα σφέας 
οϊμας μοΰο' έδίδαξε, φίλησε δε φΰλον αοιδών. 
For it ÍS right that bards should receive honour and reverence from every man alive, inasmuch as 
the Muse cherishes the whole guild of singers and teaches each one his rules of song (tr. Т.Е. 
Lawrence) 
' 8,492-3· But now change your theme and sing of how Epeius with the help of Athene carpented 
together that great timber horse (tr TE Lawrence) 
^ Cf. 1,10 των άμόθενγε είπε , 
1
 ' " das Anfangen an einem bestimmten Punkte des Gesanges, welcher oft gehort und nach 
seinem Zusammenhange bekannt war ", К F Améis - С Hentze, Homers Odyssee, Leipzig 
81889, ad loc; see Notopoulos (1949), 18-19 on the influence of the audience on the singer's 
performance 
1 2
 Ford (1992), 33. 
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two complementary elements: the skill of the singer himself and the 
inspiration provided by the Muses. These elements do not exclude one 
another, but are operational at the same time. The singer Demodocus is 
described thus: 
Δημόδοκον • τω γάρ ρα θεός πέρι δώκεν άοιδήν 
τέρπειν, δππτι θυμός έποτρύνησιν αείδειν.13 
Ανδ τηε σινγερ Πηεμιυσ σαθσ οφ ηιμσελφ· 
αυτοδίδακτος δ' ειμί, θεός δε μοι εν φρεσιν οϊμας 
παντοίας ένέφυσεν
14 
These examples of Homeric implicit poetics allow a more specific 
delineation of what is meant by νεωτάτη. Any modern interpretation of 
"newness" in the sense of "originality" can be ruled out. Rather one 
should look at the singer's task of preservation: with his song he 
preserves the past and the names of those who lived in the past. When 
he sings of the glorious deeds of heroes, he brings back to life these 
deeds for his audience and, in a way, visualizes them. The vividness of 
his song accounts for its strong emotional effect on the audience15. Thus 
it seems that in a context of oral poetry the quality of "newness" can be 
explained in terms of "presentness" or vividness. 
Pindar occasionally reflects on the requirements of his songs, and 
in Nemean VIII, 19-22 he considers the difficulties involved with 
laudatory poetry on contemporaries. He would like to praise Deinas and 
his father Megas, but he hesitates to do so: 
ϊσταμαι δη ποσσί κούφοις, άμπνέων τε πρίν τι φάμεν. 
πολλά γαρ πολλά λέλεκται, νεαρά δ' έξευ-
ρόντα δόμεν βασάνω 
ές ελεγχον, άπας κίνδυνος- οψον δε λόγοι φθονεροίσιν, 
άπτεται δ' έσλών άεί, χειρόνεσσι δ' ουκ ερίζει.
16 
1 3
 8, 44-45: Demodocus, to whom the god has given the gift of song in order to charm, 
whichever way his heart moves him to sing 
^ 22, 347-8: self-taught I am, and the god has planted all kinds of song in me 
1 5
 For the emotional effect of vividness (enargeia ) see Quint 10 111,2,32, see, e.g , Odysseus' 
tears when listening to Demodocus' song on the Trojan War at 8, 73-92, or on the Wooden Horse 
at 8, 486-531; Penelope's bursting into tears when hearing Phemios' song on the return of the 
Greek heroes at 1, 325-44, except sadness, die singer will predominantly produce pleasure 
(τέρψις) 1, 340-55; 4, 183-95; 8, 536-43, etc.; see Segal (1992), 22. 
161 stand on light feet now, catching breath before I speak. For there are songs m every style, but 
to put a new one to the touchstone for testing is all danger. Words are a morsel to the envious, 
and their envy always fastens on the noble, but leaves the base alone (tr. F J Nisetich, 1980) 
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In Pindar's expression of hesitation one can recognize the 
"Hindernismotiv", a technique by which the poet can assert himself: 
despite the difficulties he will proceed with his song.17 In the lines 20-21 
Pindar distinguishes between two categories of poetic themes: first there 
are many themes which have been treated this way and that, and 
secondly there are "new things" (νεαρά) which are "found" (έξευρόντα) 
and put to the test.18 
In the first category Pindar deals with his literary themes in 
terms of the opposition between old and new. Elsewhere he says that it is 
the poet who conserves the past by choosing it as subject for his song19: 
άλλα παλαιά γάρ 
εΰδει χάρις, άμνάμονες δε βροτοί, 
δ τι μη σοφίας άωτον άκρον 
κλυταΐς έπέων ροαΐσιν έξίκηται ζυγέν
20 
Remembrance of former grace (παλαιά χάρις) depends on the poet's 
decision to include it in his song.21 In the 8th Pythian Ode thé question 
of inclusion of the glorious past of Aegina is made explicit. In his praise 
Pindar mentions the Graces favouring the island's "just city" and its 
renown because of the connection with the Aiacids. Its glory remains 
perfect, and many praise its heroes and their accomplishments in song 
(25: πολλοΐσι...άείδεται). But then Pindar breaks off this laudatory 
section: 
ειμί δε ασχολος άναθέμεν 
πάσαν μακραγορίαν 
λύρα τε και φθέγματι μαλθακφ, 
μη κόρος έλθών κνίστ). το δ' έν ποσί μοι τράχον 
ΐτω τεον χρέος, ώ παΐ, νεώτατον καλών, 
1 7
 Cf Ο 11,94 f, Ν 111,80 f., on the Hindemismotiv see Η. Gundert (1978), 98 f.; cf. also Solon 
fr 26-27 GP (against Mimncrmus), fir. 7,1-2.5-6 GP. 
1 8
 See A.M Miller (1982), 111-120. 
1 9
 In an oral culture the past is predominantly preserved by putting it in verse: see Thomas 
(1992), 114 " . if something was worth remembering and passing on, it would be better 
remembered if it was in verse " 
2 0 ƒ. VH.16-19 But the grace of old drops to sleep, and mortal men forget whatever has not 
intermingled in the glorious streams of verses, and come to flower through a poet's stall [tr. F J. 
Nisetich], Bowra's translation (*-Ί985) retains the image of the song as chariot* But ancient beauty 
slumbers, and men forget whatever has not been yoked to echoing streams of songs to come to the 
utmost peak of art 
2 1
 See also N. VII.12-13· τα! μεγόλαι γαρ άλκαί Ι σκότον πολύν ϋμνων εχοντι δεόμεναι (For 
great deeds of strength, if they lack songs, are sunk in deep obscurity, tr F J. Nisetich). 
IV. KAINOS 115 
έμα ποτανον άμφι μαχανφ.2 2 
The ancient stones on Aegina are put aside by the poet, and he changes 
his subject to the present: Aristomenes' latest victory (νεώτατον καλών) 
will be the next theme of the song. Thus one can see that (events of) the 
past as potential subject-matter can be referred to by the poet with 
παλαιός
2 3
, and that it is contrasted with (events of) the present, referred to 
with νέος or νεαρός. It appears that newness does not imply something 
hitherto unknown, but rather the poetic realisation of something already 
known. This presentation should make an impression of newness: in 
that way the poet can be original. This is clearly expressed in the 9th 
Olympian: 
αϊνει δε παλαιον μέν oîvov, ανθεα δ' ΰμνων 
νεωτέρων.
24 
Thus "old" in the sense of "well-known" and "new" in the sense of 
"recent, fresh" appear to function as characteristics of literary subject-
matter. The presentation of new and memorable information is, in this 
genre, expected of the poet, the "messenger of victory".25 
The second thematic category concerns finding a new subject-
matter and its reception. As can be seen above, the poet is aware that 
finding a new theme and presenting it for the audience's judgment 
involves taking a risk. Here we have a technical aspect of the poetic craft: 
new material can be "found", the verb used being (έξ)ευρίσκειν. 2 6 In a 
poetical context the verb occurs in the 3rd Olympian, where Pindar 
introduces his victory-song on Theron of Akragas as follows: 
...Μοίσα δ' οΰτω ποι παρέ-
στα μοι νεοσίγαλον εύρόντι τρόπον27 
2 2
 P. Ш.29-34: But 1 am without leisure to set the whole story down m melody and lyrics. 
Tedium would surely come and chafe my audience. But here is something hastening to meet me. I 
am indebted to you for it, my child - the latest of your victories: now watch it fly upon the wings 
of my devising ¡tr. F.J. Nisetich]; On the "Abbnichsfonnel" see Race (1990), 41-57 and Van der 
Weiden (1991). 92-93. 
23 In N. V1II.51-52 πάλαι is used to refer to the traditionally of laudatory song: ην γε μαν 
έπικώμιος ΰμνος Ι δη πάλαι (the songs of praise abo existed long ago, tr F J. Nisetich) 
2 4
 O. IX.47-48· But we praise wine for its age, and songs for the fresh bloom upon them (tr. FJ. 
Nisetich); cf. I. V.63: νέον.,.ΰμνον. 
2 5
 Crotty (1982), 82-83 with n 26. 
2 6
 Van Groningen (1960), 17. 
2
 ' О. Ш,4: For so the Muse stood at my side when I discovered this new mode of song [Ir, 
Nisetich]; similarly O. 1,110: εύρων όδον λόγων, О IX,80-1: εϊην εύρεσιεπής άναγείσβαι Ι 
πρόσφορος εν Μοισάν δίφρω; Ρ 1,60. αγ' επειτ'...φίλιον έξεύρωμεν ϋμνον, fr. 122,14; in Ν. 
VI.53-4 Pindar refers to the finding of subject-matter by predecessors: καί τοδτα μεν παλαιότεροι 
όδον άμαξιτον εΰρον; Cf. also Bacchyhdes fr. 5; on (έξ)ευρίσκειν in non-poetical contexts see 
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Inspired by the Muse, the poet has "found" his new song Mention of the 
Muse's role as source for inspiration puts the poetical character of this 
passage beyond doubt.28 The poet's task is thusto compose his song, and 
this task is referred to by εύρίσκειν, that does not consist in an creatto ex 
mhtlo but that involves the collection of material already available. As 
Pindar often presents his song as being performed on the spot29, one can 
include here a passage in the 4th Pythian, where he explicitly mentions 
an aspect of his technique: he interrupts his narrative on the Golden 
Fleece and says: 
μακρά μοι νείσθαι κατ' άμαξιτόν · ωρα 
γαρ συνάπτει και τίνα 
οίμον ϊσαμι βραχύν πολ-
λοίσι δ' αγημαι σοφίας έτέροις χ 
Here the the process of poetic finding or invention is not defined by the 
technical term εύρίσκειν, but one can seen it presented in practice. The 
element of selection and conscious decision to exclude material, which 
is relevant and potentially useful, has an important part in the process of 
composition. 
An important implication of the inclusion of new contemporary 
subjects like the praise of a victor, lies in the possible negative reaction of 
the audience. As can be seen in Nemean Ш.22 (see above), the audience 
might react to the praise of a contemporary with jealousy (φθόνος). This 
is a well-known topic in encomiastic literature: jealousy is part of 
human nature, and therefore achievements by contemporaries may be 
badly received. This state of affairs is acknowledged by Thucydides, 
who has Pericles say in the Funeral Oration: φθόνος γαρ τοις ζώσι προς το 
άντίπαλον.
3 1
 Hence, the poet should proceed tactfully and carefully in 
dealing with these themes. 
Bundy (1986), 58 n S3, on εϋρεσις as "literary invention" in poetical contexts see Waszink (1978) 
and Verdenius (1983), 54-55 
2 8
 See Verdenius (1983), 41-43, esp n 129 
2 5
 Crotty (1982), 8 "Some odes present the poet in the act of composing the ode "; see also J. 
Henngton, Poetry into Drama. Early Tragedy and the Greek Poetic Tradition, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles & London 1985,26 f 
30 ρ г ,247-249 But it's a long way by the main road, and time presses I know a certain 
shortcut, for I am guide to many m the turns of song [tr Niseüch] 
" Th 11,45,1 the living feel envy towards a rival, cf Gorgias, Palamedes 28 ειπείν έπίφθονον 
μέν αληθές δε, see also Aristotle, Rh. 11,10,5 (1388 a 7 8) ιοίς γαρ έγγυς κα'ι χρόνω και τόπω και 
ηλικία και δόξη φθονοΰσιν {we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or reputation, tr 
Rhys Roberts-Barnes) 
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In Pindar the newness of subject-matter is relevant, but in a way 
different from Homer It is present in passages where he states explicitly 
some of the rules of his genre Themes should be "new ' in the sense that 
they are either a fresh realisation of traditional material or consist of 
contemporary events like a victory in an athletic contest In the latter 
case, the poet should beware of envious feelings on the part of the 
audience 
In terms of literary theory, "newness" can be used with 
refererence to a work's freshness rather than to its quality of being in an 
early stage of development, ι e being "young" This distinction is 
reflected in the Greek idiom of the classical period The latter quality is 
referred to with the adjective νεός, while the former is expressed by 
καινός This indicates that καινός has taken over that particular semantic 
scope formerly belonging to νεός 
The adjective καινός and its cognates are used of objects rather 
than persons, and it qualifies an object as "new" in the sense that this 
object m contrast to other objects provides the senses with an impression 
of freshness 3 2 It is this quality that has a special appeal to the intellect 
and provokes interest, because it suggests inventiveness This usage 
seems to be derived from καινοτομεΐν, a term used in mining "to cut 
fresh into stone, to open a new vein" Thus the verb is found in 
Xenophon (Veci Г .27), and it seems plausible to assume that this 
occurrance reflects an older usage Metaphorically, in the sense of 
"introducing novelties", the verb is first used by Aristophanes 
Vesp 876 (Bdelykleon praying to Apollo) δέξαι τελετην καινήν, ψναξ, ην 
τφ πατρι καινοτομοΰμεν 3 3 
The metaphor will probably have been easily accepted, because the 
mining activity at Laureion was important to Athens 3 4 
An early instance of καινός in the special sense of "literary 
freshness"35 seems to be in Euripides Troades 512, the opening verses of 
a choral song 
άμφί μοι 'Τλιον, ώ 
3 2
 For this distinction see Schmidt (1878), Bd II, 115 f (s ν νέος, 47 17), Chantraine (1968), 
479 
3 3
 Accept the new rite о lord we institute afresh for the father 
3 4
 Cf Anst Eccl 584 and 586, see Muller (1974), 122-123 
3
^ For older instances of καινός as new" in the general sense see e g A Cho 659, Eum. 406 
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Μούσα, καινών ΰμνων 
αεισον έν δακρύοις φδαν έπικήδειον.
36 
Неге καινός refers to the song the chorus will sing: it is different from 
previous songs and it will contain a new version of the fall of Troy 
compared to the well-known epic treatment.37 
Of special interest is Herodotus IX.26,1, where the debate between 
the Tegeans and the Athenians on their respective positions in the battle 
array is represented. Both parties consider themselves to be right, and 
argue their point in a speech, in which they και καινά καΐ παλαιά 
παραφέροντες "bring to bear (deeds) from recent times and from the 
past". Both speeches in their catalogues of exploits make use of 
mythology and elements from encomiastic discourse This feature 
connect them to the early practice of epideictic rhetoric, esp. the 
epitaphtos hgos.38 The explicit disposition of the speeches according to 
καινά ανδ παλαιά suggests that this was a scheme utilized in this genre 
of speech making.3 9 This, again, strongly suggests that καινός had 
importance in early rhetoric. 
Further illustration can be found in Aristophanes' Clouds, in the 
debate between Better Argument and Worse Argument: 
B.A. άπολεΐς σύ ; τίς ών; 
W.A. λόγος. 
Β.Α. ήττων γ' ών. 
W.A. άλλα σε νικώ τον έμοΰ κρείττω 
φάσκοντ' είναι. 
Β.Α. τί σοφον ποιών; 
W.A. γνώμας καινός έξευρίσκων. 
Β.Α. ταΰτα γαρ ανθεί δια τούτουσί 
τους ανόητους. 
W.A. ουκ, αλλά σοφούς.40 
And similarly elsewhere in the same comedy: 
κατ' έκ τούτων ών αν λέξη 
3
* On Ilion ο Muse, chant to me the funereal song, a new hymn, fid of tears 
3 7
 See Lee (1968), 164 ad loc 
3 8
 See Loraux (1986), 65 
3 9
 See Radermacher (1954), 301-302, How / Wells, II (1928), 296-7 
4 0
 Ar -Nu 893-6 You destroy me ' Who do you think you are ' • An argument - Yes, but an 
inferior one - Yes, but I'll defeat you who vaunt yourself better than me - Oh, and what'll you do 
that's so clever? - Devise a new set of principles - Yes, that's all the rage now, thanks to these 
fools [indicating the audience] - Not fools, but intelligent people, [tr Sommeretein, 1982]. 
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ρηματίοισιν καινοίς αυτόν 
και διανοίαις κατατοξεύσω.
41 
The background to this usage is the new education, introduced by the 
sophists. In general, this can be seen in the arguments brought forth 
from both sides. Better Argument, who represents the dominant way of 
life, based on traditional beliefs, focuses on respect for tradition in music 
and poetry, acceptance of mythology and respect for the elder 
generation.4 2 Conversely, Weaker Argument represents innovation and 
argues for a challenge to tradition and poetry by rational argument, and 
to mythology by agnosticism and cynicism, and for moral nihilism.4 3 
It is made clear that followers of this kind of learning are sophists (1111; 
1308-9), whose primary skill is persuasive speaking (239; 260f.; 1077). 
According to Better Argument the Athenians are led on by the sophists 
and their new way of thinking.4 4 As is well known, the sophists 
introduced a unconventional spirit in understanding the principles of 
general behaviour. They questioned traditional morality and its way of 
life. Their instruction provoked reaction: conservatives felt that their 
influence was detrimental and they considered it necessary to speak out 
against relativism and a mental attitude to which they were not 
accostumed. The passages quoted illustrate that the confrontation 
between these two attitudes was indeed an issue at the time: they 
indicate both the intellectual aspect (έξευρίσκων) and the provocation of 
interest (the apparent interest the Athenians take in these novelties) as 
elements of the discussion. The sophists' newness has an element of the 
unexpected, which could be called its "shock-value", as emerges clearly 
4
* Ar №i 942-4. And then, on the basis of what he says I'll shoot him down with deft new 
phrases and ideas [tr Sommerstein, 1982] 
4 2 A r № < 964f,902f .963, 981f, 993 
4 3
 Ar Nu 317f, 942f, 1003, 1058,1109, 1048f, 1080f., 1470f, 1506-9, 1020f, 1039f., 1061. 
4 4
 See Schiappa (1991), 110-112, Dover (1968), lvii-lxvi, cf Gorgias Palamedes 26 βουλοίμην 
8' αν παρά σου πυθέσθαι, κότερον τους σοφούς άνδρας νομίζεις ανόητους η φρόνιμους εϊ μεν 
γαρ ανόητους, καινός ό λόγος, άλλ' ουκ αληθής (reading, with Sauppe, καινός for κενός mss.), 
where καινός seems to appear in a context of intellectual activity Cf also Dtalexeis 6,1. λέγεται 
Ы τις λόγος οϋτ' όλαθης οϋτε καινός (ςηερε οτηερ μσσ ρεαδ κενός), these passages may be 
relevant to the textual problem in Eur Нес. 824 και μην - ίσως μεν του λόγου κενόν τάδε, Ι 
Κύπριν προβάλλειν άλλ' δμως είρήσεται, where Solinsen (1975), 57 suggests to read καινόν for 
κενόν " designated as strange or new because it is unusual and daring to remind Agamemnon 
that Cassandra is now his mistress and that this ought to create a relationship of χάρις between 
Hecuba and himself' (my italics) it seems to me that this conjecture is supported by the texts 
quoted above, on the error in transmission, consisting of a confusion of ai and e, due to change in 
pronunciation, see F W Hall, A Companion to Classical Texts, Chicago 1970 (= 1913), 184. 
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from another passage in Aristophanes: καινόν γ' "that's something new 
for you".45 
The relevance of the sophists and their ideas emerges clearly 
from another instance in Aristophanes. In the Frogs he has Aeschylus 
and Euripides confront each other on the question of what constitutes 
good tragedy, and in this confrontation sophistic views on literature has 
an important place.46 During this agon the chorus comments: 
μέγα το πράγμα, πολύ το νείκος, αδρός ό πόλεμος έρχεται, 
χαλεπον ούν έργον διαιρείν, 
όταν ό μεν τείνη βιαίως, 
ό δ' έπαναστρέφειν δύνηται κάπερείδεσθαι τορώς. 
άλλα μη 'ν ταύτφ κάθησθον · 
είσβολαί γάρ είσι πολλαί χατεραι σοφισμάτων. 
ο τι περ ούν έχετον έρίζειν, 
λέγετον, έπιτον, ανά (δε) φέρετον 
τα τε παλαιά και τα καινά, 
κάποκινδυνεύετον λεπτόν τι και σοφον λέγειν. 
ει δε τοΰτο καταφοβεΐσθον, μη τις άμαθία προση 
τοις θεωμένοισιν, ώς τα 
λεπτά μή γνώναι λεγόντοιν, 
μηδέν όρρωδείτε τοΰθ' · ώς οϋκεθ' οΰτω ταΰτ' έχει. 
έστρατευμένοι γαρ είσι, 
βιβλίον τ' έχων έκαστος μανθάνει τα δεξιά· 
αϊ φύσεις τ* άλλως κράτισται, 
νυν δε και παρηκόνηνται. 
μηδέν ούν δείσητον, άλλα 
πάντ' έπέξιτον, θεατών γ' οΰνεχ', ώς όντων σοφών.
47 
4 5
 Ar Eccl 926-7, cf also Nu 547, V 1044, cf Ussher (1973), 204-5, ad loc "а surprise, в 
retort you weren't expecting", cf Hipp Int 17 ταΰτα ην ποιεί) και μή τάχιστα ΰγιαίνη, ού 
καινόν ή νοΰσος γαρ ώς χαλεπή (If you do this and the patient does not recover quickly, this и 
nothing new for this disease is a difficult one) 
4 6
 See Sicking (1962), 42 f, 91 f. Pfeiffer (1968), 46-47 allows with hesitation for some 
sophistic influence in the Aeschylus/Eunpides-debate, the question is carefully scrutinized by 
O'Sullivan (1992), passim (but see esp 7-22, 106-150), who argues convincingly for the presence 
of much terminological material on matters of stylistic theory derived from the sophists 
4 7
 Ar Ra. 1099-1118 serious the issue, important the debate, solid the fight that is going on. 
Difficult is making a decision, when one attacks forcefully and te other is able to reply and resist 
cleverly But you two shoudn't keep always to the same ground there are many other ways of 
smart attack. All you have for the debate, say it, use it, bring it up, whether it be old or new, and 
nsk to say something subtle and skilful And if you fear that the audience is too stupid to 
appreciate the subtleties while you are speaking, never mind that is no longer the case They are 
well-trained, and each has his book and understands the witty points Their nature, which is well 
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This chorus song, which may be taken to reflect the opinions of the poet 
himself48, is clearly concerned with sophistical ideas and techniques as 
they come forward in a debate.4 9 Furthermore, it suggests that the 
audience was acquainted with these techniques, because they have had 
training. Here a connection is made between teaching by the sophists 
and learning from books, a phenomenon of which Aristophanes 
apparently disapproves. The relevant point here is that using "the old and 
the new" (τα τε παλαιά καΐ τα καινά) as part of the debating technique 
belongs to the methods advocated by the sophists ( ε ί σ β ο λ α ί . . . 
σοφισμάτων). 
2. Thucydides, the sophists. 
The evidence in Aristophanes' plays suggests that the issue of 
"newness" is closely linked to the sophists and their influence. It should 
be remembered that they often presented their ideas in the form of 
speeches: as can be inferred from the example of Gorgias, these were 
composed as a demonstration in practice of the concepts their author 
held. 5 0 They were not only intended to present these concepts as such, 
but they were at the same time examples of new methods in literary 
composition and thinking in general. Gorgias' Helen is a case in point: 
looking at its content, one can see how he introduces a more rational 
approach to myth by arguing a defense of Helen, whose guilt had been a 
subject in literature since Homer. In the construction of Helen's defense, 
he applies considerations from outside the original mythological 
framework. Not only does he refer to the part played by the gods or the 
all governing force of Fate, he also takes the possible influence of the 
spoken word and the power of love into consideration. Furthermore, on 
the level of formal argumentation one can see the application of more or 
less systematical methods of thinking, as they were developed by the 
endowed anyway, has been sharpened now So have no fear, but attack ail, certainly because of the 
audience, they being skilled people [translation based on the text and commentary of Stanford 
(21963)J, see also Denmston (1927), 113-121, Dover (1993), 329-331 
4 8
 See Dover (1993), 329, Radermacher (1954), 299-300, Sicking (1962), 94 
4 9
 See Dover (1993), 10-24, Radermacher (1954), 300-304; cf the craze for debate and reasoning 
in Eq. 1375 f, the wish to be δυνατός λέγειν in Eq 346, for the 4th century see Isoc XV.244 f. 
5 0
 On sophistic speeches as demonstrations see Gorgias, frs. 6, 17-19 DK, AnsL Soph El 33, 
183 b 36 - 184 a 8; cf Cole (1991), 75-78, Kennedy (1994), 18-19, an explicit reference lo a 
model-speech can be found in Isoc XI.48 in writing his defense of the despot Busins Polycrates 
wanted παράδειγμα καταλιπεϊν ώς χρη περί ιών αισχρών αιτιών καί δυσχερών πραγμάτων 
ποιείσβαι τας απολογίας, see also Pemot (1993), 1,19 f, Ch I, § 3 
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sophists. To these belong, e.g., the argument from probability and, more 
generally, the principle of arguing both sides of a question (in utramque 
partem disputare).51 It is with innovations like these that the sophists made 
their mark and were able to enhance the effectiveness of their speeches. 
Confirmation of this point may be found in Thucydides, who has Cleon 
say to the Athenians in the Mytilene-debate: 
μετά καινότητος μεν λόγου άπατάσθαι άριστοι, μετά δεδοκιμασμένου 
δ' μη ξυνέπεσθαι έθέλειν, δοΰλοι δντες των αίεί άτοπων, ΰπερόπται δε των 
εϊωθότων.
52 
In what follows, Cleon articulates what he sees as the bent for rhetorical 
display on the part of the Athenians. According to him, they wish to be 
orators themselves or, failing that, to create the impression of being on 
an intellectual par with orators: they applaud a sharp remark before it is 
fully expressed or anticipate what will be said. They are slow, however, 
to understand the consequences of these utterances and are 
insufficiently concentrated on the matters really at hand (111,38,6). 
Cleon's conclusion is: 
απλώς τε ακοής ήδονη ήσσώμενοι και σοφιστών θεατούς έοικότες 
μάλλον ή περί πόλεως βουλευομένοις.53 
The display of rhetorical art appears to impress the audience: they 
applaud these techniques, of which kainOthw is one. As one can infer 
from the phrase μετά κοινότητος...εϊωθότων, the newness is characterised 
by τα άτοπα: "what is out of place", "strange", or "paradoxical".54 The 
paradoxical here can be further defined as "contrary to expectation": it is 
3' See Solmsen (1975), 20 f ; cf Eur Antiope fr. 29: έκ παντός αν τις πράγματος δισσών λόγων 
Ι αγώνα θεΐτ' αν, ει λέγειν εΤη σοφός 
5 2
 Th III,38,5 you are easily taken in by the newness of an argument and are unwilling to 
conform to what is proven to be just, slaves as you are to what is always abnormal and disdainers 
of what is ordinary; on this particular aspect of the Athenian state of mind see also 1,70,2 (the 
Corinthians speaking to the Spartans) oi μεν γε νεωτεροποιο'ι και έπινοησαι οξείς κα'ι έπιτελέσαι 
έργω α αν γνώσιν ύμεΐς δε τα υπάρχοντα τε σώζειν και έπιγνώναι μηδέν και έργω ουδέ 
τάναγκαΐα έξικέσθαι (they [sc the Athenians] are innovators, quick in taking their decisions and 
in putting into effect what they planned, you are inclined to conserve what exists, to think of 
nothing new and when action is called for not even to fulfill what is necessary, on the verb 
άπατάσθαι and the background of Gorgias' concept of the deceptive power of speech (απατή' 
seeHelen, 8,11) see Verdenius (1981), 116-128, esp. 116-7 
" Th Ш,Э8,7' In a word, fallen victim to the pleasure of listening [sc. to speeches], you 
resemble more a theatre-audience at the feet of sophists than men deliberating on matters of the 
city , cf what Cleon says at 111,38,4 the Athenians are θεαταί μεν τών λόγων , άκροατα'ι δε των 
έργων, paraphrased by Homblower (1991), 426 "when speeches are to be heard, you behave like 
spectators, but, where actions are concerned, you are content to be a mere audience", on the 
negative connotation in σοφιστών see Classen-Steup (1892) ad loc, the same sentiment is 
expressed in D Π.12; V,2; ХІХ.Э; LU; Aesch 1,178 f.; 11,146 
*
4
 See LSJ J ν άτοπος 2, with reference to this text 
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the inventiveness of the spreaker that impresses the audience. When 
looking at the opposites of καινός, the contrast appears to be between that 
which is well-known, traditional and costumary (expressed by είωθώς, 
ήθάς, πολλάκις θρηλούμενος, παλαιός, αρχαίος, and - in a more general 
sense - ό αυτός) 5 5 and what deviates from it. See e.g.: 
άλλ', ή δ' ος, ώδε λέγω, ουδέν καινόν, άλλ' όπερ άεΐ και αλλοτε και 
έν τφ παρεληλυθότι λογφ ουδέν πέπαυμαι λέγειν.56 
And: 
και τούτων πάντων ουδέν έστι καινόν ούδ' ήμέτερον εύρημα, άλλ* ό 
παλαιός, δν ούτος παρέβη, νόμος οΰτω κελεύει νομοθετεϊν.57 
Thus it seems that κ α ι ν ό τ η ς / κ α ι ν ό ς probably refers to a 
phenomenon well established in the rhetorical tradition.58 This tradition 
can be traced back to the teaching of the sophists, especially given what 
Socrates says on the subject in the Phaedrus. Much of the discussion in 
this dialogue is concerned with the question of what constitutes valid 
philosophical rhetoric, and when Phaedrus recites the speech on the 
subject of love he has just heard from Lysias, this provides the occasion 
for Socrates to analyse and criticise this specimen of rhetoric. The 
Lysianic speech is first characterized by Phaedrus as "some sort of 
speech on love"59: in it Lysias defends the paradoxical theme that a boy 
should not surrender to the advances of one who is in love with him, but 
rather to one who is not. By maintaining this Lysias is said to prove 
himself to have been "clever" (κεκόμψευται) or inventive. In having 
Lysias choose this subject-matter and thus raise expectations about the the 
way in which this subject will be developed, Plato puts the speech 
clearly in the context of the writings of the sophists.60 This is confirmed 
5
' Cf. the maxim πάλιν χρόνω τάρχαΐα καινά γίγνεται DK II, 389 Anm 5 (maybe to attributed 
to Knlias), Аг HA 606 b 20 άεΐ φέρει τι Λιβυή καινόν (always something fresh in Ubya' a 
proverb on the diversity oí animals in Libya, cf Zenobius Proverbia 2,51), Soph OR 916. 
εννους τα καινά τοις πάλαι τεκμαίρεται. 
5 6
 Plato Phd 100 b 1-3 Well, said Socrates, what I mean is this, and there is nothing new about 
it I have always said it, in fact I have never stopped saying it, especially in the earlier part of this 
discussion [tr Tredenmck, in Hamilton-Cairns] 
5
 ' D XX, 89 And in all this there is nothing new, no innovation of our own, but the old law, 
transgressed by Leptines, lays down this procedure m legislation, [tr J H Vince 1970] 
5 8
 See Hudson-Williams (1948), 77 (who, however, confines the technique to the expression of 
conventional thoughts in new words), cf. Sicking (1962), 113' referring to Plato Phdr. 261 d 
5
' PI Phdr 227 с 4 ö γαρ τοι λόγος, περί δν διετρίβομεν, ούκ οιδ' οντινα τρόπον ερωτικός 
6 0
 See Norden (1915), 69, Anm 1 "κομψόν zierlich, dann überhaupt geistreich stammt aus der 
alten Sophistenzeit, das sehen wir aus Aristophanes, Eurípides, Platon" (with references); cf. De 
Vnes(1969), 37 od toc 
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when Phaedrus says that in his view Lysias is the ablest writer of the 
day, using the phrase δεινότατος ών των νυν γράφειν (228 a l ) , and 
thereby playing on the programmatic slogan used by the sophists, that 
their teaching will make pupils "capable speakers" (δεινός λέγειν).61 
After listening to the speech, Socrates is invited by Phaedrus to 
give his opinion. In doing so he distinguishes between two different 
ways of analysis: first there are matters of style, such as "lucidity and 
terseness of expression, and consistently precise and well-polished 
vocabulary" (σαφή και στρογγυλά, και ακριβώς έκαστα των ονομάτων 
άποτετόρνευται)62, then there is the question whether the author has "said 
what he ought" (τα δέοντα εϊρηκότος του ποιητοΰ)63, which is a criterion of 
content. On both counts the speech seems unsatisfactory (ούδ'...ίκανόν), 
and to this point Socrates adds: 
καί ούν μοι έ'δοξεν, ω Φαιδρέ, ει μή τι σύ άλλο λέγεις, δις καί τρις τα 
αυτά είρηκέναι, ώς ού πάνυ εύπορων τοΰ πολλά λέγειν περί τοΰ αύτοΰ, η 
'ίσως ούδεν αύτω μέλον τοΰ τοιούτου· και έφαίνετο δή μοι νεανιεύεσθαι 
έπιδεικνύμενος ώς οίος τε ών ταύτα έτέρως τε και έτέρως λέγων άμφοτέρως 
είπεΐν άριστα.
64 
According to Socrates the speech is repetitive: this may be because the 
author is short of themes on the given subject, or maybe this is of no 
concern to him. Rather the speech can be understood as a demonstration 
of virtuosity: Lysias tries to prove his ability to make variations on a 
certain theme, and to be succesful with each of these. Furthermore, the 
theme is paradoxical and therefore also suited for the purpose of display 
of virtuosity on the part of the author. Because of both these features the 
speech is a typical example of sophistic writing: first interest is provoked 
6 1
 Cf PI. Men 95 с 4 and Symp 198 с 2 (on Gorgias), on δεινός/δεινότης λέγειν and sophists 
in general see Guthrie (1971), 32 f 
6 2
 234 e 7-8 (tr Hackforth, in Hamilton-Cairns); on the stylistic terminology and its origin in 
sophistic theories on style see O'Sulhvan (1992), passim 
6
' I.e.; on τα δέοντα as a rhetorical technical term cf Gorgias Helen 2- λέξαι tò δέον όρθως; 
кос. МП,7-8. on objectionable teachers of wisdom (competitors in the field of pedagogy against 
whom Isocrates is here engaged in a polemic) who περί δε lûv παρόντων μηδέν των δεόντων μήτ' 
ειπείν μήτε συμβουλεΰσοι δυναμένους, cf XV, 86,276-277, see Hudson-Williams (1948), 79; 
Homblower (1987), 46-49 
6 4
 235 a 1-6 Perhaps you won't agree with me, Phaedrus, but really it seemed to me that he said 
the same things several times over, maybe he is not very clever at expatiating at length on a 
single theme, or possibly he has no interest in something like that, m fact it struck me as an 
extravagant performance, to demonstrate his ability to say the same thing twice, m different words 
but with equal success (tr Hackforth, with slight alterations by me) 
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by the a priori unexpected thesis, and its skillful treatment is proof of the 
author's virtuosity.65 
Later in the discussion, Socrates deals with the achievements of 
earlier sophists on the techniques of rhetoric (266 e l f . ) . He deals with 
the contents of manuals, in which one can find rules on style as well as 
on the parts a speech should have. Even though his words are ironical, 
the passage can still serve as evidence for the teachings of the sophists.66 
He explicitly draws attention to Tisias and Gorgias: 
Τεισίαν δε Γοργίον τε έάσομεν εΰδειν, (1) οι προ των αληθών τα 
εικότα είδον ως τιμητέα μάλλον, (2) τά τε αυ σμικρά μεγάλα και τα μεγάλα 
σμικρά φαίνεσθαι ποιοΰσιν δια ρώμην λόγου, (3) καινά τε αρχαίος τά τ' 
εναντία καινώς, (4) συντομίαν τε λόγων και άπειρα μήκη περί πάντων 
άνηΰρον;6 7 
Socrates attributes the discovery of four different techniques to the 
representatives of Sicilian rhetoric: (1) argumentation on the basis of 
probability, (2) alteration of the apparent status of statements, (3) 
variation, (4) capability of varying the speech's length. The elements (1) 
and (4) can be left out of consideration here 6 8 , but (2) and (3) are relevant 
to the question at h a n d . T h e first pair of opposites ( important-
unimportant) seems to foreshadow the technique later referred to by the 
technical terms αΰξησις and μείωσις. 6 9 An example of this technique can 
6 5
 On the genre of (par)adoxography see Van der Poel (1996), Pease (1926); cf. also Lassen« 
(1944); Ferrari (1987), 88-95; on variation as typical of sophists and rhetorical technique see Cole 
(1991), 12-14,20-22,76-77. 
6 6
 Ferrari (1987), 70-71; De Vnes (1969), 219 f. 
6 7
 267 a 5 f.: Should we let Teisias and Gorgias rest, who realized that probability deserves more 
respect than truth, who could make trifles seem important and important points trifles by the force 
of their language, who dressed up novelties as antiques and vice versa, and found out how to argue 
closely or at interminable length about anything and ever) thing [tr Hackforth; I follow De Vnes 
in taking the sentence as a (rhetorical) question and have altered the translation accordingly]. 
4 8
 On (1) see Gagarin (1994), 46-57; on (4) "horizontal amplification" cf. Crg. 449 с 4: on 
Gorgias' contention that he can speak concisely Socrates answers: και μοι έπίδειξιν αύτοΰ τούτον 
ποΐησαι, της βραχυλογΐας, μακρολογίας δε εις αύθις {Cive me an exhibition of this brevity of 
yours, and reserve a lengthy discourse for another time, tr. Woodhead), Prt. 334 e 4 - 335 a 2: 
Socrates to Protagoras, άκήκοα γοΰν...8τι συ οίος τε ει και αυτός και άλλον διδάξαι περί των 
αυτών και μακρά λέγειν, εάν βουλή, οϋτως ώστε τον λογον μηδέποτε έπιλιπεΐν, και αυ βραχέα 
οϋτως ώστε μηδένα αού εν βραχυτέροις ειπείν - ει συν μέλλεις έμο'ι διαλέξεσθαι, τω έτέρω χρω 
τρόπω προς με, τη βραχυλογία (What they told me is...that you have the gift both of speaking 
yourself and of teaching others to speak, just as you prefer - either at length, so that you never run 
dry, or so shortly that no one could beat you for brevity. If then you are going to talk to me, 
please use the second method and be brief, tr. Guthrie); on rnakrologia and brachylogia see Cole 
(1991), 96. 
6 9
 This technique can be labelled "vertical amplification" (on the terminology see E.R. Curtius 
(1963), 483-4). see W Plobst, Die Auxesis, München 1911, 3· "Die Kunst, Taten oder 
personliche Eigenschaften über ihre wirkliche Große hinaus /.u steigern " 
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be found in the manual attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, who 
gives the rules for anticipation of the opponent's arguments· δει δε τα μεν 
εκείνων μικρά ποιείν, τα δε σαυτοΰ αΰξειν, ώς έν ταΐς αϋξήσεσι 
προακήκοας.
70 
With regard to (2) one should bear in mind that a distinction is 
necessary between this theoretical concept as such and its distortion in 
the popular slogan that sophists were able "to make the weaker cause 
seem stronger". This is a pejorative rendering of what the sophists taught 
in order to discredit them.71 
The phrasing of technique (3) is reminiscent of the previous 
descriptions of καινότης, especially the sophistic technique mentioned by 
Aristophanes (Ra. 1107, see above) of "bringing up old or new 
arguments" (άναφέρειν τα παλαιά ral τα καινά). Once again, it appears 
from texts of Plato that this insistence on "newness" is typical of the 
sophists and their claims of rhetorical skill A clear illustration of this 
can be gained from another passage in the Gorgias, where Socrates talks 
with Callicles. The latter complains that Socrates keeps saying the same 
things: 
КАЛ. 'Ως άει ταύτα λέγεις, ω Σώκρατες 
ΣΩ. Où μόνον γε, ω Καλλίκλεις, άλλα και περί των αυτών 7 2 
Elsewhere Socrates explicitly says that "to hold to to the same" is typical 
of philosophy: ή δε φιλοσοφία άει των αυτών (Grg-. 482 a 7), and the way in 
which he describes his critical attitude is also always the same: ε'μοιγε ό 
7
" Anax AR 1439 b 5-7 You must minimize the arguments of your opponents and amplify your 
own, as you have already learnt to do from the instructions about amplification [tr. Forster], cf. 
142S a 27 f, where the argumentation on war and peace is presented and the technique of 
amplification is to be applied τα μεν τών εναντίων ταπεινοΰντες, τα δ' ημέτερα ταΐς αΰξήσεσι 
μεγάλα καθιστώντες (belittling the points of superiority possessed by the enemy and exaggerating 
those which we ourselves enjoy [tr Forster]), cf AT Rh 1403 a 17 f το δ' αΰξειν και μειοΰν 
σύκ ίστιν ενθυμήματος στοιχείον ταΰτα δ' εστί πάντα περί α οι συλλογισμοί και ενθυμήματα. 
amplification and depreciation are not an element ofenth) тете all these things are the subject-
matter of deductions and enthymemes (tr Rhys Roberts) He relegates the technique of 
amplification and depreciation (the technique to "show that a thing is great or small" προς το 
δεΐξαι öu μέγα ή μικρόν) to the category of subject-matter rather than argumentation as such. 
7 1
 Cf Ar NU 1020 f with J Scholten, Retoren en democratie Funkties en disfunkties van de 
retonka m klassiek Athene, diss Groningen 1990, 18, Ar Rh 1402 a 24-26, on the distinction 
between the pejorative and positive interpretation see Schiappa (1991), 103-116, for the common 
man's negative impression of sophists in the 4th century see Isoc XIII, 1, XV.168, XV.IS where 
the pejorative reading is starting-point for his apology, on the misrepresentation of sophists see 
Wilcox (1943), 113-133 
7 2
 PI Grg 490 e 9-10 Collides How you keep saying the same things, Socrates1 · Socrates· Not 
only that. Collides, but about the same matters [tr Woodhead], cf 491 b 6-7 (Socrates to 
Callicles) συ μεν γαρ έμε φτις άει ταύτα λέγειν, και μέμφη μοι, on the possibility of these being 
authentic words of Socrates see Dodds (1976), 290 
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αυτός λόγος εστίν άεί (Grg. 509 a 4). The same point is made by the 
Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia to distinguish himself from the 
sophist Hippias, who also complains against Socrates' repeating himself. 
On Socrates' reply that he (Hippias) will of course never say the same 
thing twice on the same matter because of his great knowledge, the 
sophist's answer is: 
αμελεί, πειρώμαι κοινόν τι λέγειν άεί.73 
A similar description of Hippias' methods is given in a later source: 
Hippias is said to have taken his subject-matter from both poetry and 
prose and to have composed a speech using this material: 
εγώ έκ πάντων τούτων τα μάλιστα [και] ομόφυλα συνθείς τοΰτον 
καινον και πολυειδή τον λόγον ποιήσομαι.74 
Thus the conclusion seems to be that "newness" was an item in the 
programme of the sophists. It is difficult to establish, however, what 
exactly is meant when they the sophists spoke of καινότης. Evidence in 
Aristophanes indicates that the concept is connected with the use of 
arguments (see above). Socrates" description of the technical concepts 
attributed to Tisias and Gorgias seems to imply that the newness-phrase 
belongs to the field of style, as the verb to supply in the phrase (καινά τε 
άρχαίως τά τ' εναντία καινώς (λέγειν)75), suggests. This restriction does 
not seem compulsory, though. The immediate context does not exclude 
the possibility that subject-matter may still be included. Indeed, from 
Cleon' words, as they are reported by Thucyclides (see above), it appears 
that it is not only by stylistic devices that the Athenians are carried 
away, but also by the content of the arguments itself. It may very well 
be, then, that form as well as content are in the scope of rhetorical 
καινότης. 
3. Isocrates. 
Καινότης is presented and described by Isocrates as an element of 
his rhetorical programme. He appears to be influenced by the sophistic 
tradition in his own theorizing on this point, but he ultimately differs 
from it. From a passage in the prooemium of his Panegyrtcus one can 
gain a better understanding of what he means by this "newness". 
7
' Xen.Mem. Г ,4,6: of course, I always try to say something new 
7
* Clem Alex. Vl,7,45 (= ft. 86 В 6 DK): by taking what a homogeneous from all these sources 
together I will make this new and variegated speech. 
7 5
 De Vries (1969), 223 ad loc. 
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Isocrates presents the theme of his discourse in 3: ήκω συμβουλεύσων περί 
τε του πολέμου τοΰ προς τους βαρβάρους και της ομονοίας της προς ημάς 
αυτούς "I have come before you to give my counsels on the war against 
the barbarians and on concord among ourselves". He does this with 
awareness that many, calling themselves sophists, have already 
presented a speech on this theme, but he 
(a) αμα μεν έλπίζων τοσούτον διοίσειν ώστε τοις αλλοις μηδέν πώποτε 
δοκείν είρήσθαι περί αυτών 
(b) αμα δε προκρίνας τούτους καλλίστους είναι τών λόγων, οΐτινες περί 
μεγίστων τυγχάνουσιν οντες.76 
Consideration (a) refers to the competition between authors. Isocrates 
regularly expresses his intention to improve on the work of predecessors, 
a principle known as υπερβολή (see below on 5 ) 7 7 . The second 
consideration on the importance of the proposed theme can be found in 
other panegyric texts as well7 8, but here there is an additional 
programmatic element typical of Isocrates. Speeches like these offer an 
opportunity for displaying ability (τους λέγοντας μάλιστ' έπιδεικνύουσι) 
and are profitable for the audience (τους άκούοντας πλεΐστ' ώφελοΰσιν). 
What Isocrates means by "the greatest affairs", a subject claimed by him 
elsewhere too 7 9 , can be deduced from his Panathenaicus, where he is 
speaking of his preferences: 
οΰ περί μικρών την προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος, ουδέ περί τών ιδίων 
συμβολαίων ουδέ περί ων άλλοι τινές ληροΰσιν, άλλα περί τών 'Ελληνικών 
καί βασιλικών καί πολιτικών πραγμάτων, δι' α προσήκειν ώόμην μοι 
τοσούτω μάλλον τιμάσθαι τών επί το βήμα παριόντων, δσω περ περί 
μειζόνων και καλλιόνων ή 'κείνοι τους λόγους έποιούμην.80 
The list of subjects of "affairs of Hellas, kings and states" reflects the 
scope of Isocrates' activity as a publicist. He wrote discourses on matters 
of general politics, and addressed them to communities like the 
7
" Isoc. IV,4: (a) expecting lo be so far superior lo them that it will seem as if no word had ever 
been spoken by others on this subject and (b) at the same tune selecting those speeches as the best 
who are on the subject of the greatest affairs. 
7 7
 On this principle in general see Stemphnger (1912), 152 158, Cf IV, 11. τους προς ύπερβολήν 
πεποιημένους (sc λόγους), see also Ihe verb ϋπερβάλλεσθαι X,3: πώς γαρ αν τις ϋπερβάλοιτο 
Γοργίαν; Χ, 13 τα μεν μικρά ράδιον τοις λογοις ΰπερβάλεσθαι 
7 8
 See e.g. Lysias Π,3 
7 9
 Χ, 5, 8, 12, cf commentary p. 168-169 ad loc. 
8
^ XII, 11. ƒ did not choose the subject of small matters, or private contracts, or the things on 
which others foolishly speak, but of the affairs of Hellas, kings and states subjects because of 
which I thought to be entitled to higher honour than those who come and stand on the platform, 
in proportion as my speeches were on greater and nobler subjects. 
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Athenian assembly or individuals like king Philip of Macedón. But 
already at the outset of his career as a publicist he claimed general 
affairs as his field, as in the Helen, where he says that it is his aim to 
pursue the truth και περί τας πράξεις έν αίς πολιτευόμεθα (5). 
To these general introductory considerations Isocrates connects 
more specific statements on aspects of the present situation. He applies 
the considerations (a) and (b) to the actual speech: 
(c) επειτ' ούδ' καιροί πω παρεληλύθασιν, ώστ' ήδη μάτην είναι το μεμνήσθαι 
περί τούτων, τότε γαρ χρή παύεσθαι λέγοντας, όταν 
( c l ) ή τα πράγματα λάβη τέλος και μηκέτι δέη βουλεύεσθαι περί αυτών, 
(c.2) ή τον λόγον ϊδη τις έχοντα πέρας, ώστε μηδεμίαν λελείφθαι τοις αλλοις 
ύπερβολήν.
81 
This dual consideration is then elaborated thus: 
(с.Г) εως δ' αν τα μεν ομοίως ώσπερ πρότερον φέρηται, 
(c.2') τα δ' είρημένα φαύλως έχοντα τυγχάνη, 
πώς ού χρή σκοπείν καί φιλοσοφείν τούτον τον λόγον, δς ην κατορθωθεί, και 
τοΰ πολέμου τοΰ προς αλλήλους και της ταραχής της παρούσης και τών 
μεγίστων κακών ημάς απαλλάξει;82 
Isocrates' decision not to address some issues depends on two criteria. 
The first (c. l/c. l ' ) concerns the conditions which create the issue and 
could be labelled external: as soon as these conditions cease to be present, 
the issue is resolved, and no further discussion is necessary. The second 
(c.2/c.2') regards the discussion of the issue itself and is therefore 
internal: as long as there has been no satisfactory treatment of the 
problem resulting in its solution, discussion and development can be 
continued and a new contribution is possible. 
To these considerations on the issue in its factual aspects, both 
extrinsic and intrinsic83, another consideration is added, which has to 
do with the specific task and possibilities of the speaker/author. Isocrates 
8 1
 IV, 5: Furthermore, the right moment has not yet gone by, so that it nould be fittile now to 
bring up this subject For only then should we cease to speak, when (c ]) either the affair has 
come to an end and it is no longer necessary to take counsel on it, or one sees that the discussion 
is complete, so that there is no more room for improvement by others 
" IV, 6: (с.Г) But as long as conditions remain the same as before and (c 2') what has been said 
appears to be inadequate, do we not have the duty to investigate and reflect upon this discussion, 
which if brought to a successful end, will deliver us from the warfaic between ourselves, the 
present upheaval, and the greatest ills?, cf Sandys ( 1872), 46 ad loc 
8 3
 The distinction made by Büchner (1958), 17-18 between factual and personal ("Isokrales...mit 
dem sachlichen Anliegen also das persönliche Interesse des Rhetors \ erquickte") at this instance 
does not seem adequate the considerations made here concern Ihe general problem of the issue and 
its components, rather than the individual interest of the rhetor 
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now introduces the question of the formal treatment of the issue and 
enters the technical sphere of rhetoric 
(d 1) προς δε τούτοις, ei μέν μηδαμώς άλλως οίόντ' ην δηλοΰν τάς αΰτάς 
πράξεις άλλ' ή δια μιας ιδέας, εΐχεν αν τις ύπολαβείν ώς περίεργον έστι τον 
αυτόν τρόπον έκείνοις λέγοντα πάλιν ένοχλείν τοις άκούοισιν 
(d.2) επειδή δ' ol λόγοι τοιαύτην εχουσι την φύσιν, ώσθ' οίόντ' είναι περί 
των αυτών πολλαχώς έξηγήσασθαι, και τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινά ποιήσαι και 
τοις μικροίς μέγεθος περιθεΐναι, και τά τε παλαιά καινώς διελθείν και περί 
τών νεωστί γεγενημένων άρχαίως ειπείν, 
(d.3) οΰκέτι φευκτέον ταΰτ' έστι περί ων έτεροι πρότερον είρήκασιν, άλλ' 
αμεινον εκείνων ειπείν πειρατέον.84 
What Isocrates addresses here (d. 1-3) is the first task of the rhetorically 
skilled author in the total configuration of the activities relevant to the 
composition of the speech. The remarks made by boti ates are clearly 
programmatic, and, as was already noticed by Longinus35, this part of 
the prooemium can be regarded as an επάγγελμα "programme"86. After 
considering the general demand for improvement on predecessors, the 
selection of worthy subject-matter and the subject-matter itself in its 
factual aspects (a - c), he now turns to rhetorical technicalities. First he 
states the fundamental precondition for the demand of variety. If there 
existed only one way to treat a subject, every return to tins subject would 
be useless and a burden on the audience This is countered by a 
statement that old subjects must no longer be avoided, but rather that an 
improved speech should be realised (d.3). Realisation of this aim is based 
8 4
 IV, 7-8 (di) In addition, if it were tn no other way possible to present the same subject-maHer 
except m one form, one might suppose it to be superfluous to trouble the audience once more by 
speaking m the same way as those <before htm> (d2) but since discourses ore of such nature that 
they can go on at length in many different ways on the same subject to bi mg what is great to a 
low level and invest what is small with importance, to treat what is old m a new way and to speak 
on what recently happened in an old way -, (d3) we must no longer a\oid the subjects spoken 
about before by others but we must try to speak better than ihey 
8 5
 Longin 38,2 where (d 2) is cited (with the significant substitution ol διηαμιν for φύσιν) and 
it is added that Isocrates σχεδόν γαρ το τών λόγων εγκωαιον απιστίας της καθ' αύτοΰ τοις 
άκούοισι παράγγελμα και προοίμιον έξεθηκε {one could almost sa\ that he made his eulogy of 
speeches into an introductory announcement of mistrust against himself, on παράγγελμα in the 
sense of "programme" cf Longin 2,1 τεχνικά παραγγέλματα 6 ώς ειπείν ε\ παραγγέλματι. 
8
^ On επάγγελμα as ' announcement of one's art" or "programme" see Ar Rh 1402 b 25 το 
Πρωταγόρου επάγγελμα, cf PI Ptg 319 a 3-7 (Socrates speaking) δοκεΐς γαρ μοι λέγειν τήν 
πολιτικην τέχνην καί ΰπισχνεΐσθαι ποιείν άνδρας αγαθούς πολίτας αυτό μεν ουν τοΰτό έστιν, 
εφη (sc ό Πρωταγόρας), το επάγγελμα Б επαγγέλλομαι (I take yon to be describing the art of 
politics, and promising to make men good citizens That, said he (Proraqoras), is exactly what I 
profess to do tr Guthrie), cf PI Men 95 b 10, Euthyd 273 e 5 f, Gì ç 447 с 2 (on Gorgias) τί 
έστιν δ επαγγέλλεται τε και διδάσκει, see also Ch II ρ 22 & n 33 69 on Isoc XIII as 
"programme" or "manifesto", see Steidle (1952), 259 
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on the fact that discourses (λόγοι) have the capacity to deal with one and 
the same subject in different ways (d. l ), л capacity A\hich manifests 
itself in two fashions, each in a twofold differentiation (d 2): 
A: 
- τα μεγάλα ταπεινά πονησαι "to make what is great low"; 
- τοις μικροίς μέγεθος περιθεΐναι "to confer greatness upon what is small". 
B: 
- τα παλαιά καινώς διελθείν "to recount what is old ш a new way"; 
- περί των νεωστί γεγενημένων άρχαίως ειπείν "to speak on what recently 
happened in an old way". 
On this passage the following remarks should be made 
1. The argument as a whole is the expression of a general aim8 7: 
the rhetor should treat a subject, eventhough it has been addressed by 
other rhetors before him, and he should improve on his predecessors. 
This is a repeated statement of the principle of υπερβολή, already 
mentioned in (a). The achievement of this aim is dependent upon the 
realisation of the potentialities of speeches (oi λόγοι τοιαύτην εχουσι την 
φύσιν, ώσθ' οίόντ' είναι...; cf. Longinus' rendering cited above). Thus it 
can be said that the phrases A and В expiess the rhetorical aims the 
rhetor should try to achieve. 
2. Phrases A and В provide a parallel to what nas said by the 
Platonic Socrates in the Phaedrus on the achievements of the Sicilian 
representatives of early rhetoric (see above) They ueie credited with 
three separate contributions: except argumentation from probability and 
the technique of makro-/brachylogia, they were able to "make the 
smaal look great and the great small by the power of discourse, and 
<express> the new als old and the old as new" (τά τε αύ σμικρά μεγάλα και 
τα μεγάλα σμικρά φαίνεσθαι ποιοΰσιν δια ρώμην λόγου, καινά τε άρχαίως τά 
τ' εναντία καινώς). The concept as formulated here by Isocrates consists 
of the same elements, albeit that the phrasing is not identical. These 
elements are: 
a. it is due to the specific nature of speech that variation in rhetoric is 
possible: PL: δια ρώμην λόγου » Isoc. · oi λόγοι τοιαύτην εχουσι την φύσιν; 
b. the variation manifests itself in the contrasting pairs of "big" and 
"small", "old" and "new": PL: τά σμικρά μεγάλα καί τα μεγάλα σμικρά 
8 7
 The verbal adieclivs are not accompanied by an agens .ind therelorc the emphasis is on the 
action expressed by the verb see KG 1,447 
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φαίνεσθαι ~ Isoc: τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινά ποιήσαι και τοις ιηκροίς μέγεθος 
περιθεΐναι / PI.: καινά τε άρχαίως τά τ ' εναντία καινώς ~ Isoc.: τά τε παλαιά 
καινώς διελθεϊν καΐ περί των νεωστί γεγενημένων άρχαίως ειπείν. 
From the phrasing in this passage and Plato's cited above, it may be 
concluded that the concept of "newness" was known as a "slogan" used 
by the sophists to draw attention to their rhetorical skill 
3. This point is corroborated by the fact that Isocrates says that 
subject-matter used by predecessors is no longer (ούκέτι) to be avoided, a 
detail often disregarded. 8 8 Against the background of the evidence in 
Aristophanes and Plato, this ούκέτι indicates that since the introduction 
of the variation-technique by the sophists the renewed neatment of old 
subject-matter has become a possibility for the rheloi to prove his skill 
and virtuosity.89 Here also it is seems that Isoci ates is pai t of the tradition 
of the sophists. 
4. It should be remembered that Isocrates' remai к·, are made at the 
outset of what is to be a panegyric speech a specimen oí the rhetoric of 
praise. As can be seen from later theorists on rhetoric, the technique of 
amplification and depreciation was considered to be especially at home 
in this kind of speeches. Aristotle puts it thus όλως δε των κοινών ειδών 
απασι τοις λόγοις ή μεν αΰξησις έπιτηδειοτάτη τοις έπιδεικτικοίς, τάς γαρ 
πράξεις όμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ώστε λοιπόν μέγεθος περιθεΐναι και 
κάλλος .
9 0
 The technical rules Isocrates presents here are suitable to the 
purpose of this particular genre: other rhetoncal genres like the dicanic, 
m e n t i o n e d explicitly (see c. 11: τους αγώνας τους περί των Ιδίων 
συμβολαίων), are excluded from the scope of these rules 0 1 It may be that 
the limitation of the "newness"-concept to this rhetoncal genre is to be 
attributed to Isocrates. The sources quoted on the sophists above do not 
8 8
 E g tr Norlin one must not shun the subjects , Caims ( 1972), 98 10(1 fails to incorporate 
this point in his discussion of this passage 
8 9
 Stemphnger (1912), 127 refers to the sophists and thi.ii capacity jedes schriftstellerische 
Objekt nach den Wünschen des Hörers (oder Lesers) und Darsteller', zu Tassen und in allen 
Farbenschattierungen abzutönen" and cites the phrase attributed to Protjgoi .is τον ησσω λόγον 
κρείσσω ποιεΐν (80 A 21 DK),cf Aul Gell NA V,3,7, when, iliesamc words arc cited and where 
it is stated that Protagoras promised to teach his pupils by what activity of words the weaker case 
could be made the stronger (polhcebatur se id decere quanani \ erborimi industria causa infimuor 
fieret fortior, quam rem Graece ita dicebat τον ήττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεΐν) 
™ Αι Rh 1368 a26-29 And, ingenerai, of the classes of things common to all speeches, the 
amplification is most suitable for declamations, where we take the actions us admitted facts, and 
our business is simply to invest these with greatness anil betiut\ [tr Rhys Roberts, with 
alterations], for the meaning of των κοινών ειδών cf Grimaldi (1980), 221-222 a¿ toc, cf. Алах. 
AR 1427 b 37 f, Longin 12,1 
9 1
 See Isoc ΧΠ,11 cited above (n 62), Wilcox (1943) 
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imply such a limitation, and furthermore it should be taken into 
consideration that Isocrates does emphasize that what came to be called 
epideictic rhetoric is the genre where he has introduced innovations.92 
Thus, it is in this respect that Isocrates distinguishes himself from 
the sophists: whereas he recognizes the vanation-ide<il as expressed by 
them, he considers it to be applicable to a pai ticular geni e of rhetoric. Of 
course, this genre contains a number of different sub-genres, such as the 
panegyric, the political speech9 3, and the encomium, which indicates 
that he is not just speaking about "speeches on the past" 'M 
From what follows in the prooemium of the Vanegyricus one can 
gain a somewhat more concrete understanding of what καινότης is 
about. After having stated the general principle, Isocrates now turns to 
the subject-matter involved in this speech, and the way to handle i t 
(e.l) αϊ μεν γαρ πράξεις ai προγεγενημέναι κοιναί πάσιν ήμΐν κατελείφθησαν, 
(e.2) το δ' έν καιρφ ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι καί τα προσήκοντα περί έκαστης 
ένθυμηθηναι καί τοις όνόμασιν εύ διαθέσθσι των εύ φρονούντων ϊδιόν 
έστιν.
95 
The phrase αϊ πράξεις αϊ προγεγενημέναι "the actions of old urne" seems to 
resume ταΰτα περί ων έτεροι πρότερον είρήκασιν of (d 3). This phrase 
probably refers to "the past" in a very geneial sense When speaking of 
the past, Isocrates uses a number of different terms, like τα γενόμενα, a i 
πράξεις των προγόνων, το παλαιόν, τα έ'ργα γενόμενα 9 ( ' Judging from what 
Isocrates characterizes as "historical", the scope of histon has its starting 
point in the legendary times of the Trojan War (and e\en before) and 
goes on until events that took place recemlv (400--530 ВС). Here, as 
emphasis is so clearly on rhetorical theory, he seems to ι efer to the past 
as potential subject-matter for speeches. It is less piobable, therefore, to 
restrict the interpietation of these remarks to the geme of the Funeral 
Oration. 
In (e.2) Isocrates presents the methods by which his aim 
formulated above can be achieved. The task of the accomplished rhetor 
is first to use his subject-matter while obsemns; the rules entailed in the 
9 2
 Wersddrfer (1940), 38-40, Ussher (1990), 8 
'Э On Ihe definition of λόγος πολιτικός see Ch V, ρ 1691 
9 4
 See Eucken (1983), 147 with Anm 19 
9 3
 Г , 9 (e I) For the e\ents of the past are left as a com/mm lientace Го m all, (e 2) and to use 
them with due measure, and to conceive what is filling to lach <oftlicm> and to make a good 
composition m phrase, is typical of the intelligent 
9 6
 See Hamilton (1979), 291 f 
IV. KAINOS 134 
principle of καιρός (on which see ch. Ill) Next, each element of this 
subject-matter should be dressed in appropriate thoughts, i.e. the element 
of the past should be used properly as material in an argumentative 
structure. 
An example may clarify this last point: in a polemic with his 
rival Polycrates, Isocrates criticizes the use he made of information on 
the despot Busiris. Polycrates lost his credibility when he attributed to 
Busiris impossible exploits (αδύνατα), whereas Isocrates restricts himself 
to his achievements· άλλα τοσούτφ πλέον ήμίν απέχεις τοΰ πιστά λέγειν, 
όσον έγώ μεν ούδενός αυτόν αίτιώμαι των αδυνάτων άλλα νόμων και 
πολιτείας, αϊπερ είσι πράξεις των ανδρών τών καλών κ ά γ α θ ώ ν συ δε 
τοιούτων δημιουργον άποφαίνεις ων.,.ούδείς αν ανθρώπων ποιήσειεν9 7. This 
incorrect procedure of Polycrates is referred to by χρήσθαι: in his eulogy 
he incorporated the stories of Busiris' shifting the course of the river Nile 
and of his cannibalism, of which he offered no proof This being the 
case, he has no right to criticize Isocrates: "you cannot demand of others 
a procedure you do not in the slightest degree use (κεχρημένος) yourself 
(c.31). 
Finally the accomplished rhetor should form his thoughts 
(arguments) using in the right words. 
It is on these three components of method that the rhetor proves 
his individual ability ( ϊ δ ι ο ν ) . These components , presented as a 
sequence, are καταχρήσεσθαι, ένθυμηθήναι. διαθέσθαι to organize the 
material, to construct arguments, and to compose the light phrases. 
Finally, Isocrates recapitulates the mam points lie made in this 
section of the prooemium, restating the principle of competition and its 
application to rhetoric: 
(f.l) ηγούμαι δ ' οΰτως αν μεγίστην έπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν κα! τάς αλλάς τέχνας 
και την περί τους λόγους φιλοσοφίαν, ει' τις θαυμάζοι και τιμώη μη τους 
πρώτους των έργων αρχόμενους, ά λ λ α τους αρισθ ' εκαστον αυτών 
έξεργαζομένους, 
97 И, 32: No, you are removed from giving a credible account to the same degree as I do not 
make htm responsible for the impossible but for laws and a constitution, and these are the 
achievements of honourable men; but you present him as the author of siti It things as...no man 
could perform. 
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(f.2) μηδέ τους περί τούτων ζητοΰντας λέγειν περί ων αηδείς πρότερον 
εϊρηκεν, άλλα τους οΰτως επισταμένους ειπείν ώς ουδείς άν άλλος δύναιτο.98 
Here the pursuit of epideictic rhetoric is described in terms of 
competition. Improvement in the arts in general, and in rhetoric in 
particular can be made if two criteria aie met fust, one should 
acknowledge the importance of striving after perfection (τους ίίρισθ' 
εκαστον αυτών έξεργαζομένους), and second, that one should compete in 
the same field in order to be able to judge skill (επισταμένους ειπείν).99 
Now that the principle of καινότης has been descnbed in general, 
it is possible to gain a more specific insight in what the principle means 
in practice by looking at instances where it is applied 
4. Isocrates: καινότης in rhetorical contexts. 
In the opening section of his Helen, Isocrates ci incizes groups of 
competitors in the field of discourse. He distinguishes three different 
groups (c.l): 
[1] X,l είσί τίνες οι μέγα φρονοΰσιν, ην ύπόθεσιν άτοπο\ και παράδοξον 
ποιησάμενοι περί ταύτης άνεκτώς ειπείν δυνηθώσι· καί καταγεγηράκασιν οι 
μεν ού φάσκοντες οίον τ' είναι ψευδή λέγειν ουδ' άντιλέγειν ουδέ δύω λόγω 
περί τών αυτών πραγμάτων άντειπείν, οι δε διεξιόντες ώς άνδρία καί σοφία 
καί δικαιοσύνη ταύτόν έστι, καί φύσει μεν ουδέν αύτώ\ έ'χομεν, μία δ' 
επιστήμη καθ' απάντων εστίν άλλοι δε περί τάς έριδας διατρίβουσι τάς 
ουδέν μέν ώφελούσας, πράγματα δέ παρέχειν τοις πλησιάζουσι δυναμένας 
Έγώ δ' ει μέν έώρων νεωστί την περιεργίαν ταύτην έν τοις λόγοις 
έγγεγενημένην καί τούτους έπί τη καινότητι τών εύρημένων φιλοτιμουμένους, 
ούκ αν ομοίως έθαύμαζον αυτών · νΰν δέ. 10° 
'
8
 Г .10 (fl) Now it ΐί my opinion that the greatest advance could be made m every art and 
especially m the study of oratory, if not those were admit ed and honomid η ho make the first 
beginning m any pursuit, but those who bring each oftluni to its best peifection (f2) and not 
those who seek to speak on subjects no one spoke about before, but those who know how to 
speak as no one else could 
^
9
 On the thought of the most accomplished practitioner ol an art being its originator cf HWR 
s ν aetiologia [Bons], 203 with Anm 4, on skill as a criterion in hieran criticism see Verdemus 
(1983), 20-24 
'*Ό There are some who are much pleased with themselves if after settmt; up an extraordinary and 
absurd subject, they succeed in discussing it in an acceptable way, and men lune grown old, some 
asserting that it is not possible to say or contradict what is false nor to oppose two arguments on 
the same matter, others arguing that courage, wisdom and justice are identical and that we possess 
none of these by nature, but that there is only one know ledge concerning them all, and shU others 
are busy with disputations that are good for nothing and capable of giving tionble to their pupils 
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There are thus three groups1 0 1 active in the field ol discourse, whose 
works are characterized by Isocrates as "futile": their sublets are out of 
the ordinary and contrary to expectation But besides being useless, they 
are not even original in their ideas. If these subjects would have been 
introduced recendy (νεωστί), then the newness of the inventions 
(καινότητι των εϋρημένων), on which these men take pride, would not 
have been so much out of place. But if one looks back at the preceding 
generation of what Isocrates calls sophists (σοφιστάς) - and he mentions 
Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno and Melissus, с 2-3 -, it becomes evident that 
the same ideas were already proposed bv them. At ι his point it is 
relevant to note (1) that these groups are described as claiming to be 
presenting something new and (2) that the word used, by Isocrates and 
probably (as one might surmise by implication) by themselves as well, 
is καινότης. Apparently the slogan used by the sophists is still valid in the 
context of the debate on discourse. Their claim, howe\er, is not justified: 
in this case it appears that the older sophists have preceded them. 
At the end of his discourse Isocrates leturns to the issue of content. 
After having presented his discourse on Helen and h.uing remarked 
that many more topics could have been used (67: πολύ δε πλείω τα 
παραλελειμμένα τών είρημένων εστίν 1 0 2 ) , he enumerates a number of 
potential topics for another discourse, such as taking I Ielen as a symbol 
of Hellenic superiority over the barbarians (67-68). His concluding 
sentence is (69): 
[2] X, 69 ην ουν τίνες βούλωνται ταύτα διεργάζεσθαι και μηκύνειν, ούκ 
άπορήσουσιν αφορμής, όθεν Έλένην εξω τών είρημένων εςουσιν έπαινείν, 
άλλα πολλοίς και καινοίς λόγοις έντεύξονται περί αύτης
 ι (
" 
Here καινός refers to subject-matter relating to Helen that has not been 
used by Isocrates but that is available for other writeis. it is potential 
Asfar as I am concerned, if I would see that this futile acni ity would ha\ с t Published itself only 
recently in discourse and that they were priding themseh es on the novi lt\ ¡if their inventions, I 
would not be surprised at them in the same degree but as 11 is 
101
 On the identification of these groups see the commenury ρ 167 f ad Im 
102 f
ar
 more has been omitted than what has been said 
1 0 3
 If then, some are willing to develop this subject and ti cat it ¡n sonu к ιιΐζΐΐι, they will not be 
at a loss for a starting-point from which they can praise Helen apart from u hat has been said, but 
they will hit upon many new arguments concerning her 
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subject-matter to be introduced in another speech and could be selected 
and developed. The context suggests that this statement concerns the 
stage of invention in composing a speech. If a writer wants to develop a 
theme and treat it in length, he will easih find a starting-point for his 
argument. The phrase μηκύνειν is similari) used in a technical sense in 
the Busiris, 44: 
πολλών δ' ενόντων ειπείν έξ ων αν τις και τον έ'παινον καΐ την άπολογΐαν 
μηκύνειν, ούχ ήγοΰμαι δεϊν μακρολογείν.104 
This sentence is parallel to the one in Helen. Both are technical 
statements on the way a specific speech is to be composed and both relate 
to the topics available. On the basis of this parallelism one can clarify 
what is being said: 
-the αφορμή105 or "point of departure" from which (όθεν) a laudatory 
speech starts can be interpreted as the ενόντα or "existing points" with 
which (έξ) one can spin out a speech. The "existing points" can be seen 
as the potential subject-matter or arguments available to a writer on a 
given subject. 
- μηκύνειν as a technical term can be interpreted as "amplify": to make a 
speech longer by adding more arguments. 
Thus the Helen ends with a return to the issue which already 
dominated the prooemium: the selection of subject-matter and its 
treatment. While beginning with a critique of mals and then 
presenting an exemplary speech, and finally returning to the original 
issue, Isocrates underlines the programmatic charactei ol this speech. It 
is an επάγγελμα and a lesson by example of Isocratean rhetoric (see 
commentary). Relevant for the discussion here is that καινός occurs in a 
technical context and refers to existing subject-matter that can be used in 
speeches and thereby made new. 
Not only content, but also form can be considered under καινότης. 
This occurs at the very opening of the Antidosis, whei e Isocrates draws 
attention to the peculiar nature of the discourse that is about to be read (1): 
1™ Although there are many points available from which one can make the praise or defense 
longer, I don't think I need to prolong my speech 
1 0 5
 As "point of departure" it can refer to '4he tool with uhich to do something" (VII.32, V,63; 
П,4; ХГ .40, ΧΓΧ.6), "a principle of life" (IX.28). and "azurnem" (Ер IX 2) 
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[3] XV, 1 Ει μεν όμοιος ήν ό μέλλων άναγνωσθήσεσθαι τοις ή προς τάς 
αγώνας ή προς τάς επιδείξεις γιγνομένοις, ουδέν αν οιμαι προδιαλεχθηναι 
περί αύτοΰ· νυν δε δια την καινότητα και την διαφοραν αναγκαΐόν έστι 
προειπείν τας αιτίας, δι' ας οΰτως άνόμοιον αυτόν οντά τοις άλλοις γράφειν 
προειλόμην· μη γαρ τούτων δηλωθεισών πολλοίς αν ίσως άτοπος είναι 
δόξειεν.
106 
First it should be noted that the discourse is explicit]) piesented as one 
that is written (γράφειν προειλόμην) and to be read (άναγνωσθήσεσθαι): it 
is, therefore, not conceived as a discourse to be actunlh delivered. The 
judicial form it has, being composed as an apologetica] speech on the 
occasion of a trial for an exchange of property1 0 7, is purely fictitious. 
Secondly, the discourse is different from two established rhetorical 
genera, discourses for αγώνες or places oliere, genu ally speaking, a 
confrontation of views occurs. The unspecified phrase used by Isocrates 
justifies the inclusion of both judicial and deliberate e rhetoric under 
this heading. The other genre is the epideictic, which can refer to 
virtuoso display or public performance of literary prose pieces. 
After stating what the discourse is not, Isocrates underlines its 
newness and difference, and says that without further explanation it 
may to its public seem άτοπος "out of place' Its main characteristic is its 
strangeness seen as a result of its diffeience from what the public 
expects. What makes it so strange? The question is ansueied by Isocrates 
in с 9-12, where he reveals what the discourse is: it is a λόγος μικτός 
"mixed discourse". The writing of such a discourse is not easy or 
simple, but presents a difficult task (9). In с 10 the components of the 
discourse are described as follows: 
εστί γαρ τών γεγραμμενων (a) ενια μεν έν δικαστηρίω πρί πο\ τα ρηθηναι, (b) 
τα δε προς μεν τους τοιούτους αγώνας ούχ άριιόττοντα, περί δε φιλοσοφίας 
πεπαρρησιασμένα καΐ δεδηλωκότα την δύ\«μιν αύτης (ci εστί δέ τι και 
τοιούτον Β τών νεωτέρων τοις έπί τα μαθήματα και την παιδείαν όρμώσιν 
άκούσασιν αν συνενέγκοι, (d) πολλά δέ και τών ύπ' έμοΰ πάλαι γεγραμμενων 
" * ¡f the discourse which u about to be read aloud would be similar ti> the ones either for the 
places of contest or for public performance, I would not have given it am pulimmary discussion; 
but as it is, because of its newness and its being different it is necessari in \rate beforehand the 
reasons why I have preferred to write a discourse which n so unlike the oilurs If this would not 
be made clear, it might to many seem strange 
1 0 7
 On the procedure of άντίδοσις or challenge to the exchange of propem in order to avoid a 
liturgy see A R W Henderson, The Law of Athens Procedure, Oiford 1971 236 8 
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έγκαταμεμιγμένα τοις νυν λεγομένοις ούκ άλόγως ούδ' άκαίρως, άλλα 
προσηκόντως τοις ύποκειμένοις.108 
The written product contains: 
(a) some parts appropriate for a courtroom; 
(b) other parts are unfitted for such contests, but die statements on 
learning or intellectual pursuit (φιλοσοφία) and t xpositions on its 
capacity; 
(c) there is such matter that would be profitable to hear for these young 
men who pursue knowledge and education; 
(d) there is inserted in the present speech much from what was already 
written in earlier works. 
The presence of parts under (a) can be accounted for by the fictitious 
judicial setting of the discourse. They are appropriate, because Isocrates 
uses this setting as an opportunity to defend his views on education and 
his activity as a teacher, it is only natural that he would repeat his 
concept of φιλοσοφία under (b) and give his advice for prospective pupils. 
The categories (b) and (c) together provide a reformulation of what can 
be labelled as the programme of his school. The apologetical character of 
the discourse explains the insertion of earlier material: the selection 
appears to be representative for Isocrates' publicizing as a whole. By 
discussing each item he can defend and clarify his message from the 
beginning to its end. This purpose is explicitly stated latei, at с 55, before 
the actual quotation of the parts of earlier speeches: 
δέομαι δε των πολλάκις άνεγνωκότων τα μέλλοντα ρηθήσεσθαι μη ζητεΐν έν 
τφ παρόντι παρ' έμοΰ καινούς λόγους, μηδ' όχληρόν με νομίζειν, οτι λέγω 
τους πάλαι παρ' ϋμίν διατεθρυλημένους. εί μεν γαρ έπίδειξιν ποιούμενος 
ελεγον αυτούς, είκότως αν είχον την αϊτίαν ταΰτην · νυν δέ κρινόμενος καΐ 
κινδυνεύων αναγκάζομαι χρήσθαι τούτον τον τρόπον αΰτοϊς.109 
10* Of what is written (a) some things have their proper place in a court-room, (b) others are not 
suited for contests like those, but are frank statements on teaming and clai ijicalions of its power: 
(c) and there is something of such nature that is profitable for those young men to hear who set 
out on the field of acquiring knowledge and education, (cl) and much of и hat I have written in the 
past is mixed with what is said presently, in a way not without good icawn nor without due 
measure, but relevant to the subject at hand 
1™ ƒ ask those of you who have read many times what i\ going to be urn/ now not to look for 
new discourse on my part and not consider me burdensome because I say u Imi has been abundantly 
talked about since longe amongst you; if I were saying this while gnniii a display, I would 
reasonably be subject to this complaint, but at this moment, because I от on trial and at nsk, I 
am forced to use them in this way. 
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The citations will be verbatim, and there will be no vuution Isocrates 
will not present them "otherwise" (δι' έτερων) but will produce "exactly 
those" (αυτούς τούτους) which were reason for his calumnators to indict 
him (c 56) This passage confirms that καινότης which consists of 
variation (δι' έτερων) would be out of place in this discoiu se, but this kind 
of newness can be part of display (έπίδειξις) 
Καινά referring to variation occurs in To Philip M where Isocrates 
is about to repeat his call for a war of the Hellenes agamsi the barbarians 
already put forward in his Panegyncus He savs to be at л loss 
[4] V, 84 οΰτε γαρ ταύτα βούλομαι λέγειν τοις έν έκείνφ γε /ραμμένοις, οΰτ' 
'έτι καινά δύναμαι ζητείν ' 1 0 
The opposition between ταύτα βούλομαι λέγειν and καινά δυναμαι ζητείν 
makes it clear that variation is the point here 
Thus, the combination of judicial, programmatic ind apologetica! 
writing - forms of writing by themselves well established - in one and 
the same discourse is what makes the Antidosis so different and 
unexpected That is why it is καινός "new" 
The special character of the Anttdosis and, by extension, most of 
Isocrates' writing, is further elucidated in с 45-47 In defense of his 
publications he points to the fact that there are "as many forms of 
discourse as there are of poetry" (τρόποι τών λόγων εισιν ουκ έλάττους ή 
των μετά μέτρου ποιημάτων) He mentions 
(a) οι μεν γαρ τα γένη τα τών ημίθεων αναζητούντες writi is of genealogy; 
(b) oi δε περί τους ποιητάς έφιλοσόφησαν writers of liteiary criticism of 
poets, 
(c) έτεροι δε τάς πράξεις τας έν τοις πολεμοις συναγα féìv εβουλήθησαν 
writers of the history of war, 
(d) άλλοι δέ τίνες περί τας ερωτήσεις και τας αποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν, ους 
άντιλογικούς καλοΰσιν writers who occupy themsehes with questions 
and answers, <works> they call "antilogokoi" 
There are more to name, but Isocrates does not çi\e them all he 
confines himself to mentioning the one literary form which is fitted for 
him (ης έμοί προσήκει), ι e the form or kind of prose ho produces This 
4 0 1 do not want to say the same as what has been said there (sc in the Panegyncus), nor am I 
any longer able to look for new things 
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category is defined on two grounds on its content (περί) and on its form 
(πεπονημένοις μετά λεγομένοις) 
[5] XV, 47 είσίγάρ τίνες γράφειν δε προηρηνται λόγους ου περί των ιδίων 
συμβολαίων άλλ' 'Ελληνικούς και πολιτικούς και πα\ ηγυρικούς, ους 
άπαντες αν φήσαιεν ομοιότερους είναι τοις μετά μουσικής και ρυθμών 
πεποιημένοις ή τοις έν δικαστηρίω λεγομένοις καί γαρ tfi λεςει ποιητικωτέρα 
καί ποικιλωτέρα τάς πράξεις δηλοϋσι, καί τοις ένθυμήμοσιν όγκωδεστέροις 
καί καινοτεροις χρήσθαι ζητοΰσιν, έτι δε ταΐς άλλαις ίδεαις επιφανεστέραις 
καί πλείοσιν δλον τον λόγον διοικοΰσιν
 ш 
The first differentiating criterion is that his discourse concernes national 
rather than individual interests, such as litigation on contracts He is 
concerned with questions involving all citizens, and ( \ ( n all Hellenes 
The second criterion is one of form his discourse is composed rather 
like poetry This is evident on three levels 
- the way in which things are said, the style (λέξει), 
- the material used, the thoughts (ένθυμήμασιν), 
- the way his discourse is structured, its organization (διοικοΰσιν) 
Καινότης is here used in relation with level two, die material the 
discourse use's (χρήσθαι) 
The importance of the demarcation from other foi ms of discourse 
is clear from what follows (47-50) The reason why me n like to listen to 
this kind of discourse as much as poetry, and why rhcy like to learn 
from it, is that writers in this kind of literature are considered wiser, 
better, and more beneficial (σοφωτέρους καί βελτίους και ιιάλλον ώφελείν 
δυναμένους) than judicial orators This is based on the fact that the 
former have their capacity (δΰναμιν) from learning (φιλοσοφία), and 
that they are not ephemeral but rather honoured in all societies and 
times (τους δ' έν άπάσαις ταΐς όμιλίαις καί παρά πάντα το\ ¿ρονον έντιμους 
οντάς καί δόξης επιεικούς τυνχάνοντας) Here Isocrates pi ι sents himself as 
heir to the tradition of the wise poet (σοφός) who, Ье(.ііье of his status, 
4 * There are some who prefer to write discourses not concerning pinate contracts, but on 
Hellas, on the polis, and on solemn themes discourses which all would sm ore more like works 
made with music and rhythm than the ones spoken m court And rightly so because they set their 
material forth in a style that is rather poetical and varied they seek to use tliouçiits that are rather 
impressive and new, and further they also organize the discourse as а и hole with sections that 
stand out and are of greater number 
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can produce texts of poetical quality and can ad\isc mankind. Like a 
poet, Isocrates is a literator and teacher at the same time ! '-
Isocrates can use καινότης also as a criterion to differentiate 
between qualities of discourse. At с 79-80 he repeats his preference for 
"national" themes, and in c.81 states that writers of this kind of discourse 
should be held in higher esteem even than lawgivers, because they are 
rarer, have a more difficult task and need a moi e prudent mind 
(σπανιώτεροι και χαλεπώτεροι και ψυχής φρονιμωτέρας δεόμενοι 
τυγχάνουσιν). In a society such as Athens the following can be said about 
both activities, which were very comparable at an earlici Mage (c. 82): 
[6] XV, 82 επειδή δ' ένταΰθα προεληλύθαμεν ώστε και τους λόγους τους 
εΐρημένους και τους νόμους τους κείμενους αναρίθμητους είναι, και των μεν 
νόμων έπαινεΐσθαι τους αρχαιότατους, των δε λόγων τους καινότατους, 
σύκέτι της αύτης διανοίας έργον εστίν.
113 
The task of the writer has become much more diffu uh. A lawgiver is 
much helped by the fact that many laws have come inio existence and 
he can build on that. But for the writer of discourse, who is confronted 
with the same phenomenon in his field, the consequence is the opposite 
(c.83): 
λέγοντες μέν γαρ ταύτα τοις πρότερον είρημένοις άναισχυντείν και ληρείν 
δόξουσι, καινά δε ζητοΰντες επιπόνως εύρήσουσι. '
1 4 
Consequently, the more a writer of discourse succeeds in his difficult 
task, the more he earns praise. The themes Isocrates piefers to discuss 
belong to this category (see also above on the Helen). I'lius καινότης in 
relation to serious and national subject-matter can sene as the criterion 
for useful discourse. 
Καινότης does not automatically have a positive qualification. It 
matters that a writer realizes in what genre he is woikmg and what its 
rules and conventions are. This is clear from Isocrates' protreptic writing 
"
2
 Cf. the proocmium of Euagoras; see also Ch I, 5 2 
1
 * 3 But since we have progressed to that point и here tin· discourses ч/т /; fun e been spoken and 
the laws that are in existence are countless, and the olden of laws and ihe m u est of discourses are 
praised, this is no longer a task for the same kind of thinking 
1
 *^ For if they say the same things as what has been said before, they и ili \cem to be shameless 
and to speak foolishly; but if they look for what is new, they will have di/fit ulty finding it. 
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(παραίνεσις), such as the To Nicocles In c. 40-41 Isocrates gives 
consideration to the character of this kind of writing. It Nicocles would 
find that many things said in the discourse are well known, he should 
not be surprised. Much wisdom has, of course, been pro\ ïcled by previous 
generations. The rule to be observed here is the following (41): 
[7] Π, 41 άλλα γαρ οϋκ èv τοις λόγοις χρή τούτοις ζητείν τάς κοινότητας, 
έν οίς οΰτε παράδοξον οΰτ' απιστον οϋτ' εξω των νομιζομιΐνων ούδεν εξεστιν 
ειπείν, άλλ' ήγείσθαι τούτον χαριέστατον, ος αν των διεσπαρμένων εν τοις 
των άλλων διανοίαις άθροϊσαι τα πλείστα δυνηθη καί φράσαι κάλλιστα 
περί αυτών.
1 1 5 
The καινοτήτες referred to here are novelties because ι hey, as elsewhere, 
present departures from the known and expected. Hei e the point is that 
novelty refers to content rather than foim: protreptu unting is about 
practical wisdom and the wish to organize one's life accordingly. The 
accomplished writer of protreptic seeks his material in the thoughts of 
others, collects it and puts it to finished form. These thoughts constitute 
the content116 of the protreptic discourse. Thus, καινότης icfers to content 
and its qualification depends on genre. Novelties ih.u deviate from 
common knowledge have no place in paraenetic discoiusc. 
5. Isocrates: καινός outside rhetorical contexts 
In the Panegyricus Isocrates argues lor the cultiu.il superiority of 
Athens, and presents as his first argument the discoicrv of the art of 
agriculture. This was a gift from the goddess Demeter, together with the 
installation of her mystery cult at Eleusis. Before telling this story he 
says (28): 
[8] IV, 28 και γαρ ει μυθώδης ό λόγος γέγονεν, όμως αύτω καί νυν ρηθηναι 
προσήκει.
117 
" ' And rightly so, because in the kind of discount, »here it is not possible to say what is 
extraordinary or incredible or outside common behej, one should not \cck novelties, but one 
should consider him most accomplished, who is able to bung together nw>t of u hat is scattered in 
the thoughts of others and to present them m the nw\t beautiful way. 
^ ' On διάνοια as "content" cf. PI. Lys. 205 a 9 - b 3 ου τι των μέτρο>\ διουαι άκοΰσαι ουδέ 
μέλος εϊτι πεποίηκας εις τον νεανίσκον, άλλα της διανοίας, ίνα ειδώ :i\u τρόπον προσφέρη 
προς τα παιδικά; see A.W. Nightingale, 'The Folly ol Piaise Plato's Cuuquc of Encomiastic 
Discourse in the Lysis and Symposium", CQ 43(1993). 1 ! 5 
1 1 7
 Yes, even though the story is legendary, it desencs lo be told now agoni 
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After repeating the myth in c.28-29 he insists on its credibility, and adds 
proofs to support his view. The first proof consists of re< ourse to tradition 
(c.30): the ground for some to disbehe\e the story, i.c that it is old (ώς 
αρχαίων όντων), can plausibly (είκότως) be turned around to be support 
trustworthyness: 
δια γαρ το πολλούς είρηκέναι και πάντας άκηκοέναι προσήκει μη καινά μεν 
πιστά δε δοκείν είναι τα λεγόμενα περί αυτών. ' ' 8 
The story about Demeter concerns events that happened ,i long time ago 
and might therefore be considered "not recent", but, bi r.iuse of its status 
as a tale of tradition, it is still worthy of belief. Here κσι\ ός occurs in a 
context of the critical examination of mvtli This passage (c 30-32) is one 
of a n u m b e r in which Isocrates shows himself to be a critical a n d 
conscious assessor of the past, thereby conforming ю the sophistic 
tradition. 1 1 9 
Similarly καινός is opposed to παλαιός in с 43, «he ie the founders 
of the Panhellenic festivals are honoiued, because they provided the 
opportunity 
τάς τε παλαιάς ξενίας άνανεώσασθαι και κσινας ετέρας ποιήσσσθαι.
1 2 0 
In the Euagoras Isocrates uses καινός to qualify stoiies by poets as 
"made up" . In с 36 he mentions the stoiies told by poeis about returns to 
the throne by princes in ancient times (παλαιών καθόδ(θν): 
[9] IX, 36 ούτοι γαρ ού μόνον των γεγενημένων τας καλλίστας ύμίν 
άπαγγέλλουσιν, άλλα και παρ' αυτών καινάς συντιθέαση '-' 
T h e contrast between "the most beautiful of those th.il happened" and 
" repor t " on the one hand and "new" and "compose by themselves" 
makes it clear that καινός here can be interpreted as "made u p " . It 




 Because ofthe fact that many have told the sun \ anil allhme heard 11 ιι is correct to regard 
what is saib about these events not as recent, but at /пп/пшг/п 
1 1 9
 Cf. ΧΠ.Ι49-50 (trustworthyness of historical data) sec Hamilton I '979). 290-298; cf. also 
ΓΧ.66 (critique of myth); see also ρ 177-179 below 
120 to renew old friendships ana make other new one \ 
1 2 1
 These do not only report the most beautiful of the ones that actuall\ happened, but also by 
themselves compose new ones. 
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Comparable is the passage at с 9, where Isociates discusses the 
liberties poets have in their means of composition With regard to 
content they can represent gods as conversing with men, and with 
regard to expression (δηλώσαι) they aie not restricted to every day 
speech, but can express 
τα μεν ξένοις, τα δε καινοΐς, τα δε μεταφορέας ι 2 2 
Καινός here refers to the use of words that did not occur till then: 
neologisms. In later times this category of words would be termed όνομα 
πεποιημένον.123 
б. conclusion 
From Homer onward, originalit; as newness 01 fieshness has 
been a concern of writers. Later it becomes an independent issue as the 
search for "newness" (καινά λέγειν), întioduced as л riiterion of self-
identification by the sophists. By this they seek to mouse intellectual 
stimulation and interest. 
Isocrates, an heir to the sophistir tradition, is also very much 
concerned with this concept. His usage of the progianimatie key-word 
(καινός; καινότης) can be described as follows: 
(a) it can refer to freshness in style (variation of рпымпц) as well as in 
content (selection of new potential material on a given subject); 
(b) it is used as a discriminatory exit« ion in polemical contexts: used 
positively, it refers to the quality (a) to be found as a lequirement in 
Isocrates' own works; used negatively, taken as "novelties", it refers to 
the works of rivals (sophists as well as philosopheis) in the field of 
discourse-writing. 
^
22Some things with exotic words, some with пем uu/гЛ others using ii^iuime speech, 
1 2 3
 AT Poet 1457 b 1 - 58 a 6, 1458 a 18 - 59 a 16. Dum Hal Comp 2s 22-24 
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СЬ. V. The Helen as an example of Isocratean discourse. 
5.1. Introduction. The Helen-theme in Greek Literature. 
The figure of Helen appears often in Greek literature, from early 
epic in the ninth century ВС until Helen's Abduction by Colluthus, the 
author of epic poetry in the late fifth century AD.1 Evidently her life and 
significance stimulated the interest of many writers, who tried to discuss 
the effect of her exceptional beauty and address the question of her 
responsibility for the horrors of the Trojan War. During the course of 
centuries writers treated this theme from different perspectives and 
presented a variegated whole of representations, reflecting their 
individual personalities and the differences in outlook of their respective 
times. 
The literary representation of Helen is founded on the mythical 
figure of Helen, about whom there are different traditions in 
mythography. One of these seems to have been dominant: it appears to 
be the basis for most treatments in literature, and it is on this one version 
that Isocrates has founded his Helen. This vulgate version can be 
summarized as follows: 
From the union of Zeus (disguised as swan) and Leda there 
resulted two eggs. From the first of these Helen and Clytaemnestra were 
born, from the second Castor and Polydeuces. Of these children only 
Helen is unanimously mentioned as having divine parentage, of the 
others this is said only incidently. They were considered natural 
children of Leda and Tyndareus, her husband and king of Sparta. 
When she was twelve years old, Helen was abducted by Theseus. 
He, however, soon returned her later to her father. Then, being of 
marriagable age and exceptional beauty, she was wooed by many 
famous heroes. Among these were Diomedes, Ajax, Ulysses, 
Philoctetes, Idomeus, Patroclus and Menelaos (whose brother 
Agamemnon had married Helen's sister Clytaemnestra). In order to 
avoid conflict among the pretending heroes, Ulysses proposed that they 
1
 See Bnins (1905), Becker (1939). Ghali-Kahil (1955). Bertone (1970), Homeyer (1977); Braun 
(1982), Poulakos (1986), Jake] (1986) and Tuszynska (1987) focus their attention on Gorgias and 
Isocrates, for the iconography of Helen see UMC Г -1,498-563 and Г -2, 291-358. 
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all take an oath, by which they vowed to come to the aid of whoever 
became Helen's husband, if he would be wronged. Finally, Menelaos 
married Helen and, after Tyndareus' death, became king of Sparta. 
Then, one day, at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis, a conflict 
arose between the goddesses Hera, Athena and Aphrodite, over the 
question who was the most beautiful. This conflict was prompted by Eris, 
who brought a golden apple with the inscription "for the fairest" to the 
wedding banquet. The question was then settled by invoking the 
judgment of a mortal. For this the Trojan prince Paris, also known as 
Alexander, was chosen: he had been abandoned by his parents, king 
Priam of Troy and his wife Hecuba, and grew up on Mount Ida. He was 
called on as a judge in this contest, because he himself was 
exceptionally handsome, intelligent and, being a simple goatherd, pure. 
The goddesses tried to influence Paris' decision by offering him 
special gifts. Hera offered wealth and power, Athena practical wisdom 
and success in battle. But Aphrodite offered marriage with the most 
beautiful woman ever: Helen. Finally Paris decided that the apple 
belonged to Aphrodite. 
Later, after having been restored as prince of Troy, Paris came to 
Sparta as a guest at Menelaos' court. There he met Helen and, because of 
the inattentiveness of Menelaos, he was able to abduct her from Sparta. 
Thus she deserted her husband and daughter, Hermione, and took part 
of the court's treasure with her. 
On their journey to Troy Paris and Helen were forced by storms 
to take refuge on Cyprus and in Egypt, but finally they reached king 
Priam's city at the mouth of the Bosporus. The Greek heroes, true to their 
oath, united to assist Menelaos and organised under the leadership of 
Agamemnon an expedition against Troy, in order to retrieve Helen. The 
Trojans, however, were unwilling to restore her, and thus the siege of 
Troy began. For ten long years the war lasted and many were killed. 
Finally Troy was taken and destroyed. 
After that, Helen and Menelaos were reunited, but he found 
himself unable to punish Helen for her conduct. They returned to 
Sparta. 
Prior to Isocrates, the myth of Helen was treated by a number of 
authors, who all give attention to the question of how Helen's conduct 
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should be evaluated. The vulgate version of the myth leaves room for the 
possibility that Helen was not abducted against her will, but that she 
voluntarily left with Paris and knowingly deserted her husband and 
child. The Trojan War was a direct result of the fact that she was taken to 
Troy: this aggravated her responsibility for the bloodshed and 
desecration that took place during that war. The treatment of this 
question, Helen's guilt, can properly be defined as the Helen-theme in 
literature. 
First of all, the treatment of the theme can be found in Homer's 
epics, where the figure of Helen appears a number of times and serves 
different literary purposes. First, in Iliad III, 145-165, she is present on the 
wall of Troy to inspect the Greeks and identify some of their leaders. 
Also present is a group of elder Trojans, who comment on her: they 
stress her beauty and consider it understandable that both Trojans and 
Greeks are willing to go to war for her sake (156-158). But they continue 
in a critical vein (159-160): 
άλλα και ώς, τοίη περ έοΰσ', έν νηυσί νεέσθω 
μηδ' ήμίν τεκέεσσί τ' όπίσσω πημα λίποιτο.2 
The elders suggest Helen's responsibility for the calamity that will befall 
Troy and its inhabitants as a result of the siege. Here Helen's guilt is 
addressed for the first time in Greek literature. But at the same time, the 
elders do not remain untouched by her beauty: thus Homer introduces 
the fundamental ambiguity with regard to Helen. They feel sympathy 
and understanding as they acknowledge the influence and power of her 
beauty, but they are unable to forgive her for the misery she causes. The 
mixed reaction of love and hate is to become a recurrent motif in later 
treatments of the Helen-theme. 
King Priam, who is also present on the wall, invites Helen to sit by 
him and offers her some comfort. He then refers to the role played by 
the gods in the explanation of what caused the war (164-165): 
ου tí μοι αίτίη έσσί · θεοί νύ μοι αΐτιοί εϊσιν, 
οΐμοι έφώρμησαν πόλεμον πολύδακρυν 'Αχαιών.3 
Here another motive is introduced: if the gods are responsible for what 
happens, Helen is not to be blamed. In that case she is a mere instrument 
2 Still, even if so beautiful, she should return home on the ships and not remain, causing misery 
to us and our children in the future. 
3 It is not you who is responsible· responsible, in my view, are the gods, who brought the 
lamented war with the Achaeans upon me. 
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in the hands of a superhuman major force. This also becomes a 
recurrent motive. 
In the Odyssey the reaction of aversion towards Helen is 
predominant. In 11, 436-439 Odysseus, in his encounter with the spirit of 
the deceased Agamemnon in Hades, uses Helen as an example of the 
ways in which Zeus has brought misery to the house of Atreus: 
ώ πόποι, ή μόλα δη γόνον Άτρέος εΰρύοπα Ζευς 
έκπάγλως ήχθηρε γυναικείας δια βούλας 
έξ άρχης· 'Ελένης μεν άπωλόμεθ' εΐνεκα πολλοί, 
σοι δε Κλυταιμνήστρη δόλον ήρτοε τηλόθ' έόντι.4 
The negative evaluation of Helen is reinforced by parallelism with the 
case of Clytaemnestra, who consciously plotted to kill her husband. 
Similarly in other instances (14, 67-71; 17, 118-119) Helen is directly 
connected with the deaths of both Greeks and Trojans, and hence 
receives a negative evaluation. At the same time, the role of the gods is 
stressed as those ultimately responsible for man's fate. This procedure of 
double motivation is, of course, a typical element of the mentality 
present in archaic literature. It does not affect the observation that in 
these instances Helen is negatively perceived. 
Another perspective is offered in 23, 218-224: there Helen is 
mentioned by Penelope, who maintains that she would never have been 
unfaithful to her husband, had she known that the Greeks would 
achieve her return to Menelaos' court. Penelope says (222-224): 
την δ' η τοι ρέξαι θεός ώρορε έργον άεικές· 
την δ' ατην ού πρόσθεν έω έγκάτθετο θυμφ 
λυγρήν, έξ ης πρώτα και ήμέας ΐκετο πένθος.5 
Helen's action is again condemned as a shameful deed, but the 
responsibility lies with the god (Aphrodite: see 4, 261 ) who made her do 
it. The god caused her to be in a state of "blindness" or "delusion" (ατη), 
and therefore she was unfaithful to Menelaos and eloped with Paris. 
With this the motif of love is addressed, which in the case of Helen 
shows its destructive potential. The goddess of love clouded Helen's 
judgment and made her act in a way she would otherwise never have 
4
 Alas and woe is me' From the beginning has wide-seeing Zeus dreadfully visited the seed of 
Atreus through women's arts What an army of us died for Helen; and now Clytaemnestra spins 
this web of death for you, while you are far away [Ir.TE Lawrence]. 
' And surely a god made her do this shameful deed, and from that same moment she put a 
blindness in her mind, banefull, which first brought sorrow aJso to us 
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done. Negative evaluation of her action is underlined by the intended 
contrast with Penelope's faithfulness to her husband: Helen's 
unfaithfulness is a negative foil for one of the main themes of the 
Odyssey. 
A more positive image emerges from the description of Helen in 
Book 4, where she has returned to Sparta as king Menelaos' wife. In 4, 
219-234 her knowledge of the healing power of herbs is highlighted: that 
knowledge she owes to Polydamna, an Egyptian woman. Here occurs 
the motif of the Egyptian connection, which evokes the atmosphere of 
arcane knowledge and even witchcraft in relation to Helen. This motif 
will return again in later treatments. 
In his treatment of the Helen-theme Homer provides several 
motives (the love/hate attitude towards her; the gods who gouvern 
human fate; the power of love; the connection with Egypt) that leave the 
impression of an awareness on his part of the fact that her behaviour 
leaves room for opposing evaluations. His attitude toward the Helen 
figure, as it emerges from the evaluative comments of his characters, 
shows nuance and balance.6 These motives became part of the set of 
stock issues raised in later treatments of the Helen-theme. 
From the lyric period onwards the balanced approach is 
abandoned in favour of, in most cases, a clear condemnation of Helen's 
behaviour. This can be observed in Sappho's poem 16, where Helen's 
example is taken as evidence for the statement of the opening priamel 
that the most beautiful thing on the black earth (έπ[ί] γάν 
μέλαι[ν]αν.. .κάλλιστον) is not cavalry or infantry, but whatsoever a 
person loves. This statement is then easily made understood (σύνετον 
πόησαι) by referring to Helen, who far surpassed mankind in beauty, 
and who, probably under the influence of love7, deserted her husband 
and sailed to Troy, mindless of her child and parents. Even more 
negative and critical is Alcaeus, who in fragments 42 and 283 explicitly 
connects Helen to the horrors of the Trojan War. In fir. 42 she is used as a 
contrast to Thetis, wife of Peleus, and the grief that came to the Trojans 
6 This is also discernible in the way Homer represents Helen's own views in Ш, 428-436 and VI, 
344-358, where she appears conscious of her guilt and showing regret The representation enables 
the audience to feel sympathy for her; see also Lendle (1968), Snell (1973). 
7
 Lines 11-12 read παράγαγ' αϋταν I....] σαν, where the subject "love ("s power)" may plausibly 
be supplied' pace D.L Page, Sappho and Alcaeus. In Introduction to the Study of Ancient Lesbian 
Poetry, Oxford 1959, 54, see E M. Voigt, Sappho et Alcaeus. Fragmenta, Amsterdam 1971,44. 
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"came from you (= Helen)": έκ σέθεν, line 3. Again, in fr. 283 Alcaeus 
remembers how Helen's heart was set afire and how she left Menelaos 
for the Trojan prince, who had violated his host's trust, and deserted her 
child and marital bed. The fragmentary poem ends with an evocation of 
the destruction and horrors of the war, and the deaths of many "because 
of that woman" (εν]νεκα κήνας, 1. 14). 
The negative approach is also the basis of Aeschylus' 
representation of Helen as a destructive instrument in the hand of Fate: 
as such she is on a par with her sister Clytaemnestra. Both women are 
instrumental in the retribution and destruction that haunts the house of 
the Atridae. This is expressed in harsh words and images in the second 
stasimon of Aeschylus' Agamemnon (681-781), where he plays on 
Helen's name by associating it to the verb έλεΐν "to ravage", and by 
suggesting the similarity between Helen and a goddess of vengeance. In 
this respect there is a parallel between her and Clytaemnestra, who 
claims the same role explicitly for herself (1552-3). 
Another motif in the literary treatment of the Helen-theme is that 
of the phantom (εΐδωλον), which represents a separate version of the 
Helen myth. According to this version king Proteus of Egypt kept Helen 
and the Spartan treasure behind and sent Paris on his way to Troy 
accompanied by a phantom of Helen. This story, which may have been 
first introduced by Hesiod8, was the basis of the so-called Palinode 
composed by the lyrical poet Stesichorus. The origin of this work is 
explained in Plato's Phaedrus 243 a-b, by describing it as an example of an 
"ancient mode of purification" (καθαρμός αρχαίος). Stesichorus had 
offended Helen - probably in his poem entitled Helen - and was punished 
by loss of his eye-sight. To make amends he wrote a recantation, in 
which he defended her by telling the phantom story.9 
In Gorgias' Helen the Helen-theme is used as material in a model 
speech to provide potential lines of argument in her defense. His 
approach is influenced by his rhetorical intentions: the fact that Helen 
8
 According to a scholion on Lycophron Alexandra 822 by Tzetzes πρώτος 'Ησίοδος της 'Ελένης 
το εΐδωλον παρήγαγε Hesiod may very well have included this version in his Γυναικών 
κατάλογος, see Bertille (1970), 82 f 
' See M Davies, Poetarum Mehcorum Craecorum Fragmenta , vol I, Oxford 1991, 177-180, s v. 
Stesichorus, fr 193 according to the author of Ρ Oxy 2506 (= Chamaeleon fr. 29 Wehrli) this 
version constituted a "novelty" ό Στησίχορος οϋτως δη ¿καινοτόμησε τάς ιστορίας, Cf PI. 
Resp DC, 586 с 3-5 το της 'Ελένης εΐδωλον υπό των έν Τροία Στησίχορος φησι γενέσθαι 
περιμάχητον αγνοία τοΰ άληθοΰς 
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went to Troy with Paris is not denied, but her responsibility is. In terms 
of the later Jíosu-theory, of which there are préfigurations discernible in 
5th century literature, this argumentative starting-point can be 
characterised as the στάσις of ποιότης. Gorgias uses the traditional 
literary motives, with the exception of the phantom motive, as material 
for his argumentation and identifies four different arguments to prove 
she cannot be held responsible for the Trojan War. These arguments 
are, first, that she was subject to "force majeure", either because her 
abduction was ordered by the gods, or ordained by fate or chance; 
second, that she was abducted by force; third, that she succumbed to the 
power of speech; and fourth, that she was overwhelmed by the power of 
love. Thus the Helen is an instance of the apagogetic method of 
argumentation, by which the presentation of possibilities is followed by 
their refutation. In this methodological respect the Helen is similar to the 
other preserved works by Gorgias, the Palamedes and On not-being. The 
story of Helen serves as the material by which the procedure is 
exemplified.1 0 
Herodotus' account of Helen (II, 112-120) has an elaborate version 
of the phantom-theme, for which he mentions the priests of the tempel 
of "foreign Aphrodite" (ξείνη 'Αφροδίτη) - part of the sacred domain of 
Proteus - as his source. Because of the peculiar name "foreign 
Aphrodite" and on the basis of the story told by the priests, Herodotus 
conjectures (συμβάλλομαι) that the goddess worshipped in the temple is, 
in fact, Helen. He then tells the complete myth about Helen, in which 
all traditional motives are present, and furthermore he concludes that 
Homer was familiar with the Egypt-motive as well. This he infers from 
the passages VI, 289 f.; 4, 227 f.; 4, 351 f., but he observes that evidently 
Homer chose not to include this story because it was not as fitting for his 
epic as the one he did use ( 116: οΰ γαρ ομοίως ές την έποποιίην ευπρεπής ί\ν 
τω έτέρω τω περ έχρήσατο). Next he considers the consequences of the 
phantom-story, was the story about the Trojan War a Greek fabrication, 
he asks the priests. They then tell the story how Menelaos came to Egypt 
after Troy had been taken and he had found out that Helen had not been 
held by the Trojans, as they had mantained all along. The Egyptians 
returned her to him and Menelaos made preparations to sail home. 
1 0
 See Jäkel (1987), on apagogy in Gorgias see Solmsen (1975), 13 Γ ; on the Helen and its 
argumentative content see Braun (1982), 161-165 
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Adverse winds detained him, however, and he sacrificed two native 
Egyptian children. For this desecration he incurred the hate of the 
Egyptians, but he was able to escape and sailed in the direction of Libya. 
Finally Herodotus tries to assess the trustworthiness of the priests' 
account on Helen: on the basis of argumentation from probability he 
concludes (120,5) that the Trojans did not have Helen at the time and 
therefore were unable to return her to the Greeks. That they did not 
believe them was divine purpose: the utter destruction of the Trojans 
should prove to mankind that serious crime is punished by the gods by 
heavy retribution (των μεγάλων αδικημάτων μεγάλαι etoi και αϊ τιμωρίαι 
παρά των θεών). In his interpretation of the story Herodotus shows 
himself to have a rational approach: he applies probabilities as criteria in 
his assessment and, instead of taking the myth at face value, he tries to 
determine its hidden meaning or moral content. This can be seen as a 
manifestation of the rationalism advocated and applied by the sophistic 
movement.1 1 
Fifth-century tragedy introduces the element of human 
responsibility for his own actions in the treatment of the Helen-theme. 
This emerges clearly in Euripides Trojan Women 948 f., where both 
Hecuba and Menelaos point to Helen's voluntary act of leaving with 
Paris and her responsibility as a result of this.1 2 Further, what may be 
called a casuistic approach is characteristic of the way Euripides 
introduces the Helen-theme in some of his tragedies. The traditional 
accusations are directed towards her in a number of instances13, and in 
others the case is even debated by parties from both sides.1 4 Of these the 
debate between Hecuba and Helen in the Trojan Women is an example of 
Euripides' interest in opposite argumentation. Since the issue as such 
does not play an essential role in the play's plot, inclusion of the debate 
seems to reflect a general appreciation for attempts to argue a difficult or 
even impossible position: in this case the vindication of Helen's 
elopement. To argue the case of Helen presents a challenge to 
argumentative virtuosity, and to provide proof of this quality was the aim 
1 1
 See Solmsen (1975), 172 f, Guthrie (1971), 178 f.; on the understanding of υπόνοια or 
"hidden meaning" as the aim of sophistic analysis see Richardson (1975), 65 f. 
1 2
 Cf Eur Hipp. 474 f, see also the sophistic use made of this argument by άδικος λόγος m Ar 
Clouds 1076 f, see also the classic instance of Orestes's killing of his mother Clytaemnestra- an 
act perpetrated on divine command, for which he is at the same time held personally responsible 
1 3 S e e e g Orestes 1142,1584, IphigeneiaatAulis76;Andromache602f. 
1 4
 Hecuba 269, 442 f, esp. 629 658 (the second stasimon); Trojan Women 914-1032. 
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of paradoxographic discourse.15 The phantom-story is the basis for 
Euripides' Helen, and it may even be that the account given by Herodotus 
suggested the plot.16 The presentation of Helen as a virtuous woman 
waiting for her husband in Egypt, brought there by the will of the gods, 
constitutes an novel elaboration of the traditional phantom-motive. 
Thus it seems clear that the Helen-theme enjoyed literary 
interest, and was treated by important authors before the publication of 
Isocrates' Helen. The literary tradition provided a number of different 
approaches and stock motives. In most cases the use of the Helen-theme 
provided an opportunity for a negative approach, in which Helen was 
responsible for the Trojan War. Her vulnerable position was an 
invitation to the sophists to use her case in their search for effective 
arguments and their virtuoso display. They contributed to the creation of 
a positive approach of the theme, which seems to originate in Hesiod 
and Stesichorus and which enabled Euripides to represent Helen as even 
virtuous. 
15
 See Sotasen (1975), 31. 
16
 Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus 337 f. may serve as an indication thai Herodotus' account of 
Egyptian history in the second book of his Histories (of which the Helen episode is part) was 
well-known at the time. 
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5.2. Translation 
Helen 
I ¡II There are some who pride themselves if, after having chosen an 
extraordinary and absurd subject, they are able to speak about it in an acceptable 
way Also there are old men some assert that it is not possible to say what is 
false, neither to contradict, nor to give two opposite accounts about the same 
matters, and others claim that courage, wisdom and justice are one and the same 
thing, and that by nature we possess none of these things, but that there is one 
knowledge concerning them all, sttll others busy themselves with disputations that 
are of no use and merely cause difficulties f or their pupils 
12] As far as I am concerned, if I saw that this futile activity arose recently in the 
field of discourse, and that these men placed their pnde in the novelty of their 
discoveries, I would not wonder at them so much But is there anyone now, who υ 
such an ignoramus that he doesn't know about Protagoras and the sophists of his 
tune, that they left us writings of similar nature and even more troublesome than 
these* 13] For how could one do better than Gorgias, who ventured to say that 
nothing of what is, exists, or Zeno, who tried to show that the same things are 
possible and impossible at the same time, or Melissus, who attempted to prove 
that all is one, although the number of things in nature и infinite1 
14] But even though these men made it so very clear that it is easy to construct a 
fahe discourse on any subject one may propose, they still busy themselves m this 
they, however, should let this tiresome pedantry go, which pretends to prove things 
m discourse but which has long since been proved wrong in actual life, and should 
pursue the truth ¡5] they should educate their pupiL· m the transactions with which 
we maintain our society, and exercize them in the practice of these matters, 
considering that it is much better to form an opinion on useful things in a 
reasonably well fashion, than to have accurate knowledge on futile things, and to 
be slightly better in what is important than to be far superior in what is 
unimportant and has no value for life 
¡6] And furthermore, they care for nothing else than to make themselves 
wealthy from young men It is the philosophy concerned with disputations that is 
capable of doing this for they don't care about private or public affairs and enjoy 
those discourses most that do not serve a single practical purpose ¡7] Now young 
men such as these may well be excused for having this frame of mind m 
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everything they continue to meline to the extraordinary and the wonderful. But 
those who pretend to educate them deserve to be criticised, because they accuse 
those who are deceitful in private contracts and who unjustly use speech. But they 
themselves do something even more shocking than these: the former do damage to 
strangers, but they chiefly harm their pupils. 
IS] They have caused false discourse to increase to such a degree that some now, 
seeing these men benefit from such a thing, dare to write that the life of beggars 
and fugitives is more enviable than that of other human beings, and they use ti as 
proof that when they can say something about ignoble matters, they will easily 
have much to say on what is good and honourable [9] To me the most ridiculous 
of all seems that it is by arguments such as these that they try to convince us that 
they possess knowledge on publtc affairs, while they have opportunity to 
demonstrate this precisely where they put their claims: for it befits those who make 
a claim to wisdom and maintain that they are wise men, to be superior and excel 
private persons, not m things that nobody cares about, but where all compete with 
one another, [loi But now their behaviour resembles that of someone who pretends 
to be strongest of all athletes and enters a contest where nobody ehe would think it 
fit to meet him. For what sensible person would try to praise misfortune* 
No, it is evident that it is out of weakness that they take refuge m doing this. [Ill 
For there u only one way leading to writings such as these, and to find, learn, and 
imitate it is not difficult. But the discourses of common interest, the ones that are 
trustworthy, and those stmilar to these, are devised and put in words through 
many ways of presentation and appropriate timing that are hard to learn, and their 
composition is more difficult, just as it takes more effort to be solemn than to be 
derisive, or to be senous than to be joking You can conclude that from the 
following. [12] no one who wished to praise flies, sali, and that hind of subject has 
ever been at a loss for words, but those who have endeavoured to speak on what 
M commonly accepted as good, honourable, and distinguished for virtue, have all 
failed to speak adequately about the possible topics. [13] For one cannot with one 
and the same mentality speak as required on each of these subjects: no, it is easy 
in discourse to supersede what is trivial, but difficult to attain the magnitude of the 
other subjects. And while it happens only rarely when speaking about subjects 
with repute that one finds something nobody else said before, on what is worthless 
and humble whatever someone might say is entirely original. 
[14] That is why, of those who have wished to speak in praise, I 
compliment the one who wrote on Helen most, because he has recalled the 
memory of a woman, who was superior in birth, beauty, and repute. But all the 
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same, this small thing escaped him: he claims to have xatitten an encomium on her, 
but he actually delivered a defense of her actions. 115] This discourse does not 
have the same shape nor concerns the same deeds, but quite the contrary: a 
defense befits those who are accused of injustice, praise those who are 
distinguished for some good. 
But in order to prevent the impression of doing the easy thing and to 
criticize others without presenting something of my own, I will try to speak about 
this same woman, thereby omitting all that has been said by others. 
II ¡16] I start my discourse with the origin of her family. While Zeus begat 
most of the demigods, of this woman alone he wanted to be called father. He was 
especially concerned with the son of Alkmene and the children of Leda, but he 
preferred Helen so much over Herakles that he provided him with strength, which 
can overcome all with force, but to her he allotted beauty, which by its nature can 
even rule over strength itself. [17] He knew that distinction and splendour do not 
arise from a quiet life but from wars and contests, and he wished not only to exalt 
their bodies to the gods, but abo to leave their glory ever remembered: therefore he 
made his son's life full of toil and adventure, while he gave her a nature that is 
universally admired and contended. 
¡II ¡IS] First Theseus, called son of Aigeus but actually son of Poseidon, when 
he saw her not as yet in full maturity but already superior to the others, was so 
overwhelmed by her beauty that he, himself a man accustomed to rule others and 
although possessing a very great country and a very secure kingdom, thought that 
life would not be worth living among his present blessings without intimacy with 
her. 119] And since he was unable to take her from her guardians · they waited for 
the child's maturity and the oracle of the Pythian priestess -, he disregarded the 
power of Tyndareus, despised the might of Kastor and Polydeukes, and belittled 
all the dangers present in Sparta: he took her by force and brought her to Aphidna 
in Attika. 120] And he was so grateful to Peirithoos, his companion in the 
abduction, that when Peirithoos wished to court Kore, daughter of Zeus and 
Demeter, and asked his friends ' help for the descent into Hades, he decided, since 
he was unable by his advice to dissuade his friend, to accompany him regardless 
of the evident danger. He thought he owed him this debt, and could not refuse any 
task Peirithoos would ask in return for his share in the dangers they had met. 
121] If the man who did this had been an ordinary person and not one of 
the most distinguished, it would not yet be clear if this discourse was a praise of 
Helen or an accusation of Theseus. But now we will find that of all other men of 
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high repute one is lacking m courage, another in wisdom, and another m some 
other of these attributes, but that he alone is wanting in none and possesses virtue 
complete in all respects 
122] It seems right to me to speak about this man even at greater length for I think 
that those who wish to praise Helen have this as the greatest pledge of good faith 
if we can show that the men themselves who loved and admired her deserved 
more admiration than others For with regard to what happens in our own day, it 
ts only reasonable that we must judge on the basis of our own opinions, but in 
regard to events so long ago tí ts fitting that we show ourselves to be of one mind 
with the intelligent men of that age 
123] Well, the best I can say about Theseus ts this he lived at the time of Herakles 
and he was his rival m glory For not only did they equip themselves with similar 
armour, but they abo shared the same pursuits, while performing acts appropriate 
to their common origin For being born from brothers, the one from Zeus, the other 
from Poseidon, they were abo brotherly m their ambitions they alone of former 
generations established themselves as champions of human life 
124] It came to pass that the one undertook adventures more famous and more 
great, the other more useful and more like a Hellene For Eurystheus ordered the 
one to bring bach the cattle from Eurytheia, to fetch the apples of the Hespendes, 
to bring up Cerberus, and other toils like that, from which he would not benefit 
others but bring danger to himself [25] The other, however, as hts own master, 
chose those struggles from which he would emerge as benefactor either of the 
Hellenes or of his own country Thus the bull that was sent by Poseidon and 
ravaged the land, and which no human being dared to face, he subdued alone, 
thereby delivering the inhabitants of the city from great fear and much anxiety ¡26] 
And after that he became ally of the Lapiths and he fought against the Centaurs, 
creatures of a dual nature, who are superior m speed, strength and danng, and 
who destroyed some cities or made preparations to do so, and were threatening 
others He conquered them m battle, immediately put an end to their insolence and 
later caused their race to disappear from mankind. 
121] About the same time the monster, raised m Crete, born from Pasiphae, 
daughter of Helios, to whom the city sent in obedience to the oracle's command 
twice seven children, provoked Theseus' anger so much as he saw them led away 
and escorted by all the populace to a savage and certain death, and mourned while 
still alive, that he thought it better to die than to live as king of a city forced to pay 
so pitiable a tribute to the enemy [28] He joined them on their ship and triumphed 
over the creature, half man and half bull, that possessed strength as befits its origin 
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from such bodies Having thus saved the children Theseus returned them to then 
parents and freed the city from an obligation so savage, so terrible, and so 
ineluctable 
[29]1 do not know, however, how I will deal with the rest for now that I 
have turned to Theseus' exploits and started to speak about them, I hesitate to stop 
half-way and leave out the lawless conduct of Skiron, Kerkyon, and others whom 
he confronted and thus delivered the Hellenes from many great misfortunes I feel 
myself being earned beyond due measure, and I fear that I might seem to some to 
be more concerned about htm than about the topic I originally announced [30] For 
both these reasons I prefer to leave out most because of irritation in my audience, 
and to treat the rest as concisely as I can, so that I will gratify both them and 
myself, and not completely surrender to those who are habitually jealous and 
anticue whatever is said. 
[31] Well then, Thesues displayed his courage in those deeds m which he, 
on his own, was alone at nsk, his knowledge of war he displayed in the battles 
that he fought together with the whole city, his piety towards the gods he showed at 
the time of the supplications of Adrastos and the children of Heracles he saved 
them by defeating the Peloponnesians in battle, and to Adrastos he restored, 
notwithstanding the Thebans' resistance, those who had died under the walls of 
the Kadmetafor burial, his other merits and his prudence he displayed m what has 
been said here before, and especially in the governance of his city 
[32] For he saw that those who seek to rule citizens by force are slaves to others 
and that those who make life dangerous for others live themselves in fear, and are 
forced to wage war, both with their citizens against foreign invaders and with 
Others against their fellow citizens, [331 and further that they plunder the temples of 
the gods, kill the best of their citizens, distrust their closest friends, live in no less 
anxiety than those in prison awaiting death, and that they are deemed fortunate f or 
their seeming success, but that deep down they feel more anguish than others [34] 
For what is more painful than to live m constant fear that one of those near you 
might assassinate you, and to be afraid of your guards no less than those who plot 
against you * He despised all such men and considered them to be plagues rather 
than rulers of their country, he thus demonstrated that it is easy to rule alone and 
at the same time to be no worse disposed than those who live as citizens on equal 
footing 
[35] And first of all by uniting the city, that was composed of separate scattered 
settlements, he made it so great that from that time onward to the present day it is 
the biggest of all Hellenic cities Next, after the establishment of a common 
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homeland and liberating the minds of his feUow-atizens, he instituted the rivalry 
for virtue open to all. he believed that he would be supertor to them anyway, 
whether they practised virtue or neglected it, and he knew that honours bestowed 
by the high-minded are sweeter than those awarded by slaves. 
[36] And far from doing anything against the wishes of the citizens he gave the 
people control over affairs of the community, while they considered him worthy to 
rule alone, they believed that his monarchy was more trustworthy and useful to the 
common good than their own democracy. For unlike other rulers he did not impose 
labours on others and enjoy the pleasures on his own, but the dangers he made his 
own and the benefits he bestowed to all m common. 
[37] Thus he spent his life not as a victim of conspiracies but beloved, not 
preserving his rule with alien military force but protected by the good-will of the 
people, enjoying power like monarchs and benefactions like popular leaders. For 
so much m accordance with law and honour was his administration of the city 
that to this very day traces of his gentleness can be found in our customs. 
[381 Well now, as for this woman born from Zeus who was able to control 
such excellence and moderation, how could one but praise her, honour her, and 
regard her as far superior to all other women who have ever lived? For surely we 
shall never be able to put forward a more trustworthy witness or more competent 
judge of Helen's own good qualities than Theseus' insight. But to avoid the 
impression that because of lack of material I spend time on the same theme and 
that I misuse the reputation of one man to praise her, I also want to speak on the 
further course of events. 
IV [39] After Theseus' descent to Hades, when Helen returned to Lacedaimon 
and was of mamagable age, all the kings and rulers then had the same opinion 
about her: although they could have outstanding wives in their own cities, they 
disregarded marriage at home and came to be suitors of her. [40] While it was not 
yet decided who was to be her husband and all had an equal chance, it became 
evident to all that she was to be an object of universal contention. Therefore they 
held an assembly and they exchanged pledges to provide genuine assistance, if 
someone should try to take her away from the one who had been judged worthy of 
her· each of them thought that he was thereby providing support for himself. 
[41] All were deceived in their expectations except one, but nobody was mistaken 
about their shared common opinion. For shortly afterwards there arose amongst 
the gods a dispute on beauty, and Alexander, the son ofPnam, was appointed as 
judge Hera promised to give him kingship over all Asia, Athena promised victory 
tn battle, and Aphrodite his marriage with Helen [42] Not being able to make a 
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decision on their physical beauty but overwhelmed by the sight of the goddesses, 
he was forced to make judgement about their gifts: he chose living with Helen over 
all else, not with an eye to pleasure - although that, to be sure, is something 
preferred by intelligent men over many other things, but that was not what he was 
after - [43] no, he wished to become the son-in-law of Zeus, and he considered this 
to be afar greater and better honour than kingship over Asia, and he believed that 
great powers and dominions sometimes fall to insignificant men, but that nobody 
of future generations would be thought worthy of a woman like her; and 
furthermore he believed that he could leave his children no better possession than 
securing for them a descendancy from Zeus, not only from the father's side but 
also from their mother's. 144] For he knew that all other good fortunes quickly 
change, but that nobility of birth always remains with the same possessors, so that 
this choice would be to the advantage of all his family, whereas the other gifts 
would be so only for his own lifetime. 
[45] No sensible person could critiche these reasonings, but some who do not 
consider a previous event but only look at what consequently happens, have 
already slandered him. Their lack of understanding can easily be seen by all from 
the slanderings they have uttered against him. ¡46] For how can they avoid ridicule, 
if they consider their own nature more capable than that of Alexander, the one 
preferred by the gods? Evidently, on this important dispute in which they got 
involved, they did not appoint just an ordinary man to make a decision, but 
obviously they took the selection of the best judge as seriously as they were 
concerned about the matter itself. [471 One must consider what kind of man 
Alexander was and form a judgement on him not from the resentment of those 
who lost the contest, but from the reasons why the goddesses upon deliberation 
unanimously preferred his insight. Nothing prevents even the innocent from ill-
treatment by the stronger: but to receive such honour of being made judge of the 
gods while being a mortal, that is impossible except for a man far superior in 
intelligence. 
(4SI I am surprised anyone feels that Alexander decided wrongly to choose a life 
with Helen, for whose sake many of the demigods were ready to die. Would he not 
have been foolish, if he, while knowing that the gods were engaged in rivalry over 
beauty, himself had despised beauty, and would he not have thought that to be the 
greatest of gifts, about which he saw that these goddesses mostly concerned? 
V [49] Who would have rejected marriage with Helen, at whose abduction the 
Hellenes were as indignant as if the whole of Hellas haid been laid waiste, and the 
barbarians were as proud as if they had conquered us all? It is clear how they 
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both felt, for although there had been many reasons for complaint between them 
before, on these they preserved peace, but on account of her they waged a war so 
great, not only in the intensity of its rage but abo in the extent of its duration and 
the multitude of its armaments, as never had taken place before. (SOI Although it 
was possible for one party to be free of the calamities that beset them by returning 
Helen, and for the other to live in peace for the time to come by forgetting about 
her, neither were willing to do so. On the contrary, the barbarians allowed their 
cities to be destroyed and their land ravaged, refusing to restore her to the Hellenes; 
and the Hellenes chose to stay in a foreign country, grow old there and never to see 
their families again rather than to abandon her and to return to their own home 
country. [51] And this they did not do out of devotion to the cause of Alexander or 
Menelaos: no, one party was champion of Asia, the other of Europe, in the belief 
that wherever Helen resided in person, that country would be most blessed. 
[52] Such an ardent desire for the hardships of the campaign did not only take 
possession of the Hellenes and the barbarians, but even of the gods: they did not 
even dissuade their own offspring from taking part in the struggles around Troy. 
On the contrary, Zeus, although aware of his fate, nevertheless encouraged and 
sent Sarpedon, and Eos Memnon, and Poseidon Kyknos, and Thetis Achilles: [53] 
it was the opinion of the gods that it was more honourable f or them to die fighting 
on behalf of Zeus' daughter than to live, and not take part in the dangers on her 
account. And why should one be surprised that this was their firm decision 
concerning their children? They themselves took part in a far greater and more 
terrible battle than the one against the Giants: against them they fought united, but 
on behalf of that woman they fought each other. 
VI [54] With good reason they came to that decision, and indeed I am able to 
use extravagant statements concerning her: for beauty, the most august, the most 
precious, and the most divine of all that exists, she possessed more than anything 
else. It is easy to see beauty's power of the things lacking courage or wisdom or 
justice many are more highly valued than any of these three separately; but of the 
things lacking beauty we will find none that is desired: no, they are all despised 
except in so far as they share in that quality. And virtue is held in highest esteem 
for the reason, that it is the most beautiful of habits. ¡55] One can see how far 
superior beauty is to all existing things from our attitudes towards each of these. 
All other things, which we need, we only want to have, but we feel no further 
affection for them in our soul; for what is beautiful, however, we have an inborn 
desire, to the same degree stronger than our will as beauty is superior. 
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[56] Towards those who surpass us in intelligence or in other respects we feel 
jealousy, unless by daily benefits they win us over and force us to show affection; 
but towards the beautiful we immediately feel goodwill, and for them alone we 
never grow tired to do service, just as for the gods. [57] We prefer to be slaves to 
the beautiful rather than to rule over others, and we are more grateful when they 
impose many tasks on us than when they give us no orders. And those who are 
under some other power we criticize and call flatterers, but those who serve beauty 
we consider to be lovers of beauty and of enterprise. 
[581 We show such reverence and consideration to this quality that we hold those 
possessors of beauty who make a profit from it and who are ill advised 
concerning their own youth more in contempt than the ones who violate other 
persons; but those who guard their flower of youth and keep it untouched by the 
perverted like a holy temple, we honour for all times as highly as benefactors of 
the whole city. 
[59] But why should I spend time repeating human opinions? No, Zeus the all-
mighty who reveals his power in everything ehe, considers it just to approach 
beauty humbly. For he came to Alkmene in the guise of Amphitryon, united with 
Danae as a golden stream, took refuge in the arms of Nemesis in the form of a 
swan, and took Leda for his bride again in the same disguise. Evidently it is 
always by stratagem and not by force that he pursues this kind of endowment. [SO] 
And so much greater is the esteem paid to beauty by the gods than by us, that they 
show understanding when their wives are overcome by it; one could cite many 
cases of goddesses who fell victim to a mortal's beauty, but none of them tried to 
conceal what had happened as if it were a disgrace: no, they preferred their acts to 
be celebrated in hymns as beautiful deeds rather than keep them untold. The 
greatest proof of what I say is this: we will find more mortals owing their 
immortality to beauty than to all other excellences. 
VII [61] To all these Helen was superior to the same degree as she surpassed 
them in outward looks. Not only did she become immortal herself, but after she 
acquired godlike power she first elevated her brothers, who were already in the 
grip of destiny, to the gods. And in her desire to make this change acceptable, she 
bestowed on them conspicuous honours: their appearance will rescue those who 
are in peril at sea, provided they invoke them piously. 
[62] Next she showed much gratitude towards Menelaos for all the toils and perils 
he undertook on her behalf: while the whole house of Pelops had perished or had 
fallen victim to calamities beyond remedy, she not only protected him from these 
misfortunes but also changed him from mortal to god, and made him her husband 
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and consort for all time to come [63] And as a witness for this I can refer to the 
city of the Spartans, which preserves ancient tradition with great care for even 
now in the Laconian city of Therapnae they offer holy and traditional sacrifices to 
them both, not as to heroes but as to gods 
¡64] Abo to the poet Stesichorus Helen proved her power when he had slandered 
her m the opening of his ode, he was deprived of his eye-sight, but when he 
understood the reason for this misfortune and composed the so-called Palinode, 
she restored him to his normal state [6} J And some Homendae say that she came 
to Homer by night and ordered him to compose a poem on the participants in the 
expedition against Troy, because she wished to make their deaths more enviable 
than the life of others They also say that partly because of Homer's skill, but 
mostly because of her, the poem became so full of charm and renowned among 
all 
[66] Thus, because she has the power to punish as well as to reward, it is the duty 
of the wealthy to appease and honour her with offerings, sacrifices and other 
ceremonies, and of the philosophers to speak about her in a way worthy of her 
qualities for such are the tributes it befits the learned to offer 
VIII [67] What has been omitted exceeds by far what has been said For apart 
from the skills, intellectual pursuits, and other useful matters the origin of which 
may be attributed to her and to the Trojan war, we may justly consider Helen the 
reason that we are not the slaves of the barbarians For we will find that the 
Hellenes became of one mind because of her, and joined in a common expedition 
against the barbarians and that for the first time Europe erected a victory 
monument over Asia [68] In consequence we experienced great change formerly 
those who encountered misfortune amongst the barbarians considered tt right to 
rule over cities of the Hellenes, like Dañaos who fled from Egypt and occupied 
Argos, and Kadmos from Stdon who became king of Thebes, and the Canans 
who colonized the islands, and Pelops, the son of Tántalos, who conquered the 
whole of the Péloponnèse But ever since that war our race expanded so much that 
tt took large cities and much territory from the barbarians [69] If anyone wishes to 
develop these matters and enlarge on them, they will not be at a loss to find a 
starting point to praise Helen apart from what has been said no, they will 
encounter many and new arguments concerning her 
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5.3. Previous interpretations of Isocrates' Helen. 
Modern scholarship on the Helen of Isocrates is rather short. Most 
older interpreters have expressed the view that this is a piece intended by 
Isocrates to show his virtuosity as a rhetorician. This would make the 
discourse nothing more than an example of the potentialities of rhetoric 
as a formal art.17 
More recently the discourse has been the object of renewed study. 
Kennedy (1958) tried to show that the Helen is essentially a political 
document , and that it illustrates Isocrates ' tendency to advocate 
Panhellenism. This interpretation is based on an analysis of 49-53 (the 
section on the Trojan War) and 67-69 (the conclusion), in which 
Isocrates refers to the Panhellenistic programme. This interpretation 
fails, however, to take into consideration in what way these sections fit 
in with the main subject of the discourse as a whole. As will be seen in 
the commentary below, the Panhellenistic theme is a functional motif 
and subordinate to the main theme, rather than the discourse's main 
subject. 
Buchheit (1960) studied the Helen as an example of epideictic and 
was primarily interested in establishing its place in the development of 
that particular genre. He offered a comparison between Isocrates and 
Gorgias and, after the juxtaposition of a number of phrases from both 
discourses, concluded that Isocrates was "ein regelrechter Abschreiber", 
whose attempt at epideictic should be considered a failure. Buchheit 's 
study is rather superficial, however, and shows little interest in close 
analysis of Isocrates' work and its structures. His in terpreta t ion is 
therefore insufficiently substantiated. 
Kennedy (1958) was answered by Hei lb runn (1977), who 
convincingly showed that the limited political in terpre ta t ion was 
untenable. He also argued for a purely epideictic interpretation and 
characterized the discourse as a "sophistic-rhetorical document". 
Braun (1982) offered a new comparison of Gorgias' and Isocrates' 
Helen. He studied the differences in the way Helen is represented by 
both authors and concluded that Isocrates in fact answered Gorgias. 
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V. Commentary 166 
Although his analysis of the relations between both discourses is 
thorough and takes the aspect of over-all rhetorical strategy into 
consideration, his view on Isocrates remained unsatisfactory. It is odd 
that he failed to take into account the significance of the sections 54-60, 
the eulogy on beauty, which is of essential importance to the discourse 
as a whole. He, too, adhered to the narrow interpretation of the Helen as a 
piece of epideictic writing similar to Gorgias' work: both are "sinnvoll 
nur als Schriften <zu> verstehen, die rhetorische Meisterschaft gerade 
am paradoxen und unernsten Gegenstand erweisen sollen" (174). 
Eucken (1983) provided a careful reading and analysis with 
special reference to those elements in the discourse that may enable one 
to establish Isocrates' position in the polemic between intellectual and 
philosophic movements at the time. He shows himself alert to the 
subtleties of Isocrates' thought and phrasing, but, because his interest is 
primarily on questions of doxography and identification of Isocrates' 
rivals, he pays less attention to the rhetorical features of the discourse. 
Poulakos (1986) was the first to attempt a comprehensive 
interpretation of the Helen, in which the problem of the seeming 
incompatibility of the proemium and main text is seriously addressed. 
He correctly maintains that there is thematic coherence between both, 
and that the discourse as a whole is unified in structure, purpose and 
meaning. The proemium contains a claim to superiority over rivals in 
rhetorical education, and the main text is illustrates that claim. Thus the 
Helen can be viewed as a programmatic composition inviting pupils to 
study Isocratean rhetoric, a piece of serious epideictic discourse, and an 
argument for the superior status of Isocratean education in contrast to the 
doctrines and practices of other educators. Poulakos' interpretation seems 
to be substantially correct, but does not address all the relevant issues. As 
a programmatic discourse, the Helen is also intended as an exemplary 
product of Isocratean rhetorical theory and technique. Since these 
technical questions are not incorporated in his approach, Poulakos' 
interpretation remains incomplete. 
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5.4. Commentary 
• section 1: prooemium (1-15) 
The proemium as a whole has a polemic character. Isocrates 
identifies groups of rivals in the field of education, and criticizes their 
programme. To this criticism he immediately adds his own point of 
view, and presents the principles of his own programme of education. 
Given these features the proemium presents itself as an επάγγελμα or 
manifesto. In this respect it is similar to Against the Sophists. 
The argument in 1-15 is presented in three distinct stages. The 
first (1-5) introduces the main subject: education. Then (6-13), within 
this general context, the issue is narrowed down to the correct 
instrument to be used in education: the πολιτικός λόγος or "politically 
relevant discourse". Finally (14-15) the main text, an encomium on 
Helen, is announced as an example of politically relevant discourse. 
Thus the argument moves from the general to the specific, in a 
rhythmical pattern in which the views and practices of Isocrates' 
opponents views and those of his own are alternated. 
I. education 
1 είσί τίνες οι: the opening phrase (είσί τίνες followed by a 
relative sentence) is similar to those of the Hippocratic treatises Περί 
τεχνής (VI, 2-26 Littré) and Περί φυσών (VI, 90-115 Littré). Since these 
treatises show clear rhetorical features in general, and since their 
opening sections are polemical, this similarity suggests that the opening 
phrase reflects a conventional procedure used in this kind of texts.18 
1 οι μέγα.,.δυναμένας: Isocrates distinguishes between three 
groups of rivals on the basis of their tenets or philosophical beliefs 
(δόξαι). The organisation in clusters according to δόξαι seems to have 
been an accepted procedure for producing inventories of intellectual 
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movements before Aristotle. In this respect, also, there is similarity with 
some Hippocratic writings.19 
The first cluster is probably that of Antisthenes and the Cynics; 
the second Plato and the Academy (the Socratics); the third the 
practitioners of casuistic refutation, who exploit verbal ambiguities and 
master clever debating skills: Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, as they 
are portrayed in Plato's Euthydemus, seem to be examples of this 
movement. For further discussion of the possible identification of these 
clusters see Eucken (1983), 44-73. 
2-4 έγώ δέ.,.διατρίβουσιν: in a self-assertive way Isocrates 
marks the counter-attack. He argues that his opponents' doctrines are not 
original (§ 3) and that, although their predecessors made it dear that one 
can easily give an untrue account (ψευδή λόγον) on any subject, they 
continue to do just that (§ 4). This state of affairs is countered: Isocrates 
refers to the fact that his own works are indeed innovative (καινός, see § 
13) and that they have the quality of αλήθεια or "truth". This quality is 
claimed as a property of his φιλοσοφία implicitly in this preamble (§ 4-5) 
and explicitly in XII, 260 (in which passage it is made clear that the 
qualification of "truth" is dependent upon an evident conformity to 
reality as perceived by the senses). 2 0 The last point, the quality of 
truthfulness, receives emphasis by being put first, immediately 
following the point of criticism last mentioned. 
4-5 οΰς έχρήν...ώφελοΰσιν: here Isocrates presents the essence of 
his view on education. The sentence contains the fundamental elements 
of his concept of φιλοσοφία, each of which is referred to by (a) key­
word (s): 
- the pursuit of truth (αλήθεια) 
- the education of pupils in "politics", i.e. all matters relevant to life in the 
πόλις (περί τας πράξεις èv αις πολιτευόμεθα τους συνόντας παιδεύειν) 
- training and practice as an integral part of education (περί την έμπειρίαν 
την τούτων γυμνάζειν) 
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- the priority of possessing opinion on useful issues over having exact 
knowledge on useless ones (κρεϊττόν έστι περί των χρησίμων επιεικώς 
δοξάζειν ή περί τών άχρηστων ακριβώς έπίστασθαι) 
- concentration on what is important and useful for living (τοις 
μεγάλοις.,.καί τοις προς τον βίον ώφελοΰσιν). 
Cf. ΧΠ, 28-30; XV, 184-5; 266-271 for an elaborate presentation of Isocrates' 
φιλοσοφία. His doctrine consists of a practical philosophy of life for a 
member of his πόλις. This provides the general frame of the discourse: 
education should be concerned with subjects which are useful and 
valuable to life. 
This stance implies that Isocrates' intention is a serious. As the 
proemium is a preamble to an epideictic main text, this means that he 
considers epideictic rhetoric, if correctly approached, a serious genre 
(see below). 
Π. the educator's instrument: the πολιτικός λόγος 
6-7 άλλα γάρ...βλάπτουσιν: after defining education and its 
ends in the first subsection, Isocrates lets this general point rest and turns 
to a new topic: the instruments of education. His opponents abuse the 
character of the young to serve their purpose of self-interest. What they 
offer to them is out of the ordinary and elicits wonder, and that is exactly 
what attracts the young mind. Therefore it is the conduct of the teachers 
that is to be reprehended: in their methods they do not contribute to a 
useful education, but only statisfy the young's interest in the power of 
argument as such.21 In stead of being useful to their students, they do 
them harm. 
8 τοσούτον δέ...εύπορήσο·ϋσιν: the second point (δε) of criticism 
is on the content of their writings. They are remote from reality 
(ψευδολογείν, see above), but they bring advantage to their authors. This 
circumstance stimulates the production of more discourses in which 
paradoxical themes are defended, e.g. the enviability of the life of 
beggars and exiles. It may be that the argument in these discourses was 
2 1
 Cf. XIII.16 and Ch ΠΙ, 80 f, for the attitudes of the young cf. Anstotle Rh 11,12, 1389 a 12-
14. και φιλότιμοι μέν είσι, μάλλον δε φιλόνικοι· υπεροχής γαρ επιθυμεί ή νεότης, ή δέ νίκη 
υπεροχή τις, cf 1389 a 34-36 
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based on the fallacy that as beggars sing and dance in temple precincts 
and exiles can live where they want, they must be happy because such 
things are true of people who seem to be happy. This way of fallacious 
reasoning is used by Aristotle as an example of the fallacy παρά το 
έπόμενον (ДА. 11,24,1401 b 20-29). 
Their ability to write such discourses they adduce as proof 
(τεκμήριον) that if they are able to speak (εχουσί τι λέγειν) on a base 
subject, they will have an abundance of arguments (εύπορήσουσιν) on 
noble subjects. This argument is refuted in 11, below. 
9-10 έμοί δέ δοκεΐ.,.έπιχειρήσειεν: Isocrates' counter-attack is 
opened, as in 2, with an emphatic self-reference. His argument is based 
on the enthymematic consideration that if his opponents would possess 
πολιτική επιστήμη, as they claim they do, they would show proof of this 
in their manifestoes. This they evidently do not, as Isocrates showed 
before, which leads to the - unexpressed - conclusion that they lack what 
they claim to possess. 
The point made enables Isocrates to present his doctrine of 
examplariness: the good teacher must show himself superior in wisdom 
and thus provide an example to be imitated and followed by his pupils. 
Cf. XIII,18: the teacher should τοιούτον αυτόν παράδειγμα παρασχείν ώστε 
τους έκτυπωθεντας και μιμήσασθαι δυναμένους ευθύς άνθηρότερον καΐ 
χαριέστερον των άλλων φαίνεσθαι λέγοντας. Cf. XV, 206, 278. 
A comparison of his opponents to athletes who enter a contest 
where they will meet no competition concludes the argument with 
respect to the discourses with useless themes and anticipates the next 
point: the difficulty of writing valuable discourse. 
11-13 άλλα δήλον...ϊδιόν έστιν: discourses as produced by his 
opponents are simple products. But discourses on subjects that are of 
communal interest and are trustworthy (κοινοί και πιστοί) constitute a 
higher literary level. They are "more difficult" (χαλεπωτέραν εχουσι τήν 
σΰνθεσιν), because effort and seriousness are required. On the technical 
aspects see Ch. II, p. 27 f. and III, p. 81 f. 
This claim is substantiated by arguing that writing a discourse 
praising (έπαινεΐν) petty subjects like praising bumble-bees or salt, is easy 
and offers an abundance of material, but it is very difficult to do justice to 
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the potential of noble subjects. This argument reverses those used by his 
opponents in 8. Here the subjects of λόγοι κοινοί και πιστοί are specified: 
they are what is generally recognized as good and noble, and what is 
morally superior (περί των όμολογουμένων αγαθών ή καλών ή τών 
διαφερόντων έπ' аретр). These subjects are further (13) characterized as 
having μέγεθος and δόξα. 
An advanced level in literature also requires a different state of 
mind: if one wishes to do justice to the subject (άξίως ειπείν, a key-word 
of Isocratean theory of discourse: see above), this will involve a 
determination to overcome difficulty. 
The topic of difficulty might also serve as an indirect form of 
advertisement: the insistence on his type of discourse as representing an 
advanced level implies that his audience, his prospective pupils, are 
challenged as competent arbiters. 2 2 
In Isocrates' view, then, the encomium should be considered 
serious literature. O n this point he parts with most sophists, who practised 
the paradoxical encomium for display reasons. In its serious purpose, 
however, the prose encomium seems to be heir to the tradit ion of 
protreptic poetry. 2 3 Isocrates himself explicitly positions himself in this 
poetic tradition: see IX, 8-11 and XV, 166. As can be inferred from Plato 
Symp. 198 b -199 b and 215 a, there existed rules for serious encomiastic 
writing, which claimed to be directed towards " t ru th" . 2 4 
12 των μέν γαρ...βουλήθεντων έπαινείν: according to Bury 
(1932, xx-xxi) this is probably a reference to Antisthenes, rather than to 
Polycrates. Cf. Plato Symp. 177 b 5-7 εγωγε ηδη τινί ένέτυχον βιβλίφ άνδρας 
σοφοΰ, έν ώ ένησαν αλες επαινον θαυμάσιον έχοντες προς ώφέλειαν. It 
seems, then, that Isocrates and Plato agree in their rejection of 
Antisthenes. If this is correct, this passage may be further evidence that 
there is more c o m m o n ground between Isocrates and Plato than 
generally acknowledged (see Ch. II on δόξα, p. 35 f., 85-86 and Ch. I l l on 
synthetic concept of rhetoric). 
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V. Commentary 172 
13 ί δ ι ο ν : the word used by Isocrates to indicate originality. Cf. 
V,110: the intellectual excellences of Heracles are material for praise and 
have not as yet been treated by anyone. Therefore they constitute a τόπος 
'ίδιος καί πανταπάσιν άδιεξέργαστον. See Ch. IV, 32 f. Cf. also Gorgias Hel. 
9: ел' αλλότριων τε πραγμάτων και σωμάτων εύτυχίαις και δυσπραγίαις ΐδιόν 
τι πάθημα δια τών λόγων επαθεν ή ψυχή. 
3. Helen as a suitable subject for good discourse 
14 διό καί...διήνεγκεν: the third subsection is closely connected 
to what precedes. Having established the advanced status of laudatory 
discourse on noble subjects in subsection 2, Isocrates now introduces a 
specific example of such a subject. It is a suitable subject because she was 
a woman who was superior in descendance, beauty and fame: thus she 
answers to the criteria of § 12 (see above). 
14 τον γράψαντα itepl της 'Ελένης: the selection of Helen as a 
subject of laudatory discourse (των ευ λέγειν τι βουληθέντων) is approved 
by Isocrates. Two points can be made: 
(1) T h e author responsible for this discourse remains unnamed, but it 
seems reasonable to assume that he was a figure well-known to the 
audience. More information on the discourse written by him can be 
gained from what follows: 
- the work was entitled Περί 'Ελένης 2 5 
- the work was presented by its author as an encomium (φησί μεν γαρ 
έγκώμιον γεγραφέναι περί αύτης) ; 
- the work was of apologetic character and consisted of a defense of her 
deeds (τυγχάνει δ' άπολογίαν είρηκώς υπέρ τών εκείνη πεπραγμένων). 
Given these considerations (the selection of Helen as subject; the 
professed laudatory intention; the apologetic character) it seems probable 
that Isocrates is referring to Gorgias' Helen , 2 6 This conclusion, however, 
is not a necessary one, if one takes the following into consideration: 
(a) the phrase itself and the context of the preamble suggest that Isocrates 
has a contemporary writer in mind; 
23 See Schmalznedt (1970); cf the phrase γράφειν περί τίνος refeiring to certain published works 
in V.10, ΧΠ,85,172,173, cf XV.13. 
2 6
 A synthesis of the question of the identification of this anonymous writer is offered by Braun 
(1982), 158-160, who himself decides in favour of Gorgias 
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(b) the proemium of Isocrates' Busins is also a critique of a rival author 
there it is Polycrates, who is censured for pretending to have written a 
defense of Busins (4 Βουσίριδος απολογία, 5 άπολογήσασθαι φάσκων), 
which, however, has had the reverse effect of adding to the Egyptian 
tyrant's bad reputation There, as here, the critique consists of pointing 
out that the nval author has failed to observe the generic rules or 
conventions of laudatory discourse, and secondly, the critique on a 
matter of literary principle is followed by an example of genencally 
correct discourse The similarity suggests that also in the case of Helen a 
recent, but genencally defective discourse on the same subject has 
prompted Isocrates to write his version, 
(c) it is probable that not only Gorgias, but also other authors wrote on the 
subject of Helen, since that appears to be a much used theme in 
literature see, e g , Ar Thesm 850 την καινήν 'Ελένην μιμήσομαι27 and see 
above (§5 1), 
These considerations leave room for the possibility that a 
representative of the rival school, where unsenous discourse is taught 
(see on subsection 2, above), had recendy published a virtuoso piece on 
Helen, exemplifying the rhetorical capabilities to be learned there This 
representative might even have been the same Polycrates criticized in 
the Busins His activity as an author is characterized by Demetrius as 
follows επαιζεν γάρ, ούκ έσπούδαζεν (De eloc 120) To consider this as a 
possibility is justified by the parallel case of the unnamed author in the 
account of Socrates' banquet with Agathon and Alcibiades in the preface 
of Plato's Symposium The άλλος τις mentioned there (172 b 2) cannot be 
identified with certainty, but might be Polycrates of Samos, the rhetor 
from what is known about his literary activity, it seems défendable to 
attribute an attack against Socrates through the composition of a work 
containing the description of a banquet-scene to him 2 8 Furthermore, the 
procedure of polemic in the proemium, which is typical of the way in 
which fourth-century intellectual movements attacked each other29, can 
support this hypothesis 
(2) The choice of Helen is m keeping with the paradoxical character of 
the discourse With regard to this it should be remembered that encomia 
2
' See Kanmcht (1969) I 21 26, maybe Anstophanes is here referring to Stesichorus' Palinode 
see above ρ 6 & n 9 
2 8
 See Bury (1932) xvii ш 
2 9
 See Owen (1983), 19 f 
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on (par)adoxical30 themes could very wel have a serious, and especially 
edifying or educational intent. As evidence for the existence of a 
continuing tradition of such literary works since the time of the sophists 
one can adduce Aulus Gellius N.A. XVII, 12,1: 
Infames mátenos, sive quis mavult dicere "inopinabiles", quas Grata 
άδοξους υποθέσεις appellant, et veteres adotti sunt, non sophistae solum, sed 
philosophi quoque et noster Favonnus (..) vel ingenio expergificando ratus 
idóneas vel exercendis argutiis vel edomandis usu dtjficultatibus. 
In the case of Helen as a subject of such a discourse, in which her beauty 
and its positive stimulating effect is a central theme, the element of 
surprise seems to be consciously sought for by Isocrates. As a rule, the 
positive thematisation of beauty occurred in connection with men: a 
manly appearance and good looks were considered an asset. As the 
cases of Pandora and Helen show, beauty in a woman can be used for 
the very negative interpretation of its destructive power.31 By choosing 
Helen as a positive model Isocrates enhances the paradox. In doing so he 
plays on the effect of the unexpected, and secures attention in the 
audience (see also p. 125 n. 65). 
15 ί ν α δε μη δοκω.,.είρημένα: distancing himself from his 
rivals once again, Isocrates declines to take an easy way, and presents a 
laudatory discourse on Helen of his own. This will be an example of 
innovation (καινότης, see ХІІІД2: ούτος είναι δοκεΐ τεχνικώτατος ος τις αν 
(...) μηδέν δε των αυτών τοις άλλοις εύρίσκειν δύνηται). 
15 άπολογεΐσθαι...έπαινεΐν: the precision of terminology might 
reflect influence on Isocrates by Prodicus, whose preference for όρθόθης 
ονομάτων is well-known (see Plato, Euthyd. 277 e 4: πρώτον γάρ, ώς φησι 
Πρόδικος, περί ονομάτων όρθότητος μαθείν δει; cf. Arist. Top. 112 b 21). 
3 0
 On Menander Rhetor's classification of encomia see now Van der Poel (1996), 204-213, who 
convincingly argues that paradoxa and adoxa constitute one category, paradoxon is a 
qualification of the theme from the point of view of the audience, adoxon from the point of view 
of the subject's nature 
3 1
 See Hall (1995), S1-S2 On the cultivation of male beauty see also below on §5 54-60; on 
male beauty-contests cf Arist Ath Pol 60,5, [Andoc ] IV, 42, Athenaeus Deipn 565 f ; cf 
also the ironic beauty contest between Socrates and the handsome young Cntobulus in Xen. 
Symp 5, see Guthrie (1969), 387-388 
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A further example of terminological distinction in Isocrates is Г , 
130: χρή δε κατηγορείν μεν ήγείσθαι τους έπί βλάβτι τοιαϋτα λέγοντας, 
νουθετείν δε τους έπ' ωφελεία λοιδοροΰντας. τον γαρ αυτόν λόγον ούχ ομοίως 
ΰπολαμβάνειν δει μετά της αύτης διανοίας λεγόμενον. 
Cf. Radermacher (1951), 6&-6Э ad Prodicus В Vili, 10-11. 
The proemium as a whole suggests the following to its audience: 
1. the discourse on Helen shall be all that his rivals' works are not: it will 
be a piece of serious and politically relevant discourse, with educational 
purpose; 
2. it will exemplify the state of mind, which will result from the 
education in Isocrates' school; 
3. it will offer an innovative treatment of the Helen-theme. 
In every respect the discourse will prove to be programmatic. In 
agreement with his ideas on the means of education Isocrates will offer 
a text which exemplifies both technical conventions and rules of 
rhetoric, and the moral doctrine of his school.3 2 The proem as such 
fulfills its main function, as identified in rhetorical theory, of securing 
the audience's attention and announcing the subject (Anax. An Rhet. 
29,1,1436 a 3340; Arist. Rh. Ill, 14,1414 b 17 f.). 
The analysis of the main text (16 f.) will show that the implicit 
announcement is indeed carried out. There is, therefore, no reason to 
assume that the discourse as a whole lacks in unity. To refer to Aristotle 
Rh. 111,14, 1414 b 27-29 in support of the view that the Helen is not unified 
in the sense that proemium and main text are not connected, is 
unjustified.3 3 Aristotle's remark that "there is nothing in common 
between the eristics and Helen" (ούθεν γαρ οϊκείον υπάρχει τοις έριστικοίς 
και Ελένη) indicates that there is a difference in material or subject-
matter 3 4 between proemium and main text, but from what follows it is 
clear that he does not mean that the discourse itself can no longer be 
regarded as a whole: αμα δε και έάν έκτοπίστ), άρμόττει μη δλον τον λόγον 
ομοειδή είναι. The point here is avoidance of uniformity. 
3 2
 On the use of model speeches in education see Ch. I, § 3. 
3 3
 See Poulakos (1986), 3-4 for a discussion of interpretations in this vein by Jebb, Norlin, 
Howland and Jaeger, Kennedy (1958) challenges these interpretations 
3 4
 For ύπάρχειν referring to the subject-matter of a text see ДА. 11,22, 1396 b 8 f (τα 
υπάρχοντα as "topics", see Grimaldi (1988), 286 ad loc). 
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- section 2: Helen's birth and parentage (16-17) 
16 μεν oiv: marks an incision in the narrative the particle 
combination mdicates both that the precedent section concludes and that 
a new section opens 3 5 In this instance it signifies a transition from the 
introductory section 1 (chs 1-15) to the beginning of the main text, and 
underlines the explicit announcement την αρχήν του λόγου 
ποιήσομαι In this way Isocrates achieves integration of the sections of 
the discourse the introduction and the main text are thus closely 
connected (see also on 16 and 22, below) 
16 τήν αρχήν τοΰ γένους αυτής: treatment of the laudandus' 
descendancy is a conventional element of the encomium, to be placed at 
the beginning Cf the γένος-sections in the Euagoras and the Busins, also 
placed immediately after the introductory section 
- IX, 12 πρώτον μεν ουν περί της φύσεως της Εύαγόρου και τίνων ην 
απόγονος δοκεϊ μοι πρέπειν διελθείν 
- XI, 10 περί μεν ουν της Βουσίριδος ευγενείας τίς ούκ αν δυνηθείη ραδίως 
ειπείν 
16 ύπο Διος...κληθηναι: stresses the particular affection of Zeus 
towards Helen, an affection which singles her out as a woman of special 
importance A long list of demigods and their mothers is provided by 
Zeus himself in Horn XIV, 315-328 
16 σπουδάσας.,.πέφυκεν: confirms Helen's singular position by 
addition (δε) of a σύγκρισις between herself and Heracles The first 
element of this comparison is concerned with their individual singular 
qualities Both are endowed by a special gift Heracles by strength 
(Ισχύς), Helen by beauty (κάλλος) But Helen's gift is superior, because 
beauty has the natural capacity of subjecting even strength to itself Here 
kâllow is mentioned for the first time it will return frequently m what 
follows and is clearly a central motif of the speech as a whole 
35
 See Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993). 27 28,48-49 
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17 εϊδώς δε...έποίησεν: constitutes the second element of the 
comparison between Helen and Heracles: their status, both among the 
gods and among mankind. They are both exalted (όναγογείν) to divine 
position in heaven and leave behind on earth (καταλιπείν) their 
everlasting glory. Both constituents of their status are presented in their 
complementary function by the antithesis άναγαγείν - καταλιπείν, 
making use of effective parisosis and homoioteleuton . 
17 τάς δόξας αείμνηστους: the epic atmosphere, that was 
already implicitly evoked in c.16 by referring to the demigods and their 
descendancy from Zeus, is here made explicit. The phrase "glory that 
will always be remembered" is reminiscent of the Homeric κλέος 
αφθιτον (see e.g. Horn. IX, 413; IX, 189-191: κλέα ανδρών). As the epics of 
Homer have a function in preserving the heroism of the past, so is it the 
function of the encomium to preserve virtue. Cf. the programmatic 
statement in the Euagoras : 
- IX,4: ό δε λόγος ει καλώς διέλθοι τας εκείνου (sc. Euagoras') πράξεις, 
άείμνηστον αν την άρετήν την Εύαγόρου παρά πάσιν άνθρώποις ποιήσειεν. 
Celebration is a function shared by epic poetry and encomiastic 
witing.36 
17 έπίπονον.,.περιμάχητον: the use of compound words (διπλά 
ονόματα) is considered by Aristotle (Rh. Ill, 1408 b 11 f.) to be especially 
appropriate for the "emotional speaker": τα δε ονόματα τα διπλά...μάλιστα 
άρμόττει λέγοντι παθητκώς. Except when the speaker is in a state of anger, 
this rule applies και όταν εχη ήδη τους άκροατας και ποίηση ένθουσιάσαι ή 
έπαίνοις ή ψόγοις ή όργη ή φιλία "when he has a grip on his audience and 
causes them to be enthousiastic, either by praise or blame, or anger or 
friendliness". To this Aristotle adds that the emotional speaker will be 
sympathetically received by his audience, and that this style is 
appropriate to poetry, because poetry is something inspired (ενθεον γαρ ή 
ποιήσις, cf. 1406 b 1 f.). The use of the language of emotion with its 
resounding compound words, a feature of the grand style*7, serves to 
support the statement about Helen's nature by creating an atmosphere of 
3 6
 See Nagy (1989), 8-18 (who points to the same element in Pindar and the proem to Herodotus' 
Histories ). 
3 7
 See O'Sullivan (1992), 36-38. 
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impressiveness. It seems that the admiration for Helen is reflected in the 
grand poetic style adopted here. Thus Isocrates chooses his phraseology 
according to his own rules on appropriateness (see Ch. Ill, p. 91 f.), and 
does what Aristotle prescribes in Rh. Ill, 1408 a 18 in his treatment of 
πρέπον in λέξ ις : to speak on praiseworthy themes with admiration 
(λέγειν, έάν δέ επαινετά, άγαμένως). 
Assessing the intended effect of this "poetic" opening section of 
the main text one might compare Plato Symposium 198 a 1-2, where the 
reactions of the symposiasts to the laudatory speech on Eros by Agathon 
are described. Agathon's speech has stylistic features similar to this 
section in Isocrates. Since Agathon's speech in the Symposium is 
intended as an imitation, albeit it an ironic one, of the abundant poetic 
style of Gorgias 3 8 , the reactions to it might be an indication of the 
appreciation for the "gorgianic" style: 
εΐπόντος δε τοΰ Άγάθονος πάντας εφη ό 'Αριστόδημος άνοθορυβήσαι τους 
παρόντος, ώς πρεπόντως τοΰ νεανίσκου είρηκότος και αϋτω και τω θεω. 
("After Agathon had finished, Aristodemus said, all present loudly 
applauded, because the young man had spoken in a manner suited to 
himself and to the god.") 
Similarly, then, the poetic opening section in reflecting Helen's status 
by its grand style might have received a favourable react ion 3 9 in the 
audience. 
17 περιμάχητον: (1) the same c o m p o u n d adjective is used in 
connection with Helen and the phantom-motive by Plato Resp. IX, 586 с 
4-5: το της 'Ελένης εΐδωλον ύπο τών έν Τροία Στησίχορος φησι γενέσθαι 
περιμάχητον αγνοία τοΰ άληθοΰς. The explicit reference to Stesichorus and 
the poetical quality of the adjective itself (see above) suggests that 
perimäxhton is an allusion to Stesichorus' Palinode. 
(2) In his list of things considered a good (αγαθόν), which is part 
of the treatment of subjects of deliberative discourse, Aristotle refers to 
(1363 a 8 f.) "that which many aim at and which is manifestly an object 
3 8
 On the Gorgianic features of Agathon's speech see Dover (1980), 123; Eucken (1983), 107-
114. 
3 9
 On (άνα)θορυβησαι as referring to the applause granted to a successful speaker see Bury 
(1932), 84; see also V. Bers, "Dikastic Thorubos ", in: P.A. Cartledge - F.D. Harvey, Crux. 
Essays in Greek History presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday, London 1985, 1-
15. 
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of contention": ού πολλοί έφίενται καί το περιμάχητον φαινόμενον. In ΕΝ 
1168 b 18-19 τα περιμάχητα are the things which men consider to be best, 
and in 1169 a 21 highly prized goods ar called τα περιμάχητα αγαθά. This 
usage is similar to the sense here. T h e thought might be enterta ined 
that in constructing his list of topical "goods", Aristotle had this passage 
in mind. 
- section 3: Theseus (18-38) 
The section on Theseus can be divided as follows: 
1. 18-20: Theseus abductor of Helen 
2. 21-22: general characterisation of Theseus 
3. 23-28: comparison Theseus - Heracles 
4. 29-30: transition 
5. 31-37: Theseus founder of Athenian culture and society 
6. 38: conclusion 
1. 18-20: Theseus first abductor of Helen 
18-20 και πρώτον.. .συνεκινδύνευσεν: the episode of Helen ' s 
abduction by Theseus and Peirithous is given in one sentence of 
exceptional length. Similarly, in §§ 41-43 the episode of Paris' choice is 
presented in one long sentence. It seems that Isocrates is here presenting 
a specimen of his virtuosity as a speech-maker: utilizing the linguistic 
potentials of the period, and gorgianic figures as means of semantic 
demarcation of information-units by sound effect, he is able to construct 
an intricate sentence with a clear articulation in subordinate clauses. 
Rhythm, balance, and assonance provide the framework in which the 
thought of the sentence is developed. In this way the sentence is 
constructed from periods and cola and remains linearly percept ib le . 4 0 
The exceptional length of the sentence may be explained as explorations 
of the limitation of periodical sentences by Isocrates.4 1 
4 0
 On the technique involved in a long sentence sustaining itself by utilizing "halls" or "rests" see 
Denniston (1952), 15, 60 f., see also Zucker (1963), 87-89. 
4 1
 On the distinction sentence - period see Kennedy (1963), 110-111; for a discussion of the 
period as such see Schenkeveld (1964), 23-41; on experimentation by Isocrates see Usher (1973), 
41-42. 
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The appreciation of this particular stylistic feature must take the 
manner in which these sentences were perceived into consideration. 
Isocrates himself explicitly mentions that his discourses were not meant 
to be orally performed as "spoken text", but to be received (read or heard) 
as a specimen of written discourse. It is conceivable that in constructing 
such artificial long sentences Isocrates exploites to the fullest the 
possibilities of a recent innovation in literary composition: the 
production of written texts to be read.42 As one can infer from what was 
said on § 16 above, such a display of stylistic virtuosity might be 
intended to impress the audience, or even elicit its explicit approval. 
According to ancient literary critics this feature was 
reprehensible, because in it's artificiality it was pushed to far. In his 
discussion of Isocrates' style Dionysius of Halicarnassus identifies this 
problem clearly: 
ή δε λέξις (...) στρογγυλή δε ούκ εστίν, ώσπερ εκείνη (sc. the style of 
Lysias), καΐ συγκεκροτημένη και προς αγώνας δικανικούς εύθετος, ύπτία δε 
έστι μάλλον και κεχυμένη πλουσίως, ούδε δη σύντομος ούτως, άλλα και 
κατασκελής και βραδύτερα του μετρίου.45 (De Isoc. 2) 
Isocrates' style is, according to Dionysius, periodic and rhythmical, and 
therefore more suited for reading than for practical usage: αναγνώσεως 
μάλλον οίκειότερός έστιν ή χρήσεως, (ibid.) These discourses can best be 
appreciated by recitation (επιδείξεις) or by private study (ή έκ χειρός 
θεωρία). 
18 καΐ πρώτον μεν: the transition from section 1 to 2 is smooth: 
the opening of section 2 is clearly marked by καί, and the phrase 
περίβλεπτον καί περιμάχητον την φύσιν is followed by the first example to 
prove the general point, made at the end of section 1: Theseus was the 
first to be overwhelmed by Helen's beauty, even though she was still a 
child at the time (cf. Plut. Thés. 31), and he is ready to challenge her 
family and all Spartan heroes in his attempt to abduct her (19). 
18 λεγόμενος...γενόμενος: an allusion to and variation of Gorgias 
Helen 3, on Helen's parents: δήλον γαρ ώς μητρός μεν Λήδας, πατρός δε τον 
4 2
 See Ch I, § 4 
4 3 Ян style (. ) is not compact, like that one (sc Lysias ' style), and closely knit and suited for 
forensic speeches, but rather sprawling and overflowing with its own exuberance, and it is not so 
concise, but seems to drag its feet and move to slowly [tr Usher, adapted] 
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μεν γενομένου θεοΰ, λεγομένου δε θνητού, Τυνδόρεω και Διός. See Buchheit 
(1960), 59; also Ch. Г , 140 f. on καινότης as "variation". 
18 ήττήθη του κάλλους ò κρατείν των άλλων είθισμένος: 
Theseus provides the example of what was said in 16: beauty brings even 
strength into subjection, which in itself is capable of overpowering 
others. 
18-19 ώσθ' . , .κατέθετο: an elaborate treatment of the 
circumstances unfavourable to the execution of Theseus' plan to abduct 
Helen serves as a means to amplify (αΰξησις) the effect of her beauty on 
him: against all odds he is resolved to have her as his companion. 
20 κα1...συνεκινδύνευσεν: illustrates Theseus' gratitude and 
loyalty to his friend Peirithous, who helped him in the abduction of 
Helen. Now that Peirithous undertakes to gain possession of Kore, he 
receives the help of Theseus. The analogous situation is reflected in the 
antithetical syntax of both kola ( τ ο σ ο ύ τ ο ν . . . κ α τ έ θ ε τ ο / 
τοσαύτην...συνεκινδύνευσεν). 
2. 21-22: Theseus qualified as judge 
21 ei μεν οΰν...εστίν: the transition to the next subsection is a 
logical nexus: Theseus' abduction of Helen was an act of violence (19: 
βία λαβών αυτήν) which would evoke condemnation. If the abductor 
Theseus had been just anyone, the previous subsection could be 
interpreted, not as praise of Helen, but as an accusation of Theseus. This 
brings up the point to be treated next: how to evaluate Helen's abduction 
by Theseus. 
21-22 νυν δε...οντάς: Theseus is not just anyone, but a man of 
particular distinction, superior to all other men of renown: these are each 
distinguished by a certain individual virtuous quality (courage, wisdom, 
etc.), but he possessed virtue in all respects. This observation serves as an 
answer to the indirect and unexpressed question on the interpretation of 
the previous subsection. At the same time it leads to a second point (δοκεΐ 
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δε) : given Theseus' consummate virtue, it is appropriate to elaborate on 
him (και δια μσκροτέρων ειπείν). 
The insertion of further treatment of Theseus is explained and 
justified by Isocrates (ηγούμαι γάρ) by reference to its function: it serves as 
an argument from authority. Those who wish to praise Helen have the 
highest guarantee (πίστιν), if it can be shown that those who loved and 
admired her, were themselves remarkable men. 
On this argument from authority see Aristode Rh. II, 1398 b 20 f., 
where it is part of the list of κοινοί τόποι (universally applicable models of 
argumentation: see Grimaldi (1988), 291-3 and 312-315 for the τόπος έκ 
κρίσεως). It is based on using the judgment of a person considered to be a 
trustworthy witness for or against the question under discussion. 
Isocrates' use of Theseus as an authoritative source for the reliability of 
the proposition that Helen is praiseworthy, is one of the examples used 
by Aristotle (1399 a 2 f.): και περί της 'Ελένης ώς 'Ισοκράτης εγραψεν δτι 
σπουδαία, εΐπερ θησευς εκρινεν. 
22 δσα μεν γάρ.,.φαίνεσθαι: the use of the argument from 
authority is supported by a further methodological reflection on its 
validity. On contemporary issues one can reasonably judge by one's 
own opinions (δόξαις.-.διακρίνοιμεν), a statement based on Isocrates' 
expressed philosophical preference of δόξα to επιστήμη (see on § 4-5, 
above). On issues from the past, however, one follows the opinion of 
intelligent men of that time, who are for that reason qualified as judges. 
This implies that one should also follow the criteria of evaluation of these 
men and, if need be, take distance from contemporary criteria. This 
argument returns at 45-47 and is further developed there. It reveals 
Isocrates' scientific attitude in dealing with arguments drawn from 
myth and history, (see below, on §§ 45-47). 
The presence of such passages, where Isocrates reflects on matters 
of method, can be explained by the didactic intent his works have. The 
argument and the subsequent justification of its use exemplify his 
preferred didactic method and its theoretical basis ad oculos (see Ch. I, § 
3). 
3. 23-28. The Theseus/Heracles - σύγκρισις 
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23 κάλλιστον. . .ειπείν: the smooth transition is similar to those 
in 16 and 21: μεν ουν marks the conclusion of what precedes (Theseus is 
a qualified judge, and therefore to elaborate on him is justified) and the 
beginning of the announced elaboration (§ 22: δια μακροτέρων ειπείν). As 
elsewhere, an integration of the discourse's subsections and their 
adjustment to its main theme is what Isocrates aimes at. 
23 Ήρακλεΐ...ένάμιλλον: the elaboration is made in the form of 
another comparison, now between Theseus and Heracles . 4 4 It has two 
separate parts: (1) 23-25: the comparison in the strict sense, which aims to 
prove Theseus' superiority over Heracles because of the universal utility 
of his exploits, and (2) 25-28: a catalogue of Theseus' exploits to prove the 
point 
Part (1) opens, in encomiastic tradition, with their similar divine 
parentage and ambitions (note the intentional effect of έξ αδελφών 
γεγονότες...άδελφάς...επιθυμίας εσχον): to be champions of h u m a n life. 
From 24 (συνέβη δε...) onwards, the difference between the two heroes is 
focused on, in order to achieve the comparison's aim: to prove Theseus' 
superiority. This is done by highlighting two distinguishing marks: 
- Heracles' exploits are more famous and heroic, but Theseus' are more 
useful (ώφελιμωτέρους) and more akin to the nature of the Hellenes (τοις 
"Ελλησιν οίκειοτέρους
4 5); 
- for this statement Isocrates offers proof by referring to the fact that 
Heracles was (a) in essence a h e r o who served: τψ (= Heracles) μεν 
Εύρυσθευς προσέτοττεν, who (b) had no intention to benefit mankind, but 
who procured fame for himself by facing danger: οΰ τους άλλους 
ώφελήσειν άλλ' αυτός κινδυνεύσειν. In support of this Isocrates mentions 
some of the labours Heracles undertook: to bring Geryon's cattle, to 
obtain the apples of the Hesperides, and to fetch Cerberus from Hades. 
All of these have no apparent use for humankind. Isocrates' selection 
seems intent ional : by excluding labours that were a benefit for 
h u m a n k i n d (e.g. killing the lion of N e m e a or the birds of lake 
4 4
 See also lakel (1986), 75-76, Eucken (1983), 95-101, who discusses the possibility of 
references to the philosophy of Antisthenes in this section His qualification of this section as 
"Exkurs" seems inappropriate as he himself shows, the section is an integral part of the overall 
argument 
4 5
 For οικείος as referring to what is akin, as opposed to what is foreign, cf. EX,77 ούκ 
άλλοτρίοις παραδείγμασι χρώμενος άλλ' οίκείοις παρακαλώ ; V.17. ΧΠ,168, cf LSJ s ν. Ш 
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Stymphale) he is able to underline his point: no examples to the contrary 
of what is stated are allowed. Thus the selection is conducive to attaining 
an rhetorical purpose, and serves as an example of the procedure of 
conscious in- and exclusion in the construction of an argument (cf. V, 
109-112 for a different appraisal of Heracles' exploits; see also Ch. II, 31 f. 
and Г , 138 f.). 
Theseus, however, is presented as (a) an autonomous hero: ό δ' 
αυτός αϋτοΰ κύριος ών, in which capacity he conforms to the Athenian 
ideal of independence and sovereignty, and (b) as performing exploits 
which would make him a benefactor of the Greeks and his own nation 
(ή των 'Ελλήνων ή της αύτοΰ πατρίδος ευεργέτης γενήσεσθαι). 
Thus the comparison is based on two issues, utility and a 
definition of Greekness (of which self-determination is a crucial 
element). These are both elements of the politically relevant discourses 
(λόγοι πολιτικοί) Isocrates professes to write (see on §§ 4-5, above). It 
serves to present Theseus as a typically Athenian hero, who incorporates 
the ideals held by the Athenian community. 
The catalogue of Theseus' exploits (25-28) serves as a paradigmatic 
argument in support of the claim of his superiority. Isocrates recalls 
Theseus' struggle with the Marathon bull and his battle against the 
Centaurs as an ally of the Lapiths. The catalogue is crowned with the 
story of his victory over the Minotaur, by which he won freedom for 
Athens from its annual tribute imposed by the Cretans. The closing 
sentence's final colon with its effective tricolon disqualifying the tribute 
and emphatic closure focusing on the freedom as the result of Theseus' 
actions serves as a powerful means to bring the intended message of the 
comparison across: την δέ πόλιν οΰτως άνομου και δεινοΰ και 
δυσαπαλλάκτου προστάγματος ήλευθέρωσεν. 
4. 29-30: the break-off 
29 απορώ δέ.,.έπιλοίποις: the catalogue evoking the image of 
Theseus as the ideal Athenian hero is suddenly ended, and a 
completely different topic is introduced. The connection between the 
previous subsection and the new one is marked by δέ, which indicates 
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the continuation to a new section, without any specific nexus, except that 
the new section is part of the narrative complex as a whole 4 6 
The statement as such is an example of the rhetorical figure 
δ ιαπόρησις / dubitano see the definition in Quintihan IX,2,19 cum 
simulamus quaerere nos, unde inapiendum, uh desinendum, quid potissimum 
dtcendum, an omntno dtcendum sit Its function is to create t h e image 
(simulamus ) of the speaker in action it thus imparts the illusion of actual 
performance and spontaneity In this respect Isocrates seems to proceed 
"more Pindarico" 4 7 
On Isocrates' explicit aemulation (υπερβολή see Ch IV, 128 f ) of 
Pindar in the genre of encomiastic literature see XV.166 δεινότερον, ει 
Πίνδαρον μεν τον ποιητην 'ότι την πόλιν έρεισμα της 'Ελλάδος ώνόμασεν, 
οΰτως έτίμησαν, έμοί δε πολύ πλείω και κάλλιον έγκεκωμιακότι μηδ' 
ασφαλώς εγγένοιτο έπιβιώναι An illustration of Isocrates' use of the 
Pindanc tradition, both with regard to content and form, is provided by 
the proemium of the Euagoras On the implication of this insistence on 
continuation of the encomiastic genre for the seriousness of the Helen as 
such, see above on section 1, περί λέγειν 4 8 
29-30 αισθάνομαι. . .έκιτιμάν: on the programmatic issues and 
technical terminology of this passage see Ch III, 87 f 
29 εξω φερόμενον των καιρών: the admission of transgression 
of the proper limits for the catalogue of Theseus' exploits not only serves 
as an excuse The fact that the catalogue is inevitably longer than 
appropriate to the proportion of the discourse reflects the multitude and 
significance of Theseus ' achievements In this respect the lengthy 
Theseus-section also has iconic function, in that it underl ines, by its 
length as such, the quality of Theseus as authoritative judge 
Deliberate use of iconiciry4 9 by Isocrates can be illustrated from 
two further instances 
4 6
 Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993), 12 13 
4 7
 Cf Pind Ρ IX.78, О ΧΠΙ.48, see Wilson (1981), 181-187, Race (1990), 51-52, Crotty 
(1981), 30-31 
4 8
 See Race (1987) 
4 9
 Defined as the functional relation between form and content see Lotman (1973), , Bronzwaer 
(1990) 
V Commentary 186 
1. XV, 7: after having considered the best way to defend himself against 
the accusations raised by his detractors, Isocrates concludes that the only 
method available would be to write a discourse "as an image of my 
thought and of the rest of my life" (ei γραφείη λόγος ώσπερ είκών της έμής 
διανοίας και των αλλων των έμοί βεβιωμένων). 
2. XI, 73: the effectiveness of a technically accomplished encomium is 
based on the concept that it can serve as an image of the laudandus' deeds 
and thought (ηγούμαι καλά μεν είναι μνημεία και τάς των σωμάτων εικόνας, 
πολύ μέντοι πλείονος αξίας τας τών πράξεων και της διανοίας, ας έν τοις 
λόγοις αν τις μόνον τοις τεχνικώς εχουσι θεωρήσειεν). 
3. XII, 84-87: the decision to insert an encomium on Agamemnon (74-
83), which might be considered longer than it should50 (πολύ πλείοσιν 
είρημένοις του δέοντος), is justified by Isocrates by pointing out that it 
would be more reprehensible to leave out some of Agamemnon's 
virtuous attributes than to do so in obeyance to the strictly formal 
requirements of the discourse's proportion: 
άλλα γαρ ήγησάμην ούχ ούτως εσεσθαι δεινόν, ην επί τοΰ μέρους τούτου δόξω 
τισι τών καιρών άμελείν, ως ην περί ανδρός τοιούτου διαλεγόμενος παραλίπω 
τι τών έκείνω τε προσόντων αγαθών κάμοί προσηκόντων ειπείν. 
Thus content has priority over form: Agamemnon's virtues are many 
and relevant to the argument of the discourse as such (προσηκόντων 
ειπείν). 
According to Isocrates, his decision will receive appreciation from the 
most cultivated members of his audience, for two reasons: they 
recognize (a) that when speaking on justice, Isocrates needs to be more 
concerned with treating that subject in the way it deserves than with the 
discourse's proportion (ταύτης άξίως έρώ μάλλον σπουδάζων ή περί την τοΰ 
λόγου συμμετρίαν); and (b) that the correct decision to extensively present 
their exploits will be in the interest of the laudandi (την δε περί τάς πράξεις 
εύβουλίαν αυτούς έπαινουμένους ώφελήσουσαν) .5 1 
5. 31-37: Theseus founder of the Athenian nation 
3 0
 On το δέον as a technical term in rhetoric see Ch II, 42, n 100 and Ch Г , 117, n 63 
5 1
 On the Agamemnon-section as a whole, see Race (1978), who does not recognize the element 
of iconicrty. 
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31 μέν oiv: the transition from the break-off (29-30) to the 
continuation of the main narrative in this subsection is smooth: the 
announcement of conciseness (30: περί των άλλων ώς αν δύνωμαι 
συντομώτατα διελθείν) is put into practice at the beginning of the new 
subsection, that opens with an enumeration of Theseus' virtues. 
31 τήν...διφκησεν: the opening period contains a priamel: a 
number of Theseus' virtues are summarily mentioned, as are his 
exploits (έργα) revealing them. After having referred to his courage, 
military knowledge, and piety, Isocrates finally mentions Theseus' 
prudence (σωφροσύνη), which is elaborated upon in what follows (32-37). 
As this specific virtue is dissociated from the others and will be the basis 
for the description of Theseus as ideal leader of Athens, the virtue of 
prudence is clearly highlighted. Here Isocrates takes the opportunity to 
present Theseus as prudent and intelligent leader of the community, an 
άνήρ πολιτικός, and as such the ideal type in the perspective of Isocratean 
education, which is aimed at making men able to govern (διφκησεν 
emphatically placed last). Thus the programmatic character of the 
speech influences the way in which Theseus' portrait is composed. 
32-34 όρων γαρ...πολιτευόμενων: in 32-34 Isocrates introduces, 
as the first part of the subsection (the beginning of which is marked by 
γαρ) Theseus' fundamental political conviction: his rejection of tyranny 
and the exercise of power in the context of a democratic polity. In this 
respect his attitude reflects not only a general Athenian ideal, but also 
more specifically Isocrates' own political beliefs. In his ideal 
constitution, based on the concept of geometrical equality, those qualified 
to rule are in power by consent of those ruled. This ideal constitution is 
delinetated in the Areopagtticiii.S2 
35-37 καί πρώτον μέν...καταλελεΐφθαι: after the establishment 
of Theseus' principle of government, Isocrates proceeds to illustrate this 
by presenting three instances of his political prudence. Thus the series of 
instances in 35-37 is in close connection (marked by καί, which 
5 2
 See Bnngmann (1965), 75-96, Lombard (1990), 63-97. 
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indicates inclusion of a further item in the context of what precedes53) 
with 32-34. 
Theseus' three major achievements in government are: (1) 
founding the Athenian nation by συνοικισμός, the unification of 
settlements, (2) the institution of rivalry between citizens, based on 
equality and directed towards distinction on the basis of merit, and (3) 
founding government on the fundamental principle of acceptance of the 
ruler by his subjects, on the basis of εύνοια: reciprocal good-will. As this 
last point presents a concept fundamental to Isocrates' political thought54, 
it receives elaborate treatment. 
The subsection is concluded by a recapitulation of Theseus' 
significance for Athenian government. By claiming that his πραότης is 
still discernible in Athenian political life, Isocrates establishes Theseus 
as founding father of Athens and a representative of the politically 
moderate, whose ideal is summed up in the concept of the πάτριος 
πολιτεία. 
6. the subsection's conclusion 
38 την δη γεννηθεΐσαν...ού γαρ δή: the Theseus-section is 
concluded by a dual procedure: (a) first the reader is referred back to 
Helen, the main subject of the discourse, and what was said about her 
parentage in the first section of the main text. This is information the 
author and his readers have in common (marked by δ ή 5 5 ) , which 
provides the ring-composition (16: τοΰ γένους αύτης, ύπο Διός γεννηθέντων) 
with both an anaphorical and inclusive function; (b) at the end of the 
subsection it has become evident that Theseus is indeed a qualified judge 
of Helen's virtues, and therefore the subsection has served its function as 
argument from authority. Thus the answer to the rhetorical question πώς 
ούκ έπαινείν χρή... is an emphatic "yes", because now the qualification of 
Theseus is information shared by all (ού γαρ δή.,.εξομεν). This point, too, 
is embedded in ring-composition (22: πίστιν.,.Έλενην έπαινείν - 38: 
έπαινείν χρή...μάρτυρα πιστότερον). 
5 3
 Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993), 11. 
5 4
 See de Romilly (1958), 92-101; de Blois & Bons (1992), 169-172. 
î 5
 Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993), 52-53, 141 f. 
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38 των 'Ελένη προσόντων αγαθών: Helen's virtuous attributes 
are potential topics for laudatory discourse on her. See Д09-110, where 
Isocrates discusses the possibilities of producing a novel praise of 
Heracles, not based on his courage (άνδρία) and exploits (άθλοι), topics 
which have been used by so many before, but based on his spiritual 
virtuous attributes (περί.,.τών τρ ψυχτ) προσόντων αγαθών). Cf. ΧΙ.44: 
πολλών δ' ενόντων ειπείν έξ ών αν τις και τον επαινον καΐ την κπολογίαν 
μηκύνειν, ούχήγοΰμαι δεΐν μακρολογείν. See also above on 'ίδιον, section 13. 
- section 4: The judgment of Paris (39-44) 
the section can be divided in two subsections: 
1.39-44: Paris' choice 
2. 45-48: evaluation 
1. 39-44: Paris' choice 
39 μετά γάρ...κατάβασιν: cohesion between the previous section 
and the following one is established by the phrase ίνα δε μη δοκώ δι' 
άπορίαν.,.καΐ περί των έχομένων διελθείν, which announces the transition 
at the end of 38, and the continuation of the narrative (the beginning of 
which is marked by γάρ) of Helen's suitors in chronological order in 39 
f. 
39-40 άπαντες...παρασκεύαζειν: as a preamble to the main topic 
of this section, the story of the oath between the princes of Greece and 
suitors of Helen is told. The fact that Helen is preferred to the women of 
first rank in their own native towns serves as an argument a fortiori for 
her special status. 
Furthermore, cohesion is achieved by mentioing the fact that the 
princes decided to take the oath, since it was clear to all of them that 
Helen would be the object of contention in the future (έσομένη 
περιμάχητος). Thus the phrase resumes what was said in section 2 (see 
above). 
41 της μεν ουν Ιδίας ελπίδος...διήμαρτεν: the conclusion of the 
preamble is reached (ούν): Isocrates makes two observations, sc. that their 
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private expectations were frustrated except for those of Menelaos, and that 
their shared opinion on Helen as a woman for whom men would 
contend was correct. This leads up to the treatment of the judgment of 
Paris in the following paragraphs, and prepares the resumption of the 
oath and the presentation of its consequences (the Trojan War) in 49. 
41-43 ού κολλοΰ γαρ χρόνου...γεγονότες: the story of the 
j u d g m e n t of Paris is told in one continuous period of exceptional length: 
see on §§ 18-20 above. 
41 'Αλέξανδρος 6 Πριάμου: the image of Paris is generally a 
negative one (see already Homer VI, 282-3: Paris as μέγα πήμα Τρωσί; cf. 
4, 25Э-62)5 6, a state of affairs implicitly recognized by Isocrates (42: ού 
προς τας ήδονάς άποβλέψας; 45: ουδείς αν τοις λογισμοΐς τούτοις 
έπιτιμήσειεν) but subsequently challenged by a reinterpretation of the 
choice m a d e by Paris on the basis of an evaluation of his reasons to 
choose Aphrodite (on which, see below). 
41 κριτής: the three contending goddesses, who in o r d e r to 
influence the judge, offer Paris gifts, in return for which h e should vote 
for them. Hera offers rule over all Asia (της 'Ασίας βασιλεύειν), Athena 
victory in war (κρατεΐν έν τοις πολέμοις), and Aphrodite marriage with 
Helen (τον γάμον τον Ελένης) У1 In effect, Paris is overwhelmed by the 
sight of the goddesses, and is forced to choose between their gifts rather 
than between the goddesses themselves, and thus his choice becomes 
one of three different ways of life. The possibilities presented are the life 
of a king, of a warrior, and of a married man, caring for his family. In 
this way Isocrates is able to reinterpret the myth of Paris' judgment as a 
moral lesson, in which he can delineate some of the ideals of his own 
educat ional programme. Thus the section is an instance of creative 
mythology and is both an exemplification of the principle of καινότης 
and a means to present the moral view inherent in Isocrates' educational 
thought. 
5 6
 See RE XX, 1499-1500 s.v. Paris,8 [E. Wüst); see also T.C.W. Slinton, Euripides and the 
Judgment of Paris, London 1965, passim; for the iconography see Chr. Clairmont, Das Parisurteil 
in der antiken Kunst, Zürich 1951. 
3 7
 On the procedure of this άγων and the use of stratagem see I. Weiler, Der Agon im Mythos. 
Zur Einstellung der Griechen zum Wettkampf, Darmstadt 1974, 104-107, 258-263. 
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In this respect the Paris-episode is comparable to the famous story 
of the Choice of Heracles, as told by the sophist Prodicus. That story was 
also meant as a moral lesson: Heracles choose the steep way, leading to 
virtue (αρετή). For a version of this story see Xen. Mem. 11,1,21-34. 
42 εΐλετο: as Paris makes a choice based on a conscious and 
intelligent weighing of arguments, he represents the ideal type of 
citizen, the product of Isocratean education. His reasoning is presented to 
have run as follows: 
(a) he dismissed pleasure (ηδονή) as a principle of choice: the 
significance of this decision is amplified by an inverted argument a 
fortiori by referring to the fact that even the wise (τοις ευ φρονοΰσιν) 
regard this as preferable to many other things. In doing so he shows 
himself to conform to the picture of the ideal political leader, as it is 
presented in XV, 132: χρή τους πολιτευόμενους και βουλομένους άρεσκείν 
προαιρείσθαι μεν των τε πράξεων τάς ώφελιμωτάτας και βελτίστας και των 
λόγων τους αληθέστατους και δικαιότατους. His moral purpose is 
contrasted in 133 with the inclination of the many: οράς δε την φύσιν την 
των πολλών ως διάκειται προς τάς ήδονάς. Cf. XV, 221: πολλοί των 
ανθρώπων δια τάς άκρασίας ούκ έμμένουσι τοις λογισμοίς, άλλ' 
άμελήσαντες τοΰ συμφέροντος έπί τάς ήδονας όρμώσιν; cf. also 11,29 (with 
XV.71); 111,40,44; ΙΧ.45; XV.289 (Isocrates' students disdain a life of 
pleasure); 
(b) by marrying Helen he acquires the good esteemed highest among 
men: to be Zeus' son by marriage and thus provide for his offspring the 
descendancy of Zeus from both the side of the father and the mother. 
Thereby he secured for himself the state of ευδαιμονία, of which 
personal and lasting success is a constituent element next to having 
successful children. See the μακαρισμός of Euagoras (IX.70-72): Ευαγόρας 
δ' οϋ μόνον θαυμαστότατος άλλα και μακαριστότατος έξ αρχής ων 
διετελεσεν. τί γαρ άπέλιπεν ευδαιμονίας, δς τοιούτων μεν προγόνων 
ετυχεν.,.θνητος δε γενόμενος άθάνατον την περί αΰτοΰ μνήμην κατέλιπε...πρός 
δε τούτοις...εύπαιδίας τυχεΐν...καί το μέγιστον, ...ούδένα κατέλιπεν ίδιωτικοΐς 
όνόμασι προσαγορευόμενον,... 
44 ήπίστατο γάρ: Paris seeks to avoid the insecurities of good 
luck, and to attain what has permanence: nobility of birth (εύγένειαν άεί 
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τοις αϋτοίς παραμένουσαν). For the concept of permanence as something 
good and causally linked with nobility and wisdom see VII, 13: καίτοι 
τας εύπραγίας.,.καί παραμένουσας...τοις άριστα και σωφρονέστατα την 
αύτων πόλιν διοικοΰσιν. The principle that the wise rest their hopes on 
their own actions and insight (τοις αυτών πράγμασι και ταΐς αυτών 
διανοίαις), and not count on the mistakes of others, for good luck will 
only last when based on effort, is given at VIII,60. Thus, in his action 
and reasoning Paris also reflects Isocratean teaching. 
44 εύγένειαν: as Paris is used by Isocrates as a model for his own 
educational ideal, the use of this word might be intentional to underline 
the Athenian quality the reinterpreted figure of Paris here receives. 
Isocrates probably plays on the connotations of Athenian communal 
ideology the word will have to the Athenian audience. Thus a discrete 
appeal to the audience's emotions (their sense of being part of a 
community) becomes part of the argument. 
2. 45-48: evaluation 
45-47 των μέν ούν tb φρονοΰντων...διαφέροντα: in §§ 45-47 
Isocrates evaluates the reasons (λογισμοίς) Paris had for choosing 
Aphrodite, and he criticizes those who find fault with Paris' reasoning. 
This evaluation is an integral part of the argument in this section: it 
follows the treatment of the motivation for the choice in 43-44 and is, as 
such, a separate subsection (marked by μεν ουν: see on 16, 23, 31 above), 
concluded by a transitional paragraph (48) leading up to the next section 
(see below). 
The evaluation consists of a logical interpretation of the episode as 
it is presented in the first subsection. It is important to note that the 
episode has a clear orientation, in accordance with the main theme of 
the discourse as a whole: the significance of Helen's beauty. Although 
Paris is made judge in a beauty-contest, when he reaches his decision 
he assesses the utility and moral quality of the gifts offered to him by the 
goddesses. The assessment is made by the application of standards 
preferred and advocated by the author, Isocrates himself. By this 
procedure Isocrates provides an interpretation of the episode from the 
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perspective of his own educational programme, like he did with the 
myth of Theseus (see above) 
This subsection with its description of the procedure of 
interpretation of myth and its methodology, allows the formulation of 
some general observations on the use of mythical material by Isocrates 
(1) Isocrates' approach can be characterised as "rational" the myth is not 
introduced for its own sake, but for the specific reason that it serves a 
purpose In this case Isocrates' purpose is, first of all, rhetorical the myth 
is made into an argument and is therefore an integral part of the 
argumentation of the discourse as a whole Furthermore, its introduction 
allows Isocrates to include the evaluation, which serves an exemplary 
function it illustrates Isocratean education In this sense the myth serves 
as a medium it is used as material for the presentation of a point the 
author wishes to make As such, this approach is comparable to the 
literary use tragedians make of myth described by Aristotle (Poet 14, 
1453 b 22 f ) τους μεν οβν παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν ούκ εστίν, λέγω δε 
οίον την Κλυταιμνήστραν άποθανοΰσαν ύπί> τοϋ 'Ορέστου ( ), αυτόν δε (sc 
the writer of tragedy) εΰρίσκειν δει και τοις παραδεδομένοις χρήσθαι 
καλώς Myth is the raw material used in the process of invention 
(2) The method of not taking a myth's meaning at face value, but to seek 
an interpretation revealing its meaning, is used by Isocrates in XIII,2 
There he argues that foreknowledge of the future is something of which 
human nature is incapable (τα μέλλοντα προγιγνώσκειν οϋ της ημετέρας 
φύσεως έστιν) This statement is supported by reference to Homer, who 
has the highest reputation for wisdom (ό μεγίστην έπί σοφία δόξαν 
είληφώς) He represents the gods as at times deliberating about the future 
τους θεούς πεποίηκεν εστίν δτε βουλευομένους υπέρ αυτών 5 8 The reason for 
this is not that Homer knew the divine mind, but because he wanted to 
make it clear that the capacity to have foreknowledge of the future is 
impossible to attain for mankind ήμΐν ένδείξασθαι βουλόμενος οτι τοις 
άνθρώποις εν τούτο των αδυνάτων εστίν Here Homer serves as educator 
and sophist avant-la-Iettre, displaying an approach to myth adopted 
generally in intellectual circles at the time and thereby, because of his 
acknowledged authority, supports that approach 5 9 A man endowed with 
5 8
 See e g Hom XVI 431 ff ΧΧΠ 168 ff 
5 9
 On the use of Homer as role model for the sophistic movement see O'Sullivan (1992), 66-79, 
esp 67 & n 35 
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practical intelligence will interpret myth and indentify what it is that 
myth wants to "show" (ένδείξασθαι ) . By adopting this procedure 
Isocrates follows the educational tradition of the sophists.6 0 In this 
particular case the deliberation amongst the gods on the future serves as 
an a fortiori argument: if the gods do not have foreknowledge of things to 
come, then certainly humankind will be incapable of attaining that 
capacity. 
(3) The rational quality of this approach is reflected in the phraseology: 
there is a high frequency of words referring to intellectual activities. 
Some of these directly refer to the method followed by Isocrates, others 
do so indirectly and e contrario : they are used by Isocrates in his 
description of what other interpreters are neglecting to do. These words 
are: ένθυμεΐσθαι: the process of logical thought - σκοπείν; σκέπτεσθαι: 
exercizing critical sense - λογισμός: reasoning.61 
Generally speaking, it should be noted that Isocrates uses these 
words in the context of his concept of δόξα. To him "opinion" is 
preferable to "absolute knowledge" as a basis of intellectual activity, 
because the latter is unattainable, given the contingency of human 
existence. When exercizing his δόξα, a man has at his disposal a 
number of specific intellectual capabilities, which he can bring to bear 
in situations as they arise. Some of these presented below can clarify the 
method under discussion here. 
- XV,184: a fundamental requirement for being capable of judgment is a 
conscious activation of the mind and the observation of what 
consequently happens for the most part (προσέχοντες τον νουν καΐ 
δυνάμενοι θεωρείν το συμβαίνον ώς επί το πολύ). As a result of this one 
will most often (πλειστάκις) be succesful in reaching good judgment; 
- ПІ.8: here the general rule given in Х Д84 is applied to political 
deliberation. People of intelligence, when deliberating, must not think 
that they have knowledge of what the consequence will be, but must, as 
men who exercize their judgment, thus think about them (= the matters 
on which they deliberate), whatever the outcome will be (χρή δέ τους 
6 0
 On the sophists as interpreters of Homer see Richardson (1975) and id. (1992); an example of 
this procedure can be found in Plato Symp. 190 b 6-7, where Homer's story on the giants 
Ephialtes and Otus (V, 385 f.; 11, 307-320) is reinterpreted by Aristophanes as referring to the 
androgynes: δ λέγει "Ομηρος περί Έφιάλτου τε και "Ωτου, περί εκείνων (sc. the androgynes) 
λέγεται. 
6 1
 Cf. IV,6, 9; II, 7 (= XV, 255); V, 29; XV, 292; XII, 261; see on XI, 35 below; see also 
Mikkola (1954), 73-74, 77; Homblower (1987), 100 f.; Penili (1992). 
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νουν έχοντας περί ων δ' αν βουλεύωνται μη νομίζειν είδέναι το 
συμβησόμενον, άλλ' ώς δόξη μεν χρωμένους, δ τι αν τύχη δε γενησόμενον62, 
οϋτω διανοείσθαι περί αυτών) As the future is uncertain anyway, in 
deliberation intelligent men must not pretend to have certain 
knowledge, but must exercize their capacity of judgment 
- XI, 35 in his critique of his rival Polycrates, Isocrates maintains that 
any writer of encomiastic literature should produce discourse that is able 
to stand careful scrutiny (έξετάζειν) In this discourse, the issue is the 
Egyptian king Busins' authorship of certain institutions Since that issue 
is undecided, the question is open to general consideration and 
judgment needs to be made (έν κοινώ των πραγμάτων όντων και δοξάσαι 
δέον περί αυτών) The appropriate procedure to do this rests on the use of 
argument from probability έκ των εικότων σκοπούμενος νομίσειεν (τις) 
As Busins is of divine descent, is the most powerful man of his time and 
most renowned amongst other peoples it stands to reason (the evidential 
value of the argument underlined by δη που) to ascribe the authorship to 
h im 
It appears, then, that δόξα depends on expenence and observation, and in 
that respect can be said to be of empirical nature Its usefulness lies in its 
dual application of diagnosis (the capability of gaining insight) and of 
prognosis (the capability of foretelling a probable outcome) 6 Î 
(4) As myth belongs to the past, an intelligent man should not, in 
evaluating an historic episode, apply his contemporary set of entena 
only, but he should consider the histoncal context Those who fail to do 
so easily find fault with Pans των δέ μηδέν προ του πράγματος 
ένθυμουμένων άλλα το συμβαίνον μόνον σκοπουμένων ηδη τινές 
έλοιδόρησαν αυτόν To neglect this additional element when dealing 
with past events is, however, considered a folly (άνοια), in instance of 
not thinking correcdy (see also Ch Г , ρ 133 f ) 
Thus the subsection on the evaluation of Pans' motivation serves 
as an illustration of how the concept of δόξα is practically applied in 
interpreting myth 6 4 and, given the programmatic character of the 
discourse as such, as an illustration of Isocrates' methods of teaching 
Pans has become a model (παράδειγμα) with protreptic function An 
6 2
 The addition of αγνοοΰντας by Ruschi is superfluous, cf Laistner (1927), 80 ad loc 
6 3
 See Jaeger (1960) 289 n 2 
6 4
 Jakel (1986), 78 79 
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example is V.114: Philip is urged to imitate (μιμήσασθαι) the spirit of 
Heracles, who has just been depicted as benefactor of all Hellenes in a 
laudatory section 111-112. See also above, section 1, on the serious intent 
of the encomium. 
The criteria to be applied, then, when reasoning with a sense of 
history are the following (46-48): 
- historical context: a contemporary man should not consider his 
judgment more competent than the one the gods selected (sc. Paris'): as 
the gods were clearly very much concerned about the issue itself, they 
will surely have selected the best judge possible; 
- objectivity: one should consider (σκοπεΐν) the judge's quality and not 
scrutinize (δοκιμάζειν) him by the feelings of anger of those defeated in 
the contest, but by the reasons why the goddesses unanimously selected 
his insight (διάνοια). In doing so the gods submitted themselves to the 
judgment of a mortal: given the fact that the stronger (in casti the gods) 
always prevail over de weaker, this proves the exceptional superiority of 
this mortal's intelligence; 
- assessment: the decision Paris reached was the good outcome of a 
process of deliberation (βεβουλεΰσθαι). He recognized that he would 
have been a fool (ανόητος), if he would have put less value on beauty 
than the gods themselves did. Therefore one could say that he is an 
example of a man making good use of his capacity of judgment. 
48 έλόμενον...ηθέλησαν: the phrase τον.,.έλόμενον brings the 
audience back to the main focus of the Paris-section: his choice to live 
with Helen. With this also returns the motive of her being the object of 
contention amongst the heroes (ης ένεκα πολλοί των ημιθέων άποθνήσκειν 
ηθέλησαν). This prepares the way for setting the next step in the 
discourse's main argument: the treatment of the Trojan War, which was 
a direct result of Paris' choice. 
- section 5: The Trojan War (49-53) 
49 τ{ς...ύπερεϊδεν: the section is presented as the next episode in 
Helen's life, which follows her involvement with Paris. The narrative is 
continued, and a new element is introduced (δε). 
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The rhetorical question underlines the significance attributed to 
the marriage with Helen by both conflicting parties: it brought war to 
both Greeks and non-Greeks and they considered it a matter of national 
interest. Technically the device serves as a means of amplification. 
49 δήλον.,.γέγονεν: the war between the Greeks and the 
barbarians over Helen is presented in the context of the general East-
West conflict (see below). Isocrates refers to the many causes of conflict 
prior to this one: he may be thinking of the abductions of Io, Europe and 
Medea (see Hdt. I, 1-3). 
The conflict is further amplified by characterizing the war as in 
many respects the biggest to date. This statement seems polemical and 
directed against Thucydides, who in the introductory sections of his 
History of the Peloponnesian War claimed that the Peloponnesian War had 
been the greatest ( I, 1-2: τον πόλεμον.,.μέγαν χε εσεσθαι και άξιολογώτατον 
των προγεγενημένων; Ι, 21, 2: ό πόλεμος ούτος, καίπερ των ανθρώπων έν ω μεν 
αν πολεμώσι τον παρόντα αίεΐ μέγιστον κρινόντων, παυσαμένων δε τα 
αρχαία μάλλον θαυμαζόντων, άπ' αυτών των έργων σκοποΰσι δηλώσει όμως 
μείζων γεγενημένος αυτών). These statements by Thucydides can, in tum, 
be explained as polemical and self-assertive: at the opening of his 
historiographical work the author deals with his predecessor, Herodotus, 
and claims superiority.65 It is in the interest of Isocrates' purposes in the 
Helen to utilize the inclination of the general public to idealize the wars 
of the past, a tendency identified by Thucydides. The image of a 
superior Athens must remain unchallenged: therefore no reminiscence 
should de made to the disastrous outcome for Athens of the 
Pelopponesian War. 
50 έξόν.,.άπελθεΐν: after the war's magnitude Isocrates depicts 
the mentality and spirit of the parties involved in the conflict. Both sides 
are willing to bring the utmost sacrifices in their battle over Helen. The 
barbarians allow their land and cities to be laid waste, as the Athenians 
had done in their struggle with Sparta. Maybe this statement is an 
intentional reminder by Isocrates of that traumatic period in Athenian 
6 5
 See Lendle (1992), 77-84, the claim to superiority is based on both historiographical method 
and rhetorical purpose see Woodman (1988), 28 f., Homblower (1991), 63. 
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history, which took place less than fifty years ago. 6 6 The appeal to 
collective memory can serve as a powerful means to underline the 
determination (for this particular aspect see esp. Th. 11,61,2) of the 
barbarians and, through this, the strong influence Helen had on them. 
The same is true for the Greeks, who are willing to sacrifice their best 
years and suffer long separation from their home and families. 
51 κ α ΐ . , . ε σ ε σ θ α ι : the section is concluded with an explicit 
reference to the conflict as being one between Europe and Asia (see also 
below, on section 8) . 6 7 At this point Helen herself and the conflict on her 
behalf acquire features of fourth century Panhellenic ideology. The 
Trojan War can be seen as the préfiguration of the war between Greeks 
and the peoples of the East, especially the Persians. The fact that in this 
section the name Troy is never explicitly mentioned is conducive to the 
realisation of that interpretation. 
52 τοσούτος 8 ' έρως ένέπεσε: the ardent desire for the 
hardships just described on the level of mankind also took possession of 
the gods. This is the next step (δέ) in the narrative of the subsection and it 
enlarges Helen's sphere of influence to the divine world. Again, this is 
an amplification (underlined by the particle-cluster ού μόνον...άλλα και, 
which in itself implies amplification of the second element 6 8). 
Reference to έρως prepares the way for the next section, the eulogy 
on beauty (54-60), where the explanation of Helen's influence is 
implicitly based on human inclination towards the beautiful (55: των 
κοίλων έρως ήμίν έγγίγνεται, see below.) 
The phrase έρως ένέπεσε suggests overpowering force: cf. Aesch. 
Ag. 341: έρως δέ μη τις πρότερον έμπίπτη στρατό) Ι πορθείν; Soph. Ant. 782: 
"Ερως, δς έν κτήμασι πίπτεις; Th. VI,24,3: έρως ένέπεσε τοις πάσιν 
έκπλεΰσαι. 
6 6
 The devastation of Attica and its effect on the evacuated inhabitants is described by Thucydides 
(Π, 21,2-3,47,2,54,1; 59,1,61,2) and, of course, reflected in Aristophanes' comedies Acharnions 
and Peace See also Xen Oec 6, 6-7 
6 7
 See J de Romilly. "Isocrates and Europe", G & R 39 (1992), 2-13 
6 8
 Cf V.116 (also with an antithesis of άνθρωποι and θεοί) and frequently elsewhere; see 
Braunert (1962), 226-236, esp. 233 f 
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52-53 τοις θεοΐς.,.προς σφάς αυτούς έπολέμησαν: the 
commitment of the gods to the cause of Helen is made apparent by 
Isocrates from two actions the gods undertake. This serves as another 
amplification of the conflict: 
(1) the gods are willing to sacrifice the lives of their own offspring, 
considering (ηγούμενοι) that it is more honourable for them to have died 
fighting for Helen than to live without having taken risks on her 
account. This decision on their part is understandable, because 
(2) the gods themselves engage in a struggle even more terrible than the 
one they fought against the Giants. Then they fought together (μετ' 
αλλήλων έμαχέσαντο), now they fight against each other (προς σφάς 
αυτούς έπολέμησαν). The significance of this statement becomes clear, if 
one considers the context of Panhellenism in this section: the gods fail to 
preserve unity (ομόνοια). Unification of Greece against the common 
enemy in the East was a primary goal of the Panhellenistic ideology. 
The all pervading power of Helen's beauty is here painfully 
demonstrated: it is even capable of causing conflict between the gods, 
and their battle is therefore δεινός, as it is contrary to expectation. 
Here a climax is reached in the description of the sequence of situations, 
in which Helen was object of contention (περιμάχητος). As the gods are 
involved, the audience might develop doubts on the praiseworthiness of 
Helen. The implied question is answered in the next section. 
- section 6: the eulogy on beauty (54-60) 
The eulogy consists of two parts: 
- 54-58: the opinions of mankind on beauty's power; 
- 59-60: the attitudes of the gods as proof of beauty's power. 
In this twofold structure the section is analogous to the previous: in both 
cases the issue at hand gaines significance by its elevation to the level of 
the divine. 
54 ευλόγως: the phrasing is intentional and effective: the section 
is announced in its double function of eulogy on beauty and integral 
part of the argument. 
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54 ευλόγως...αύτης: the indirect and unexpressed question on the 
behaviour of the gods and on the aptness of Helen as object of praise is 
answered in the opening sentence of the new section. With respect to 
both the gods' behaviour and their reasons for it (κάκεΐνοι..) and the way 
in which Isocrates praises Helen the answer is prepared by ευλόγως, 
which is emphatically placed first and which is further explained by 
κάλλους yáp..(see below). 
The phrase τηλικαύταις ύπερβολαΐς seems to contain an indirect 
justification for raising the implied question at the end of section 53 (see 
above). The context could suggest that υπερβολή here has a negative 
connotation and should be interpreted as "excess" (cf. IX.73: on Euagoras: 
τίνες των ποιητών περί τίνος...ΰπερβολαΐς κέχρηται, λέγοντες ώς ην θεός έν 
άνθρώποτς η δαίμων θνητός). But even if taken neutrally as "in superlative 
terms" (cf. V,ll: καθ' υπερβολή ν; XII, 123 - which provides a prescription 
on υπερβολή in praise - : δει δέ τους έπιχειροΰντας καθ' ύπερβολήν τινας 
έπαινείν μη τοΰτο έπιδεικνύναι μη πονηρούς οντάς αυτούς, αλλ' ώς άπάσαις 
ταΐς άρεταΐς καί τών τότε και των νϋν διήνεγκαν) Isocrates evidently feels 
the need to provide an explanation. 
54 κάλλους γάρ...εστίν: the explanation offered (γάρ) opens with 
an emphatic reference to the central topic of the section: κάλλος and its 
power. Now attention is focused on beauty itself, while it was repeatedly 
present as an element of previous sections (see 16; 19; 23; 37; 41; 43; 48; 
53). In these sections examples were offered of the power beauty has: 
now the line-up of these examples leads to a culmination, in which the 
power of beauty as such is reflected upon. 
It is clear from many literary and philosophic writings that the 
Greeks had special interest in beauty, its influences, and human 
responses to it. In their view there existed a direct connection between 
the quality of beauty in the exterior, physical sense and in the interior, 
moral sense. This can be illustrated by the following observations: 
- in Homer there is no clear distinction between exterior appearance and 
intrinsic value, which leads to the expectation that a beautiful man will 
also be a sensible and a brave man: see XI, 363-7 and, of course, the e 
contrario case of Thersites; cf. Hes. Th. 79-93.69 This idea essentially 
6 9
 See W J. Verdemus, "Notes on the proem of Hesiod's Theogony ", Mnem. 25 ( 1972), 251 ; id. 
(1983), 25,53; F. Solmsen, "The Gift of Speech in Homer and Hesiod", ТАРА 85 (1954), 1-15. 
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remains present in Isocrates' time one only has to refer to physical 
beauty stimulating philosophic desire in Plato's Symposium, a dialogue 
that in itself is a clear reflection of the fascination exercized by beauty 
T h e sequence of speeches in that dialogue can be read as a gradual 
ascent from the eulogy of eros or sexual desire as a product of the 
confrontation with physical beauty to the eulogy of Socrates' inner 
beauty or virtue, the product of his contemplation of absolute beauty 7 0 
- many instances in literature bear witness to the fact that beauty was 
considered to have a superhuman quality See, e g , the story, told by 
Plutarch Ages 34, 8-11, about the Spartan Isadas, whose exceptional 
physical beauty so much overawed his opponents that he was able to 
break through their lines unhurt This happened either because a god 
protected him or μείζον τι και κρεΐττον άνθρωπου φανείς τοίς έναντίοις Cf 
Hom VI, 119 f (GlaucusandDiomedes) .Hdt ΓΧ,25,1 (Masisüos) 
The exterior and interior range in the concept of beauty is 
reflected in the ambiguity of the word καλόν, which associates beauty 
with appropriateness and fitness for function T h e connect ion with 
αγαθόν is therefore close at hand The former is the more inclusive term, 
as is clear from Anst Met XIII, 1078 a 31 το αγαθόν και το καλόν έτερον 
το μεν γαρ άεί εν πράξει, το δε καλόν και έν τοις άκινήτοις 7 1 T h e 
translation "fine, fineness" most approximates the wide range of το 
καλόν
 7 2 
54 ράδιον δε γνώναι: the power of beauty is delineated by the 
successive treatment of different aspects from which to consider it 
1 (54) as a virtue, 
2 (55) as a stimulant of desire, 
3 (56-57) as a stimulant of voluntary submission, 
4 (58) as an object of reverence 
The structure of the argument in each consideration is essentially based 
on contrast 
7 0
 Thus the sequence in itself can be seen as a formal representation of Diotima s Ascent to 
Beauty in Socrates' speech, on Alcibiades speech see Walerfield (1994), xxxu see also 
Rutherford (1995) ] 97 204 
7 1
 Cf Plato Symp 201 с 1 7 204 с 7 f 
7 2
 See Guthrie (1969), 170, Woodruff (1982) 110, 181 189, see also Dover (1974), 41-45, 69 
73, Grassi (1962) 54-69 
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54 των μεν γαρ...εστίν: the first consideration involves a contrast 
between beauty as something desirable and other things to be desired 
Many things, to which the virtues of courage, wisdom and justice 
cannot be attributed, appear to be valued higher than these virtues 
themselves Thus, there are things considered valuable, which do not 
have the principal virtues (the same ones are mentioned in 1, see above) 
as attributes This is different with the attribute beauty nothing lacking 
beauty will be found desirable By using this opposition Isocrates is able 
to pronounce κάλλος an αρετή superior to even the principal όρεταί 
The use of ιδέα (54, 58) to refer to beauty reflects the full semantic 
range of κάλλος and covers both physical beauty (the exterior aspect) and 
nobility and goodness (the interior aspect) Further the word underlines 
that the perception of κάλλος is, in the first instance, a visual experience 
The "spectacle of beauty" prompts the primary reaction of physical 
attraction and the secondary reaction of philosophical desire 7 S The 
element of visual perception is reflected in the use of îrçn and its 
cognates in the immediate context of beauty see 17 περίβλεπτον, 18 ίδών, 
39 ύπεριδόντες ('), 42 όψεως, 56 ίδόντες, 61 όψιν 
Similarly, αρετή in itself is valuated most highly, because of all 
states of mind (επιτηδεύματα) it is the most beautiful As a man's state of 
mind causes him to act in a certain way, virtuousness becomes evident 
by making choices and acting accordingly Of this notion the sections 
on Theseus, Pans, and the Trojan War are exemplary instances 
55 γνοίη δ' αν τις., έστιν: the second point of consideration is 
beauty's superiority to other things Beauty owes its superior status to the 
effect it has on human beings with respect to other things they need 
they are satisfied to want to have them and feel no further stirring in 
their soul It is beauty, however, that awakens desire (έρως) 7 4 Different 
from the response these other things elicit, desire produces an additional 
affect (προσπεπόνθαμεν) m the soul, which exceeds the βούλεσθαι of these 
other things to the same degree as the beautiful is superior to them 
56-57 καΐ τοις μεν., νομίζομεν: the third point of consideration is 
the attitude of men towards persons attributed with beauty Again the 
7 3
 Ferren (1990) 142 f cf Plato Phdr 251 d 1 f 
7 4
 For the concept of "didactic έρως", ι e the enthusiasm for a subject, see Shorey (1909), 197 
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argument is by contrast: while towards persons endowed with qualities 
other than beauty and superior to one's own the reaction will be a feeling 
of jealousy, to those who are beautiful the reaction will be a feeling of 
good-will and a willingness to serve. The servihum avions is illustrated 
from two perspectives: 
- it is considered preferable to the rule over others; 
- those who bring it into practice are φιλόκαλοι και φιλόπονοι. 
Beauty stimulates an attitude of voluntary submission. The phrase ευνοι 
γιγνόμεθα suggests the notion of εύνοια, fundamental to Isocrates' socio­
political thinking (see above). Φιλοκάλοι seems to appeal to the mentality 
of the Athenians as "lovers of beauty", as it is expressed by Pericles in 
Thucydides' version of his Funeral Speech (11,40,1): φιλοκαλοΰμεν, 
which also exploits the complete semantic range of καλός. 
57 θεραπεύοντες: on the motive of servttium amoris see also Plato 
Symp. 183 a-b, 196 с (Agathon's speech).75 
58 τοσαύττ\...ποιήσαντας: the fourth and concluding 
consideration bestows on beauty a divine aura. Isocrates contrasts people 
who misuse beauty to the correct use of beauty, which aims at its 
preservation rather than its exploitation. Here he uses terms which have 
religious associations. The beautiful body is seen as shrine, inaccessible 
to the base (αβατον τοις πονηροίς ιερόν); towards the attribute of beauty 
(the term ιδέα is resumed from consideration 1 in ch. 54) the attitude is 
one of reverence and caution (ευσέβεια και πρόνοια). With the elevation 
the divine level the audience is prepared for the next element in the 
eulogy. 
59-60 και τί δεί.,.ήβουλήθησαν: Isocrates amplifies the power of 
beauty by showing that the gods are similar to mankind in their attitude 
towards that quality, and that in their reaction they even exceed 
humankind. This is illustrated by two instances, where again the 
argument makes use of contrast: 
1. Zeus the Almighty (Ζευς ό κρατών πάντων) becomes humble (ταπεινός) 
in his approach to beauty, as can be seen from his disguises in his 
7
^ See Rutherford (1995), 202, on the supposed Isocratean ongin of the motive see O. Carbonero, 
"De isocratea amatori! servitù origine", Latimias 40 (1992), 193-196. 
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dealings with mortal women. He denounces his usual prerogative to the 
use of force (βία) and avails himself of cunning (τέχνη); 
2. they show consideration towards goddesses who succumb to mortal 
beauty, which they do not consider shameful, but rather a glorious deed 
to be celebrated in hymns. 
60 μ έ γ ι σ τ ο ν . , . ά π ά σ α ς : the concluding sentence allows a 
recapitulation of the main points of the section. (1) there is a direct 
relation between το κάλλος and the divine; (2) το κάλλος is a virtue. The 
conclusion anticipates the request to the intellectuals (educated in 
Isocrates' school) in 66 (see below). 
- section 7: Helen's exploits (61-65) 
In this section Isocrates concentrates on Helen's έργα. They are 
in t roduced after the eulogy on beauty, which already elevated the 
narrative to divine level. Her exploits are now presented in a divine 
context as well. The section is divided in two parts, one (61-63) showing 
Helen's benefactions towards members of her own family, the other (64-
65) showing her to be patron of the poets Stesichorus and Homer. 
61 <bv 'Ελένη...διήνεγκεν: the nexus with the previous section is 
strong, the "relative connection" providing cohesion. 7 6 T h e eulogy on 
beauty e n d e d with reference to the many mortals who earned their 
immortality by that quality. These mortals are the antecedent in the 
relative connection. As the eulogy presented κάλλος in both its physical 
and moral aspects, now Helen herself is treated in the same framework. 
In comparison to her antecedents her status is immediately amplified 
(πλέον εσχεν). 
61-62 ού γαρ μόνον. . .κατεστήσατο: H e l e n ' s superiori ty is 
argued (γάρ) from the observation that she not only attained the status of 
immortality, in which respect she is comparable to her antecedents 
referred to in 60, but also that she made commendable use of her godlike 
7 6
 Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993), 18-19 
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power (for οΰ μόνον...άλλα καί underlining the amplification see above, 
p. 181). This is illustrated from two instances: 
-πρώτον μέν: she elevated her brothers to divine status and made their 
mutation (μετά βολήv) from humans to gods credible by bestowing 
evident honours on them; 
- μετά δε ταΰτα: out of gratitude for Menelaos' efforts on her behalf, she 
freed him from the curse that rested on his family and (gradation) she 
made him a god, to be sharer of her house and throne. 
Isocrates' representation of Helen and her exploits is similar to the way 
he represented Paris. In his reinterpretation of the traditional myth the 
evident aspect of physical beauty is complemented by the addition 
exploits commendable from a moral point of view. Helen's moral beauty 
shows itself in her altruism. 
63 καΐ . , .οΰσιν: the statements on Helen's divinity are 
substantiated by a reference to the fact that the city of Sparta pays honour 
and reverence to Helen and Menelaos as gods (ώς θεοίς άμφοτέροις 
οΰσιν). The trustworthiness of Sparta as a witness is established by 
pointing out that the city, that is observing this custom till recent times 
(ετι καί νϋν), shows special care in the preservation of tradition (μάλιστα 
τα παλαιά διασώζουσαν). The validity of the argument from tradition is 
explained by Isocrates in XII,149-150: it derives from the fact that belief in 
tradition is shared by many intelligent men: ει μέν γαρ μόνος έπίστευον 
τοις τε λεγομένοις περί των παλαιών...νϋν δε πολλοί και νουν έχοντες ταύτον 
έμοι φανείεν αν πεπονθότες. The reference to tradition thus becomes 
"nothing unreasonable" (ουδέν αλογον).77 The persuasive effect of the 
reference to "many" is indicated by Aristotle Rh. 1,6,1363 a 9: oí δέ 
πολλοί ώσπερ πάντες φαίνονται. 
64-65 ένεδείξατο. . .ποίησιν : here Helen's responsibility is 
claimed for the origin of two literary works: Homer's Iliad and 
Stesichorus' Palinode. Both works are relevant to this discourse. First, as a 
punishment for his blasphemous ode on her, Helen deprived Stesichorus 
7 7
 OD Isocrates' use of historical data (which encompasses both myth and history) see Hamilton 
(1979). 
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of his eye-sight. After he composed his recantation (παλινωδία), he was 
restored to his normal state. Secondly, some Homeridae claim that Helen 
appeared to Homer in a dream and commanded him to compose a poem 
on the expedition to Troy. This must refer to the Iliad , and the story may 
even originate from VI,357-8, where Helen says to Hector: .. ώς καί 
όπίσσω Ι άνθρώποισι πελώμεθ' άοίδιμοι έσσομένοισιν. 
In both cases she is presented as a deity stimulating literary 
works, and in that capacity she is comparable to a Muse. She is thus 
introduced in the realm of literature and its producers (ποίησις), to which 
also Isocrates himself claims to belong (see Ch. I, § 2 and Ch. Ill, p. 99 f.). 
In this particular role she can serve as an ideal figure to those engaged 
in literary production, especially when these literary works have a 
serious ethical and educational purpose, since she herself is 
commendable as a model from that very perspective. 
66 ώς ουν.,.άπαρχάς: the conclusion (οΰν) to this section declares 
the protreptic intent of the discourse as a whole. All men must pay 
tribute to Helen in a way appropriate and compatible to their means. For 
the "philosophers", i.e. those who adhere to Isocratean φιλοσοφία, this 
consists in speaking of her in a way that does justice to the qualities she 
has: πειράσθαί τι λέγειν περί αυτής άξιον των υπαρχόντων εκείνη. The 
phrase contains the essence of Isocrates' programme of rhetoric (see 
XIII,12: ούτος είναι δοκεΐ τεχνικώτατος, ος τις αν άξίως μεν λέγη των 
πραγμάτων, μηδέν δε των αυτών τοις άλλοις εϋρίσκειν δύνηται). It is also the 
way in which they can show to be educated in his school, as can 
concluded from πεπαιδευμενοις, which conveys the training (παιδεία, cf. 
oi πεπαιδευμένοι in XII, 30-32) received there. 
The implication is that the educated should produce "beautiful" or 
"fine" discourse. For Isocrates källow is a quality of good discourse: see 
IV, 4,13; XV, 77, 276 (and cf. Plato Gorg. 474 e 5-7).™ 
- section 8: Finale (67-69) 
78
 See Wersdorfer (1940), 20, Eucken (1983), 92-93, on the general concept of the association of 
persuasive power with beautiful form of expression see Verdenius (1981), 121-122, see also ad 54, 
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67 πολύ δέ...εστίν: the discourse's conclusion opens with the 
assertion that much more could have been said on the subject This 
statement suggests the author's confidence in his own ability, especially 
regarding his powers of invention The potential abundance of material 
is proof of his technical ability as a composer of discourse, and as such 
serves the "manifesto"-function (επάγγελμα) of the discourse itself (see 
above) 
67 χωρίς γαρ...νομίζοιμεν: the invention of many practical arts, 
among which is rhetoric79, was ascribed to Homer, whose works were 
considered the source for information on a wide range of subjects An 
illustration of this is Xen Symp 111,5, Г ,6 
As Isocrates argued in the previous section, Helen prompted the 
composition of the Iliad Now she can be credited with the authorship of 
the useful arts just referred to The use of άνενεγκεΐν and αίτίαν suggests 
that in an aetiological context the image of Helen as "first inventor" 
(πρώτος εΰρετής) is conveyed 8 0 Her responsibility for the establishment 
of these arts is proved by "leading back" (άναφέρειν) these arts to her 
action in the past8 1 
67-68 εΰρήσομεν γαρ...βαρβάρων: in this instance the theme of 
Panhellenism is explicitly addressed Its constituent elements of unity 
among the Greeks (τους "Ελληνας όμονοήσαντας) and a common 
expedition against the barbarians (κοινήν στρατείαν έπί τους βαρβάρους) 
are mentioned in connection with the Trojan War, which is now 
interpreted as the first victory of Europe over Asia This war thus 
becomes the emblem of the Panhellenistic movement This can be 
further substantiated by the observation that as a consequence (έξ ών) of 
that victory the Greeks were able to prevail over Asia and to take over a 
number of its cities and territory, while the reverse was formerly the 
case 
' ' For the sources see Radermacher AS A Г 2, G A Kennedy, "The Ancient Dispute over 
Rhetoric in Homer', AJP 78 (1957), 23 35, M Delaunois Le plan rhétorique dans l éloquence 
f recque d Homere à Demosthène, Brussel 1959 7 16 0
 See A Kleingunther ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΕΥΡΕΤΗΣ Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer 
Fragestellung, Leipzig 1933, 47 f 118 f (on the comparable case of Busms) 
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It should be noted that Panhellenism is here directly mentioned 
for the first time in the discourse as a separate topic. Earlier it served 
indirectly as a subsidiary motif or foil, as in the section on the Trojan 
War (see above). Panhellenism evidently was an important issue to 
Isocrates, but it does not dominate this discourse. The topic is hinted at by 
the use of key-concepts in earlier sections and is directly addressed in 
the final section: its presence reflects Isocrates' general engagement. 
69 flv οΰν.,.κερί αυτής: the discourse ends with a generous 
gesture on the part of Isocrates. Panhellenism is potential point of 
departure (αφορμή) from which another praise of Helen can be produced. 
Just as Isocrates himself has used the Helen-myth and reinterpreted it to 
convey his educational message, so another author can use the myth 
and present it from the perspective of the Panhellenistic programme. 
That discourse, as the one delivered now, would be an instance of 
novelty (καινώς λέγειν). 
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5.5. Conclusion 
Isocrates' Helen is a discourse of programmatic character: it is a 
serious encomium of Helen, that reflects the educational programme of 
his school both on the level of moral doctrine and rhetorical technique. 
As an example of rhetorical composition the discourse shows 
features which can be seen as practical realisations of Isocrates' theories, 
which have been described in the Chs. ІІ-Г . These features may be 
summarized as follows: 
- from the perspective of the ιδέα-concept, the discourse conforms 
to the requirements of selection (the Theseus-section, esp. the selectivity 
in the comparison Theseus-Heracles; exclusion of the phantom-motive), 
whole and part (all the discourse's sections conform to the main subject 
thematically and generically), plurality (the discourse consists of a 
number of separate sections), connection (cohesion between the sections 
is apparent esp. when the discourse is perceived linearly) and 
consistency (the discourse is conceived as a synthetic whole which is 
thematically orientated). 
- from the perspective of the κοιρός-concept, the discourse's 
sections are purposefully organized according to its end (τέλος): they 
each separately contribute to the realisation of the main thesis and in 
their arrangement show a gradation towards the establishment of the 
climactic image of the goddess Helen symbolizing the power of beauty. 
The sections' dimensions are delineated by the requirements of effective 
argumentation, in the sense that they contain what is necessary for 
making a complete and persuasive argument. In their effectiveness they 
bear witness to the advanced intellectual level (δόξα) of the author. 
- from the perspective of the καινός-concept, the discourse is an 
innovative interpretation of the Helen-myth, which not only consists of 
a version hitherto unheard of, but also has a serious intention. 
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POIETIKON PRAGMA 
Isocrates' theorie van retorische compositie 
Met een retorisch commentaar op de Helena 
SAMENVATTING 
Het onderzoek naar de theorie en praktijk van Isocrates' retorische 
compositie is wenselijk vanuit twee overwegingen. Vanuit het 
algemene perspectief van de geschiedenis van de Griekse literatuur 
maakt de beschrijving van Isocrates' methoden en hun toepassing de 
juiste vaststelling van zijn positie ten opzichte van voorgangers, zowel 
dichters als proza-auteurs, mogelijk. Daarnaast voorziet dit onderzoek in 
een lacune: bij gebrek aan een beschrijving en analyse van Isocrates' 
retorische theorie en praktijk op het terrein van de compositie is het niet 
mogelijk zijn positie in de geschiedenis van de retorica precies te 
bepalen. De antieke traditie spreekt wel van een hocratea ratio in de 
retorica, maar de inhoud daarvan is nog niet vastgesteld. 
Isocrates heeft geen handboek geschreven, dat zou kunnen dienen 
als bron voor zijn gedachten over compositie. Zijn gepubliceerde 
werken dienden echter als voorbeelden van zijn geprefereerde manier 
van werken. Een nauwkeurige analyse van deze werken moet daarom 
antwoord geven op de vraag waaruit Isocrates' theorie en praktijk van 
retorische compositie bestond. 
Deze analyse wordt vooraf gegaan door een algemene kaderstelling: 
er wordt aandacht gegeven aan aard en karakter van Isocrates' werken 
als geschreven teksten bestemd voor onderwijs in zijn school en 
lectuur, er wordt een verklaring gegeven voor het ontbreken van een 
handboek van Isocrates, en er wordt duidelijk gemaakt hoe de 
geleidelijke overgang naar de schriftcultuur relevant is voor het begrip 
van Isocrates' werken. 
Uitgangspunt bij het onderzoek is steeds het programmatische 
geschrift Tegen de sofisten (or. 13), waarin Isocrates aan het begin van 
zijn carrière als leraar de grondslagen van de door hem geboden 
opleiding en vorming formuleert. In de paragrafen 14-18 ordent hij zijn 
retorische paideia aan de hand van drie fundamentele termen: ιδέα, 
καιρός en καινός. Deze termen vormen, in die volgorde, een sequens 
van taken voor wie een geschreven betoog maakt: zij representeren de 
principes van Isocrates' concept van retorische compositie. 
Met de termen ιδέα en είδος verwijst Isocrates naar de eigenschappen 
van de oppervlakte-structuur van een betoog. Deze "vormen" zijn het 
materiaal waarmee de auteur zijn betoog opbouwt: ze staan hem ter 
beschikking als potentiële inhoud en vorm. Het is aan de auteur om 
daaruit een juiste selectie te maken. Tesamen maken de geselecteerde 
"vormen" het geheel van het betoog uit, zowel wat betreft de vorm (de 
wijze waarop de tekst zich aan de lezer presenteert) als de inhoud (de 
elementen waaruit de tekst is opgebouwd). De "vormen" van het betoog 
hebben dus betrekking op alle niveaus van de tekstconstitutie: met ιδέα 
kan Isocrates zowel de tekst als geheel aanduiden, als één van de 
tekstdelen, maar ook een bepaalde wijze van expressie voor een 
gedachte of argument. Alle "vormen" tesamen moeten een compleet 
betoog uitmaken, dat een complex en synthetisch geheel vormt. 
De term καιρός heeft betrekking op de wijze waarop de tekst en de 
tekstdelen in relatie tot elkaar staan. De taak van de auteur is hierbij 
zich te vergewissen van de criteria voor de relatieve lengten van 
tekstdelen. Daarbij spelen een aantal aspecten een rol: de functie van 
het tekstdeel in het grotere geheel van het betoog, de lengte van het 
tekstdeel in relatie tot de daarin behandelde inhoud, en de proporties 
van het betoog als geheel. De beslissingen die de auteur moet nemen 
ontstijgen het strict technische vlak en vereisen gevoel en 
g e ï n f o r m e e r d b e o o r d e l i n g s - v e r m o g e n ( δ ό ξ α ) . Daarmee 
vertegenwoordigt deze taak een gevorderd niveau in de retorische 
opleiding. 
Aan zijn theoretische uiteenzettingen over de juiste maatvoering in 
een betoog legt Isocrates een filosofische en didactische notie ten 
grondslag. Tussen de compositie van een betoog en het maken van 
keuzes in het praktische leven bestaat in zijn visie een analogie: beide 
zijn slechts dan succesvol als een gezond oordeelsvermogen aanwezig 
is. De retorische opleiding heeft als doel dit oordeelsvermogen te 
ontwikkelen en is aldus voorwaarde voor het effectief en doelgericht 
optreden van de burger in de gemeenschap van de polis. 
Isocrates' retorische proportieleer vertoont een grote gelijkenis met 
eendere noties uit de sfeer van het artistieke handwerk en de 
(beeldende) kunsten. Daarmee lijkt hij aan te sluiten bij de traditie 
waarbij een verwantschap wordt gezien tussen de productie (ποίησις) 
van kunstwerken en van literaire werken: beide zijn het resultaat van 
vakmanschap en delen een gemeenschappelijk doel en techniek. 
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De term καινός wordt door Isocrates gebruikt om zijn vereisten met 
betrekking tot de mate van originaliteit en ongebruikelijkheid van een 
betoog te ordenen. Op dit punt wijkt hij af van de traditie van de sofisten, 
die met de behandeling van onverwachte thema's de aandacht wilden 
vestigen op hun virtuoze taalbeheersing. Ook Isocrates eist "nieuwheid" 
in een betoog, op het niveau van expressie en bij de selectie van stof. Hij 
voegt daar echter een inhoudelijke eis aan toe: het betoog moet voor de 
burger relevant zijn en ondergeschikt aan het overkoepelende doel van 
Isocrates' werken: hun verantwoorde vormende waarde en functie. 
De Helena is een betoog van programmatisch karakter: het biedt een 
lofrede op Helena en reflecteert het vormingsprogramma van Isocrates' 
school, zowel qua ethische doctrine als qua retorische techniek. Het 
betoog vertoont eigenschappen die geduid kunnen worden als 
praktische realisaties van Isocrates' retorische theorie: 
- op het vlak van ιδέα voldoet het betoog aan de vereisten van selectie (de 
Theseus-sectie, vooral in de vergelijking Theseus/Herakles; absentie 
van het fantoom-motief uit de Helena-mythe), van de relatie 
geheel/deel (alle delen van het betoog zijn thematisch georiënteerd), 
van pluraliteit (het betoog telt een aantal verschillende secties), van 
verbinding (cohesie tussen de secties), en van samenhang (het betoog 
is een synthetisch geheel); 
- gezien vanuit het καιρός-concept vertoont het betoog een doelgerichte 
organisatie van de delen: ieder afzonderlijk draagt bij aan het 
realiseren van de centrale stelling van het betoog. In hun ordening 
vormen de delen een gradatie die culmineert in het beeld van de godin 
Helena, die de macht der schoonheid symboliseert. De omvang van de 
delen is bepaald door de vereisten van effectieve argumentatie: zij 
bevatten alles wat bijdraagt tot een complete en overtuigende 
argumentatie. In zijn effectiviteit reflecteert het betoog het gevorderde 
intellectuele niveau (δόξα) van de auteur; 
- de vereiste van καινός wordt zichtbaar in de innovatieve interpretatie 
die gegeven wordt aan de Helena-mythe. Deze interpretatie vormt niet 
alleen een nieuwe versie als zodanig, maar wil ook binnen het genre 
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